Managerial Incentives and Durable Goods Monopoly

In many cases durable goods monopolists who sell out output do not appear to act in the competitive fashion suggested by Coase (1972). This indicates the firm‘s owners mitigate their commitment problem with buyers in some manner. This paper shows that managerial incentives provide a natural mechanism for the owner to mitigate its commitment problem without explicitly contracting with buyers. Owners will optimally shift their managers from the singular goal of profit maximization by penalizing them for sales. Additionally, the paper demonstrates that the degree to which managerial incentives and compensation diverge from pure profit maximization is in large part a function of the durability or quality of the product.     

Viability of Traditional Banking Activities: Evidence from Shifts in Conduct and Excess Capacity

This paper applies modem statistical techniques to estimate levels and shifts of market conduct and aggregate excess capacity in the provision of traditional US banking products such as loans and demand deposits. A variety of models indicate that loans are competitively supplied, with no obvious excess capacity as defined. Some models indicate an anticompetitive shift in demand deposits after 1984, but other evidence suggests that this result may be an artifact attributable to the growth of NOW accounts, MMDAs, and the like. All results suggest that the current levels of these services can be profitably sustained under current market conditions.     

The Dynamics of Oligopoly Behavior: A Study of the US Cigarette Industry, 1955–90

This paper uses the comparative statics method of testing for a monopoly equilibrium to track the competitiveness of the US cigarette industry between 1955 and 1990. The degree of competition ranged from somewhat less than a Coumot–Nash equilibrium would imply to somewhat more. Although the industry's behavior was highly autocorrelated, there were periodic reversions to behavior that was much more competitive than the trend     

Small Firms and the Strategy of the First Mover

Timing of entry and the decision to be a leader or follower in products or markets is a complex decision and empirical evidence suggests that first movers do not always 'capture' all the potential benefits from being first. Small firms in particular are faced with problems when deciding on whether to be a first or later mover. Their strategies were examined using a sample of 264 firms in chosen industry sectors and specific external and internal factors were found to explain much of the variation in timing of entry strategies by these firms. In particular a composite measure of the technological turbulence that firms faced in their supply chain was seen as a crucial determinant of early entry whilst uncertainty as to general business conditions explained much of the late and non pioneering strategies. Even within this group of small firms, size also played an important role with the smallest companies tending to be the most pioneering     

Competitive Tendering and Contracting in the Public Sector: A Survey

This paper is a survey of the role and impact of competitive tendering and contracting (CTC) policies in the public sector. The paper examines the theoretical rationale for introducing competition in the provision of public services and the methodology by which contracting decisions are reached. It investigates the extent of implementation and nature of outcomes in several countries. A broad sweep of the empirical findings suggests that CTC generates substantial cost savings. Lack of adequate data makes an assessment of the effect on quality more troublesome, and further research is needed     

Heterogeneity and Share Contracting in Medical Group Practices

This paper offers an empirical analysis of the relationship between income sharing rules and physician heterogeneity in medical group practices.The economies to group formation associated with risk–sharing, mutual monitoring,and internal referral are served by sharing at least a portion of group income equally. Sharing group income equally is problematic, however, when group members differ in their contribution to group income. Member contributions to group income may differ because of differences in ability, effort, or the price of services across specialty fields. The analysis below is addressed to the question of how income sharing rules in physician groups are affected by variation in member contributions. The analysis finds evidence that heterogeneity in member contributions to group income limits the use of equal income sharing rules in multispecialty groups relative to single specialty groups, and large groups relative to small groups. Nevertheless, 65% of all groups in the survey share at least a pn of group income equally, which broadly suggests that the joint surplus enhancement from risk sharing, mutual monitoring, and internal referral are sufficient to overcome the incentive problems of such rules     

Business Conditions and Business Starts

This paper analyses the effect of business conditions on new firm starts. The birth of new firms displays a pro-cyclical behaviour, more firms being created when GDP is growing fast and the interest rate is low. The entry response to industry profitability is tempered by the level of sunk costs; for a given profit signal, more entry occurs where sunk costs are low.     

The Use of the Logit Model in Applied Industrial Organization

Qualitative choice models, such as the logit model, can capture important firm and product asymmetries. This paper surveys use of the logit model in industrial organization, with special focus on its application to merger analysis. The basic model and its motivation are reviewed, as is its estimation. Discussed in some detail is the use of the logit model to predict the price and welfare effects of horizontal mergers in differentiated products industries. Simulation using a qualitative choice model is argued to be far superior to traditional structural analysis. Logit merger simulations have the particular virtues of low informational and computational burdens and the use of the logit model can be motivated as reflecting a diffuse prior on the structure of demand.     

R&D Costs,Innovative Output and Firm Size in the Pharmaceutical Industry

This study examines the relationships between firm size, R&D costs and output in the pharmaceutical industry. Project–level data from a survey of 12 US–owned pharmaceutical firms on drug development costs, development phase lengths and failure rates are used to determine estimates of the R&D cost of new drug development by firm size. Firms in the sample are grouped into three size categories, according to their pharmaceutical sales at the beginning of the study period. The R&D cost per new drug approved in the US is shown to decrease with firm size, while sales per new drug approved are shown to increase markedly with firm size. Sales distributions are highly skewed and suggest that firms need to search for blockbuster drugs with above–average returns. The results are consistent with substantial economies of scale in pharmaceutical R&D, particularly at the discovery and preclinical development phases.     

The Economics of Business Process Design: Motivation,Information and Coordination Within the Firm

This paper presents a transaction cost analysis of the internal business processes of firms. Business processes are collections of activities which are technologically or managerially linked so that they jointly affect value added. Their organisation is characterised by their ‘architecture’—the allocation of responsibilities amongst individuals and groups and communication between them for information and coordination—and their incentive structure. The overall costs of organisation are determined by losses due to imperfect motivation of process members, which flows from the incentive structure, and imperfect information and coordination, which flow from the architecture, together with the resource costs associated with incentives and architecture. Perfect motivation corresponds to ‘team behaviour’ and a quantitative model, based on team theory, indicates how the best architecture depends on the degree interaction between activities comprising the business process.     

The Costs of Arbitrage and Futures Market Trading Activity

Abstract Standardizing a futures contract’s specifications to enhance its transfer-ability is problematic for any commodity whose cash market adopts relational contracting procedures. Standardization implies the contract’s value cannot be completely determined by competitive arbitrage order flow, inhibiting the market’s price discovery function, and leaving the futures price susceptible to manipulation. These effects may result in the market’s failure. The model, based on the theory of storage, predicts that contracts with a higher spread-open position price volatility are more likely to contain a range of arbitrage indeterminacy, hence to experience difficulties in sustaining trading. The prediction is supported in an empirical examination of 104 US futures markets. The range of indeterminacy also increases the informational requirements of spread traders, reducing the effectiveness of spread arbitrage in maintaining the equilibrium intertemporal futures pricing relationship. Detailed evidence from 15 US contract markets demonstrates spread arbitrage is less effective in contract markets which subsequently fail.     

Double Deflation and the Measurement of Output and Productivity in UK Manufacturing 1979–89

The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of applying double deflation methods to the measurement of productivity growth in UK manufacturing between 1979 and 1989. A number of alternative indicators of output growth are considered and it is argued that double deflated value added is the superior concept to employ for the measurement of productivity. It is shown that output measured by double deflated value added fell by 0.05% over the period between 1979 and 1989 whereas the official series indicates that output rose by 12.2% over the period. Measuring productivity as output per person employed, the double deflated value added measure indicates that between 1979 and 1989productivity increased by 34%> whereas the official series indicates an increase of 51 %. Whereas the latter may indicate a productivity miracle the former does not     

The Shifting Sands of Merger Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission

This paper presents a statistical model for Federal Trade Commission merger enforcement. After reviewing the literature, economic and political variables are posited to explain bureaucratic merger decisions. Various probit models are estimated with the results suggesting that the Commission enhanced the consideration given to merger–specific efficiencies in response to exogenous pressure to increase merger enforcement. Overall, the tightening of merger policy appears to have been focused on the transactions lacking documented cost savings     

A Survivor Test of the American Agency System of Distributing Property Liability Insurance

In earlier work byjoskow and by Cummins and VanDerhei, the American Agency system of distribution has been deemed inefficient, i.e. excessively costly. We test this in a natural way by examining whether the system survives in competition with more efficient systems. We find that it survives, but is in steady decline.     

Co–evolution of Industry Structure,Technology and Supporting Institutions,and the Making of Comparative Advantage

In recent years,a considerable body of research has been established on the co–evolution of technology and industry structure, from the time that the technology is young to the time when it is mature· A somewhat smaller body of research has been established on how private and public institutions, and public programs and policies co-evolved with a technology and industry· It is proposed here that nations differ in their pace and pattern of institutional response to the birth and development of an industry, and that the locus of comparative advantage is largely determined by these different kinds of national response.     

Agency and Control Problems in US Corporations: The Case of Energy-efficient Investment Projects

Private sector corporations in the United States fall short of their potential to increase shareholders'1 wealth in a number of ways. One example is the failure to undertake profitable energy conservation investments. Explanations of this phenomenon include agency and moral hazard problems, imperfect information and incentives, myopia, and X-inefficiency. Data from a survey conducted by the US Environmental Protection Agency and from interviews with corporate executives are used to explore these hypotheses. Good overall corporate performance is found to be associated with longer internal payback requirements for energy investments. Suggestions for improving corporate decision-making in this area are proposed.     

Selective Distribution,Refusal to Sell and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission

Refusal to sell to ‘unauthorised’ dealers is an integral part of a selective distribution system. Under such a system manufacturers authorise only those dealers meeting their specific requirements. Where the market involved is ‘reasonably competitive’ it is widely recognised that manufacturers, dealers and consumers can gain. The British Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) has been criticised for its interpretation of what constitutes a ‘reasonably competitive’ market. In a recent report into the supply of fine fragrances the issue was again central to its findings that the selective distribution system was not against the public interest. The European Commission has also recently granted exemption from Article 85 for the distribution system operated by the leading firms. We argue that the MMCs analysis of competition was again flawed in this case and that the danger to the consumer and new entrants is compounded by the Europe–wide exemption.     

The Dynamics of Firm Growth and Survival Under Alternative Forms of Control

The publication of the passive learning model of Jovanovic [Jovanic, B., "Selection and the Evolution of Industry," Econometrica, 1982, 60, 649–670.] initiated a resurgence of interest in firm growth and survival processes. Yet all the recent work has focused on the profit maximizing firm, without considering how robust the results are to alternative forms of control. This paper applies the model to the case of the labour managed firm, a type of firm studied extensively for its divergent behaviour from profit maximising firms. The findings indicate that Jovanovic's key predictions are rendered indeterminate under labour management, although there is evidence to show that the actual empirical relationships continue to hold. In considering possible explanations for the breakdown of the results, we conclude that the Jovanovic model overemphasizes institutional structure to the neglect of more fundamental determinants of growth and survival.midt, Paul Geroski and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and discussions. Any remaining errors are my own.     

The Determinants of New Firm Formation in UK Construction: Evidence from Quarterly VAT Registrations

This paper examines the ways in which industry-specific and macro-economic factors combine to lead to variations over time in the rate of new firm formation in the UK construction industry. The paper corroborates findings from elsewhere which suggest that housing wealth may be an important source of collateral for individuals seeking to raise the finance necessary to start up in business. The analysis of industry-specific influences supports the hypothesis that formation activity in construction is responsive to variations in the relative returns to entrepreneurship     

Choice of Distribution System in the New Zealand Life Insurance Industry

Using 1988–93 panel data drawn from the New Zealand life insurance industry, this paper examines empirically the notion that the choice of distribution system is an efficient contracting solution to incentive conflicts between owners, managers and sales agents in life insurance firms. Consistent with what was hypothesised, the empirical results suggest that choice of distribution system is distinguished by organisational form, firm size, and sales commission. However, contrary to expectations, the variables representing product diversity and asset specificity were found not to be statistically significant. The empirical results thus lend mixed support for prior predictions.