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1.
Siebel T 《Harvard business review》2001,79(3):118-25, 165
There is a growing awareness among corporations that the quality of the customer experience they provide directly affects their bottom line. Many are turning to high-flying software maker Siebel Systems for help in managing those relationships. The young company holds a leadership position in an explosive market-enterprise application software. But customer satisfaction, not dot-com chic, is foremost on the mind of Siebel Systems' founder, chairman, and CEO, Tom Siebel. The buttoned-down Siebel rejects the freewheeling management style and culture that characterize many Silicon Valley companies. As the former CEO of Gain Technology and a former executive at Oracle, Siebel believes in putting customers ahead of technology, discipline ahead of inspiration. In this interview, conducted at the company's San Mateo, California, headquarters, Siebel describes how this obsessive focus on customer satisfaction has been the driving force behind the company's success. He talks about how the organization remains true to its core values: a deep commitment to providing customer satisfaction; responsible fiscal practices that have created a cash-positive business amid today's cash-negative dot-coms; and general professionalism. "The notion of dressing in jeans and a T-shirt to greet the CEO of a major financial institution who just got off the plane from Munich is not acceptable," he says. Siebel Systems rejects the concept of going to war with rivals; instead, the CEO says, the company has forged an ecosystem of partnerships that allows it to support and integrate its own systems with other companies' software products and ultimately ease the customer's software installations. Indeed, Siebel says, the CEO's most important job is to understand what customers need and deliver that.  相似文献   

2.
Although most companies have collected lots of friends and followers on social platforms such as Facebook, few have succeeded in generating profits there. That's because they merely port their digital strategies into social environments by broadcasting their commercial messages or seeking customer feedback. To succeed on social platforms, says Harvard Business School's Piskorski, businesses need to devise social strategies that are consistent with users' expectations and behavior in these venues--namely, people want to connect with other people, not with companies. The author defines successful social strategies as those that reduce costs or increase customers' willingness to pay by helping people establish or strengthen relationships through doing free work on a company's behalf. Citing successes at Zynga, eBay, American Express, and Yelp, Piskorski shows that social strategies can generate profits by helping people connect in exchange for tasks that benefit the company such as customer acquisition, marketing, and content creation. He lays out a systematic way to build a social strategy and shows how a major credit card company he advised used the method to roll out its own strategy.  相似文献   

3.
Leading a supply chain turnaround   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Slone RE 《Harvard business review》2004,82(10):114-21, 158
Just five years ago, salespeople at Whirlpool were in the habit of referring to their supply chain organization as the "sales disablers." Now the company excels at getting products to the right place at the right time--while managing to keep inventories low. How did that happen? In this first-person account, Reuben Slone, Whirlpool's vice president of Global Supply Chain, describes how he and his colleagues devised the right supply chain strategy, sold it internally, and implemented it. Slone insisted that the right focal point for the strategy was the satisfaction of consumers at the end of the supply chain. Most supply chain initiatives do the opposite: They start with the realities of a company's manufacturing base and proceed from there. Through a series of interviews with trade customers large and small, his team identified 27 different capabilities that drove industry perceptions of Whirlpool's performance. Knowing it was infeasible to aim for world-class performance across all of them, Slone weighed the costs of excelling at each and found the combination of initiatives that would provide overall competitive advantage. A highly disciplined project management office and broad training in project management were key to keeping work on budget and on benefit. Slone set an intense pace--three "releases" of new capabilities every month--that the group maintains to this day. Lest this seem like a technology story, however, Slone insists it is just as much a "talent renaissance." People are proud today to be part of Whirlpool's supply chain organization, and its new generation of talent will give the company a competitive advantage for years to come.  相似文献   

4.
Day GS 《Harvard business review》2007,85(12):110-20, 146
Minor innovations make up most of a company's development portfolio, on average, but they never generate the growth companies seek. The solution, says Day--the Geoffrey T. Boisi Professor of Marketing and a codirector of the Mack Center for Technological Innovation at Wharton--is for companies to undertake a systematic, disciplined review of their innovation portfolios and increase the number of major innovations at an acceptable level of risk. Two tools can help them do this. The first, called the risk matrix, graphically reveals the distribution of risk across a company's entire innovation portfolio. The matrix allows companies to estimate each project's probability of success or failure, based on how big a stretch it is for the firm to undertake. The less familiar the product or technology and the intended market, the higher the risk. The second tool, dubbed the R-W-W (real-win-worth it) screen, allows companies to evaluate the risks and potential of individual projects by answering six fundamental questions about each one: Is the market real? Explores customers' needs, their willingness to buy, and the size of the potential market. Is the product real? Looks at the feasibility of producing the innovation. Can the product be competitive? and Can our company be competitive? Investigate how well suited the company's resources and management are to compete in the marketplace with the product. Will the product be profitable at an acceptable risk? Explores the financial analysis needed to assess an innovation's commercial viability. Last, Does launching the product make strategic sense? examines the project's fit with company strategy and whether management supports it.  相似文献   

5.
Competing on capabilities: the new rules of corporate strategy   总被引:48,自引:0,他引:48  
In the 1980s, companies discovered time as a new source of competitive advantage. In the 1990s, they will discover that time is only one piece of a more far-reaching transformation in the logic of competition. Using examples from Wal-Mart and other highly successful companies, Stalk, Evans, and Shulman of the Boston Consulting Group provide managers with a guide to the new world of "capabilities-based competition." In today's dynamic business environment, strategy too must become dynamic. Competition is a "war of movement" in which success depends on anticipation of market trends and quick response to changing customer needs. In such an environment, the essence of strategy is not the structure of a company's products and markets but the dynamics of its behavior. To succeed, a company must weave its key business processes into hard-to-imitate strategic capabilities that distinguish it from its competitors in the eyes of customers. A capability is a set of business processes strategically understood--for example, Wal-Mart's expertise in inventory replenishment, Honda's skill at dealer management, or Banc One's ability to "out-local the national banks and out-national the local banks." Such capabilities are collective and cross-functional--a small part of many people's jobs, not a large part of a few. Finally, competing on capabilities requires strategic investments in support systems that span traditional SBUs and functions and go far beyond what traditional cost-benefit metrics can justify. A CEO's success in building and managing a company's capabilities will be the chief test of management skill in the 1990s. The prize: companies that combine scale and flexibility to outperform the competition.  相似文献   

6.
How to invest in social capital.   总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6  
Business runs better when people within a company have close ties and trust one another. But the relationships that make organizations work effectively are under assault for several reasons. Building such "social capital" is difficult in volatile times. Disruptive technologies spawn new markets daily, and organizations respond with constantly changing structures. The problem is worsened by the virtuality of many of today's workplaces, with employees working off-site or on their own. What's more, few managers know how to invest in such social capital. The authors describe how managers can help their organizations thrive by making effective investments in social capital. For instance, companies that value social capital demonstrate a commitment to retention as a way of limiting workplace volatility. The authors cite SAS's extensive efforts to signal to employees that it sees them as human beings, not just workers. Managers can build trust by showing trust themselves, as well as by rewarding trust and sending clear signals to employees. They can foster cooperation by giving employees a common sense of purpose through good strategic communication and inspirational leadership. Johnson & Johnson's well-known credo, which says the company's first responsibility is to the people who use its products, has helped the company in time of adversity, as in 1982 when cyanide in Tylenol capsules killed seven people. Other methods of fostering cooperation include rewarding the behavior with cash and establishing rules that get people into the habit of cooperating. Social capital, once a given in organizations, is now rare and endangered. By investing in it, companies will be better positioned to seize the opportunities in today's volatile, virtual business environment.  相似文献   

7.
Ghemawat P 《Harvard business review》2005,83(12):98-108, 153
The leaders of such global powerhouses as GE, Wal-Mart, and Toyota seem to have grasped two crucial truths: First, far from becoming submerged by the rising tide of globalization, geographic and other regional distinctions may in fact be increasing in importance. Second, regionally focused strategies, used in conjunction with local and global initiatives, can significantly boost a company's performance. The business and economic data reveal a highly regionalized world. For example, trade within regions, rather than across them, drove the surge of international commerce in the second half of the twentieth century. Regionalization is also apparent in foreign direct investment, companies' international sales, and competition among the world's largest multinationals. Harvard Business School Professor Pankaj Ghemawat says that the most successful companies employ five types of regional strategies in addition to--or even instead of--global ones: home base, portfolio, hub, platform, and mandate. Some companies adopt the strategies in sequence, but the most nimble switch from one to another and combine approaches as their markets and businesses evolve. At Toyota, for example, exports from the home base continue to be substantial even as the company builds up an international manufacturing presence. And as Toyota achieves economies of scale and scope with a strong network of hubs, the company also pursues economies of specialization through interregional mandates. Embracing regional strategies requires flexibility and creativity. A company must decide what constitutes a region, choose the most appropriate strategies, and mesh those strategies with the organization's existing structures. In a world that is neither truly global nor truly local, finding ways of coordinating within and across regions can deliver a powerful competitive advantage.  相似文献   

8.
C L Bernick 《Harvard business review》2001,79(6):53-8, 60-1, 146
In 1994, the consumer products company Alberto-Culver North America faced flattened sales and the most difficult competitive environment of its history. President Carol Bernick knew that overcoming theses challenges would require a certain kind of corporate culture-but it wasn't the culture the company had. She changed that by focusing on four areas. First, Bernick made culture visible and elevated it to priority status, often by highlighting desired values and behaviors that already existed in pockets of the company. Her annual "state of the company" address stresses that people must be attuned to business realities and the drivers of success. Employees now develop statements of individual economic value describing their contributions to the company's profitability. The company's ten cultural imperatives are required knowledge for all. Second, Bernick and her executive team created the role of growth development leader (GDL). Each mentors about a dozen people. Her frequent meetings with GDLs make them effective agents of change upward and downward. The role is coveted because GDLs have real power to make change: every year they vote on the issues, large and small, that must be addressed by the business as a whole. Third, the company uses an employee survey to identify areas for improvement and to provide 360-degree feedback to GDLs and top management. And fourth, successes are celebrated constantly--through stock awards for the best GDLs, Business Builders Awards for great innovators, and many other, less formal means. Since 1994, the company has cut employee turnover in half, seen sales grow 83%, and watched pretax profits rise 336%--indicators of how cultural change is driving business results.  相似文献   

9.
The headlines are filled with the sorry tales of companies like Vivendi and AOL Time Warner that tried to use mergers and acquisitions to grow big fast or transform fundamentally weak business models. But, drawing on extensive data and experience, the authors conclude that major deals make sense in only two circumstances: when they reinforce a company's existing basis of competition or when they help a company make the shift, as the industry's competitive base changes. In most stable industries, the authors contend, only one basis--superior cost position, brand power, consumer loyalty, real-asset advantage, or government protection--leads to industry leadership, and companies should do only those deals that bolster a strategy to capitalize on that competitive base. That's what Kellogg did when it acquired Keebler. Rather than bow to price pressures from lesser players, Kellogg sought to strengthen its existing basis of competition--its brand--through Keebler's innovative distribution system. A company coping with a changing industry should embark on a series of acquisitions (most likely coupled with divestitures) aimed at moving the firm to the new competitive basis. That's what Comcast did when changes in government regulations fundamentally altered the broadcast industry. In such cases, speed is essential, the investments required are huge, and half-measures can be worse than nothing at all. Still, the research shows, successful acquirers are not those that try to swallow a single, large, supposedly transformative deal but those that go to the M&A table often and take small bites. Deals can fuel growth--as long as they're anchored in the fundamental way money is made in your industry. Fail to understand that and no amount of integration planning will keep you and your shareholders from bearing the high cost of your mistakes.  相似文献   

10.
The shakedown     
Bodrock P 《Harvard business review》2005,83(3):31-5, 147; discussion 36, 38, 40-1
Customer Strategy Solutions, a California-based developer of order-fulfillment systems, is facing a shakedown. Six months after the firm's CEO, Pavlo Zhuk, set up a software development center in Kiev, local bureaucrats say the company hasn't filed all the tax schedules it should have. Moreover, Ukrainian tax officials claim that the company owes the government tax arrears. Zhuk is shocked; he and his colleagues have done everything by the book. This isn't the first time Zhuk has encountered trouble in Ukraine. In the process of getting the development center up and running, a state-owned telecommunications utility had made it difficult for Zhuk to get the phone lines his company needed. Senior telecom manager Vasyl Feodorovych Mylofienko had told Zhuk it would take three years to install the lines in his office-but for a certain price, Mylofienko had added, the lines could be functioning the following week. Even as the picture of rampant bribery and corruption in Ukraine becomes clear, Zhuk still doesn't want to pull out of the country. Of Ukrainian descent, he has dreams of helping to modernize the country. By paying his programmers more than they could make at any local company, he hopes to raise their standard of living so they can afford three meals a day without having to barter, stand in queues for hours, or moonlight. And yet, he isn't sure he can keep compromising his principles for the sake of the greater good. Should Customer Strategy Solutions pay off the Ukrainian tax officials? Commenting on this fictional case study are Alan L. Boeckmann, the chairman and CEO of Fluor Corporation; Rafael Di Tella, a professor at Harvard Business School; Thomas W. Dunfee, the Kolodny Professor of Social Responsibility and a professor of legal studies at Wharton; and Bozidar Djelic, the former finance and economy minister of Serbia.  相似文献   

11.
They're nominally and ultimately responsible for strategy, but today's CEOs have less and less time to devote to it. As a result, CEOs are appointing "chief strategy officers"--executives specifically tasked with creating, communicating, executing, and sustaining a company's strategic initiatives. In this article, three authors from Accenture share the results of their research on this emerging organizational role. The typical CSO or top strategy executive is not a pure strategist, conducting long-range planning in relative isolation. Most CSOs consider themselves doers first, with the mandate, credentials, and desire to act as well as advise. They are seasoned executives with a strong strategy orientation who have usually worn many operations hats before taking on the role. Strategy executives are charged with three critical jobs that together form the very definition of strategy execution. First, they must clarify the company's strategy for themselves and for every business unit and function, ensuring that all employees understand the details of the strategic plan and how their work connects to corporate goals. Second, CSOs must drive immediate change. The focus of the job almost always quickly evolves from creating shared alignment around a vision to riding herd on the ensuing change effort. Finally, a CSO must drive decision making that sustains organizational change. He or she must be that person who, in the CEO's stead, can walk into any office and test whether the decisions being made are aligned with the strategy and are creating the desired results. When decisions below the executive suite aren't being made in accordance with strategy, much of the CSO's job involves learning why and quickly determining whether to stay the course or change tack.  相似文献   

12.
Freeman KW 《Harvard business review》2004,82(11):51-4, 56-8, 147
The literature on CEO succession planning is nearly unanimous in its advice: Begin early, look first inside your company for exceptional talent, see that candidates gain experience in all aspects of the business, and help them develop the skills they will need in the top job. It all makes sense and sounds pretty straightforward. Nevertheless, the list of CEOs who last no more than a few years on the job continues to grow. Implicit in many, if not all, of these unceremonious departures is the absence of an effective CEO succession plan. The problem is, most boards simply don't want to talk about CEO succession: Why rock the boat when things are going well? Why risk offending the current CEO? Meanwhile, most CEOs can't imagine that anyone could adequately replace them. In this article, Kenneth W. Freeman, the retired CEO of Quest Diagnostics, discusses his own recent handoff experience (Surya N. Mohapatra became chief executive in May 2004) and offers his approach to succession planning. He says it falls squarely on the incumbent CEO to put ego aside and initiate and actively manage the process of selecting and grooming a successor. Aggressive succession planning is one of the best ways for CEOs to ensure the long-term health of the company, he says. Plus, thinking early and often about a successor will likely improve the chief executive's performance during his tenure. Freeman advocates the textbook rules for succession planning but adds to that list a few more that apply specifically to the incumbent CEO: Insist that the board become engaged in succession planning, look for a successor who is different from you, and make the successor's success your own. After all, Freeman argues, the CEO's true legacy is determined by what happens after he leaves the corner office.  相似文献   

13.
As chairman and CEO of the Xerox Corporation, Paul Allaire leads a company that is a microcosm of the changes transforming American business. With the introduction of the first plain-paper copier in 1959, Xerox invented a new industry and launched itself on a decade of spectacular growth. But easy growth led Xerox to neglect the fundamentals of its core business, leaving the company vulnerable to low-cost Japanese competition. Starting in the mid-1980s, Xerox embarked on a long-term effort to regain its dominant position in world copier markets and to create a new platform for future growth. Thanks to the company's Leadership through Quality program, Xerox became the first major U.S. company to win back market share from the Japanese. Allaire describes his efforts to take Xerox's corporate transformation to a new level. Since becoming CEO in 1990, he has repositioned Xerox as "the document company" at the intersection of the worlds of paper-based and electronic information. And he has guided the company through a fundamental redesign of what he calls the "organizational architecture" of Xerox's document processing business. Few CEOs have approached the process of organizational redesign as systematically and methodically as Allaire has. He has created a new corporate structure that balances independent business divisions with integrated R&D and customer operations organizations. He has redefined managerial roles and responsibilities, changed the way managers are selected and compensated, and renewed the company's senior management ranks. And he has articulated the new values and behaviors Xerox managers will need to thrive in a more competitive and fast-changing business environment.  相似文献   

14.
The five competitive forces that shape strategy   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
In 1979, a young associate professor at Harvard Business School published his first article for HBR, "How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy." In the years that followed, Michael Porter's explication of the five forces that determine the long-run profitability of any industry has shaped a generation of academic research and business practice. In this article, Porter undertakes a thorough reaffirmation and extension of his classic work of strategy formulation, which includes substantial new sections showing how to put the five forces analysis into practice. The five forces govern the profit structure of an industry by determining how the economic value it creates is apportioned. That value may be drained away through the rivalry among existing competitors, of course, but it can also be bargained away through the power of suppliers or the power of customers or be constrained by the threat of new entrants or the threat of substitutes. Strategy can be viewed as building defenses against the competitive forces or as finding a position in an industry where the forces are weaker. Changes in the strength of the forces signal changes in the competitive landscape critical to ongoing strategy formulation. In exploring the implications of the five forces framework, Porter explains why a fast-growing industry is not always a profitable one, how eliminating today's competitors through mergers and acquisitions can reduce an industry's profit potential, how government policies play a role by changing the relative strength of the forces, and how to use the forces to understand complements. He then shows how a company can influence the key forces in its industry to create a more favorable structure for itself or to expand the pie altogether. The five forces reveal why industry profitability is what it is. Only by understanding them can a company incorporate industry conditions into strategy.  相似文献   

15.
论企业核心能力信息的自愿披露   总被引:29,自引:0,他引:29  
核心能力信息是区别于其他企业,反映企业持续竞争优势源泉的信息,是企业信息披露战略的重要内容。由于核心能力信息已经超越了传统财务信息的范畴,具有“非规范性”的总体特征,通过自愿性披露揭示企业核心能力信息成为允当选择。本文在分析核心能力信息自愿披露动因的基础上,从资产角度探讨了核心能力的确认方法,并对核心能力自愿披露的实现方式进行了研究,认为核心能力信息的自愿披露应该遵循循序渐进的原则,以非财务报告披露为起点,逐步过渡到管理层讨论与分析(MD&A)披露,最终实现核心能力报告的披露目标。  相似文献   

16.
Selling the brand inside   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Mitchell C 《Harvard business review》2002,80(1):99-101, 103-5, 126
When you think of marketing, chances are your mind goes right to your customers--how can you persuade more people to buy whatever it is you sell? But there's another "market" that's equally important: your employees. Author Colin Mitchell argues that executives by and large ignore this critical internal audience when developing and executing branding campaigns. As a result, employees end up undermining the expectations set by the company's advertising--either because they don't understand what the ads have promised or because they don't believe in the brand and feel disengaged or, worse, hostile toward the company. Mitchell offers three principles for executing internal branding campaigns--techniques executives can use to make sure employees understand, embrace, and "live" the brand vision companies are selling to the public. First, he says, companies need to market to employees at times when the company is experiencing a fundamental challenge or change, times when employees are seeking direction and are relatively receptive to new initiatives. Second, companies must link their internal and external marketing campaigns; employees should hear the same messages that are being sent to the market-place. And third, internal branding campaigns should bring the brand alive for employees, creating an emotional connection to the company that transcends any one experience. Internal campaigns should introduce and explain the brand messages in new and attention-grabbing ways and then reinforce those messages by weaving them into the fabric of the company. It is a fact of business, writes Mitchell, that if employees do not care about or understand their company's brands, they will ultimately weaken their organizations. It's up to top executives, he says, to give them a reason to care.  相似文献   

17.
Logically, the practice of corporate finance and corporate strategy should be closely coordinated, but in reality there remains a massive gap between the two. This can lead strategically oriented firms to de‐emphasize or even discard NPV. Neither financial theory nor competitive strategy has been very open to the economic value of investment opportunity capture. Strategy must recognize that financial flexibility provides powerful advantages and financial theory must evaluate entire strategic programs rather than discrete, stand‐alone projects. Necessarily, the financial discussion of cost of capital and capital structure has to change. The authors offer two specific concepts to bridge the Gap between Finance and Strategy: 1) Reserve Financial Capacity is the annual sum of Free Cash Flow, Financing Flexibility and Cash Reserves over the period envisioned for strategy execution. Individual projects must belong to strategic programs in the sense that they either: 1) keep the base business running; 2) preserve an existing competitive position; or 3) form part of a program to enhance advantage or fashion a strategic breakout. 2) Strategically Sustainable Cost of Capital is the true, blended cost of capital required to complete an entire capital program. These concepts provide financial rigor to firms with well‐defined strategies and allow managements to wield Financial Flexibility as a strategic weapon, creating options on unique buying opportunities, such as at the bottom of industry cycles.  相似文献   

18.
Measuring the strategic readiness of intangible assets   总被引:20,自引:0,他引:20  
Measuring the value of intangible assets such as company culture, knowledge management systems, and employees' skills is the holy grail of accounting. Executives know that these intangibles, being hard to imitate, are powerful sources of sustainable competitive advantage. If managers could measure them, they could manage the company's competitive position more easily and accurately. In one sense, the challenge is impossible. Intangible assets are unlike financial and physical resources in that their value depends on how well they serve the organizations that own them. But while this prevents an independent valuation of intangible assets, it also points to an altogether different approach for assessing their worth. In this article, the creators of the Balanced Scorecard draw on its tools and framework--in particular, a tool called the strategy map--to present a step-by-step way to determine "strategic readiness," which refers to the alignment of an organization's human, information, and organization capital with its strategy. In the method the authors describe, the firm identifies the processes most critical to creating and delivering its value proposition and determines the human, information, and organization capital the processes require. Some managers shy away from measuring intangible assets because they seem so subjective. But by using the systematic approaches set out in this article, companies can now measure what they want, rather than wanting only what they can currently measure.  相似文献   

19.
The success of an executive team depends heavily on the relationships the boss has with his or her direct reports. Yet the leadership literature has had little to say about what is expected in those relationships-on either side. Larry Bossidy, formerly the chairman and CEO of Honeywell, and before that of AlliedSignal, shares what he calls "the CEO compact," detailing the behaviors a leader should look for in subordinates and what they should be able to expect in return. A CEO's best people, he says, know when a situation calls for them to get involved. They generate ideas-remembering that some of the best ones may sound crazy at first. They are willing to collaborate, putting the long-term good of the company above short-term goals of their divisions. They step up to lead initiatives, even if the outcome is uncertain. They develop leaders among their people, especially through direct involvement in performance appraisals. They stay current on world events and anticipate how those events may affect the company and its competition. They drive their own growth by exposing themselves to new people and ideas and by accepting demanding assignments. And they sustain these behaviors in bad times as well as good. On the other side of the compact, the boss should provide clarity of direction; set goals and objectives; give frequent, specific, and immediate feedback; be decisive and timely; demonstrate honesty and candor; and offer an equitable compensation plan. Executives who aren't lucky enough to have such a boss can create a compact with their own subordinates, Bossidy says, and demonstrate by example. The result will be to improve team and company performance and accelerate individual growth.  相似文献   

20.
Why business models matter   总被引:45,自引:0,他引:45  
"Business model" was one of the great buzz-words of the Internet boom. A company didn't need a strategy, a special competence, or even any customers--all it needed was a Web-based business model that promised wild profits in some distant, ill-defined future. Many people--investors, entrepreneurs, and executives alike--fell for the fantasy and got burned. And as the inevitable counterreaction played out, the concept of the business model fell out of fashion nearly as quickly as the .com appendage itself. That's a shame. As Joan Magretta explains, a good business model remains essential to every successful organization, whether it's a new venture or an established player. To help managers apply the concept successfully, she defines what a business model is and how it complements a smart competitive strategy. Business models are, at heart, stories that explain how enterprises work. Like a good story, a robust business model contains precisely delineated characters, plausible motivations, and a plot that turns on an insight about value. It answers certain questions: Who is the customer? How do we make money? What underlying economic logic explains how we can deliver value to customers at an appropriate cost? Every viable organization is built on a sound business model, but a business model isn't a strategy, even though many people use the terms interchangeably. Business models describe, as a system, how the pieces of a business fit together. But they don't factor in one critical dimension of performance: competition. That's the job of strategy. Illustrated with examples from companies like American Express, EuroDisney, WalMart, and Dell Computer, this article clarifies the concepts of business models and strategy, which are fundamental to every company's performance.  相似文献   

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