下游竞争、买方谈判能力与上游产品差异化

基于零售商谈判能力的差异,构建完全信息动态博弈模型,考察下游竞争程度、买方谈判能力对上游产品差异化策略激励的影响.结果表明,下游市场竞争与买方谈判能力对产品差异化的激励不存在替代效应;当零售商不具有买方谈判能力时,市场竞争程度通过影响上游利润激励供应商的产品差异化策略,竞争程度不影响批发价格;当主导零售商具有买方谈判能力时,谈判能力通过影响批发价格激励供应商的产品差异化策略;市场竞争削弱了消费者效用水平,而买方谈判能力改善了消费者效用水平.     

预期作用下人民币汇率对出口价格的非线性传递效应研究

对外贸易中贸易款项的支付大多数都在远期,因此对未来汇率变化幅度的预期,会影响汇率对出口价格的传递效应,从而导致汇率传递出现非线性特点。本文对此进行了理论分析,结果显示,预期未来汇率变化幅度较大时,汇率对出口价格的传递程度会下降甚至可能出现负向传递。实证部分本文使用STR模型分析了1999年1月—2016年7月在汇率预期的作用下人民币汇率对出口价格的传递效应。研究发现当人民币汇率预期变动幅度较小时,汇率传递系数为正,人民币汇率升值会导致出口价格上涨,贬值导致出口价格的下降。但是当人民币预期汇率的变化幅度达到一定的阈值后,人民币汇率升值会导致出口价格下降,而贬值会导致出口价格上涨。因此货币当局有必要关注汇率预期尤其是大幅度汇率变化预期的存在对进出口价格和需求的影响。     

风险偏好的供应链再制品生产和定价决策问题研究

本文通过建立一个由制造商、再制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链,分别研究了再制造商和制造商不同风险厌恶程度下供应链的最优决策问题。结果表明：新产品市场容量扩大时,再制造商应实施扩大生产的策略,而不是调整价格策略;制造商再制品生产成本的增长会损害再制造商的利益;制造商再制品处于市场扩张期间,再制造表现出较高的风险厌恶水平时更有利;风险厌恶型再制造商产品的批发价格高于风险中性型再制造商产品的批发价格;再制造商再制品生产成本较高时,制造商应显示出较低的的风险厌恶程度。     

汇率波动下电铜跨市套利及现货外销损益的探讨

JL公司属于典型的买矿型冶炼厂,主要赚取加工费以及金属回收率收益,在实际生产运营过程中,为避免价格波动对损益的影响,需对产品在上交所及LME进行套期保值操作;在实现保值的同时,也给企业提供了套利平台,可以择机进行相关操作增加企业效益,特别是在汇率双向波动下,汇率因素更是值得引起跨市套利者的重视。     

汇率传递：模型说明及文献综述

汇率是开放经济环境下的核心工具变量,在维持一国内部平衡和外部平衡时起着重要的作用。对于汇率传递问题的关注开始于世界由固定汇率体系向浮动汇率体系转变的时期,目前它仍然是关于外部调整研究的重要内容。本文分析了汇率传递与一价定律、依市场定价之间的关系,使用一个汇率传递模型阐明了汇率变动对价格体系的传导机制。汇率变动对商品出口价格和进口价格传递应该是一个连续的过程。当获知汇率发生变动时,出口商在不完全竞争的市场结构下,出于经营目的会调整其对价格的加成,这反应到进口国的进口价格上已经是一种“不完全”的传递;而进口商品由于存在分销过程,在最终销售价格上包含了相当程度的国内不可贸易的服务成本,这部分成本由于不受汇率变动的影响,因此汇率变动对进口价格的传递会进一步被削弱。     

碳交易市场参与下的供应链网络均衡模型研究北大核心

为分析碳交易市场在碳减排方面的作用,在碳排放限额机制下,针对由多个制造商和多个零售商构成的供应链网络系统,利用均衡理论和变分不等式的方法,构建了碳交易市场参与下的供应链网络均衡模型。通过数值分析发现,当碳排放权分配极度不合理时,碳交易市场的存在会抑制制造商产品生产的积极性;当碳排放权分配存在适当偏差时,碳交易市场具有调节分配不合理的作用;碳交易价格较低时,碳限额政策和碳交易市场并不能激励企业积极参与节能减排活动;当碳交易价格较高时,碳限额和碳交易会抑制企业的经营活动。     

产业链的合作机制选择与低碳产品定价及碳减排策略

生产链上下游企业选择合适的合作机制对低碳产品定价及碳减排有重要影响。通过构建博弈模型分析三种不同合作机制下的低碳产品定价及碳减排问题:第一种合作机制即制造商与零售商进行合作,当两条生产链都选择这种合作机制时,能带来较高的碳减排率和较低的零售价格,这对制造商、零售商、消费者和环境都是有利的。第二种合作机制即两条生产链的制造商之间、零售商之间分别合作,这会带来较低的碳减排率和较高的零售价格,对两个制造商有利,而对零售商和消费者不利。分析前两种合作机制的利与弊提出第三种合作机制,即零售商和制造商共享利润下的有利于碳减排的策略。最后,结合案例讨论和数值分析的研究结果表明:当制造商和零售商收入共享比在一定范围内时,第三种合作机制可以给制造商和零售商带来更高的利润。由此为企业选择最佳的合作机制及合理的碳减排策略提供了理论指导。     

开放经济中汇率与通货膨胀关系的计量分析

<正> 汇率是两种货币之间的相对价格。在这里应注意的是,一般意义上的汇率只是两种货币间的名义上的相对价格,即名义汇率。当两个国家具有不同的通货膨胀水平时,即使名义汇率不发生变化,以两种货币计算的生产成本也会发生变化。例如,假定人民币的名义汇率为1美元等于8元人民币,当年中国的主要贸易伙伴的平均通货膨胀率为零,而中国的通货膨胀率为20％。初始时中国企业生产一只电子表的生产成本为7元人民币,外国企业生产同类产品的生产成本     

人民币汇率、资产价格与非线性利率规则

本文以IS-Philips模型为基础构建了一个包含汇率和资产价格(房地产价格)的利率规则,并利用MS-VAR模型实证检验了人民币汇率、资产价格与利率规则的非线性动态关系。研究结论显示:我国利率政策在应对人民币汇率与房地产价格时,存在显著的区制转换效应。当房地产价格处于高区制(即房价处于较高水平)时,利率的上升幅度大于其处于低区制(即房价处于较低水平)时的上升幅度;同时,当人民币汇率处于高区制(即人民币处于强势状态)时,利率的下降幅度大于其处于低区制(即人民币处于弱势状态)时的下降幅度。     

汇率变动与经济危机:人民币汇率问题分析

文章运用汇率转嫁理论,给出一组根据汇率变动分析经济危机的指标。并以中日韩三国为对象做了实证研究,论证了当关于汇率的出口产品价格弹性小于1时,本国汇率有贬值的可能;而大于1,本国汇率有升值的可能。当关于汇率的国内产品价格弹性偏离0较大时,汇率变动会引发国内经济危机。文章根据这些指标对当前人民币汇率问题进行了分析,得出人民币应小幅升值的结论。     

鲜活农产品供应链协调研究——基于风险规避的收益共享契约分析

供应链协调是鲜活农产品供应链高效运作的基础。本文通过引入新鲜度因子和风险规避系数的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了由专业合作社和超市构成的鲜活农产品供应链协调问题,分析了收益共享契约机制下供应链成员的最优定价策略及供应链成员风险规避行为对批发价和零售价的影响。数值分析结果表明,鲜活农产品批发价随着新鲜度、收益共享率的增大而增大;零售价随着零售商风险规避程度的增大而减小;而批发价随着生产商风险规避程度的增大而减小,随着零售商风险规避程度的增大而增大。要改变现状应通过大力培育农产品流通组织,提高流通主体组织化程度;设计合理的收益共享机制和风险分担机制,协调供应链成员利益;加强农产品流通基础设施建设及先进物流技术的应用等措施,提升供应链整体绩效,提高鲜活农产品流通效率。     

CVaR准则下随机需求依赖价格的供应链协调研究

研究由单个风险中性的供应商和单个风险厌恶的零售商组成的两级供应链。在CVaR度量准则下探讨了随机需求依赖于价格的供应链协调问题。通过对零售商和整个供应链的决策分析,得到批发价契约不能使供应链达到协调,而收益共享契约和回购契约能使供应链达到协调,并给出了契约参数取值(范围)的计算公式。进一步证明了,回购契约与收益共享契约在零售商为风险厌恶的情形下具有等价性。同时,当供应链达到协调时,风险厌恶的零售商的利润随其风险厌恶程度的增加而增加。     

风险规避对闭环供应链决策的影响

构建了3种不同回收渠道(制造商回收、零售商回收和第三方回收商回收)下的闭环供应链模型,以制造商为Stackelber领导者,分析了分散化决策下的3种最优决策模型,考察了闭环供应链各参与方的风险规避程度对其定价决策和期望利润的影响,并借助数值分析对求解结果进行了验证。研究结果表明:随着风险规避程度的增大,零售商趋向于降低零售价格,回收方趋向于提高回收价格;在其他因素不变的情况下,闭环供应链各参与方的风险规避程度增大往往会导致其期望利润减少。     

Demand disruption and coordination of supply chain via effort and revenue sharing

This article explores the equilibrium behaviour of a basic supplier–retailer distribution channel under demand disruption via effort and revenue sharing contract. This differs from the traditional supply chain coordination model. Firstly, demand is simultaneously affected by retail price and nonprice marketing effort from manufacturers and retailers. Secondly, when the demand is disrupted, this article considers disruptions in the market scale and price sensitivity coefficient. Thirdly, the supply chain coordination model is proposed via effort and revenue sharing contract. In this way, the manufacturer reduces the wholesale price as an incentive for the retailer to share revenue. Finally, the total supply chain profit is greater with contract than no contract. This also constitutes another incentive for the players to follow the effort and revenue sharing contract.     

Unidirectional transshipment policies in a dual-channel supply chain

The main purpose of this paper is to study the ordering, transshipment price, wholesale price and contracting decisions of a dual-channel supply chain with unidirectional transshipment. We establish a dual-channel model which consists of a manufacturer, an online shop owned by a manufacturer and a retailer. We first examine the ordering decisions and establish the existence of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Then we study other decisions under two types of transshipment price setting: exogenous and endogenous. Under exogenous transshipment price, we investigate the wholesale price decisions of the manufacturer. And then we find that the transshipment strategy with wholesale price contract can coordinate the supply chain only under a certain condition and cannot accommodate arbitrary divisions of the profit. So we further develop an all-unit quantity discount contract to coordinate the supply chain and achieve win–win outcome. Under endogenous transshipment price, we use Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution to study the transshipment price decisions and obtain a transshipment price mechanism. We find that the transshipment price mechanism always coordinates the supply chain.     

Manufacturer's pricing strategy in a two-level supply chain with competing retailers and advertising cost dependent demand

The paper studies a two-echelon supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers with advertising cost dependent demand. The manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader who specifies wholesale price for each retailer. The two retailers compete with each other in advertising and they have different sales costs. The manufacturer uses one of the following two pricing strategies: (i) setting the same wholesale price for both the retailers irrespective of the difference in their sales costs; (ii) setting different wholesale prices for the retailers depending on their sales costs. Two models are developed. In the first model, the manufacturer shares a fraction of each retailer's advertising cost while in the second model, the manufacturer does not share any retailer's advertising expenses. In both the models, we derive the retailers' and manufacturer's optimal strategies. A numerical example is given to illustrate the theoretical results developed in each model. Computational results show that it is always beneficial for the manufacturer to adopt different wholesale pricing strategy for the retailers.     

The bullwhip effect on inventory: a perspective on information quality

In recent years, there has been a vast increase in the quantity of information shared across supply chain. We investigate how the timeliness and accuracy of information quality affect the value of information sharing. We use the inventory bullwhip effect (BWE) to measure the value of information sharing in a two-level supply chain consisting of one retailer and one manufacturer. The retailer faces a price-sensitive demand and the price is an AR (1) process. Our study shows if customer demand and retailer’s immediate order are delayed, using retailer’s historical order quantity to forecast can decrease manufacturer’s BWE. If information errors happen, during delivery and utilization, information sharing is not always valuable for the manufacturer. Sometimes, no information sharing can decrease much more of BWE. If information errors occur when the retailer collects demand information, value of information sharing is more significant than when there are no information errors.     

Corporate social responsibility and marketing channel coordination

We analyze a simple linear demand bilateral monopoly situation where one of the firms, either the up-stream manufacturer or the down-stream retailer, is socially concerned in terms of its desire to enhance its end-customers’ welfare in addition to the traditional profit motive. Two cases are explored: the up-stream producer exhibits corporate social responsibility (CSR) in one case and the down-stream retailer in the other. In the two-stage game, the retailer makes their quantity-setting decision in stage-two, given the two-part tariff (wholesale price and fixed franchise fee) set by the stage-one producer. In this setting, among other things, we find that the optimal channel-coordinating tariff is very different from the standard pure profit-maximizing two-part tariff. For example, if either firm in the supply/marketing chain exhibits CSR, we show the optimal wholesale price does not equal the manufacturer’s marginal production cost, nor does the fixed fee equal the monopoly profit earned by the retailer. Finally, we find that our two-part tariff CSR model provides a theoretical rationale for the empirical finding of little to no correlation between CSR and firm profits.     

均值-标准差控制下的供应链渠道Stackelberg模型

本文研究了在均值-标准差方法控制下的一个具有风险偏好(风险规避、风险中性、风险喜好)零售商与两个风险中性供应商之间供应链渠道协作和竞争。首先,在考虑零售商风险偏好下,提出了供应商联盟与非联盟两种情况中的各方处于Stackelberg-leader或Stackelberg-follower不同权利地位时各决策模式及其对应决策模型;然后,通过对比分析各决策模式最优解及深入分析零售商风险偏好对各渠道成员最优决策影响,得到了基于零售商风险偏好下的供应链渠道各成员的领导者地位将较大影响各方期望效用,而对供应链渠道整体期望效用最大化并无影响,同时,零售商过度喜好风险或者规避风险都将会对供应链整体期望效用造成致命伤害;最后,通过数值分析进一步验证了前面结论。     

低服务厌恶消费者对电商供应链决策的影响

考虑消费者在网络购物过程中对电商供应链的低劣服务存在的厌恶心理,基于前景理论,构建了消费者效用模型,分析了消费者的低服务厌恶心理对线上零售商和线下配送商的决策、电商供应链的绩效和市场需求的影响。结论如下:在分散决策情形下,消费者低服务厌恶心理的增强可以促进线下配送商提高其服务水平,促使线上零售商提高网售价格,有助于扩大市场需求和提高供应链绩效;在集中决策情形下,消费者低服务厌恶心理的增强不利于企业提高其服务水平,有助于企业降低网售价格,同时导致市场需求萎缩和供应链绩效下滑。