证券市场内幕交易监管的有效性分析

在对内幕交易监管有效性的分析上,由于研究方法和目标的不同,研究的结果也出现了很多分歧。本文对已有的研究进行了纵向比较和横向比较,从内幕交易法律的实施和国际监管的角度入手,对内幕交易监管的有效性进行分析,认为内幕交易监管是相对有效的。投资者信心、市场与法律的测度方法,以及投资者交易策略等因素都会影响到内幕交易监管的有效性。     

我国股票市场内幕交易行为分析

本文以中国证监会公布的内幕交易行政处罚公告为数据来源,从数量和主导者结构上分析我国股市内幕交易行为的现状,并从伦理、制度和监管三个层面分析内幕交易行为,最后提出相应的政策建议。     

我国股票市场内幕交易行为分析

本文以中国证监会公布的内幕交易行政处罚公告为数据来源,从数量和主导者结构上分析我国股市内幕交易行为的现状,并从伦理、制度和监管三个层面分析内幕交易行为,最后提出相应的政策建议。     

论我国对跨境证券内幕交易的监管

内幕交易行为是一种证券违法行为,禁止内幕交易是各国证券监管的重要内容。随着证券市场的国际化,各国证券市场的关联性日益紧密,内幕交易行为随之日益凸现出跨境性、复杂性和技术性使之成为各国监管的难题。我国在加入WTO后,逐步放开本国证券市场,也将带来更多监管问题。本文将对跨境内幕交易监管中的相关问题进行讨论。     

并购重组前的知情交易行为研究

并购重组中基于内幕信息的知情交易行为既是监管重点,也是学术界关注的热点问题。本文以2006—2020年我国上市公司并购重组事件为样本,考察并购重组前的知情交易行为对并购公告收益的影响。研究发现：并购重组前的知情交易行为引发了主并公司股价的提前反应,从而降低了并购公告时的市场反应,这一现象是由内幕信息泄露引起,且内幕信息主要来源于包括员工在内的公司内部人,而非机构投资者。进一步分析表明,改善信息环境可以有效缓解并购重组的信息泄露问题,体现为知情购买交易的信息泄露效应受到分析师跟踪、审计质量和问询函制度的有效制约。本文研究深化了现有的并购重组内幕交易行为研究,为实施精准监管和防范内幕交易等政策提供了一定参考和依据。     

知情交易概率的贝叶斯估计

知情交易概率(PIN)是一种被广泛使用的直接度量金融市场信息不对称风险的指标。PIN模型的极大似然估计,由于似然函数形式复杂,在最优化过程中很容易出现计算溢出的问题。本文提出了一种基于Gibbs抽样和ARS抽样的贝叶斯方法来估计PIN。模拟结果表明,贝叶斯方法克服了计算问题,并且可以得到比MLE方法更准确的估计。本文利用PIN的贝叶斯估计方法对2009—2015年期间在沪深两市交易过的股票进行实证应用分析,拓宽了知情交易概率PIN的实证研究范围。     

浅析证券市场内幕交易法律监管的完善

中国证券市场产生以来内幕交易如影随行。伴随证券市场的发展,由于制度缺失和监管不到位,内幕交易愈演愈烈。本文通过探究证券市场内幕交易的界定,分析我国现行法律监管的现状和实践情况,进而提出完善我国证券市场内幕交易法律监管的几点建议。     

内幕交易监管与监管困境研究综述

各国对内幕交易的监管基本采取立法的形式，许多学者都探讨了实施内幕交易监管的有效性以及监管效率问题。本文对相关文献进行了梳理，发现从内幕交易监管有效性的纵向比较分析，内幕交易监管并不能达到预期的效果；从横向比较分析，内幕交易监管越严格，越有利于降低内幕交易程度。总体而言，内幕交易监管是必要与相对有效的。因交易者策略与量价甄别指标的主观性而产生了监管困境，降低了监管效率。但是监管总体上可以带给市场的效益高于成本，那么内幕交易监管的实施与不断完善是非常有必要的。     

订单拆分、知情交易概率与风险定价

基于2018-2020年沪深300指数成分股的高频数据,构建累计拆分订单比变量度量市场订单拆分行为,考虑订单拆分行为对知情交易概率及其风险定价能力的影响.实证发现:订单拆分行为增加了不同算法下知情交易概率的差异,这一差异对流动性和订单规模因素具有稳健性.进一步研究发现:不同的订单拆分水平下,知情交易概率与风险定价之间呈现非线性关系,高订单拆分水平降低了知情交易概率的风险定价能力.     

期货市场内幕交易监管及认定——美国期货期权内幕交易最新案例的比较视角

本文以近期美国期货市场发生的内幕交易案件为着眼点,具体分析美国商品期货交易委员会(CFTC)最近查处的期货市场利用客户信息型内幕交易行为,即利用客户大笔交易期货及期权的信息抢先下单并以有利的交易价格进行成交获利。案件中,被告在近五年的时间内2000余次实施类似的交易行为,违反了CFTC反欺诈细则及内幕交易监管规定。通过案例比较,分析境内外期货内幕交易行为特征以及认定,为我国期货市场内幕交易监管提供启示。     

Estimating the Probability of Informed Trading

Using a new empirical model, I estimate the probability of trades being generated by privately informed traders. Inference is drawn on a trade‐by‐trade basis using data samples from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The modeling setup facilitates in‐depth analysis of the estimated probability of informed trading at the intraday level and for stocks with different levels of trading activity. The most important empirical results are: (a) the intradaily pattern of the inferred probability of informed trading is highly correlated with the intradaily pattern of observed quoted spreads, (b) differences in the magnitude of quoted spreads across volume categories are not exclusively related to differences in the level of informed trading, and (c) private information is incorporated faster in the quotes for high‐volume stocks than in the quotes for low‐volume stocks.     

Insider Trading after Repurchase Tender Offer Announcements: Timing versus Informed Trading

Abnormally high net insider selling is commonly observed after repurchase tender offer (RTO) announcements although, on average, firms experience positive abnormal returns in the years after the repurchases. We explore two potential explanations: liquidity trade timing and informed trading. Consistent with the notion that fixed price RTOs are more likely than Dutch-auction RTOs to signal undervaluation, the results suggest that insider selling after fixed price RTO announcements are driven largely by insiders who time their trades with the repurchase announcements. In contrast, selling after Dutch-auction RTOs seems to be driven primarily by informed traders who exploit mispricing associated with the repurchase announcements.     

An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading

Whether insider trading affects stock prices is central to both the current debate over whether insider trading is harmful or pervasive, and to the broader public policy issue of how best to regulate securities markets. Using previously unexplored data on illegal insider trading from the Securities and Exchange Commission, this paper finds that the stock market detects the possibility of informed trading and impounds this information into the stock price. Specifically, the abnormal return on an insider trading day averages 3%, and almost half of the pre-announcement stock price run-up observed before takeovers occurs on insider trading days. Both the amount traded by the insider and additional trade-specific characteristics lead to the market's recognition of the informed trading.     

我国证券市场内幕交易的法学实证分析——来自31起内幕交易成案的统计分析

内幕交易是证券法学界炙手可热、经久不衰的热门课题,关于内幕交易的各种概念、学说、理论被学术界翻炒得烂熟,解剖个案麻雀的精彩论著也不鲜见,但受制于案例、资料和相关数据的局限,少有学者从实证角度,系统性地研究我国内幕交易成案的总体特征。本文力图在传统证券法学研究途径之外,独辟蹊径,通过运用统计、数量分析等经济学科工具,对证券市场成立以来查处的全部31起内幕交易案件加以实证分析,以期得出我国内幕交易案件的发案特征与规律,为打击和防范内幕交易违法行为,修订内幕交易法制提供数据支持和实证参考。     

事务所规模、审计行业专长与知情交易概率

外部审计的作用在于提高公司的信息披露透明度,减少信息不对称,以保护投资者利益。本文从知情交易概率视角出发,研究了外部审计在减少信息不对称方面所发挥的作用。研究结果发现,国内"十大"审计的公司,以及由具有审计行业专长的事务所审计的公司,知情交易概率更低,而且行业专长的国内十大(非十大)审计的公司的知情交易概率也低于不具有行业专长的国内十大(非十大)。进一步检验还表明,在机构投资者持股的公司中,事务所规模和审计行业专长能够更有效减少知情交易概率。     

Merger Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An Empirical Investigation

This paper provides evidence of excess returns earned by investors in acquired firms prior to the first public announcement of planned mergers. The study is distinguished from earlier merger studies in its use of daily holding period returns for the 194 firms sampled. The results confirm statistically what most traders already know. Impending merger announcements are poorly held secrets, and trading on this nonpublic information abounds. Specifically, leakage of inside information is a pervasive problem occurring at a significant level up to 12 trading days prior to the first public announcement of a proposed merger.     

Insider Trading: Implications and Responses

An understanding of the implications of insider trading can only be achieved by analysing conflicting perceptions of what is meant by inside or privileged information. Empirical evidence on insider trading, mainly reflecting United States experiences, challenges assumptions not only about the impact of insider trading but also the efficiency of financial markets. There are hierarchies of market participants and rules on insider trading capable of practical implementation will only change the rankings. Companies have a property interest in their inside information and should bear the responsibility for its use.