应计与真实盈余管理：替代抑或互补

基于中国转型经济特有的制度环境,考察应计与真实盈余管理之间的相互关系。结果表明,在中国市场上,应计与真实盈余管理之间存在"二元"关系,即替代关系和互补关系。具体而言,市场竞争压力在应计与真实盈余管理之间具有明显的成本比较优势,使得两者具有替代关系。控制利益、管制压力在应计与真实盈余管理之间不具有显著的成本比较优势,而是应计与真实盈余管理的驱动因素,使得两者具有互补关系。     

约束条件、IPO盈余管理方式与公司业绩——基于应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理的研究

IPO盈余管理问题一直是资本市场研究的热点议题之一,本文考察了IPO企业的盈余管理方式及其对公司业绩的影响,并进一步探讨了在一定约束条件下,不同盈余管理方式对发行定价的作用。研究发现,IPO企业不仅实施了应计盈余管理,而且实施了真实盈余管理;IPO企业对盈余管理方式的选择是在发行价最大化原则下权衡的结果,当公司面临的法律保护水平较低、处于管制行业、审计师为非国际"四大"时,选择真实盈余管理更有利于提高股票发行价。此外,本文发现不同盈余管理方式对公司未来业绩的影响存在一定的差异,应计盈余管理主要影响公司的短期业绩,而真实盈余管理将会对公司的长期业绩产生较大影响。     

按下葫芦浮起瓢:分析师跟踪与盈余管理途径选择

本文使用2006-2014年的中国上市公司数据,研究了分析师跟踪对企业应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的不同作用。在控制了内生性和其它相关因素的基础上,本文发现:分析师对应计盈余管理具有监督效应,能够减少应计盈余管理;相反,其对真实盈余管理具有促进作应,跟踪分析师越多,企业真实盈余管理越多。本文对这一现象的解释是:与应计盈余管理相比,真实盈余管理具有较高的隐蔽性,分析师易于监督隐蔽性较差的应计盈余管理,这种监督迫使经理人转向真实盈余管理。本文的结论有助于全面认识和评价分析师的治理作用,指出了分析师跟踪的缺陷,为完善分析师的治理职能提供理论支持和经验证据。     

盈余管理方式与审计师风险感知研究

以2009~2013年沪深两市 A 股上市公司为样本,研究应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理对审计师风险感知的影响,研究结论表明,审计师既能感知到应计盈余管理行为带来的风险,同时还能感知到真实盈余管理行为的风险,并会从审计意见类型和审计费用两个方面采取风险应对措施。相较于有限责任制会计师事务所,特殊普通合伙制会计师事务所的审计师对盈余管理行为的风险感知更敏感。     

企业声誉与盈余管理:有效契约观还是寻租观

企业盈余管理行为从根本上反映了会计契约未得到有效执行,本文研究了作为契约执行机制之一的声誉机制对企业盈余管理行为的影响。研究发现,对于实施了正向应计和真实盈余管理的企业,良好的企业声誉能够显著抑制这种盈余管理行为,而对于实施了负向应计和真实盈余管理的企业,良好的企业声誉却能够显著增加这种盈余管理行为。这表明,拥有良好声誉的企业对外报告了更加稳健的盈余信息,符合声誉机制的有效契约观。进一步研究发现,企业声誉对盈余管理的影响是通过高质量审计师的选聘和有效内部控制的实施来实现的。     

强势企业、政治关系与盈余管理方式——来自深沪上市公司的经验证据

将盈余管理方式分为应计盈余管理与真实活动盈余管理,以深沪两市19个行业的企业2009~2013年数据为样本,研究发现强势企业较弱势企业进行了相对较高的真实盈余管理与较低的应计盈余管理。有政治关系的强势企业比无政治关系的强势企业进行了较高的应计盈余管理。从真实盈余管理的方向来看,强势企业利用隐蔽的盈余管理方式将业绩做大使得其强者表现更强。     

独立董事本地化对公司盈余管理的影响——来自2010~2014年A股上市公司经验证据

以2010~2014年 A 股上市公司为研究样本,以修正 Jones 模型估计的操控性应计绝对值作为应计项目盈余管理的衡量指标,探讨上市公司独立董事日常工作所在地和上市公司所在地是否一致对公司盈余管理的影响。研究发现,独立董事本地化能抑制公司应计项目盈余管理。此外,研究进一步发现,独立董事本地化还能约束真实活动盈余操控,包括销售操控、生产操控和费用操控等行为。     

内部控制、应计盈余管理与会计稳健性

本文从会计稳健性角度出发,实证研究内部控制有效性的经济后果。结果发现,与其他利益主体相比,公司管理层由于直接参与公司经营管理,是公司信息优势一方,同时其与其他利益主体之间的利益冲突是的其有动机和可能性进行盈余管理。而内部控制作为一项内部治理机制,对管理层机会主义行为有一定约束作用,从而有利于会计稳健性水平的提高。本文研究也表明,应计盈余管理对会计稳健性有负向,而内部控制质量的提高则有助于提高会计稳健性水平。     

浅议企业价值与现金分红、盈余管理方式的选择

上市公司现金分红和盈余管理是资本市场关注的热点问题。研究发现,现金分红行为对上市公司盈余管理方式的选择具有显著影响,即现金分红降低了实际活动盈余管理的程度,增加了应计项目盈余管理的程度,存在着实际活动盈余管理方式与应计项目盈余管理方式的“共谋”现象。研究表明,现金分红有助于企业价值的提升,盈余管理方式在现金分虹与企业价值之间的关系中起到了显著讷奇余作用。     

内部控制与异质机构持股的治理效应

本文实证检验了不同内部控制水平下,异质机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的公司治理效应。研究发现,相比外地或短期机构持股,本地或长期机构持股更有助于提升应计质量和降低盈余噪音;当公司存在实质性内部控制缺陷时,本地或长期机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的治理效应显著降低;相比国有控股,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥在非国有控股公司中受内部控制的影响更大;当公司存在财务报告实质性内控缺陷时,异质机构持股发挥的治理效应明显更弱。这些结果表明,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥离不开公司内部控制机制,二者之间是互补而非替代关系,这种互补关系主要由财务报告内部控制缺陷驱动。本研究有助于深化理解异质机构持股影响公司治理的具体作用机理,为实务界和监管机构改善公司治理、加强投资者保护提供经验参考。     

Auditor reputation and earnings management: International evidence from the banking industry

We examine the relation between auditor reputation and earnings management in banks using a sample of banks from 29 countries. In particular, we examine the implications of two aspects of auditor reputation, auditor type and auditor industry specialization, for earnings management in banks. We find that both auditor type and auditor industry specialization moderate benchmark-beating (loss-avoidance and just-meeting-or-beating prior year’s earnings) behavior in banks. In addition, we find that once auditor type and auditor industry specialization are included in the same tests, only auditor industry specialization has a significant impact on constraining benchmark-beating behavior. In separate tests related to income-increasing abnormal loan loss provisions, we find that both auditor type and auditor expertise constrain income-increasing earnings management. Again, in joint tests, only auditor industry expertise has a significant impact on constraining income-increasing earnings management.     

Evaluating the effect of industry specialist duration on earnings management

This study examines whether auditor industry specialist duration (i.e., the cumulative number of years an audit firm can be deemed an industry specialist) affects earnings management. Using a sample of 17,546 observations during the period of 2006 to 2014, we find that audits performed by firms with longer industry specialist durations are associated with lower levels of earnings management, as proxied by the absolute value of discretionary accruals. This finding enhances the industry specialization literature by showing that, in the long run, specialist auditors constrain the accrual management activities of their clients. However, we also find that audits performed by firms with longer industry specialist durations are associated with greater levels of real earnings management. In turn, this is consistent with real earnings management surfacing as an unintended consequence of specialist auditors being able to better constrain the accrual management activities of their clients (Chi, Lisic, & Pevzner, 2011).     

Firm Accrual Quality Following Restatements: A Signaling View

We consider whether and how firms improve their financial reporting credibility following a restatement by comparing two alternative views. The compliance view predicts that firms simply correct errors to comply with regulations; the signaling view predicts that improvements are broader to allow firms to signal higher reporting quality and thereby reduce information uncertainty. We find that accrual quality improves significantly following the restatement and that this improvement is observed for both earnings and non‐earnings error restatements. We also find that the extent of real earnings’ management decreases significantly. Further, we find that improvements in accrual quality are higher for firms with CEO turnover and higher incentives to improve, but lower for firms switching to an auditor of lower quality. Collectively, our findings suggest that firms signal improved reporting credibility following a restatement through higher accruals quality and lower real earnings management.     

Audit committee quality,auditor independence,and internal control weaknesses

In this paper we investigate the relation between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and the disclosure of internal control weaknesses after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We begin with a sample of firms with internal control weaknesses and, based on industry, size, and performance, match these firms to a sample of control firms without internal control weaknesses. Our conditional logit analyses indicate that a relation exists between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal control weaknesses. Firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their audit committees have less financial expertise or, more specifically, have less accounting financial expertise and non-accounting financial expertise. They are also more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their auditors are more independent. In addition, firms with recent auditor changes are more likely to have internal control weaknesses.     

What is the Relationship Between REIT Governance and Earnings Management?

The empirical corporate finance literature claims that better corporate governance constrains earnings management, while others argue that the unique legal and reporting structure of REITs may reduce the need for such internal corporate governance. Using a sample of publicly traded REITs for the 2004–2008 time period, we examine the relationships amongst corporate governance, accruals earnings management, manipulation of Funds from Operations (FFO), and real earnings management. We find that corporate governance quality is unrelated to accruals earnings management and manipulation of FFO. At first glance, the findings suggest that managers need less internal oversight because of the more transparent reporting structure of REITs. However, we document that REITs engage in significant real activities manipulation for earnings management purposes. Our empirical findings further show that corporate governance characteristics, in particular board size, independence, number of board meetings and audit committee financial expertise, are essential for constraining such activities. Finally, by focusing on a subset of REITs that act in ways which previous research has identified as more susceptible to earnings management activities, we demonstrate that good corporate governance effectively reduces accruals earnings management and manipulation of FFO for these REITs. Overall, our findings indicate that, despite the unique legal and reporting structure, REITs engage in certain forms of earnings management, and that the ability for REITs to manipulate earnings is reduced when corporate governance is more effective.     

Do heterogeneous oil price shocks really have different effects on earnings management?

Under the modern corporate governance structure, there is a knowledge gap in how companies' financial reporting practices respond to oil price shocks in China. To fill this gap, we employ China's A-share listed companies and follow Kilian (2009) study to investigate how the three types of classical oil shocks affect corporate earnings management heterogeneously. We also consider the role of oil implied volatility in this relationship and further examine the possible heterogeneity between energy-related and non-energy-related subsamples. The empirical results show that there are variant effects among the heterogeneous oil price shocks on earnings management. Specifically, oil supply shocks stimulate firms to manipulate more accrual and real earnings, and firms are more likely to carry out accrual earnings management downward. Oil aggregate demand shocks weaken the degree of accrual earnings manipulation and mainly reduce the negative accrual earnings manipulation. Oil-specific demand shocks constrain the earnings management behavior of companies and improve their accounting quality. Besides, the increased uncertainty of oil price weakens the promotion effect of oil supply shocks on earnings manipulation, and the moderating effect occurs mainly in downward earnings management. Furthermore, the subsample estimated results reveal that oil price shocks do not affect the degree of accrual earnings management of energy-related companies. Instead, they impact the non-energy-related companies. Overall, our findings provide a series of targeted policy recommendations to mitigate the principal-agent problems and cope with energy price volatility risks.     

Earnings quality and short selling: Evidence from real earnings management in the United States

Prior research provides evidence consistent with managers using real earnings management (REM) to increase earnings. This study examines whether short sellers exploit the overvaluation of firms employing REM. I find that firms with more REM have higher subsequent short interest. The positive relation between REM and short interest is more pronounced in settings where the costs associated with accrual‐based earnings management are high, such as when a firm has low accounting flexibility or faces greater scrutiny from a high quality auditor. I also find some evidence that short sellers respond to REM more than to other fundamental signals of firm overvaluation. My inferences are robust to the use of propensity score matching. Collectively, my evidence suggests that short sellers not only trade on REM information, but they also trade as if they understand the substitutive nature of alternative earnings management methods. This study provides additional insight into the important role that short sellers play in monitoring managerial operating decisions and overall earnings quality.     

Internal governance structures and earnings management

This paper investigates the role of a firm's internal governance structure in constraining earnings management. It is hypothesized that the practice of earnings management is systematically related to the strength of internal corporate governance mechanisms, including the board of directors, the audit committee, the internal audit function and the choice of external auditor. Based on a broad cross‐sectional sample of 434 listed Australian firms, for the financial year ending in 2000, a majority of non‐executive directors on the board and on the audit committee are found to be significantly associated with a lower likelihood of earnings management, as measured by the absolute level of discretionary accruals. The voluntary establishment of an internal audit function and the choice of auditor are not significantly related to a reduction in the level of discretionary accruals. Our additional analysis, using small increases in earnings as a measure of earnings management, also found a negative association between this measure and the existence of an audit committee.