浅议业主如何防范不平衡报价

不平衡报价是一种比较常用且能够带来可观收益的投标报价策略,在分析承包商结合变更、调价及索赔会采用哪些不平衡报价策略的基础上,提出了业主如何防范不平衡报价不利影响的具体措施。     

工程量清单计价模式下业主应对不平衡报价的策略研究

本文介绍了工程量清单计价和不平衡报价,概括了承包商在投标中采用不平衡报价的几种操作模式,并从业主经济利益的角度,探讨了在工程量清单计价模式下应对不平衡报价的策略。     

不平衡报价在工程量清单报价中的应用

介绍了不平衡报价的概念及不平衡报价的类型。并从承包商的角度出发,在清单计价条件下,建立了以工程实际付款现值最大化为目标函数的线性规划模型,并配以具体的工程实例求得不平衡报价的最优解。     

不平衡报价识别方法系统设计

不平衡报价是工程量清单计价模式中常用的投标报价策略,严重的不平衡报价会造成业主的超支,还不利于行业的发展。为了帮助业主有效识别承包商的不平衡报价,本文设计了一个系统,即通过构建工程量清单项目单价数据库,从单价数据库中统计出清单项目社会平均价格水平,称为不平衡报价的评价基点。运用不平衡度的数学模型,最终得出某个投标书的综合不平衡度。     

承包商不平衡报价投标策略

随着《建设工程工程量清单计价规范》的逐步推行与应用,我国工程造价计价控制方式由传统的转变为“量价分离”,这导致建筑市场的竞争更加激烈,使得承包人在投标时,为确保中标,承包商不得不竞相压低报价。在这种形势下,不平衡报价应运而生．不平衡报价是工程量清单计价模式中常用的投标报价策略,本文对不平衡报价投标策略进行了研究。     

浅析工程招投标中的不平衡报价及应对措施

随着我国经济建设进程的加快以及建筑市场的发展,招投标制度在工程建设中也逐渐受到越来越多的重视。本文以烟台市某文化中心的招投标为例,对工程招投标中产生不平衡报价的原因、手法进行了分析,以及如何识别和防范工程招投标中的不平衡报价,最后通过结合工程实例,介绍了工程招投标过程中不平衡报价的防范措施。     

施工合同实施现状分析及对存在问题的防范

1.施工合同实施现状 合同是平等主体的自然人、法人或其他组织之间设立、变更、终止民事权利义务关系的协议.建设工程施工合同参与方应在合同实施过程中相互合作、共同预测和防范风险,最终实现各自的目标.但遗憾的是:在工程施工合同实践活动中,业主由于其本身的主动地位,尽量将工程所固有的风险和不利因素向承包商身上转移,承包商在激烈的竞争中为了能够中标,往往过度降低报价;而为保证利润,承包商又在工程投标和实施中不择手段(不平衡报价、降低工程质量等),承包商和业主形成了两大对立的阵营.     

政府投资项目严重不平衡报价管控分析

对不平衡报价的主要做法进行了分析总结,提出了严重不平衡报价的界定原则,分析了严重不平衡报价的主要表现形式,结合案例提出了加强严重不平衡报价管控的相关建议,从源头上减少严重不平衡报价的出现,在实施过程中加强对严重不平衡报价的管控,切实维护政府利益。     

不平衡报价合理幅度及防范措施研究

工程量清单计价模式下"量价分离"为不平衡报价提供了可能。结合目前各省颁布的有关不平衡报价规定,本研究从不平衡报价形成的现实基础和理论基础入手,以不平衡报价的现实意义及其存在的风险对不平衡报价幅度的合理性进行分析,提出从建设项目的全过程进行不平衡报价的规制,控制承包人在项目建设全过程中因不平衡报价的获利在一定合理幅度内,并提出针对不平衡报价防范的具体控制措施。     

投标报价盈余模型研究

本文的目的在于推出一种新的工程项目投标报价盈余率决定的模型。模型对一系列对影响报价决策因素进行分析，同时结合承包商的多目标考虑，运用模糊矩阵运算，进行定性与定量相结合，全面综合的得出一种直观简易、更加符合实际情况的投标报价模型。本模型最大的特点在于承包商置身于一个不确定的竞争环境中，结合承包商的主观考虑，同时把模糊数学运算引入了投标报价中。     

建设工程招标阶段的工程造价管理研究

结合工程造价管理的实际情况，从建设工程招标的全过程系统地、全方位探讨了建设工程招标阶段的工程造价管理的优化问题，以期能给广大的业主提供一些参考，达到降低工程造价、提高投资效益的目的。     

朝东岩隧道施工招标规范化管理的实践

本文结合朝东岩隧道施工招标的实践，详细论述了如何加强隧道施工招标的规范化管理。     

Preference for bid time in hybrid auctioned IPOs: Evidence from China

Using comprehensive bidding data of 783 Chinese IPOs from June 2009 to November 2012, we investigate institutions’ preference for bid time in hybrid auctions. We find that (1) earlier bids are associated with higher pricing errors, which is more pronounced in IPOs with greater uncertainty; (2) the bid prices of earlier bids tend to be aggressively high; (3) earlier bids are associated with fewer bid shares and allocations; (4) bidders submitting earlier bids (hereafter, earlier bidders) have inferior profits; and (5) earlier bidders show persistence in bid time. Overall, the empirical results remain robust after controlling for unobserved bidder-underwriter relationships and indicate that earlier bidders tend to be less informed. Our findings reveal and highlight the effect of bid time on identifying informative bids in hybrid auctions.     

Determinants of bidder competition in corporate takeovers

The importance of bidder competition in the corporate takeover process has long been recognized in theoretical models. This paper provides empirical tests of those models. The results indicate that resistance by target management to an initial bid encourages multiple bidders. Competing bidders are less likely to enter in cases where the target is large, but more likely to arise when the initial bidder is highly levered. High initial bids (preemptive bids) are found to discourage entry by additional firms. Surprisingly, targets with high levels of free cash flow tend not to be the recipients of multiple bids.     

The determinants and effects of actual,abandoned and contested mergers

This paper reports the results of research aimed at exploring why some takeover bids give rise to merger while other do not and, using as a basis of comparison matched samples of actual and abandoned mergers, the performance effects of mergers. In this work, 50 cases of abandoned mergers occurring between 1965 and 1975 were analysed against a matched sample of 50 actual mergers. In addition, 33 cases of contested bids were also analysed. Variables used reflected managerial, shareholder and financial strength considerations. Analysis covered a period three years before to three years after each bid. Techniques of analysis were differences of means and discriminant analysis. The results show that there are important differences between target companies that are acquired and those that successfully resist takeover bids. They also show the influence of managerial and financial variables as the key to a successful takeover bid rather than variables reflecting shareholder interests. Analysis of the effects of the outcome of the bids suggests that companies involved in abandoned mergers recorded a stronger performance over the subsequent 1–3 years than those that made acquisitions, especially where shareholder and financial considerations are concerned. Target companies that resisted takeover bids showed a significant performance improvement.     

水泥厂风机振动故障的处理

本文就风机振动的类型、原因进行了阐述,理论与实践相结合,给出了解决风机不平衡的有效方法,具有重要的现实意义。     

工程项目无标底招标探讨

本文根据作者研究体会和实践经验，结合浦东国际机场工程无标底招标的实例，阐述公开，公平，公正原则下，推行工程无标底招标的基本构思，实施要领，内容和程序，探讨了工程无标底招标的实施效果和具备条件，对于我国大、中型项目的工程招标具有一定的参考作用。     

Institutional investors, antitakeover defenses and success of hostile takeover bids

In this study we investigate the question of whether institutional investors enhance or reduce efficiency in the market for corporate control. In particular, given unequivocal evidence that target stockholders gain in successful takeover bids, we investigate the impact of institutional ownership in target firms on the adoption of the type of antitakeover defense as well as the outcome of takeover bids. We find that target firms are more likely to adopt value-reducing antitakeover defenses and successfully thwart takeover bids when a higher percentage of target common stock is owned by ‘pressure-indeterminate’ investors (investment counsel firms in particular). On the other hand, the probability of a successful takeover rises with the ownership of both ‘pressure-sensitive’ and ‘pressure-resistant’ investors. The above findings support the view that institutional investors do not play a homogeneous role in the market for corporate control.