寡头结构市场的福利分析

本文把经典的古诺双头垄断模型放在整个社会这个大环境下,以整个社会的福利为视角,分析了社会的福利情况,从而得出了古诺均衡的非合作的竞争行为有利于社会福利增加的结论,从而解释了古诺均衡的合理性。接着将社会作为第三参与方将古诺双头垄断模型扩展为三方博弈,并对该情况下的福利情况进行讨论,并将结果与双头垄断模型比较,得出一些有意义的结论。     

多寡头产量博弈模型拓展

古诺模型和斯塔克博弈模型对寡头之间的博弈进行了深入的研究.但这两个模型假设了:产品无差异.而在现实生活中,厂商的产品却存在差异.本文将讨论寡头厂商的产品存在差异的博弈情况,以及博弈期间不同事件的发生对博弈产生的影响得出拓展模型.     

考虑市场份额因素的企业竞争的双目标演化博弈分析

本文通过对理性局限性的分析,在古诺模型的基础上,提出了考虑市场份额(即产量)因素的双目标古诺模型(CE模型),将竞争企业的竞争过程分为两个阶段:第一,考虑市场份额的双目标古诺竞争博弈;第二,均衡策略基础上的演化博弈。并用间接演化博弈(IEA)的方法,给出了CE模型的演化稳定策略(ESS),分析、比较了由于理性前提假设的不同而导致的两类模型的结果的不同。CE模型是传统的古诺模型的扩展,该模型的构造和均衡结果对实际情况能够做出更有效的解释和预测,本文的研究方法对其他博弈模型也具有一定的普遍意义。     

企业生态经济效率与决策者行为的博弈分析

本文针对企业生态经济效率的形成,运用博弈理论分析了居民和企业对待企业经济行为造成的环境影响问题,分别建立了博弈模型以分析各类博弈均衡解的影响因素,提出使各决策者行为有利于企业生态经济效率提高的策略选择.     

古诺博弈在选择过程中的演化行为及讨论

古诺博弈纳什均衡解的经典解释中包含了主体的理性假设，本从演化的角度分析了这一假设的局限性；然后基于生物进化论的观点定义了选择算子；对于古诺博弈，通过数值模拟探讨了选择算子的渐近行为，并得出了古诺博弈中的纳什均衡解是选择算子的稳态这一结论，从而解释了该博弈中非合作纳什均衡的自然合理性。     

双寡头创新市场结构中的知识产权保护的经济效应分析

本文基于过程创新模型,运用古诺寡头动态博弈均衡分析的方法,针对双寡头创新市场结构中,知识产权保护程度的变化对企业的创新研发投入、创新成果、企业利润,以及消费者剩余和社会福利所产生的经济效应进行了详细地分析。     

博弈理论在固定资产投资项目申报过程中的应用研究

本文在寻租理论和委托代理理论的基础上,运用博弈理论建立了固定资产投资项目申报过程中国家、审批部门和项目申报方的三方无限次重复博弈模型,分析得到了均衡解,并通过对博弈模型及其结果的分析,提出通过制度安排创造无限次重复博弈的环境,以改变博弈方的策略空间和收益结构,进而改进变均衡结果,从而达到通过有效的制度安排来提高申报项目质量的目的。     

寡头垄断、博弈策略、厂商数量与企业利润——古诺模型与斯塔尔伯格模型的比较

本文通过对双头竞争及多头竞争中的古诺模型和斯塔尔伯格模型的比较,阐释了在寡头垄断市场中,厂商选择同时设定产量(同时博弈)还是产量领导(序贯博弈),对寡头利润会产生影响,寡头市场中企业数量的多少也会对厂商利润产生影响。     

低碳信贷政策优惠下企业与商业银行的动态博弈研究

我国从高能耗经济向低碳经济转型已是大势所趋,节能减排企业向商业银行申请低碳信贷成为企业重要融资渠道。本文构建银企间低碳融资的信号博弈模型,分析市场在三种情况下的博弈均衡水平,得出企业造假的伪装成本和风险成本足够大且银行掌握的信息足够充分时实现的分离均衡为该博弈的最优解,并基于此种假设提出相关政策建议,提高市场资源配置效率。     

企业定价的博弈分析

经典的寡头市场Bertrand模型和Hotelling模型无法解释企业对不同消费者采取不同定价的策略。本文构建了不完全信息下的厂商定价模型,运用贝叶斯博弈分析了厂商的定价策略,并通过案例分析指出信息成本应有政府承担以提高市场运行效率。     

Understanding repeat playing behavior in casual games using a Bayesian data augmentation approach

With an estimated market size of nearly $18 billion in 2016, casual games (games played over social networks or mobile devices) have become increasingly popular. Because most casual games are free to install, understanding repeat playing behavior is important for game developers as it directly drives advertising revenue. Game developers are keenly interested in benchmarking their game versus the market average, and understanding how genre and various game mechanics drive repeat playing behavior. Such cross-sectional analysis, however, is difficult to conduct because individual-level data on competitors’ games are not publicly available, and that the casual gaming industry is highly fragmented with each firm making only a handful of games.I develop a Bayesian approach, based on a parsimonious Hidden Markov Model at the individual level in conjunction with data augmentation, to study repeat playing behavior using only publicly available data. After applying the proposed approach to a sample of 379 casual games, I find that the average daily attrition rate across game is around 36.5%, with an average “play” rate of 47.9%, resulting in an average ARPU (average revenue per user) across games of around 20.5 cents. Certain genres are linked to higher attrition rates and play rates. In addition, giving out a “daily bonus” or limiting the amount of time that gamers can play each day are associated with a 17.7% and 16.4% higher ARPU, respectively.     

The role of network embeddedness across multiple social networks: Evidence from mobile social network games

This article examines peer influences from network relationships within a social network game (i.e., embeddedness) and across such games (i.e., multiplexity). Drawing on social influence theory, we develop a bivariate Poisson model of users’ repeated visits and latent attrition that accommodates peer interaction after controlling for homophily. We estimate the model using data from two social network games with considerable overlap among network members. We find that friends who are only multiplex across games exert greater peer influence on users’ game visits than members who are embedded within a single game. We also determined that ignoring network multiplexity across games may lead firms to mistarget users due to biased peer influences of embedded friends. This result provides an unresearched explanation—strength of peer influence—for the mixed findings in previous literature on network embeddedness. We utilized our results to conduct several scenario analyses to demonstrate how firms can effectively manage users’ engagement and target users in multiple social network games.     

不同零售商在相同时期需求不同的经济批量博弈

经济批量博弈是库存博弈的子问题,已经建立了经济批量的模型以及相关的基本理论知识,为研究经济批量模型所对应的博弈奠定了理论基础,对于合作博弈需要保证合作联盟的稳定性,因此需要研究经济批量博弈的凸性。利用合作博弈论的理论知识,线性函数的凹性,对推广的经济批量博弈证明了其凸性,进一步完善了经济批量博弈的数学理论。凸博弈保证合作联盟的稳定性,减少了商家的成本,增加了商家的利润。     

Dynamic learning in behavioral games: A hidden Markov mixture of experts approach

Over the course of a repeated game, players often exhibit learning in selecting their best response. Research in economics and marketing has identified two key types of learning rules: belief and reinforcement. It has been shown that players use either one of these learning rules or a combination of them, as in the Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) model. Accounting for such learning may help in understanding and predicting the outcomes of games. In this research, we demonstrate that players not only employ learning rules to determine what actions to choose based on past choices and outcomes, but also change their learning rules over the course of the game. We investigate the degree of state dependence in learning and uncover the latent learning rules and learning paths used by the players. We build a non-homogeneous hidden Markov mixture of experts model which captures shifts between different learning rules over the course of a repeated game. The transition between the learning rule states can be affected by the players?? experiences in the previous round of the game. We empirically validate our model using data from six games that have been previously used in the literature. We demonstrate that one can obtain a richer understanding of how different learning rules impact the observed strategy choices of players by accounting for the latent dynamics in the learning rules. In addition, we show that such an approach can improve our ability to predict observed choices in games.     

Examining the intersection of race and gender in video game advertising

Women and racial/ethnic minorities account for a growing percentage of video game players in the USA. The economic future of the video game industry may, in part, depend on the industry's ability to adapt marketing efforts to appeal to the growing female and racial/ethnic markets. Contrary to these efforts, however, is advertisers' reliance on stereotypes in advertisements to quickly establish a common understanding and wide appeal to a mass audience. This study investigates how race and gender intersect in the stereotypical character depictions used to market video games to consumers. A systematic content analysis was carried out of 383 US magazine advertisements of console, mobile, and PC video games. Stereotyping and intersectionality literatures were used as theoretical guides for this research. Findings reveal that the marketing of video games in the USA upholds some longstanding media stereotypes of minorities and women, including that of the White male hero, submissive sexualized female, Asian ninja, and deviant Black male. The potential social and economic implications of the video game industry's reliance on character stereotypes for the marketing of video games are discussed.     

Fuzzy Bargaining Games: Conditions of Agreement,Satisfaction, and Equilibrium

Game theory in its several variants is widely recognized as a contribution to social and economic modeling. One relevant development of classical game theory, Generalized Game Theory (GGT), entails its extension and generalization through the formulation of the mathematical theory of rules and rule complexes. Social theory concepts such as norm, value, belief, role, social relationship, and institution as well as game can be defined in a uniform way in terms of rules and rule complexes. Among the applications, one major initiative has been the conceptualization of fuzzy games and equilibria. In this paper a GGT model of 2-person fuzzy bargaining games is outlined. Two key concepts are applied: (1) players’ value (or “utility”) structures consisting of ideal points or expectation levels, on the one hand, and limits of acceptance, on the other; (2) fuzzy judgment functions in which players deal with imprecise information and use approximate reasoning in making decisions and negotiating agreements. Such fuzzy judgment functions can take into account economic, socio-psychological, and cultural and institutional aspects of the bargaining context, which affect the bargaining process in specifiable ways. Several significant results are obtained from the application of this model: the opportunities (or not) for agreement, the participants’ satisfaction levels with an agreement, and the question whether or not the agreed “price” is an equilibrium price.     

基于博弈论的软件产品定价决策

针对正版、盗版软件在消费者心目中的差异,建立贝特兰德价格博弈模型,探讨了正版软件生产商、盗版软件生产商及代理商之间的价格博弈策略,得出分别使三者利润最大化的均衡价格,三者均衡价格、销售量及利润的变化趋势的结论。     

Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Including Monopolistic Manufacturer and Duopolistic Retailers: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Emergence of the Internet as a new distribution channel has led to increasing attention by researchers to dual-channel supply chain in recent years. In this paper, pricing and ordering decisions are investigated on a dual-channel supply chain which consists of monopolistic manufacturer and duopolistic retailers. The market is assumed to be controlled by the manufacturer. Thus, the manufacturer becomes leader and the two retailers act as followers. Due to establishing this new structure, different game-theoretic models including Bertrand, Collusion, and Stackelberg are developed to analyze pricing strategies under the various interactions between the two retailers. Then, the equilibrium decisions are compared under the considered scenarios and valuable managerial insights are presented. We found that the various games do not have any effects on the manufacturer’s responses. The retail prices given by the Collusion game are higher than by the other games. In the Collusion model, demands in the retail channel are lower than in the other games. Moreover, the manufacturer and retailers receive respectively the lowest and the highest profits under the Collusion game.     

Persistence and heterogeneity in entrepreneurship: An evolutionary game theoretic analysis

Studies show that countries exhibit a relatively stable level of entrepreneurial activity. To account for this fact, we adopt an evolutionary game theoretic approach. Based upon the analysis of games that capture essential features of the entrepreneurial phenomenon, we ascertain conditions under which evolutionary stable equilibria will be played by a population consisting of agents who engage in entrepreneurship and agents who do not. We show that entrepreneurship may persist even without assuming strategic complementarities or group selection. Lastly, we explain how information about equilibrium payoffs to self- and paid employment could help address the question of whether entrepreneurs differ from other economic agents.