The Shareholder Base Hypothesis of Stock Return Volatility: Empirical Evidence

We use Swedish ownership data to explore whether a large and diversified shareholder base leads to lower volatility by improving the information content of stock prices. We find that volatility increases in the number of shareholders with respect to both the number of relatively large shareholders and the fraction of shares held by investors with stakes below 0.1%. Volatility is also positively related to the number of institutional owners but negatively related to the number of large and underdiversified institutional owners. Foreign investors have no impact. Our results suggest that a large shareholder base does not lower volatility.     

A Simple Formula for the Expected Rate of Return of an Option over a Finite Holding Period

Under conditions consistent with the Black-Scholes formula, a simple formula is developed for the expected rate of return of an option over a finite holding period possibly less than the time to expiration of the option. Under these conditions, surprisingly, the expected future value of a European option, even prior to expiration, is shown equal to the current Black-Scholes value of the option, except that the expected future value of the stock at the end of the holding period replaces the current stock price in the Black-Scholes formula and the future value of a riskless invesment of the striking price replaces the striking price. An extension of this result is used to approximate moments of the distribution of returns from an option portfolio.     

CEO与CFO的矛盾探源

做好了进医院,做不好进法院,顶得住的站不住,站得住的顶不住,这类浅白却富有辩证色彩的语言道尽了职场中CFO的尴尬处境。也从一个侧面表现出企业CEO与CFO的矛盾境地。     

The Effect of Labor Market Demand on U.S. CEO Pay Since 1980

This paper shows that the rise in U.S. chief executive officer (CEO) pay from 1980 to 2003 is only partially explained by competition for profit‐producing talent in the labor market. This conclusion is obtained by removing unintended data biases from tests of the only theoretical model in the literature that relates labor market competition (measured by large firm size) to CEO pay level. When the biases are removed or minimized, no more than 33% of the 600+ percentage rise in large‐firm CEO pay since 1980 is explained by a corresponding increase in large firm size.     

The effect of corporate governance on CEO luck: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)

CEOs are “lucky” when they receive stock option grants on days when the stock price is the lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing. Extending the work of Bebchuk et al. (2010), we explore the effect of overall corporate governance quality on CEO luck. Provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), our comprehensive governance metrics are much broader than those used in prior studies, encompassing more diverse aspects of corporate governance, such as audit, state laws, boards, ownership, and director education. We show that an improvement in governance quality by one standard deviation diminishes CEO luck by 14.77–21.06%. The governance standards recommended by ISS appear to be effective in deterring the opportunistic timing of option grants.     

Pay me a single figure! Assessing the impact of single figure regulation on CEO pay

In this paper, we examine the relation between quantitative disclosure of CEO pay and the optimality of pay structure in terms of 1) level of pay, 2) pay-performance relationship, and 3) CEO-to-employee pay ratio. We use the new reporting regulation in 2013, requiring large and medium-sized companies and groups in the UK to report a single figure of total pay, as an exogenous shock to pay disclosure. Our results are based on a hand-collected sample of FTSE 100 firms over the period of 2010–2017. The main findings are threefold: Firstly, we find that CEO total pay stays roughly the same before and after the new regulation. In addition, firms that voluntarily adopt the regulation early have higher pay increases than their counterparts that do not adopt early in univariate tests. Secondly, pay-performance sensitivity actually declines after the new regulation by more than 50%. This effect is particularly evident in firms with weak corporate governance. Thirdly, the effect of the reform on the CEO-to-employee pay ratio is minimal, whereby it declined slightly following the reform, but this is only significant in univariate tests. Our results suggest that the 2013 regulation which increases the reporting transparency has limited impact on total pay and pay-performance in the UK.     

Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors

A small group of academics and practitioners discusses four major controversies in the theory and practice of corporate finance:

• • What is the social purpose of the public corporation? Should corporate managements aim to maximize the profitability and value of their companies, or should they instead try to balance the interests of their shareholders against those of “stakeholder” groups, such as employees, customers, and local communities?
• • Should corporate executives consider ending the common practice of earnings guidance? Are there other ways of shifting the focus of the public dialogue between management and investors away from near-term earnings and toward longer-run corporate strategies, policies, and goals? And can companies influence the kinds of investors who buy their shares?
• • Are U.S. CEOs overpaid? What role have equity ownership and financial incentives played in the past performance of U.S. companies? And are there ways of improving the design of U.S. executive pay?
• • Can the principles of corporate governance and financial management at the core of the private equity model—notably, equity incentives, high leverage, and active participation by large investors—be used to increase the values of U.S. public companies?

     

经营利润率、股东收益与股票价格的价值相关性研究

本文以沪、深两市A股上市公司为研究对象,在F-O模型(剩余收益定价模型)的基础上,进一步探讨了分解后的会计信息:经营利润率和股东收益与股价的价值相关性。研究结果表明,上市公司的经营利润率和股东收益对股价有显著的解释能力。本研究的贡献在于进一步拓展了市场定价模型,为证券投资提供具有实用价值的参考。     

The Effect of Serial Dependence on Multiperiod Holding Period Return Performance

The impact of the investment time horizon on risk‐return properties of asset returns depends on the presence of serial correlation and higher order serial dependencies. We present a methodology for decomposing multiperiod holding period return covariance into serial and cross‐sectional components using a recursive multiplicative model that captures the effects of serial and cross‐sectional dependencies and their joint effects without requiring a distributional form assumption. Applying this model to historical monthly return series for commonly held financial assets and portfolios of assets, we investigate the significance of the investment time horizon, the existence and relevance of time diversification, the inflation‐hedging effectiveness of different assets, and the appropriateness of applying traditional capital market theory in a multiperiod framework.     

公司规模与股票收益率关系的实证研究

本文通过对1994-2004年中国所有上市公司的流通股规模、总市值规模与股票收益率的关系运用截面回归的方法进行实证研究，发现无论上市公司的流通股规模还是总市值规模都与股票的收益率呈负相关关系，而且在剔除风险因素以后，公司规模仍然与异常收益率呈负相关关系，且具有统计上的显著性。中国股市存在小公司效应。这说明中国股票市场不是半强有效的。     

Duration and Fisher's Rate of Return over Cost

This paper seeks to explain why the net present value profiles of investment projects may intersect with changes in the interest rate. Previous explanations have pointed to differences in the timing of the projects' cash flows. However, the timing of a project's cash flows has not been defined in the literature and the relative timing of projects' cash flows typically is illustrated by a simplistic example. We make use of the projects' durations to specify timing differences and provide a more explicit analysis of the role of timing differences in the intersection of present value profiles of projects.     

CEO Horizon,Optimal Pay Duration,and the Escalation of Short‐Termism

This paper studies optimal contracts when managers manipulate their performance measure at the expense of firm value. Optimal contracts defer compensation. The manager's incentives vest over time at an increasing rate, and compensation becomes very sensitive to short‐term performance. This generates an endogenous horizon problem whereby managers intensify performance manipulation in their final years in office. Contracts are designed to encourage effort while minimizing the adverse effects of manipulation. We characterize the optimal mix of short‐ and long‐term compensation along the manager's tenure, the optimal vesting period of incentive pay, and the dynamics of short‐termism over the CEO's tenure.     

大股东认购与配股公告期的股票价格调整

国内上市公司在股票市场进行后续融资主要是通过配股方式，近两年来增发新股方式也逐渐流行。国外上市公司在股票市场中的后续融资方式很多，我们将其统称为“上市后股票发行”(seasoned equify offerings，...     

The relationships between CEO characteristics and strategic risk-taking in family firms

Abstract

We examine the influences of chief executive officer (CEO) personal characteristics on family firms’ strategic risk-taking. Building on upper echelons theory, we investigate the influences of CEO family relationships, the CEO professional education, other career experiences, tenure, and career horizon have on the risk level a company takes. By analyzing a sample of 107 Italian family firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, we find that company’s risk-taking significantly and negatively relates to CEO family relationship and professional education, but positively to CEO career horizon. This provides support to the argument that such CEO personal characteristics are key factors in explaining differences in risk-taking among family firms. Further, our analysis of control variables shows that family firms’ risk-taking relates positively to board size and negatively to company size. These results suggest that company and board characteristics also significantly influence the risk levels taken by a company.     

股权制衡与公司业绩：理论与事实

运用中国上市公司2003年度的数据,比较股权制衡的公司与股权集中、股权分散公司经营业绩,得出股权制衡的公司业绩要好于股权分散和股权集的公司,因而股权制衡对上市公司绩效产生正面影响。     

服务业发展与城市化的关系研究——基于广西地区的实证分析

城市化是影响服务业发展的重要因素,本文广西地区为例,通过对其1978-2006年服务业增加值和非农人口比重的数据进行协整和G ranger因果关系检验,找出广西地区的服务业发展与城市化之间的关系,以及它们存在的问题,以期给投资者一些有用的建议。     

控股股东干预与国有上市公司薪酬契约有效性:来自董事长/CEO纵向兼任的经验证据

以董事长/CEO在非上市控股股东单位兼任为切入点,本文分析控股股东干预对国有上市公司薪酬契约有效性的影响。结果发现,董事长/CEO纵向兼任会提高企业薪酬水平,降低薪酬—业绩敏感度。进一步的检验发现,董事长/CEO纵向兼任会显著降低高管薪酬、提高员工薪酬、降低员工薪酬—业绩敏感度,缩小高管-员工薪酬差距。本文的研究结果支持国有上市公司董事长/CEO纵向兼任的"和谐目标"假说,即纵向兼任增强了非上市控股股东的干预程度,导致上市公司承担更多的员工和谐目标,进而降低国有上市公司薪酬契约有效性。就监管政策而言,本文的研究结果意味着,我国需要同时进行非上市国有股东和国有上市公司的市场化改革,以提高国有企业的效率。     

风险回报抑或信息租金:中国上市银行CEO报酬松绑效应的理论解释

较低的透明度使商业银行面临严重的代理冲突,并使其承担过度信用风险。给银行经理设计随机收益合约能缓解道德风险。但金融管制抑制了银行经理报酬一绩效敏感性。解除规制增加投资机会,但风险也随之而来。要降低银行自由化过程中的信用风险,需要建立股票等长期激励合约,使经理获得风险回报而不是寻求信息租金。2005年以来,中国银行业经理报酬出现了显著的松绑现象。但仍以合约收益为主,长期看,中国银行业需要建立基于长期绩效的经理报酬体系。     

监督,抑或共谋?——我国上市公司股权结构与公司价值的关系研究

本文通过扩展LLSV(2002)的模型,在监督与共谋的视角下分析了大股东之间分享控制权的治理模式对公司价值的影响,并利用2000—2004年间我国上市公司的样本数据进行实证检验。研究发现:(1)股权集中度、股权制衡度与公司价值之间均存在显著的正相关关系;(2)在不同股东性质的公司中,股权制衡的效果存在明显差异,尤其当第一、二大股东均属于非国有性质时,股权制衡难以发挥积极作用。这些研究结果表明其他大股东虽然能够起监督作用,但也可能与控股股东达成共谋以分享控制权收益。     

中小企业与金融服务

我国中小企业的蓬勃发展，在国民经济中起着举足轻重的作用。其保持适度的负债率可以增大其企业价值，促进其规模扩张，激励其进行产业结构调整。但我国目前的实际情况是中小企业受到了明显的金融抑制。