自然垄断产业的放松管制和管制改革

中国垄断性产业的改革严重滞后,原有体制下的许多僵化和扭曲现象继续存在,经营绩效距消费者和所有者的要求相去甚远。经济体制改革在竞争性产业和垄断性产业的不平衡严重阻碍中国国经济的市场化进程,自然垄断产业的放松管制、管制改革及竞争性结构的形成已成为经济体制进一步改革不可回避的课题。     

英国电信产业的放松管制和对主导运营商BT的再管制

自 1 980年起 ,英国电信产业先后实施了邮政、电信分离 ,建立独立的管制机构 ,对开放市场准入和私有化以后仍然居于主导地位的运营商———英国电信公司 (BT)实施包括价格上限管制在内的一系列管制 ,促进了英国电信产业向竞争性结构的转化。目前 ,我国电信产业同样面临着放松管制以及放松管制以后如何重组和再管制主导运营商的棘手难题。本文拟对英国电信产业 2 0余年的改革经验进行比较系统的回顾和评析 ,以期对我国电信产业的下一步改革有所启示。     

英国电信产业的放松管制和对主导营商BT的再管制

自1980年起，英国电信产业先后实施了邮政、电信分离、建立独立的管制机构，对开放市场准入和私有化以后仍然居于主导地位的运营商－－英国电信公司（BT）实施包括价格上限制在内的一系列管制，促进了英国电信产业向竞争性结构的转化。目前，我国电信产业同样面临着放松管制以后如何重组和再管制主导运营商的棘手难题。本文拟以英国电信产业20余年的改革经验进行比较系统的回顾和评析，以期对我国电信产业的下一步改革有所启示。     

分类适度管制：放松管制背景下的我国政府管制结构重构

伴随着西方放松管制改革的浪潮,国内学术界也开始呼吁放松管制,但目前我国的政府管制面对的主要是行政垄断问题以及管制结构的不合理。因此,我国政府管制改革,不是“放松管制”的问题,而是管制结构重构的问题：一方面要消灭原来计划体制的管理体制、管理办法和管理方式,消除行政垄断,另一方面要转变管制重点实行分类管制,即根据垄断性产业的业务进行划分实施放松管制的政策;根据不同产业以及同一产业不同时期实施放松管制政策。     

放松管制不等于减少监管

在市场经济中，除了极少具有很强外部性或者涉及国家安全的行业以外，大部分行业都没有垄断的理由。在中国，这样“没有理由”的垄断确实非常多，以致于一些人产生了政府万能的幻觉。一个垄断陛行业，通常意味着管理成本高昂、信息不透明，却可以轻而易举地获得超额利润，不需要付出太多的努力去创新。基金就是这样一个被行政垄断出来的暴利行业。     

自然垄断产业进入管制的成本收益分析——以中国电信业为例的实证研究

本文主要分析了政府进入管制带来的管制费用、社会福利损失、被管制企业成本增加等诸多的负面影响;同时,为了建立一种基于成本收益分析基础之上的现代政府进入管制体制,在对政府进入管制的成本和收益进行了一般理论分析的基础上,对中国电信业进行了相关的实证研究,虽然本文以中国电信业为例,但是其中的分析方法却具有一般性。     

制度偏好差异与电力产业规制放松的困境--"厂网分开"引发的深层思考

本文利用“芝加哥”学派利益集团理论的基本假设，对我国电力产业内部人势力的形成、强化及其行为对市场交易的扭曲进行了详尽的分析，从而为当前电力产业规制困境的发生提出了一个基于制度偏好和企业行为的解释。结果表明，在缺乏有效规制的背景下．对自然垄断产业实施等同于一般产业的“放权让利”武改革，为利益集团的成长提供了制度条件和资金支持。由于管制权力分散在诸多的“条块”之间。“厂网分开”后也没有建立权威性的专业机构．不同利益取向的参与者之间的博弈使电力产业的规制放松陷入困境。     

《我国自然垄断行业改革研究:管制与放松管制的理论与实践》评介

刘灿教授主持完成的国家社会科学基金项目成果,即专著《我国自然垄断行业改革研究：管制与放松管制的理论与实践》日前由西南财经大学出版社出版. 作者提出了一个关于转轨经济中自然垄断行业管制改革的分析框架：产权、竞争与绩效.作者认为,在转轨经济中,应该把产权与改革绩效放到一个特殊产业的环境中来研究.在自然垄断行业,产权的改革是重要的.因为产权改革对于解决这些产业的所有制问题和管制问题,尤其对于提高产业的长期绩效和投资激励问题具有非常重要的实践意义.同时,产权改革的绩效也取决于是否有一个能够促进有效竞争的市场结构.不同的企业制度具有不同的技术效率,从而导致成本差异.低效率企业垄断地位的维持必须依靠政府行政干预.     

博弈论用于放松管制电力系统的交易分析

电力工业正向放松管制的电力交易市场转变,在这种环境下,所有的电力交易均将基于价格而不是成本。建立区域性的电力库是放松电力市场管制的最直接的途径。然而,许多关于电力库交易者行为的经济学问题仍没有解决。在放松管制的电力交易市场中,交易者追求自己的最大效益而忽视整个系统的效益。但是对零售消费者,竞争使得电价下降;对电力交易者而言,关键问题是确定有竞争性的报价。本文运用博弈论来模拟在放松管制环境内确定报价的决策过程。电力库协调者可运用该项研究成果抑制电力库交易者的不公正的联合。改进的IEEE30母线系统用来比作放松管制的电力库,以说明该方法的主要特征。     

自然垄断产业进一步放松规制的理论依据--基于对成本曲线的重新理解

基于对成本曲线的重新理解，本文对20世纪80年代以来的新自然垄断理论进行了部分修正，进一步压缩了自然垄断产业管制的范围，剔除了新自然垄断理论中“进入无障碍、企业无承受力”情况下管制的必要性。这一结论有利于我国当前对行政垄断行业的市场化改革。     

Deregulation,Entry, and Competition in Local Banking Markets

Review of Industrial Organization - By applying the Bresnahan-Reiss empirical entry threshold model on Census data for the waves 1981 to 2011, we study the evolution of entry conditions in Italian...     

Regulation and Deregulation after 25 Years: Lessons Learned for Research in Industrial Organization

This paper is based on a keynote address given at the 2004 International Industrial Organization Conference in Chicago, April 2004. I draw selectively on the literature from the past 25 years on regulation/deregulation to provide important lessons about the attributes of good research in empirical industrial organization.     

Deregulation and environmental differentiation in the electric utility industry

This paper analyzes how economic deregulation impacts firm strategies and environmental quality in the electric utility industry. We find evidence that the deregulation introduced to this historically staid industry has stimulated environmental differentiation. Differentiation is most likely to appear where its point of uniqueness is valued by customers, and we confirm this relationship in our sample. Specifically, utilities that served customers who exhibited higher levels of environmental sensitivity generated more ‘green’ power. The tendency for firms to differentiate in this way is lessened if they are relatively more dependent on coal‐fired generation or relatively more efficient. Thus, there is evidence that firms sort themselves into either differentiation or low‐cost strategies as the competitive realities of a deregulated world unfold. Deregulation and the ensuing environmental differentiation illustrate how utilities exploited formerly unmet customer demand for green power. The result has been greater levels of renewable generation and, hence, a cleaner environment. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Deregulation on Casino Win in Atlantic City

This paper examines the impact of deregulation on thedemand for casino gaming in Atlantic City. Specifically, the paper analyzes the impact ofexpanded operating hours and floor space devoted toslot machines. Using monthly win data between June1978 and July 1996, the analysis reveals that expandedfloor space had a significant, positive impact on win,resulting in an average monthly increase of over $2million. This shows the importance of developing aregulatory structure rigid enough to ensure thehonesty and integrity of the gaming industry, butflexible enough to allow management to respond tochanging market conditions.     

Sunk Cost and Entry

The usual mechanisms by which sunk costs are said to affect entry arethrough raising the expected average cost of an entrant, relative to that ofincumbents. I show that in standard models and in the absence of riskpremia imposed by financial markets on an entrant's cost of capital, sunkcosts may make entry unprofitable because of their effect on the post-entryunit costs of incumbents.     

企业进入与行业利润率——对中国钢铁产业的实证研究

本文评述了研究企业进入行为的影响因素和市场效应的相关国内外文献，在此基础上提出了一个研究企业进入与行业利润率之间双向动态关系的分析框架。在此框架内．我们分析了钢铁工业近年来高速发展过程中的企业进入和利润率变动，使用动态模型刻画了二者的相互关系．解释了为什么在利润率为负的情况下某些产业中企业进入仍然十分剧烈．同时从跨产业比较的角度测度了4个亚产业的进入壁垒和竞争强度。本文的分析方法同样适用于其他产业。     

Deregulation,governance structures,and efficiency: the U.S. electric utility sector

The business strategy literature offers apparently opposite views of the ability of vertical integration to cope with the uncertainty related to changing regulatory environments. In this paper, we analyze how the process of retail deregulation affects the comparative efficiency of governance structures, which range on a continuum from fully vertically integrated structures to market transactions. Based on the analysis of 177 U.S. electric utilities from 1998 to 2001, our results show that the process of retail deregulation has a negative impact on firms' productive efficiency, as measured using Data Envelopment Analysis. Furthermore, firms that are vertically integrated into electricity generation, or that rely on the market for the supply of their electricity, are more efficient than firms that adopt hybrid structures combining vertical integration and contracting. This research has important implications because it shows the coexistence of different types of governance structures that cope efficiently with regulatory uncertainty through different mechanisms. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Entry under Asymmetric Regulation

In recent years, the local telephone industry has evolved from a traditionally regulated structure of natural monopoly to one characterized as having a dominant firm and competitive fringe. Yet, legacy regulation from the monopoly era still remains in this new environment, and is often applied solely to the dominant firm. Economic theory suggests that asymmetric regulation of this sort will induce competitive entry. We find support for this theory by demonstrating that the amount of entry into local telephone markets is significantly higher when asymmetric quality-of-service standards are present.