European monetary policy: Institutional design and policy experience

The following article examines design issues relevant to European monetary policy: central bank independence, and the accountability and transparency of monetary policy strategy. An empirical approach is then applied which allows a comparison between the ECB and other central banks. It also enables an investigation of whether the ECB simply follows the US Federal Reserve Bank, as is sometimes claimed.     

100 Jahre Federal Reserve System

The Federal Reserve System (Fed) was created in December 1913 when the Federal Reserve Act was signed. Since then, the Fed has become the most influential central bank in the world. This article gives an overview of the Fed’s history and its structure before evaluating the Fed’s monetary policy over the last 100 years. The main findings are that the last 100 years have shown that a central bank is useful for solving economic problems but that sometimes the central bank has created its own problems.     

Federal Reserve Independence in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis: Should We Be Worried?

The extraordinary circumstances of the past few years have led to extraordinary responses by the Federal Reserve and other central banks. These ventures into uncharted waters have heightened political scrutiny to the point of raising concern about future independence. In discussing independence of the Federal Reserve, it is important to separate its regulatory and supervisory functions from its monetary policy function. It is the latter in which the question of independence is most important. History indicates that independent monetary policy has been a powerful deterrent to inflation. This paper outlines the threats to Federal Reserve independence, particularly as it exists from the unconventional policies that it pursued to mitigate the financial crisis. Economists have an important role in making the case that monetary policy remains independent.     

What's Wrong With the Federal Reserve: What Would Restore Independence?

The actual degree of independence of the Federal Reserve has varied over the years. This paper traces its history and finds that the Federal Reserve has been most successful in its dual full-employment, low inflation mandate when it follows fixed rules, and focuses on the intermediate term rather than trying to react to short-term developments under political pressure. Going forward, monetary policy should emphasize on annual monetary growth more and short-term interest rates less. A number of policies are recommended to support this overall emphasis on intermediate-term stability.     

The Depoliticization of Monetary Policy

In the past thirty years, it has been claimed that Republicans tend to favor relatively restrictive monetary policy while Democrats favor relatively accommodative monetary policy. Another claim is that, regardless of which political party is in power, monetary policy tends to be relatively restrictive during the first two years of an administration and relatively accommodative during its final two years. The present paper finds an absence of empirical evidence supporting either claim by restricting the sample period to the past quarter century (1982–2006). The depoliticization of monetary policy decisions probably reflects, among other factors, both the post-1970s new-Keynesian consensus in macroeconomic theory and the realization of political independence of the Federal Reserve System during the Volcker-Greenspan years. Editor’s note: After this article was submitted and accepted for publication by Business Economics, Mr. Tempelman took a position with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The views expressed are strictly those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.     

Threats to monetary policy independence: reasons to be concerned

Several legislative efforts are under way that aim to impose greater congressional oversight of and influence on the monetary policy decision making of the Federal Reserve System. Some of these initiatives might do little harm or even make marginal improvements. But others pose more serious threats to the operational independence of monetary policy. Proposals to require the Federal Reserve to frame monetary policy decisions according to a mathematical formula imply a concrete simplicity of policy that is inaccurate and misleading. And the reporting requirements associated with these proposals threaten to negate the major advantage of monetary policy as a countercyclical weapon—speed. Proposals to subject the non-monetary policy functions of the Fed to the appropriations process provide Congress with additional leverage that could be used to apply pressure to monetary policy decisions. For its part, the Fed should continue to increase transparency through more timely and complete release of relevant information and analysis. To best promote the objectives of stable prices and maximum employment, the operational independence of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy decision making needs to be preserved and protected.     

Three Challenges to Central Bank Orthodoxy

Since 2007–09, the Federal Reserve has pursued a very aggressive monetary policy strategy. This strategy has been associated with healthy labor market conditions, moderate economic growth, and inflation—netting out the effects of a major oil price shock—that is close to the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) 2 percent target. Thus, with the economy returning to normal, it is natural for the FOMC to begin the process of exiting its highly accommodative policy. The FOMC has laid out several well-defined steps for this process. This strategy may be called central bank orthodoxy, since it is a natural extension of the classical view. However, three challenges to this orthodoxy have developed. Although each challenge is interesting and potentially helpful, the orthodox view provides a better basis for devising near- and medium-term monetary policy decisions.     

Financial Stability and the Hemianopsia of Monetary Policy

Financial stability concerns cannot be separated from macroeconomic objectives of monetary policy. Stimulative monetary policy works by creating financial conditions that could lead to instability in markets that could, in turn, engender deflationary pressures. Although the Federal Reserve Act does not explicitly mention financial stability as an FOMC objective, it is fundamentally bound together with the achievement of the explicit goals of maximum employment and price stability.     

Monetary Policy Independence under Flexible Exchange Rates: An Illusion?

I analyse whether countries with flexible exchange rates are able to pursue an independent monetary policy, as suggested by traditional theory. I use data for three Latin American countries with flexible exchange rates, inflation targeting and capital mobility – Chile, Colombia and Mexico – to investigate the extent to which Federal Reserve actions are translated into local central banks' policy rates. The results indicate that there is significant ‘policy contagion’ and that these countries tend to ‘import’ Fed policies. The degree of monetary policy independence is lower than what traditional models suggest.     

美国经济的信贷紧缩和美联储货币政策工具创新

2007年美国爆发次贷危机,次贷危机引发信贷紧缩,信贷紧缩对美国实体经济的消极影响具体表现为:住宅投资急剧下降、企业投资急剧下降和个人消费支出的减少。信贷紧缩影响了实体经济,使美国陷入了经济衰退。美联储在这次金融危机中为稳定金融体系积极充当金融体系"最终贷款人"角色,美联储在使用传统金融工具的同时,积极创新,开发了多种新的工具。定期拍卖工具、定期证券出借工具、一级交易商信贷工具、与外国中央银行的货币互换和干预商业票据市场。当然,美联储一系列的政策创新举措也引发了许多担忧。     

A new twist on an old framework: bounded price-level targeting

One of the notable macroeconomic developments of the last two decades has been the apparent decline in the so-called neutral real rate of interest (or r-star). The declining level of r-star has significantly reduced forecasts of the steady-state federal funds rate associated with “normalized” monetary policy. Because a lower steady-state policy rate implies a heightened probability of reaching the effective lower bound on the federal funds rate in the event of an economic downturn, a debate has opened among academics and policymakers about potential changes in Fed’s monetary policy framework that might ameliorate the lower bound problem. This paper introduces a variation of price-level targeting that satisfies a definition of price stability that requires the central bank to keep the price level within a pre-specified percentage of a pre-specified target path for all time horizons into the future. The framework, referred to as bounded price-level targeting, is compared to other proposed frameworks. The paper discusses the conditions under which bounded price-level targeting is consistent with other proposals.     

人民币汇率的决定因素及其走势分析

研究人民币汇率的决定因素及其走势对我国在未来的经济发展具有重要意义。人民币汇率的主要决定因素为国内外的物价和利率水平差异、经济增长速度的快慢、国际收支状况及央行货币政策等。在短期内,由于我国经济增长放缓、美国经济逐渐复苏、美联储退出量化宽松、央行引导挤出套利资金以及国际收支的变动等原因的影响,我国人民币汇率的走势仍是双向波动,2014年内可能不会再出现人民币单边升值。预计未来跨境资金流动和人民币汇率仍保持双向波动的局面,且后者的波动幅度将加大。     

The Federal Reserve's Mandate: Long Run

Given the slow recovery of the U.S. economy, quantitative easing of monetary policy in the form of U.S. Federal Reserve asset purchases has been attractive. However, it is not clear that the current and likely future economic environment warrants this policy, given its long-term risks. This paper outlines these risks and makes the case for a return to conventional policy by allowing currently held assets to roll off the Federal Reserve's balance sheet as they reach maturity and by resuming more conventional monetary policy. This is not a quick fix, but it is less risky than current policy in achieving the Federal Reserve's long-run dual mandate of price stability and maximum employment.     

我国货币政策效果弱化的原因及对策

从宏观经济层面和货币政策本身以及中央银行的独立性等微观层面分析,使我国货币政策效果弱化的原因包括金融抑制、外汇占款、货币政策传导机制不畅、中央银行缺乏独立性等,针对这些问题我国应在疏通货币政策传导机制、大力发展金融机构债券市场和企业短期债券市场、深化国有商业银行改革、协调发展资本市场和货币市场等方面采取措施。     

Can Monetary Policy Meet the Needs of Financial Stability? Remembering the Frb Alongside the Fomc

The monetary policy remedy for demand weakness flowing from one set of macroeconomic imbalances could lead to another set of imbalances in the financial and economic system. The only prudent way to insure against collapse is to have a resilient financial system. The instruments to require that lie with regulators, not with monetary policymakers. Within the Federal Reserve System, they lie with the Board, not with the Open Market Committee. In mapping and articulating its approach to macroprudential policy, the Board needs to determine its decision-making norms having regard to their implications for communication strategy, and how it sees its own role in dynamic regulatory policy fitting with the FOMC’s approach to conjunctural policy     

Revisiting the nexus between globalisation and the shadow economy: Untying the influences of de jure versus de facto globalisation

This paper examines the relationship between globalisation and the size of the shadow economy, focusing on the differential effects of de jure and de facto globalisation. Using panel data on over 120 countries from 1991 to 2017, the results suggest that globalisation reduces the prevalence of the shadow economy. Furthermore, after differentiating between de jure and de facto globalisation, we find that both de facto and de jure globalisation are effective in curbing the spread of the shadow economy, with de jure globalisation showing a marginally larger impact. However, once we disaggregate the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries, the results show that it is mainly the OECD countries driving this result while the influence of globalisation is statistically insignificant in non-OECD countries. These results withstand a series of robustness analyses and offer important policy implications.     

在信用货币制度下中央银行超然制度的和谐构建

中央银行超然性是信用货币制度的重要特性,但中央银行在货币发行、金融政策制定、金融监管等方面存在的制度缺陷,严重影响了中央银行应具有的超然性、独立性与权威性。应加强对中央银行产权结构、外部组织结构、货币政策调节范围以及货币政策操作工具的创新,构建信用货币制度下的中央银行超然制度。     

中国货币政策不确定性和宏观经济新闻的人民币汇率效应

基于2012年4月30日至2018年12月17日的银行间7天逆回购操作利率,本文首次使用波动率回归拟合的方法,从政策利率的角度改进中国货币政策不确定性指数,并进一步研究了在不同程度货币政策不确定性的情况下,人民币兑美元汇率对宏观经济新闻的反应。收集和构建10项宏观经济新闻后,本文发现当市场参与者普遍不能较为准确地预测未来政策变化的情形时,货币政策不确定性上升,在岸、离岸人民币兑美元汇率对宏观经济新闻的反应显著减弱。当货币政策存在较高不确定性时,市场对未来政策判断的分歧加剧,进而人民币汇率对宏观经济新闻的反应不足。在货币政策不确定性较高时,增加央行的汇率沟通,可以发挥其对宏观经济新闻的补充作用,同时增强市场对宏观经济基本面信息的反应。本文不仅丰富了货币政策不确定性的负面影响、经济后果以及宏观经济新闻的人民币汇率效应相关理论研究,而且为未来货币政策制定、调整和实施提供了有价值的依据,为货币当局进行有效外汇市场干预提供了经验参考。     

Optimal monetary policy in a currency union with interest rate spreads

We introduce “financial imperfections” – asymmetric net wealth positions, incomplete risk-sharing, and interest rate spreads across member countries – in a prototypical two-country currency union model and study implications for monetary policy transmission mechanism and optimal policy. In addition to, and independent from, the standard transmission mechanism associated with nominal rigidities, financial imperfections introduce a wealth redistribution role for monetary policy. Moreover, the two mechanisms reinforce each other and amplify the effects of monetary policy. On the normative side, financial imperfections, via interactions with nominal rigidities, generate two novel policy trade-offs. First, the central bank needs to pay attention to distributional efficiency in addition to macroeconomic (and price level) stability, which implies that a strict inflation targeting policy of setting union-wide inflation to zero is never optimal. Second, the interactions lead to a trade-off in stabilizing relative consumption versus the relative price gap (the deviation of relative prices from their efficient level) across countries, which implies that the central bank allows for less flexibility in relative prices. Finally, we consider how the central bank should respond to a financial shock that causes an increase in the interest rate spread. Under optimal policy, the central bank strongly decreases the deposit rate, which reduces aggregate and distributional inefficiencies by mitigating the drop in output and inflation and the rise in relative consumption and prices. Such a policy response can be well approximated by a spread-adjusted Taylor rule as it helps the real interest rate track the efficient rate of interest.     

Macroeconomic information and stock prices

The paper analyzes the response of stock prices to the announcements of 15 representative macroeconomic variables. Stock prices respond primarily to announcements of monetary variables. Stocks of financial companies are the most sensitive to monetary news. Implicit in the stock price reactions are the market perceptions that the Federal Reserve plays an important role in future macroeconomic developments. The post-October 1982 change in the operating target of the Federal Reserve did not affect the stock price responses substantially, although it did affect the corresponding responses of short-term interest rates.