Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union

The Soviet ruling elite, the nomenklatura, used both cooption and political repression to encourage loyalty to the communist regime. Loyalty was critical both in defusing internal opposition to the rule of the nomenklatura and in either deterring or defeating foreign enemies of the Soviet Union. The cost of coopting people into the Communist Party was a decrease in the standard of living of members of the nomenklatura, whereas the cost of political repression was the danger that members of the nomenklatura would themselves be victimized. We assume that the nomenklatura determined the extent of cooption and the intensity of political repression by equating perceived marginal benefits and marginal costs. We use this assumption to construct an account of the historical evolution of policies of cooption and political repression in the Soviet Union.     

Political corruption and capture of the minority

This article presents a model of political corruption in which a briber can choose either to bribe only the incumbent party or to capture also the opposition party to sterilize its monitoring role. The analysis also explores interparty collusion, media independence, and political contestability. The model suggests that policies aiming to strengthen the role of minorities can produce ambiguous effects as they may induce bribers' avoidance behavior. Reputational sanctions appear to be less effective than criminal ones, although political contestability increases their deterrence effect. Paradoxically, harsh criminal sanctions may induce tacit collusion because minorities highly regard their outcomes once in power.     

Political repression in autocratic regimes

Theoretical models on autocracies have long grappled with how to characterize and analyze state sponsorship of repression. Moreover, much of the existing formal literature sees dictators’ behavior as determined by one type of opposition actor alone and disregards the potential role played by other types of actors. We develop a contest model of political survival with a ruler, the elite and the opposition, and show how the ruler needs to respond to revolutionary pressures while securing the allegiance of his own supportive coalition. We find that the ruler’s reliance on vertical and horizontal repression is antithetically affected by the country’s wealth and the optimal bundle of vertical and horizontal repression has important consequences for the regime’s political vulnerability. Our hypothesis about the impact of wealth on repression is strongly borne out by the empirical results, which are robust to endogeneity concerns.     

Centralized institutions and cascades

Why do sudden and massive social, economic, and political changes occur when and where they do? Are there institutional preconditions that encourage such changes when present and discourage such changes when absent? I employ a general model which suggests that cascades which induce massive equilibrium changes are more likely to occur in regimes with centralized coercive power, defined as the ability to impose more than one type of sanction (economic, legal, political, social, or religious). Centralized authorities are better able to suppress subversive actions when external shocks are small, as citizens have little incentive to incur numerous types of sanctions. However, citizens are also more likely to lie about their internal preferences in such regimes (e.g., falsely declare loyalty to an oppressive government), entailing that larger shocks are more likely to trigger a cascade to a vastly different equilibrium. The model is applied to the severity of protests that followed austerity measures taken in developing nations since the 1970s.     

The Ukraine conflict,economic–military power balances and economic sanctions

The evolution and outcomes of conflicts in Europe, including the current one in Ukraine, have been influenced by the dynamics of economic, technological and military balances, which in turn are affected by the economic warfare and sanctions that have been used to alter them. This article reviews defence economic concepts of relevance to the Ukraine conflict and then draws out lessons for the present concerning power balances, military capabilities, conventional deterrence, economic warfare and counter-measures against sanctions from experiences in Europe in the twentieth century. An evaluation is made of the impacts of economic sanctions on Russia and Ukraine in 2014–2016.     

对董事注意义务和忠诚义务的渊源分析

当事人之间的权力不对称容易导致董事的忠诚义务的形成,忠实义务等董事的义务的产生与一方拥有权力而另外一方相对没有权力的情况有关,但是其更重要的原因是委托人对受托人产生的信赖。美国的董事承担注意义务和忠诚义务的渊源是受托义务,日本则是委任合同,两者有所不同。信托理论能更好地说明忠诚义务产生的原因。而与信托理论相比,委任理论对信赖的保护的必要性程度相对比较低,委任理论只能说明注意义务的产生。     

产品市场定位与消费者忠诚之间的关系——基于浙江产品市场势力调查问卷

以2011年浙江省商务厅向各地市县发放的浙江产品市场势力调查问卷为数据来源,以其中的119家浙江省内商业企业作为研究样本,对浙江产品的市场定位与消费者忠诚之间的关系进行了实证研究。结果表明:产品市场定位与消费者的行为忠诚相关,提高产品的市场定位有利于消费者产生购买企业产品的偏好,进而促使消费者实现实际的、持续的购买行为;产品市场定位的提升尤其对产品客单价、产品销量和销售额的提升有显著的促进作用。因此,浙江企业应积极投入人力、物力,提高其产品的市场定位,以提升消费者忠诚,进而实现企业在市场中的议价能力及市场竞争力的提高。     

International sanctions’ impact on energy efficiency in target states

This paper investigates the impact of international sanctions on energy efficiency by employing the panel fixed effect as well as average marginal effect from the Tobit model via data on 30 sanctioned states over the period 1996–2015 with international sanctions including unilateral, plurilateral, U.S., EU, UN, economic, and non-economic cases. Overall, we find that the imposition of unilateral sanctions leads to a 0.067% decrease in energy efficiency, but that of plurilateral sanctions positively contribute to energy efficiency in the case of the full sample of countries. Moreover, the imposition of UN sanctions has a greater decrease on energy efficiency in the target states than the 0.042% reduction of energy efficiency when the sanctionist is the U.S. For robustness, empirical results indicate that the imposition of plurilateral sanctions results in a drop of energy efficiency in Islamic countries, but an increase in non-Islamic countries, while there are also negative shocks induced by the imposition of EU sanctions on energy efficiency in Asian countries, but not for non-Asian countries. We also consider endogenous problems and dynamic specification by using indicator variables and System GMM. In summary, our empirical findings provide policy suggestions for those sanctioned countries about how to maintain energy efficiency when facing international sanctions.     

Nexus between economic sanctions and inflation: a case study in Iran

Conventional studies have applied dummy variables to analyse the relationship between economic sanctions and inflation while we construct an index which is called Trade-Financial Sanctions (TF index). TF Index is a liner combination of indices which includes trade openness and foreign investment by applying the principal component model. Through the TF index and market exchange rate the impact of economic sanctions on inflation is analysed in the three phases of sanctions; free sanctions, heavy sanctions, and light sanctions. The results illustrate that the TF index decreases inflation when the Iran’s economy experiences free sanctions or light sanctions relative to when the economy is in heavy sanctions. Heavy sanctions create instability in the market exchange rates and widening the gap between the market and the official exchange rates. Furthermore, economic sanctions increase expected inflation among the people and drive higher inflation. Therefore, these results suggest that the government should work more seriously to solve the main obstacles of trade and investment inflows imposed by the economic sanctions.     

Country impacts of multilateral oil sanctions

In recent years, economic sanctions have become an important tool in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Though usually aimed at a single country, they also can affect the economies of other nations. Knowledge of such impacts would inform U.S. policy-makers as to which other countries might be helped or harmed, and help predict which other nations likely would support or oppose the sanctions. This article presents results relating to the imposition of sanctions in the oil market. These results are obtained from exercising a dynamic computable general equilibrium model built by Charles River Associates under sponsorship of the American Petroleum Institute. The model is used to analyze GDP effects on a number of countries from multilateral oil sanctions against Iraq. The results suggest that it is possible to provide useful information regarding the impacts of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. However, they also indicate that sanctions can be expensive, with substantial spillover effects. Though sanctions may be an appropriate policy choice in given instances, these effects should be incorporated into foreign policy analyses.     

The impact of economic sanctions on international trade: How do threatened sanctions compare with imposed sanctions?

We draw on established theoretical works in international political economy to compare the empirical effect of threatened and imposed economic sanctions on international trade. To deepen the analysis, we analyze whether there are any differential effects when different instruments of sanctions are employed, as well as whether the effect of sanctions is product specific. To do this, we use the gravity model and recent detailed disaggregated data on sanctions spanning the period 1960–2009. Our results show that the impact of threatened sanctions differs qualitatively and quantitatively from imposed sanctions. Whereas imposed sanctions lead to a decrease in the trade flow between the sender and its target, a threat of sanctions leads to an increase. The positive impact of the threat may be due to economic agents in both the sender and its target resorting to stockpiling prior to the actual imposition of sanctions to minimize any adverse consequences of the sanctions. These differential effects of threatened and imposed sanctions also extend to food and medicinal products, as well as when different instruments of sanctions are employed.     

Sanctions that signal: An experiment

The introduction of sanctions provides incentives for more pro-social behavior, but may also be a signal that non-cooperation is prevalent. In an experimental minimum-effort coordination game we investigate the effects of the information contained in the choice to sanction. We compare the effect of sanctions that are introduced exogenously by the experimenter to that of sanctions which have been actively chosen by a subject who has superior information about the previous effort of the other players. We find that cooperative subjects perceive actively chosen sanctions as a negative signal which significantly reduces the effect of sanctions.     

Do economic sanctions affect protectionism? Evidence from agricultural support

The objective of this paper is to examine whether economic sanctions contribute to influencing the target countries’ protectionist policies in the agricultural sector. Using pooled mean group estimations in a dynamic heterogeneous panel setting, we find robust empirical evidence that, in the long‐run, economic sanctions decrease agricultural protection in the target counties, and this effect is mitigated by the wealth of the target's economy. However, the relationship is insignificant in the short run. Furthermore, our results also suggest that the impact of sanctions on agricultural protection (a) increases with the severity of economic sanctions, (b) is greater for multilateral sanctions than unilateral sanctions, and (c) is more severe on agricultural protection when sanctions span a longer duration.     

Trade policy and ecology

Trade sanctions on product exports are often used as measures for conservation of stocks of living resources. Two opposing approaches are investigated. The harvest approach argues that sanctions reduce the harvest, and thus protects the stock. It is shown that this does not consider the long run effects nor the effects of sanctions on the management system. The investment approach argues that increased price protects the stock, making the species a profitable investment. It is shown that this approach does not consider the asset effects of price changes, and that the sanctions usually increase the stock in an one species analysis. If the wildlife competes for land the conclusions may be different, but still sanctions usually works. If the manager has a joint management of several species, the stock effects of sanctions are ambiguous, depending on both the species interaction, and the profitability of the harvesting from each of them. In this case it is not possible to use intuitive reasoning, sanctions give distortions to all stocks simultaneously. The threat of extinction depends crucially on the unit cost in harvesting of depleted stocks. The paper concludes that trade policy is a too general measure for the management of living resources, and may implicate important economic distortions to the ecological system.This study is partially funded by the Research Council of Norway (Environment and Development). I thank Derek Clark, Tore Thonstad, Frode Steen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration

In his 1960 seminal contribution to game theory and its applications, The Strategy of Conflict, Thomas Schelling suggested that in international negotiations, strong international opposition may be an asset rather than a liability. Rather than constraining it, the opposition would enlarge the opportunity set thus making it easier to successfully conclude international negotiations. This property, which is also known as the Schelling-conjecture, shares some aspects with constitutional economics, namely the two-level approach suggesting that it might be beneficial for all parties to give up some power by tying one??s hands. In this paper we examine by means of a simulation study how far we can take this notion in the politics of trade integration. In explicitly marrying Schelling??s 1960 idea with the 1988 two-level approach by Putnam and embedding the result into the political economy of trade we find that the threat of a domestic opposition or national institution having a veto power frequently but not always delivers a more favorable outcome for the respective trade representative at the international table. Whether the Schelling-conjecture applies or not actually depends on the subtle interplay of a ??bully effect?? and a ??serenity effect??.     

Which sanctions matter? analysis of the EU/russian sanctions of 2014

We use a quasi-natural experiment of reciprocal imposition of trade sanctions by Russia and the EU since 2014. Using UNCTAD/BACI bilateral flows data we take this unique opportunity to analyse both sanctions. In particular, we study the effectiveness of narrow versus broadly defined sanctions, and differences in the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on exports and imports. We show that the Russian sanctions imposed on European and American food imports resulted in about an 8 times stronger decline in trade flows than those imposed by the EU and the US on exports of extraction equipment. These results do not appear to be driven by diversion of trade flows via non-sanctioning countries. Hence the difference in sanctions’ effectiveness can be attributed to the limited retroactivity of Western sanctions, which allowed exemptions for exports made pursuant to contracts made prior to 2014.     

STOCK MARKET REACTION TO NUCLEAR REACTOR FAILURES

Current proposals to reform regulation of the commercial nuclear power industry ignore the potential of financial market sanctions on poor reactor management. This paper examines investor reaction to the automatic shutdowns following equipment failures at nuclear power plants from 1978 to 1985. Compared with a portfolio of nuclear utilities, the daily return to common equity of the owner of a failed reactor dropped by 0.24 percent after two trading days but increased by 0.24 percent four trading days later. Investors are averse to reactor failures but correct initial negative responses once they learn that the reactor is not damaged.     

The Interaction of Legal and Social Norm Enforcement

Although legal sanctions are often nondeterrent, we frequently observe compliance with “mild laws.” A possible explanation is that the incentives to comply are shaped not only by legal, but also by social sanctions. This paper employs a novel experimental approach to study the link between legal and social norm enforcement. We analyze whether the two institutions are complements or substitutes. Our results show that legal sanctions partially crowd out social norm enforcement. Mild laws nevertheless give scope for a potentially large, positive welfare effect, as a higher level of compliance is achieved at lower social enforcement costs.     

Judicial error and cooperation

Cooperation can be induced by an authority with the power to mete out sanctions for free riders, but law enforcement is prone to error. This paper experimentally analyzes preferences for and consequences of errors in formal sanctions against free riders in a public goods game. With type I errors, even full contributors to the public good may be punished. With type II errors, free riders may go unpunished. We find that judicial error undermines cooperation and that the effects of type I and II errors are symmetric. To investigate their relative (dis-)like for error, we let subjects choose what type of error to prevent. We find that subjects prefer type II over type I errors. However, the strength of preferences for preventing type I errors is fully in line with a motive to maximize income and does not indicate any additional psychological or fairness bias against type I errors.     

THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE LAW

1. All individual labour relations disputes arising out of breach of contract of employment including unfair dismissal should be capable of being settled by the relatively rapid, inexpensive and informal procedures of the industrial tribunals with further appeal on points of law; 2. The minimum condition of legal recognition for the closed shop should be the effective strengthening in law of protection for the individual union member or prospective member, subject to discretion concerning ‘disruptists7rsquo; 3. In the central area of collective labour relations, the following policy suggestions are made: a) criminal or civil sanctions against individual employees are impractical and best forgotten. Sanctions can only be realistically considered in relation to leaders and organisations; b) the objective for a rational law of strike action (or other forms of direct action) should be limited if it is to be realistic, i.e., not the chopping down of managerial or trade union or shop floor power but insistence on a reasonable degree of orderliness and time for second thoughts in the run up to direct action; c) it is an ancient truth that only fair and reasonable laws will command respect. Disputes procedures are a kind of quasi-law. To command respect and to justify sanctions for its breach, a disputes procedure should be independently certificated as fair and reasonable in accordance with modern labour relations standards. The C.I.R. is at present the obvious body in which to vest this certificating power; d) where adequate procedures and principles are provided by the law to deal with an identified class of industrial dispute, the use of private power, including private collective power, to impose a solution should be legally discouraged.