Banking Panics,Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium

This paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. We demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive “story” that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled. If individuals observe long “lines” at the bank, they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run. However, bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information. Extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations.     

Macroeconomic Impact of Bank Regulation and Supervision: A Cross-Country Investigation

Bank regulation and supervision (RS) is a formal institutional mechanism that aims to reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard risks in the banking sector. This paper offers an empirical exploration of the relationship between banking-sector performance and RS using data on the legal quality of bank regulation and supervision. The main channels via which RS affects bank performance are considered to be depositor trust, investment mobilization, and borrower discipline. An event study of up to fifty-three countries provides robust evidence that RS has significant positive effects on bank deposits and investment rate and significant negative effects on nonperforming loans.     

Depositor Behavior under Macroeconomic Risk: Evidence from Bank Runs in Emerging Economies

Depositor behavior has been associated with bank‐specific characteristics, random runs, or contagion episodes. Using evidence on the 2000–02 bank runs in Argentina and Uruguay, this paper shows that macroeconomic risk is also important. Few macroeconomic shocks can quickly cause large runs. Macroeconomic risk affects deposits regardless of traditional bank‐specific characteristics. Furthermore, bank exposure to macroeconomic factors can explain differences in deposit withdrawals. During crises, the evolution of bank‐specific characteristics is mainly driven by macroeconomic factors, while the informational content of bank‐specific variables declines. Overall, depositors seem responsive to risk in a broader sense than that often considered by the literature.     

Why Do Bank Runs Look Like Panic? A New Explanation

This paper demonstrates that, even if depositors are fully rational and always choose the Pareto-dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria, a bank run may still occur when depositors' expectations on the bank's fundamentals do not change. More specifically, a bank run may occur when depositors learn that noisy bank-specific information will be revealed, or when they learn that precise bank-specific information will not be revealed. The results in this paper are consistent with the empirical evidence about bank runs. It also implies that suspension of convertibility can improve the efficiency of bank runs.     

The Regulation of Private Money*

Financial crises are bank runs. At root, the problem is short-term debt (private money), which while an essential feature of market economies, is inherently vulnerable to runs in all its forms (not just demand deposits). Bank regulation aims at preventing bank runs. History shows two approaches to bank regulation: the use of high-quality collateral to back banks’ short-term debt and government insurance for the short-term debt. Also, explicit or implicit limitations on entry into banking can create charter value (an intangible asset) that is lost if the bank fails. This can create an incentive for the bank to abide by the regulations and not take too much risk.     

On the Effects of Deposit Insurance and Observability on Bank Runs: An Experimental Study

We study the effects of deposit insurance and observability of previous actions on the emergence of bank runs by means of a controlled laboratory experiment. We consider three depositors in the line of a bank, who decide between withdrawing or keeping their money deposited. We have three treatments with different levels of deposit insurance which reflect the losses a depositor may incur in the case of a bank run. We find that different levels of deposit insurance and the possibility of observing other depositors’ actions affect the likelihood of bank runs. When decisions are not observable, higher levels of deposit insurance decrease the probability of bank runs. When decisions are observable, this need not to be the case. These results suggest that (i) observability might be considered as a partial substitute of deposit insurance and (ii) the optimal deposit insurance should take into account the degree of observability.     

Banking on the Boom,Tripped by the Bust: Banks and the World War I Agricultural Price Shock

How do banks respond to asset booms? This paper examines (i) how U.S. banks responded to the World War I farmland boom; (ii) the impact of regulation; and (iii) how bank closures exacerbated the postwar bust. The boom encouraged new bank formation and balance sheet expansion (especially by new banks). Deposit insurance amplified the impact of rising crop prices on bank portfolios, while higher minimum capital requirements dampened the effects. Banks that responded most aggressively to the asset boom had a higher probability of closing in the bust, and counties with more bank closures experienced larger declines in land prices.     

银保协作、ART保险与银行信用风险转移

在分析银保协作与可选择性风险转移(Alternativ Risk Transfer,即 ART)保险的内在逻辑基础上,进一步分析 ART 保险实现银行信用风险转移的内在机理,并以此为依据设计银保信贷系统的 ART 保险机制。结果表明,ART 保险可以有效分担银保信贷系统的信用风险,降低银保信贷系统的风险运营成本,提升银保信贷系统的运营效率,并实现商业银行信用风险转移目标。可见,推行银保协作型信贷模式,对于治理信贷配给,从而提升信贷市场效率具有重要意义。     

On the dynamics and severity of bank runs: An experimental study

This paper presents an experimental investigation of the factors that affect the dynamics and severity of bank runs. Our experiments demonstrate that the more information laboratory economic agents can expect to learn about the crisis as it develops, the more willing they are to restrain themselves from withdrawing their funds once a crisis occurs. Furthermore, our results indicate that the presence of insiders, who know the quality of the bank, significantly affects the dynamics of bank runs and helps mitigate their severity. We also show that deposit insurance, even of a limited type, can help diminish the severity of bank runs.     

银保协作、风险自留与银行信用风险补偿——基于银保信贷系统的分析视角

在分析风险自留的内生逻辑基础上,进一步分析风险自留实现银行信用风险补偿的内在机理。研究表明：银保信贷系统通过对贷款企业个体风险与事先设定的平均代偿风险的匹配性甄别,实现对银行信用风险的分级补偿功能。针对银行超预期信用风险,先行实施银行风险拨备机制对银行平均代偿风险进行补偿,然后实施超额风险自留机制对超过平均代偿风险的银行超额风险部分再次进行补偿,超额风险自留补偿基金将由银行与担保机构依据各自的风险均衡配置阈值占比共同筹集,以此来实现银行信用风险分级补偿目标。并以此为依据,设计了银保信贷系统风险自留机制。     

Implications of Debt Renegotiation for Optimal Bank Policy and Firm Behavior

This paper analyzes the problems associated with the renegotiation of debt contracts involving a bank (the lender) and a firm (the borrower) when the latter is operated by a risk averse manager. Firms undertake risky projects with loan capital borrowed from the bank. When a firm cannot pay off a loan it is technically bankrupt. Both the borrower and the lender may however experience a Pareto-improvement in their positions by renegotiating the loan. By renegotiating the terms of the debt the financially distressed firm can avoid the stigmatization of bankruptcy and the bank can avoid the costs of seizing the borrower's assets. However, our main finding is that, from the bank's point of view, renegotiating as a policy of recovering loan payments may be inefficient in practice because of false bankruptcy claims and moral hazard problems associated with exposure of the borrowing firm to the risk of default. We present a solution to the false bankruptcy claim problem that involves a mixe d strategy between asset seizure by the bank and debt renegotiation.     

银行信贷与股票价格动态关系研究

本文采用五变量VAR模型对我国银行信贷与股票价格之间的动态关系进行实证分析,发现股票价格的上涨会导致银行信贷的扩张,但银行信贷扩张不是股票价格上涨的原因。基于此,本文提出对银行信贷的调控要考虑股票市场的影响。在股票市场繁荣的时候应该通过增加股票供给、丰富投资产品等措施防止股市泡沫的扩大,降低市场对股价升幅的预期,同时密切关注银行信贷资金的流向,防止资金由实体经济大量流向股票市场;而在股票市场萧条的时候,放松银行信贷并不能阻止股票价格下跌,稳定股票市场的关键是增强投资者信心,改善投资者对未来股票价格的预期。     

中国银行特许权价值的风险自律效应研究

将银行破产风险分解为经营不确定性与风险覆盖能力、杠杆风险与资产组合风险,建立动态面板模型并采用2003~2013年中国上市银行的数据和系统广义矩估计方法,分析特许权价值激励银行降低风险承担的途径和方式。研究发现：我国银行特许权价值具有抑制银行风险的自律效应,银行为避免过高风险而遭受监管惩罚或丧失市场资源,保持特许经营条件和优势,将进行积极的风险管理;特许权价值的风险自律效应主要通过促使银行提升风险覆盖能力、降低资产组合风险和杠杆风险来实现。     

Bank Capital and Risk: Is Voluntary Disclosure Enough?

This paper considers whether banks have an incentive to disclose accurate information concerning their risk and capital adequacy. State-of-the-art capital regulation relies on quantitative capital requirements, bank supervision, and public disclosure of information to the markets. Is voluntary regulatory disclosure of risk information sufficient to achieve policy objectives? The game-theoretic model of this paper suggests that voluntary disclosure can be usefully supplemented with other regulatory tools, in particular with direct supervision and financial market discipline.     

Bank runs,the deposit-currency ratio and the interest rate

This paper provides a model of an economy with a banking system which is subject to bank runs. The model is then used to explain the rise in short-term interest rates during bank runs and the fall in the deposit-currency ratio in anticipation of possible runs.     

试论民营银行准入初期的制度安排和技术约束

本文针对民营银行准入初期的构架设计,提出过渡性模块的制度安排和技术约束,包括体制上制度性安排的管理系统;机制上市场性经营的约束范围;监管上政策性修正的可行分析,以求民营银行的准入、运作、监管、发展和退出存有制度的运作空间和机制的持续作用。     

A Prudential Paradox: The Signal in (Not) Restricting Bank Dividends

By restricting dividends in the weakest banks, prudential regulators counterintuitively induce more capital payouts in marginal banks. The potential for bank runs exacerbates the incentive to signal strength through dividend payments. Regulatory restrictions on those payments can be used to achieve the first-best outcome, but only if the prevailing capital requirements are sufficiently high. In a crisis, the optimal dividend policy is more restrictive, since it allows the weak but solvent banks to pool with the strong. Finally, we show that the optimal release of regulatory bank information depends critically on the regulator's information and dividend restriction policies.     

Bank runs, foreign exchange reserves and credibility: When size does not matter

The paper considers the sizes of banking sectors that are vulnerable to runs when the central bank cares about economic stability and currency peg credibility. It is shown that when banks are small, the central bank will recapitalize unhealthy banks because doing so will not compromise its peg. While recapitalizations of large banking sectors will compromise a peg, central banks will also bailout large banking sectors in distress to prevent great economic instability. Given the central bank's expected response, a range of sizes for banking systems, which are vulnerable to runs, is found along with a condition in which size will not matter. That is, if that condition is satisfied, banking sectors of all sizes will be immune to runs. The experiences of Asia and Argentina are discussed to provide anecdotal support for the model.     

Is Government Regulation of Banks Necessary?

Banks have been involved with and regulated by governments for hundreds of years. Following a brief review of this history, I delineate nine reasons that could justify continued regulation, particularly in the United States. These include deposit insurance, preventing banks from obtaining excessive economic power, reducing the cost of individual bank insolvency, avoiding the effects of bank failures on the economy, protecting the payments system, serving the interests of popularly elected officials, enhancing the Federal Reserve's control over the money supply, suppressing competition, and protecting consumers. Analysis of each leads me to conclude that deposit insurance, which allows banks to hold insufficient capital, is the only public-policy-justifiable rationale for regulation. This concern can be managed with capital requirements; otherwise, banks should only be regulated as are other corporations.     

银行监管和股东属性对银行风险的影响——基于新兴经济体的监管数据分析

银行监管按世界银行的标准划分为总体监管和12类分项监管;银行大股东属性包括政府类、金融企业类、外资类等.总体监管可以有效地降低银行风险;大股东为工业类、金融类企业的银行能够更好地控制风险,而家族类银行的风险程度较高;通过对分项监管进行研究可以发现,加强对所有权、资本要求、经营活动限制、外部审计要求、流动性、存款保险制度、退出及监管效率八个方面的监管可降低银行总体风险,而加强准入、内部管理、资产分类配置、信息披露这四类监管反而会增加银行总体风险.