Optimal linear income taxation with general equilibrium effects on wages

The paper argues that the endogeneity of wages may make a considerable difference to optimal linear tax rates. In this case there is not only the usual direct redistribution via the fiscal system but also the general equilibrium redistribution due to the change in wages. Depending on the elasticity of substitution of the production function and the labour supply elasticities these may be reinforcing or opposing. It is shown that the general equilibrium effect may plausibly outweigh the direct effect so that net redistribution to the lower paid involves a wage subsidy financed by a lump-sum tax.     

Optimal tax progressivity in unionised labour markets: What are the driving forces?

In labour markets with collective wage bargaining higher progressivity of the labour income tax creates a trade-off. On the one hand, wages are lowered and unemployment decreases, on the other hand, the individual labour supply decision is distorted at the hours-of-work margin. The optimal level of tax progressivity within this trade-off is determined using a numerical general equilibrium model with imperfect competition on the goods market, collective wage bargaining and a labour-supply module calibrated to empirically plausible elasticity values. The model is calibrated to macroeconomic and institutional parameters of both the OECD average and a number of individual OECD countries. In most cases the optimal degree of tax progressivity is below the actual level. A decomposition approach shows that the optimal level is increased by high unemployment and by the general tax level.     

The role of labour demand elasticities in tax incidence analysis with heterogeneous labour

Whether labour bears full burden of household level income and consumption taxes ultimately depends on the degree of substitutability among different types of labour in production. We find more variation in incidence patterns across households with less than perfectly substitutable heterogeneous labour than with perfectly substitutable homogeneous labour in production. This finding is based on results obtained from homogeneous and heterogeneous labour general equilibrium tax models calibrated to decile level income and consumption distribution data of UK households for the year 1994. We use labour supply elasticities implied by the substitution elasticity in households' utility functions and derive labour demand elasticities from the substitution elasticity in the production function. First version received: March 1998/Final version received: April 1999     

Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation

This paper analyses the set of Pareto efficient tax structures. The formulation of the problem as one of self-selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems (such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist) which have recently been the subject of extensive research, but also allows the derivation of a number of new results. We establish (i) under fairly weak conditions, randomization of tax structures is desirable; (ii) if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production, then the general equilibrium effects—until now largely ignored in the literature—of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure; in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor, the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals, and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals (the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution); (iii) if individuals differ in their preferences, Pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes; while (iv) if wage income is stochastic, the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100%.Our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic.     

Redistributive Taxation under Ethical Behaviour*

We consider the implications of ethical behaviour on the effect of a redistributive tax‐transfer system. In choosing their labour supplies, individuals take into account whether their tax liabilities correspond to what they view as ethically acceptable. If tax liabilities are viewed as ethically acceptable, a taxpayer behaves ethically, does not distort her behaviour, and chooses to work as if she were not taxed. On the other hand, if ethical behaviour results in tax liabilities that exceed those that are ethically acceptable, she behaves egoistically (partially or fully), distorts her behaviour, and chooses her labour supply taking into account the income tax. We establish taxpayers' equilibrium behaviour and obtain that labour supply is less elastic when taxpayers may behave ethically than when they act egoistically. We characterise and compare the egoistic voting equilibrium linear tax schedules under potentially ethical and egoistic behaviour. We also compare our results to those obtained under altruism, an alternative benchmark.     

Reconsidering the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation*

A model with sticky wage rates and involuntary unemployment is used to compute the marginal cost of taxation, and these estimates are compared with those obtained from the conventional price-clearing equilibrium model. Important determinants of the marginal cost estimates are the response of sticky wages to a tax increase, the elasticity of demand for labour, and the unemployment gap. By contrast, the conventional model focuses on the elasticity of labour supply. The different models have different implications for efficient tax design. However, the new model generally agrees with the conventional model regarding significant efficiency costs of higher taxation.     

Capital Expansion, Endogenous Growth and Equilibrium Unemployment

A model is developed, which captures the interactions of unemployment and economic growth in general equilibrium. The economy evolves along a correct-expectations equilibrium path exhibiting endogenous job rationing, and productivity growth is driven by installation of new capital. Under the maintained hypothesis that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is less than unity, unemployment benefits are shown to shift up the whole path of equilibrium unemployment, leaving the economy with a higher natural rate of unemployment and lowering the long-run growth rate permanently. Investment tax credits financed by lump sum taxes on total income are capable of lowering the natural rate and raising the economy's growth rate.     

Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining: A Dynamic Perspective

Abstract. We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: (i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues and (ii) labour markets are subject to an inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets.     

International Factor Mobility, Government Size and Welfare

An examination of the available data reveals that the size of government varies considerably across time and countries. By making use of a simple general equilibrium model, this paper demonstrates that size of government is affected by the availability of capital and labour within an economy. Specifically, this paper utilises a model of a closed economy that produces one-private and one-public good. Both goods are produced by means of capital and labour. Production functions are subject to constant returns to scale and perfect competition prevails in all markets. The elasticity of substitution between the public and the private good is greater than unity and there is no international factor mobility in the initial equilibrium. The size of government is measured by total spending on the public good as a proportion of the total expenditure on the private and public goods. It is shown that capital (labour) inflow can decrease (increase) the size of government. Capital inflow increases welfare if the private good is relatively capital intensive whereas labour inflow increases welfare if the public good is relatively capital intensive.     

STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN A LABOUR‐MANAGED DUOPOLY

Developing a Cournot two‐stage game model with strategic capital interaction, we compare two different kinds of equilibrium in a labour‐managed (LM) duopoly. An LM firm's reaction function is negatively sloped when capital and output are simultaneously determined, while the slope of its reaction function in the second stage changes in sign depending on the magnitude of its labour‐expansion elasticity. Hence, whether the LM firms employ more capital and produce greater output at the equilibria in the two‐stage game model than at the equilibria resulting from the simultaneous selection of capital and output depends on the magnitude of their labour‐expansion elasticity.     

Old‐age Social Security versus Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision

This paper introduces an overlapping‐generations model with earnings heterogeneity and borrowing constraints. The labour income tax and the allocation of tax revenue between social security and forward intergenerational public goods are determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game played by successive generations. The political equilibrium is characterized by an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where low‐income and high‐income individuals form a coalition in favour of a lower tax rate and less social security while middle‐income individuals favour a higher tax rate and greater social security. Government spending then shifts from social security to public goods provision if higher wage inequality is associated with a borrowing constraint and a high elasticity of marginal utility of youth consumption.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality,product variety,public input and increasing returns: A static general equilibrium analysis

The paper develops a four sector small open economy model with two traded final good sectors, a public intermediate good producing sector and a nontraded good sector producing varieties of intermediate goods. There are three primary factors: capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour. Industrial sector producing a traded good uses capital, intermediate goods and skilled labour as inputs. Intermediate goods producing sector also uses capital and skilled labour. Public input producing sector and the agricultural sector producing the other traded good use capital and unskilled labour as inputs. It is shown that, if production technologies are the same for the agricultural sector and the public input producing sector and if the scale elasticity of output is very low, then an increase in capital stock (unskilled labour endowment) raises (lowers) the skilled–unskilled wage ratio. However, an increase in skilled labour endowment does not produce any unambiguous effect. On the other hand, an increase in the tax rate on industrial output and/or an increase in the price of the agricultural product, armed with the same set of assumptions, lowers the skilled–unskilled wage ratio.     

Estate tax and lifetime income inequality

This paper constructs a heterogeneous, intertemporal general equilibrium framework which integrates both intended and unintended bequest motives to examine the long-run effects of an estate tax on the inequality of lifetime income. The results are ambiguous in general and sensitive to the type of transfer motive involved. We find that in the purely intended bequest case, an estate tax increases the steady-state inequality of net lifetime income in the case where people's elasticity of intertemporal substitution is greater than one. However, in the purely unintended bequest case, the effect of an estate tax on inequality is dependent on the probability of survival.     

Capital Inflow in the Presence of Endogenous Labour Supply and Monopolistic Competition

This paper examines the impact of capital mobility within the context of a simple general equilibrium model where the supply of labour is endogenous and the producer services sector is subject to monopolistic competition. It is shown that the presence of monopolistic competition influences the size of all comparative static results. The paper also shows that the size of the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption of the final good plays a crucial role in determining the impact of changes in the supply of capital on utility-maximising labour supply and welfare. Specifically, it is shown that capital mobility has no impact on optimal labour supply if the elasticity of substitution is equal to unity. The impact of a small capital inflow on welfare can be negative if the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently larger than unity.     

Optimal taxation of externalities interacting through markets: A theoretical general equilibrium analysis

This study develops a theoretical general equilibrium model to examine optimal externality tax policy in the presence of externalities linked to one another through markets rather than technical production relationships. Analytical results reveal that the second-best externality tax rate may be greater or less than the first-best rate, depending largely on the elasticity of substitution between the two externality-generating products. These results are explored empirically for the case of greenhouse gas and nitrogen emissions associated with biofuels and petroleum.     

Growth Effects of Taxation Under Altruism and Low Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution

An increase in the tax rate on capital income may raise the rate of economic growth when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low and intergenerational transfers are absent. Since the strength of the bequest motive depends on tax rates, this paper provides conditions under which taxing capital income, and then reducing the labour income tax, is more growth enhancing than the classical policy of zero taxes on capital income, and vice versa.     

The positive relation between average labour productivity and labour intensity

Conclusion In this paper an attempt has been made to reconcile the phenomenon of a simultaneous increase in average labour productivity and labour intensity with neo-classical theory. Under certain technical and psychological conditions, this phenomenon can indeed be generated by a neo-classical model, once it has been assumed that production does not only depend on labour and the number of capital goods but on the operating-hours per machine as well. A necessary condition is that the elasticity of substitution is less than unity. Moreover, the elasticity of the degree of overtime aversion with respect to the number of operating-hours per machine has to be negative and smaller in absolute value than the substitution coefficient.Today almost everybody agrees that in reality the elasticity of substitution is less than unity. So, the technical condition may be called realistic. However, it is doubtful whether this is the case with the psychological condition. It seems rather unrealistic that the aversion against overtime work decreases if one has to work at more inconvenient hours.Thus, we may conclude that it is doubtful whether amended neoclassical theory is able to give a realistic explanation of the phenomenon of simultaneously increasing labour intensity and labour productivity. In this respect approaches which discern the phenomenon of labour hoarding [5] or employ U-shaped short-run cost curves [2], may be more promising.I wish to thank Professors F. Hartog, F. J. de Jong, and G. F. Pikkemaat, and Mr. J. W. Gunning for making useful comments on a first draft of this paper.     

Tax structure and government expenditures with tax equity concerns

We augment a standard tax model by concerns about tax equity: people get upset when labour is taxed more heavily than capital. Even the slightest concern for tax equity invalidates the common tenet that capital remains tax-exempt in small open economies. This holds for exogenous as well as for endogenous government expenditures and irrespective of whether concerns with tax equity only cause emotional discomfort or also impact on work incentives. If concerns with tax equity get more intense, the economy may choose higher taxes on labour and move to the downward sloped part of its Laffer curve. For endogenous government spending, stronger concerns with tax equity may lead to a larger size of the public sector.     

Looking back, looking ahead: Biased technological change, substitution and the wage gap

The implications of ICT on wage inequality are studied by applying a CES production function with skilled and unskilled labour. Skill-biased technological change increases wage inequality. The result is reinforced in a two-sector general equilibrium model if the income elasticity of the demand for high-tech goods and the elasticity of substitution between final goods are larger than one.     

Support to renewable energy sources and carbon capture and sequestration: comparison of alternative green tax reforms

We compare the economic and environmental effects of several specifications of a green tax reform (GTR) where tax revenues are used to support renewable energy sources (RESs) and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) activities. With this aim, we propose an equilibrium model where final-goods production uses labour and energy, and energy production uses nonpolluting RES and polluting fossil fuels. The comparison is based on three key indicators: output per worker, energy intensity and the ratio of renewables over nonrenewables. We test five variations of the GTR in addition to the no-policy case. Results show that a GTR as the one we propose here never provides a double dividend. There are environmental benefits but at the expense of the economy. Additionally, for lower tax levels, prioritizing RES support has lower economic costs and potential environmental benefits. For higher tax levels, CCS support becomes more competitive.