Migration and optimal income taxes

The issue addressed in this paper is the optimal taxation of incomes earned in the home economy, and of incomes earned abroad, when people can migrate. As a preliminary, the optimal taxation of home incomes when there is migration and no taxation of foreign incomes, is discussed. Then in a more general setting, we deal with optimal taxation of different kinds of labour when another kind of labour is not taxable, and show how this bears on the taxation of foreign incomes. The last sections of the paper analyse a simple model in which people choose between taxable labour at home, taxable labour abroad, and untaxable labour. A condition is found implying that the optimal tax on foreign income is higher than on the home income of a person of equal utility.     

The impact of changing skill levels on optimal nonlinear income taxes

The impact of changing an individual's skill level on the solution to a finite population version of the Mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem with quasilinear-in-leisure preferences is investigated. It is shown that it is possible to sign the directions of change in everyone's optimal consumptions and optimal marginal tax rates in response to such a change.     

Expenditure taxes,income taxes,and time-inconsistency

Traditional welfare-based comparisons of different tax structures implicitly assume that the government can precommit to its future optimal policy. When optimal tax rates are time- inconsistent, however, such comparisons may be misleading. This paper uses a two-period representative-consumer optimal taxation model to study the implications of time-consistency for the welfare rankings of expenditure and income taxation. I show that the welfare rankings of optimal policies may not be preserved by time-consistent ones.     

Efficient timing of income taxes

The marginal collection cost of an income tax is predicted to be a martingale, and the marginal income tax rate is predicted to be a supermartingale. Collection costs can be estimated from tax rates. Almost all tests based on a U.S. series of actual marginal income tax rates, 1913–1975, accept the hypothesis of random-walk behavior in collection costs, and reject the parallel hypothesis on tax rates.     

Efficiency wages and income taxes

The paper was written during a visit at the Ludwig-Maximilian-University of Munich in the summer of 1988. The hospitality of this institution, as well as the financial support from a Ruhrgas Scholarship under the West German Norwegian Scholarship Scheme, is gratefully acknowledged. Participants at various seminars have given useful comments and criticism. I am also grateful to two anonymous referees for their comments to an earlier version of the paper.     

Efficiency aspects of increasing inheritance taxes while decreasing income taxes

This article tries to shed some light on the economic efficiency aspects of a tax reform that would increase inheritance taxes while decreasing income taxes. An analysis of labour market decisions following the activation of such a reform is presented. An international comparison of inheritance tax collection shows that almost all industrial countries impose an inheritance tax. However, government revenue from inheritance and gift taxes in Europe is lower than 1% of GDP and is very low in the United States as well. Applying the proposed reform could increase work hours and delay retirement decisions.     

Optimum income taxation and layoff taxes

This paper analyzes optimum income taxation in a model with endogenous job destruction that gives rise to unemployment. It is shown that optimal tax schemes comprise both payroll and layoff taxes when the state provides public unemployment insurance and aims at redistributing income. The optimal layoff tax is equal to the social cost of job destruction, which amounts to the sum of unemployment benefits (that the state pays to unemployed workers) and payroll taxes (that the state does not get when workers are unemployed).     

Linearly progressive income taxes and stabilization

It has been shown that progressive income taxes may lead to saddle-point convergence when the marginal tax rate is assumed to be a continuously increasing function of income. This note shows that linearly progressive taxes may also immunize the economy against indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria. Therefore, our analysis suggests that exemption thresholds, as featured by prevailing tax codes, may help to stabilize the economy.     

Income taxes and the income velocity of money: An empirical analysis

From 1981iv to 1983ii, the growth rate of the income velocity of money declined sharoly. Almost all forecasts of this rate based on standard models overpredicted the velocity growth rate over this period. In this paper it is argued that income taxes exert a direct and discernible influence on velocity of money which has not been recognized by these models. As a result, most models failed to capture the 1981–1983 Reagan tax cuts and, consequently, overpredicted the velocity growth rate in this period. It is shown that the tax-velocity hypothesis is supported by the results of an empirical test. It is also shown that the inclusion of taxes in a model of velocity helps alleviate the overprediction of the velocity growth rate in the 1981–1983 period.     

Negative income taxes,inequality and poverty

We use a neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents to analyze the redistributive effects of a negative income tax system, which combines a flat rate tax with a fully refundable credit (“demogrant”). We show that changing the demogrant‐to‐output ratio causes significant changes in the distribution of income. Specifically, we find that increasing the demogrant‐to‐output ratio sharply reduces the level of inequality as well as both relative and absolute poverty (all measured in terms of post‐tax total income). However, these reductions in inequality and poverty come at the expense of a significant reduction in output.     

Growth, income taxes and consumption aspirations

In a Barro-type economy with exogenous consumption aspirations, raising income taxes favors growth even in the presence of lump-sum taxes. Such a policy is compatible with the behavior of private consumption, income taxes and growth rates observed in actual economies.     

The incidence of income taxes on high earners in Canada

This article explores the “brain drain” explanation for the concentration of incomes in Canada during the past 30 years, namely, that high-skilled Canadians make use of high salaries on offer in the United States to extract higher salaries at home. If this is the case, then for a given level of US salaries, the threat to accept outside offers should be more credible when the Canadian dollar is depreciating against the US dollar, and weaker when the Canadian dollar is appreciating. The data are broadly consistent with this claim: income concentration worsened during the depreciations of the 1980s and 1990s, and eased when the Canadian dollar began to appreciate in value. The article develops a simple two-parameter model based on the propositions that high earners in Canada can use US salaries to bargain for higher salaries, and that Canadian high earners can shelter part of their income from personal income taxes. It also offers some preliminary evidence about the parameter values consistent with available data. The results suggest that higher top marginal personal income tax rates may potentially accentuate top-end after-tax income inequality. If high earners are able to use their bargaining power to extract pay increases to offset higher tax rates, then the burden of increased personal income taxes will be deflected elsewhere, and may even have the perverse effect of making the after-tax income distribution more unequal than it was before.     

Health effects and optimal environmental taxes

The literature on environmental taxation in the presence of pre-existing distortionary taxes has shown that interactions with these distortions tend to raise the cost of an environmental tax, and thus that the optimal environmental tax is less than marginal environmental damages. A recent paper by Schwartz and Repetto (2000) challenges this finding, arguing that the health benefits from reduced pollution will also interact with pre-existing taxes, and may cause the optimal environmental tax to exceed marginal damages.Schwartz and Repetto’s analysis represented health effects implicitly in the utility function. In contrast, the present paper explicitly represents health effects in an analytically tractable general equilibrium model. This model shows that interactions with health effects from pollution actually will tend to reduce the optimal environmental tax, contradicting, Schwartz and Repetto’s conclusion. This demonstrates the usefulness of explicitly modeling health effects, and it reinforces the general notion that tax-interactions tend to raise the costs of an environmental tax.     

Public debt and optimal taxes without commitment

Benhabib and Rustichini [Optimal taxes without commitment, J. Econ. Theory 77 (1997) 231-259] study the properties of optimal capital taxes in economies without commitment and no government debt. They find that capital taxes may be different from zero at steady state. This note shows that, once governments have the possibility of issuing debt and smoothing taxes over time, optimal steady state capital taxes turn out to be zero.     

Which commodity taxes should supplement the income tax?

The analysis takes as its point of departure a continuum of consumers economy in which an optimum income tax exists and is the only tax instrument in operation. The welfare effects of introducing small excise taxes to supplement the income tax are then explored. Essential in this context are changes in the tax distortions of work incentives. It is shown that a commodity should be taxed or subsidized depending on whether it is positively or negatively related to leisure in a sense which is precisely defined. The results are related to earlier contributions to the literature on direct versus indirect taxation.     

The Laffer curve in schedular multi-rate income taxes with non-genuine allowances: An application to Spain

This paper models the connection between tax revenue and marginal tax rates in modern personal income taxes. In so doing, new analytical expressions for the elasticity of tax revenue to tax rates are derived taking into account global and schedular income taxes in the presence of non-standard allowances. Based on these new analytical elasticities the implicit Laffer curve is characterised and explored in detail. Calculations are performed for the individual taxpayer and the aggregate population. When applied to microdata, the model permits us to locate individually the position of every taxpayer on the entire range of the Laffer curve as well as to characterise the “representative” aggregate Laffer curve. The utility of the model to forecast revenue is illustrated by applying it to Spanish personal income tax. The model confirms that the Laffer curve is essentially an intrinsic individual matter although a virtual aggregate Laffer curve for the whole population can be inferred.     

An empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction: the case of business income taxes in Canada

Both federal and provincial governments in Canada levy corporate taxes on businesses in their jurisdictions, which potentially gives rise to horizontal and vertical tax externalities within the federation. Using a simple model of interdependent tax choices, we estimate tax-setting functions for the federal government, Ontario, Quebec, and an aggregate of the remaining eight provinces. We find evidence of significant vertical and horizontal tax interactions. Provincial tax rates respond negatively to the federal tax rate, while at least some provinces increase their tax rates in response to increases in the tax rates of other provinces. JEL Classification: H25, H7
Une analyse empirique de l'interaction fiscale entre gouvernements: le cas des impôts sur les revenus d'affaires au Canada. Au Canada, les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux collectent des impôts sur le revenu de sociétés sous leur jurisdiction. Voilà qui peut donner lieu à des effets externes horizontaux et verticaux à l'intérieur de la fédération. A l'aide d'un modèle de choix fiscaux interdépendants, les auteurs calibrent les fonctions d'imposition du gouvernement fédéral, des gouvernements du Québec et de l'Ontario, et d'une entité composée des huit autres provinces. On montre que les effets verticaux et horizontaux d'interaction fiscale sont significatifs. Les taux d'imposition des provinces réagissent négativement au taux d'imposition fédéral, mais certaines provinces accroissent leur taux d'imposition en réponse à des accroissements dans les taux d'imposition d'autres provinces.     

A model of police financing through income and consumption taxes

This article studies police financing with a focus on the difference in the timing between federal and local government funds. In general, federal government funds came from income taxes collected before possible appropriative activities while local government funds came from consumption taxes collected afterwards. We find that income-tax financing results in more workers, more police, and fewer thieves when appropriation and tax rates are the same between the two cases. Funding the police before possible appropriative activities works as a deterrence. Our findings show the complexity of studying crime and police financing even in a highly stylized model.     

Public investment criteria,insurance markets,and income taxes

The evaluation of small government investments is studied in a one-commodity, two-period world with risk and income taxation, assuming both complete and incomplete insurance markets. When marginal personal tax rates differ or markets are incomplete, there are at least two interpretations of the assumption that the distribution of income is optimal. The correct discount rate for riskless investment depends on which interpretation is chosen. The correct adjustment for risk generally does not. The use of nonmarket information - relating the returns from the proposed investment to those from ongoing activities - to compute this adjustment is explored.     

The optimal taxation of risky capital income: An elasticity rule

Should risky capital income be taxed like safe income or should tax rates be differentiated? The question is analyzed in a 2-assets model of portfolio choice. Flat tax rates are chosen in order to maximize the investor's expected utility from terminal wealth subject to an expected tax revenue constraint. If lump-sum taxes are not available, optimal tax rates are characterized by an elasticity rule: The relative change in the risk remuneration should be equal to the inverse of the product of two elasticities. One is the output elasticity of capital. The other is the demand elasticity for risky investments with respect to a revenue preserving tax variation.