In search of general evolutionary principles: Why Darwinism is too important to be left to the biologists

Bioeconomics emphasizes the common ontological ground between economics and biology. However, this does not necessarily mean that both disciplines collapse into one. Instead it is proposed here that Darwinism provides a general, meta-theoretical framework for dealing with complex evolving systems, consisting of populations of varied and replicating entities, which are found in both nature and human society. There is no alternative to the core Darwinian principles of variation, selection and inheritance to explain the evolution of such systems. Neither the actual existence of human intentionality, nor the hypothetical existence of Lamarckian processes of acquired character inheritance, offer a barrier to the use of Darwinian explanations. However, while Darwinian principles are always necessary to explain complex evolving population systems, they are never sufficient on their own. Such a generalized Darwinism can accommodate several different stances found in the literature on bioeconomics and elsewhere.      

Schumpeter’s Split Between “Pure” Economics and Institutional Economics: Why Methodological Individualism Was Not Fully Considered

While Joseph A. Schumpeter is classified as a pioneer of evolutionary economics in a wide sense and of entrepreneurship and innovation management in a narrower sense, Schumpeter is less known for his contributions in the area of scientific methodology and history of science. The paper deals with methodological premises in Schumpeter’s scientific positioning. In 1908, in his Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie, Schumpeter developed and pioneered his methodological individualism which is very much acknowledged. However, comparing these early positions with methodological writings in his History of Economic Analysis (1954) shows that he has not really shifted from methodological individualism to an institutional perspective that addresses the academic interplay and sees economic action rooted in historical predispositions, paths and social constraints.     

Darwinism in economics: from analogy to ontology

Several social scientists, including ‘evolutionary economists’, have expressed scepticism of ‘biological analogies’ and rejected the application of ‘Darwinism’ to socio-economic evolution. Among this group, some have argued that self-organisation is an alternative to biological analogies or Darwinism. Others have seen ‘artificial selection’ as an alternative to natural selection in the socio-economic sphere. Another objection is that Darwinism excludes human intentionality. It is shown that all these objections to ‘biological analogies’ and ‘Darwinism’ are ungrounded. Furthermore, Darwinism includes a broad theoretical framework for the analysis of the evolution of all open, complex systems, including socio-economic systems. Finally and crucially, Darwinism also involves a basic philosophical commitment to detailed, cumulative, causal explanations. For these reasons, Darwinism is fully relevant for economics and an adequate evolutionary economics must be Darwinian, at least in these fundamental senses. However, this does not undermine the need for auxiliary theories and explanations in the economic domain.     

Toward an Evolutionary and Moral Science

Thorstein Veblen asked in 1898 why economics is not an evolutionary science; he also proposed a Darwinian paradigm shift for economics. Among the implications reviewed here was his claim that Darwinian principles applied to social entities as well as to biological phenomena. It is also argued that economists have additional reasons for taking Darwinian evolution seriously. Recent work on the evolution of altruism, cooperation and morality show that we are on the brink of developing an evolutionary-grounded theory of human motivation that breaks from the selfish utility-maximizer lambasted by Veblen. This new theory accepts a biological as well as a cultural foundation for moral dispositions. As noted here, the neglected British institutional economist John A. Hobson — who was an acquaintance of Veblen — foreshadowed this approach.     

Metatheory as the key to understanding: Schumpeter after Shionoya

In his recent book, Yuichi Shionoya departs from previous Schumpeterianstudies. He sets out to reconstruct Schumpeter's metatheoreticalframework, which he argues is the key to a correct interpretationof his substantive writings. The centrepiece of this projectis the thesis that Schumpeter has a coherent methodologicalposition—instrumentalism—which consistently underpinshis theoretical work. The present paper examines this thesis,and in so doing paves the way for an alternative hypothesison Schumpeter. This hypothesis is based on Tony Lawson's workon the philosophy of economics.     

Bioeconomics as economics from a Darwinian perspective

Bioeconomics—the merging of views from biology and economics—on the one hand invites the 'export' of situational logic and sophisticated optimization developed in economics into biology. On the other hand, human economic activity and its evolution, not least over the past few centuries, may be considered an instance for fruitfully applying ideas from evolutionary biology and Darwinian theory. The latter perspective is taken in the present paper. Three different aspects are discussed in detail. First, the Darwinian revolution provides an example of a paradigm shift which contrasts most significantly with the 'subjectivist revolution' that took place at about the same time in economics. Since many of the features of the paradigmatic change that were introduced into the sciences by Darwinism may be desirable for economics as well, the question is explored whether the Darwinian revolution can be a model for introducing a new paradigm in economic theory. Second, the success of Darwinism and its view of evolution have induced economists who are interested in an evolutionary approach in economics to borrow, more or less extensively, concepts and tools from Darwinian theory. Particularly prominent are constructions based on analogies to the theory of natural selection. Because several objections to such analogy constructions can be raised, generalization rather than analogy is advocated here as a research strategy. This means to search for abstract features which all evolutionary theories have in common. Third, the question of what a Darwinian world view might mean for assessing long term economic evolution is discussed. Such a view, it is argued, can provide a point of departure for reinterpreting the hedonistic approach to economic change and development. On the basis of such an interpretation bioeconomics may not only go beyond the optimization-cum-equilibrium paradigm currently prevailing in economics. It may also mean adding substantial qualifications to the subjectivism the neoclassical economists, at the turn of the century, were proud to establish in the course of their scientific revolution.     

“Generalized Darwinism” and the quest for an evolutionary theory of policy-making

According to the “Generalized Darwinism” movement (GD), the three principles of variation, selection and retention/replication (labeled “Darwinian” in some variants of GD) can and should be used as a meta-theoretical framework for the explanation of evolutionary processes in the sociocultural domain. Despite their biological origins, the various variants of GD aim at redefining these principles in a way that is supposed to abstract from any domain-specific particulars. We argue that in order to qualify as an adequate meta-theoretical framework for evolutionary economics, GD should not only inspire and guide positive theory development in evolutionary economics, but also be able to support viable practical policy implications. Examining its potential to do so, however, leads us to the conclusion that in its specific deductive variant proposed by Hodgson & Knudsen (HKGD), it risks systematically misguiding evolutionary policy advice. Competing variants, such as the one proposed by Pelikan, fare better in this regard.     

Elements of Publicness in Urban Transit

This paper examines the claim that Veblen's theory of cultural evolution has generalized Darwinian principles to socioeconomic phenomena. Our argument takes place in the debate around "generalized Darwinism" in evolutionary and institutional economics. We claim that Veblen frequently relied on the concept of selection and considered institutions both as units and as factors of selection. We also argue that some of Veblen's insights can be clarified by expressing them in evolutionary-game theoretic terms. Thus, we suggest a close connection between the ontological framework of generalized Darwinism and the technical study of evolutionary phenomena through evolutionary game theory.     

Toward Generalized Evolutionism: Beyond “Generalized Darwinism” and Its Critics

This article seeks to transcend the debate regarding “generalized Darwinism” or “universal Darwinism” for the social sciences. Highlighting recent discoveries in evolutionary biology, the article argues that it is no longer tenable to insist that (neo-)Darwinism is the only proper doctrine for understanding biological evolution. Moreover, social evolution is much more than purely (neo-)Darwinian or (neo-)Lamarckian. As such, the debate on whether we deploy only (neo-)Darwinism or (neo-)Lamarckism — generalized or not — to understand social evolution is a red herring. Instead, social scientists should embrace “generalized evolutionism,” a more accommodating and versatile doctrine that subsumes “(generalized) Darwinism” or “(generalized) Lamarckism.” Empirical inquiries that deploy “generalized evolutionism” have shed important new light on some critical puzzles in human society: from institutional change to the foundation of economic development before 1500 AD, through the coming of the industrial revolution, to the evolution of the international system. More empirical efforts along this line of theorizing are needed.     

Can Darwinism be ��Generalized�� and of what use would this be?

It has been suggested that, by generalizing Darwinian principles, a common foundation can be derived for all scientific disciplines dealing with evolutionary processes, especially for evolutionary economics. We show, however, that in the development of evolutionary biology, the abstract principles of so-called “Generalized Darwinism” have not been crucial for distinguishing Darwinian from non-Darwinian approaches and, hence, cannot be considered genuinely Darwinian. Moreover, we wonder what can be gained by invoking the abstract principles of Generalized Darwinism given that they do not suffice to substantiate an explanation of actual evolutionary processes. To that end, specific hypotheses are required. They neither follow from the suggested abstract principles, nor are they more easily found on that basis. Accordingly, we find little evidence in the literature for the claim that generalized Darwinian principles enhance the explanatory power of an evolutionary approach to economics.     

Why Schumpeter has had so little influence on today’s main line economics, and why this may be changing

While Schumpeter’s broad theory of how capitalist economies worked articulated in his Theory of Economic Development received strong attention in his lifetime, it was neoclassical economic theory that took hold of the profession in the last half of the twentieth century, and today few economists even read Schumpeter. The first part of this essay considers the reasons why Schumpeter largely has been ignored. However, recent developments have increased the interests of economists in innovation and in innovation driven economic activity, and the time now may be ripe for a renaissance of Schumpeterian economics. The second part of this essay provides a sketch of what an economics text-book, written from a Schumpeterian perspective, might look like.     

Hans Singer's debts to Schumpeter and Keynes

This essay discusses Hans Singer's intellectual formation andthe influences on his early writings and on his post-1947 developmenteconomics. It asks what impact the unusual experience of studyingwith both Schumpeter and Keynes had upon his subsequent economicthinking and practice. It argues that the influence of boththese mentors was surprisingly small, compared with that ofSpiethoff and Clark. Singer repaid his debts to Schumpeter andKeynes, but by working in the new currency of development economics,some of which was his own coinage. His motivation for this vasteffort was derived from the social egalitarianism of figuressuch as William Beveridge, Archbishop Temple and R. H. Tawney,rather than the liberalism of Schumpeter and Keynes.     

The Political Economy of Tax-Based Incomes Policy: Wealth Effects of Post Keynesian TIP

This paper explores the economics of electoral democracy, an almost entirely neglected subject. Running for office necessitates resources. But students of democracy have had almost nothing to say about how much money should be spent by candidates or where that money should come from. As a result, there is a gaping void in the theory of democracy. Joseph A. Schumpeter used a market analogy in his discussion of the electoral process, but even he did not discuss how electoral campaigns are to be paid for. In fact, the few citizens who largely fund campaigns for office in the United States purchase non-rivalrous influence. They obtain the ability to shape the policies that affect all citizens. In this way, political equality is undermined. The paper concludes that achieving a more representative political system can best be attained by treating political campaigns as a public good.     

Keynes’ Preface to the German Edition of the General Theory: Nazi Sympathies or Methodological Empathies?

In the (1936) preface to the German edition of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes contrasts his methodology with that of Classical laissez-faire economics. He also compares and contrasts his methodology with German economics, which members of the German Historical School had heavily influenced. Unfortunately, some view Keynes as arguing in this Preface that his theory could more deductively apply to fascism than to laissez-faire economies. This would suggest an endorsement of Nazism. Of course, any support offered for Nazism should be condemned. However, instead of displaying Nazi sympathies, this paper argues that the Preface more likely supports the widespread methodological rejection in German economics of deducing laissez-faire outcomes from Classical postulates. Furthermore, Keynes criticizes the more inductive approach of many German economists, and states that he provides them with the theoretical framework which they could deductively apply to their totalitarian economy. Keynes should be read as arguing that his theoretical framework would prove more applicable to a totalitarian system than would a theory based on Classical laissez-faire economics. Comments in the Preface which seem to some to support Nazism should be taken, then, as support for the applicability of his theory to such a system. Keynes’ methodological arguments in the prefaces to the other editions, which reflect his overall methodological approach in the General Theory, his familiarity with German economics, his support for liberal economic and political institutions, and his anti-Nazism, all support this alternative interpretation. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Midwest Economics Association Meetings in Chicago on March 16, 2008.     

Keynes’ Preface to the German Edition of the General Theory: Nazi Sympathies or Methodological Empathies?

In the (1936) preface to the German edition of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes contrasts his methodology with that of Classical laissez-faire economics. He also compares and contrasts his methodology with German economics, which members of the German Historical School had heavily influenced. Unfortunately, some view Keynes as arguing in this Preface that his theory could more deductively apply to fascism than to laissez-faire economies. This would suggest an endorsement of Nazism. Of course, any support offered for Nazism should be condemned. However, instead of displaying Nazi sympathies, this paper argues that the Preface more likely supports the widespread methodological rejection in German economics of deducing laissez-faire outcomes from Classical postulates. Furthermore, Keynes criticizes the more inductive approach of many German economists, and states that he provides them with the theoretical framework which they could deductively apply to their totalitarian economy. Keynes should be read as arguing that his theoretical framework would prove more applicable to a totalitarian system than would a theory based on Classical laissez-faire economics. Comments in the Preface which seem to some to support Nazism should be taken, then, as support for the applicability of his theory to such a system. Keynes’ methodological arguments in the prefaces to the other editions, which reflect his overall methodological approach in the General Theory, his familiarity with German economics, his support for liberal economic and political institutions, and his anti-Nazism, all support this alternative interpretation. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Midwest Economics Association Meetings in Chicago on March 16, 2008.     

Schumpeter: Theorist of the avant-garde

This paper argues that Schumpeter’s 1911 edition of ‘Theory of Economic Development’ can be fruitfully read as a theory of the avant-garde, in line with such theories developed by artistic avant-garde around the same time, in particular by the Italian Futurists. In particular it will show that both Schumpeter and other avant-garde theorists sought to break with past (1), identify an avant-garde who could force that break (2), find new ways to represent the dynamic world (3), embrace the new and dynamic (4) and promote a perpetual dynamic process, instead of a specific end-state or utopia (5). This new reading helps us to understand the cultural meaning of this seminal text in economics. Secondly it greatly facilitates our understanding of the differences with the later interwar German edition and English edition, which were more cautious in their embrace of the new, less focused on the individual qualities of the entrepreneur and placed more emphasis on historical continuity. Thirdly this reading suggests a different reason for the bifurcation between Schumpeter and the rest of the Austrian school of economics. Traditionally this split is explained by Schumpeter’s affinities with the Lausanne School, this paper instead suggests that the crucial break between Schumpeter on the one hand and Böhm-Bawerk, Wieser and later members of the Austrian School on the other hand is their theory of and attitude toward social change.     

Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development: 100 years of development

This article sheds light on the impact of Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development over the last 100?years, and identifies insights from that work that are less well-known, but that have the potential for informing current developments in evolutionary economics. We identify these insights by tracing the development of Schumpeter’s ideas in Theory of Economic Development, which he revised heavily between the first and second German and the English editions. We not only report material lost in the process and developments in Schumpeter’s thinking that can be read off of the revisions, but also indicate how the newfound material can inform and inspire evolutionary economics today.     

Schumpeterian dynamics : Some methodological notes

The main purpose of this paper is to define ‘Schumpeterian dynamics’ and to indicate how it can serve as a basis and starting point for studies in development economics irrespective of how Schumpeter used his general approach and what kind of hypotheses he launched. Schumpeterian dynamics is characterized by its focus on economic transformation. This implies that the main interest is in causal chains outside the scope of macroeconomic growth analyses, namely in disequilibria and chain effects created inter alia by entrepreneurial activities, market processes and competition as a dynamic force. The micro underpinnings of such analyses therefore differ from those of growth models which deal with aggregates, such as investments and saving, productivity, income distribution, wage shares in value added, and capital/output ratios. Seen through Schumpeterian glasses, the micro units have no well-defined generalizable ‘propensities’, and they are not fully informed calculators reacting in a mechanical way to prices that they cannot influence. Instead, firms continuously seek new information and often search for projects which, if carried out, exert transformation pressure on the markets. Consumers can also actively influence firms and markets and do not only passively react to supply prices. Transformation analyses should not replace macroeconomic growth models, but a change of roles is called for. Such analyses have too long and too often been regarded as empirical complements to growth analyses and therefore as belonging mainly to the domain of economic historians. The stress on ‘complement’ instead of ‘alternative’ implies that some sort of a synthesis should be sought in theoretical as well as in empirical research.     

Schumpeter’s new combinations

The paper focuses attention on Schumpeter’s achievements in his classic contribution and how these relate to the contributions of other major authors. While deeply indebted to Marx’s vision of capitalism as a system incessantly in travail, Schumpeter was no ‘Marxist’. He shared B?hm’s view that profits are not due to ‘exploitation’, but thought that the latter’s attack on Marx was a failure. There are remarkable differences, but also similarities between the analyses of Schumpeter and Keynes. Marx, Schumpeter and Keynes rejected Say’s law and other basic ideas constituting the marginalist doctrine. They saw capitalism as a restless, crisis-prone system.