International consequences of US trade policy

Data on the US economy and the political climate in the USA make it probable that the trend towards trade restrictions in the United States will further intensify. What would be the consequences of an escalation of trade conflicts among the western economies? How might an internationally co-ordinated strategy to avoid such a development look?     

国际贸易环境下我国对外贸易政策的发展方向

近十几年来,全球贸易量取得了惊人的跨越式增长,而自由贸易与环境的关系问题也日趋尖锐。一方面,许多发达国家利用不对等的贸易和投资手段从发展中国家攫取大量战略性资源,却造成这些国家境内生态环境的严重失调;另一方面,一味地追求贸易扩张、资金积累和工业化又实际加剧了全球环境的恶化。环境效应对贸易的挤压性制约日益上升为国际贸易发展的焦点。在此背景下,引入环境变量,促进贸易策略的可持续性便成为实现我国对外贸易科学发展的必然之路。     

International competitiveness and trade promotion policy from a network perspective

The international competitiveness of firms and trade promotion policy are analyzed from a network perspective that emphasizes the role and importance of interfirm relations and networks spanning industry and international boundaries. First, we identify two types of producer networks involved in the overall value production system, that is, primary and ancillary producer nets. Second, we classify networks in terms of two factors that impact on their potential international competitiveness, that is, the location of networks in local or foreign markets and the presence of internationally competitive firms. This leads to the identification of different types of network situations that provide opportunities as well as threats to the international performance of firms operating in those networks and call for different types of trade promotion policies. We discuss the key features of each situation and management and trade promotion policy implications arising.     

Pareto-superior trade policy

Current literature shows the welfare superiority of ad valorem over specific tariffs or domestic governments facing foreign monopolists. This note establishes the stronger result that, for any given specific tariff imposed on a foreign monopoly, there exists an ad valorem tariff that Pareto dominates it - that produces larger profit for the foreign firm as well as larger tariff revenue and consumer surplus for the domestic economy. This Pareto ranking can be extended to the case of foreign Cournot oligopoly under certain market conditions.     

Reciprocal dumping and trade policy

This paper examines some aspects of trade intervention in a ‘reciprocal dumping’ framework of international trade. It is shown, in the presence of increasing returns to scale, that certain conventional wisdom regarding the effect of trade policies need not hold true.     

Commercial policy and intra-industry trade

This paper constructs a model of intra-industry trade within a multi-product industry whose output range is limited to that obtainable from a particular type of capital. Intra-industry trade is a natural outcome in this structure, without requiring increasing returns to scale or imperfectly competitive markets, and with its pattern determined along traditional (relative factor abundance) lines. The volume of this trade will vary inversely with the level of trade restrictions, as observed empirically. Other policies are then considered for their influence on the range, rather than the level, of domestic production, since the former is the more likely policy objective under these circumstances.     

EC trade policy beyond 1992

The initiative to set up the single European market has aroused fears abroad, and indeed even within Europe itself, that the intention is to turn the Community into a “Fortress Europe”. Attempts to allay these fears by the Council of Ministers, the EC Commission or individuals representing them have achieved little success, and on occasion have actually tended to be counter-productive. Is “Fortress Europe” an illusion or a real danger?     

Reciprocated unilateralism in trade policy

Using the menu-auction approach to endogenous determination of tariffs and allowing additionally for lobby formation itself to be endogenous, this paper analyzes the impact of unilateral trade liberalization by one country on its partner's trade policies. We find that such unilateral liberalization may induce reciprocal tariff reductions by the partner country. Intuitively, unilateral liberalization by one country has the effect of increasing the incentives for the export lobby in the partner country to form and to lobby effectively against the import-competing lobby there for lower protection.     

Anti-competitive effects of trade policy

Because GATT rules permit countries to take anti-dumping action, anti-dumping measures have come to be regarded as an integral part of the trade landscape. But is it really necessary to have both a domestic competition policy and an external anti-dumping policy, given that both policies aim to promote competition?     

Aid for trade and trade policy in recipient countries

ABSTRACT

This article explores the impact of Aid for Trade (AfT) flows on trade policy in 123 recipient countries over the period of 2002 to 2015. It shows empirical evidence that AfT interventions are conducive to trade policy liberalization. These results apply to both the entire sample and to the sub-sample of least developed countries (LDCs). Additionally, the analysis shows that the lower the development level, the higher the positive impact of AfT inflows on recipient countries’ trade policy liberalization, although above the US$ 4,885.40 threshold of real per capita income, AfT inflows exert no significant impact on trade policy.     

Lobbying costs and trade policy

We study how endogenous lobbying costs influence trade policies. Although in practice lobbying expenditures far exceed campaign contributions, the literature on the political economy of trade policy has focused on the latter. In this paper we develop a model in which informational lobbying costs play a role in determining the structure of protection. In the model, special interest groups can choose to send a signal to the policymaker regarding some information they possess, and the policymaker observes the signal before setting the trade policies. We find that lobbying expenditures directly affect the equilibrium policies. In order to test the predictions of the model we collected data on lobbying expenditures from the Center for Responsible Politics as well as data on trade and industry characteristic variables for the United States from other sources. We perform a structural estimation of the equilibrium trade policies and find support for our model. The empirical evidence indicates that lobbying expenditures play an important role in explaining the variation of protection across sectors. Moreover, the model leads to considerably lower and more reasonable estimates of the weight that the government places on social welfare relative to political contributions.     

The foreign trade policy of Japan

The article offers an analysis of the changes, during the past decade, in Japan’s foreign trade pattern. Special regard is given to the effects of the wave of price increases in the world commodity markets which, owing to the large share of raw materials and food in the country’s imports, has hit Japan particularly severely.     

Production uncertainty and trade policy commitment

Agricultural markets are characterized by production and marketing lags. Uncertainty is also an inherent feature of agricultural markets. This paper investigates if two policy active importers will choose to commit to their import levels or keep the flexibility to revise their ex-ante import levels once production decisions are made and the uncertainty is resolved. This is the constant dilemma faced by prospective WTO members. We assume production in both importing countries is subject to an asymmetric random shock. We show that a government will not want to commit to its import level when there is a high degree of uncertainty in production. However, an importing country is likely to commit to a trade policy in equilibrium although the equilibrium may be Pareto dominated. Under certain conditions, an equilibrium in which one country commits to its ex-ante import level while the other chooses the flexibility option can emerge. In this setting, international trade agreements play an important role.     

Unstable exchange rates and trade policy

Floating exchange rates affect two basic principles of GATT, namely: stability of trade policy conditions and reciprocity of trade concessions. What is the relevance of the changes to foreign trade? What possibilities for surmounting the new problems exist in the realm of external economic relations?