Effects of Temporary In‐Work Benefits for Welfare Recipients: Examination of the Australian Working Credit Programme*

We investigate the impact of ‘Working Credit’, a nationally‐implemented programme which created increased incentives for welfare recipients to undertake temporary work. Highlighting the difficulties in identifying programme effects in the absence of a randomised controlled trial or a natural experiment, we produce estimates of impacts under alternative identifying assumptions and also undertake various robustness checks. Unconditional and regression‐adjusted difference‐in‐difference estimates suggest that the introduction of the Working Credit programme increased employment rates, earnings and exits for those on income support, but matching methods and various robustness checks provide conflicting evidence on the impact on movements from welfare to work for unemployment benefit recipients. Moreover, estimated effects on earnings while on benefits are sensitive to identifying assumptions. Notwithstanding our inability to conclusively identify causal effects of the programme, we note that our findings are broadly consistent with the incentive effects of the programme, with recipients making use of the credits to increase earnings while on benefits, but not increasing movements off welfare.     

Analyst revenue forecast reporting and the quality of revenues and expenses

We decompose earnings quality into revenue and expense quality and examine their associations with analyst propensity to supplement their earnings forecasts with revenue forecasts. Analysts report more revenue forecasts to I/B/E/S when expense quality is low to compensate for the low accuracy of their earnings estimates, which has a positive association with expense quality. Expense quality is unassociated with revenue forecast accuracy, thus revenue forecasts become increasingly useful for valuing firms when expense quality is low. Analysts report fewer revenue forecasts when revenue quality is low because both earnings and revenue forecast accuracy decline as revenue quality deteriorates. To control for endogeneity, we use firm‐fixed effects to control for unobserved time‐invariant heterogeneity across firms, instrumental variables regressions and regression in changes.     

Do Analysts Disclose Cash Flow Forecasts with Earnings Estimates when Earnings Quality is Low?

Cash flows are incrementally useful to earnings in security valuation mainly when earnings quality is low. This suggests that when earnings quality decreases, analysts will be more likely to supplement their earnings forecasts with cash flow estimates. Contrary to this prediction, we find that analysts do not disclose cash flow forecasts when the quality of earnings is low. This is because cash flow forecast accuracy depends on the accuracy of the accrual estimates and the precision of accrual forecasts decreases for firms with low quality earnings. Consequently, as earnings quality decreases, cash flow forecasts become increasingly inaccurate compared to earnings estimates. Cash flow estimates that lack reliability are not useful to investors and, consequently, unlikely to be reported by analysts. This result provides an explanation for why analysts are less likely to report cash flow estimates when earnings quality is low.     

The Economic Cost of Growing Up Poor: Estimating the GDP Loss Associated with Child Poverty*

One of the motivations for the UK government's target to reduce (and eventually eliminate) child poverty is the perception of a significant long‐term economic cost of growing up in poverty. This perception arises from the observation that individuals who experience poverty in their childhood earn less as adults, are less likely to be in employment, are more likely to engage in criminal or anti‐social activities and are more likely to experience poor health and lower life satisfaction. This paper quantifies these effects, and expresses them in terms of GDP losses to the nation. We begin by focusing on lost earnings that arise from poorer skills and reduced employment opportunities, and then move on to the wider costs associated with the higher crime rates, poorer health and reduced well‐being that are linked with growing up poor. We find a sizeable economic cost, with the cost of growing up in poverty amounting to at least 1 per cent of GDP.     

Effect of Analysts' Optimism on Estimates of the Expected Rate of Return Implied by Earnings Forecasts

Recent literature has used analysts' earnings forecasts, which are known to be optimistic, to estimate implied expected rates of return, yielding upwardly biased estimates. We estimate that the bias, computed as the difference between the estimates of the implied expected rate of return based on analysts' earnings forecasts and estimates based on current earnings realizations, is 2.84%. The importance of this bias is illustrated by the fact that several extant studies estimate an equity premium in the vicinity of 3%, which would be eliminated by the removal of the bias. We illustrate the point that cross‐sample differences in the bias may lead to the erroneous conclusion that cost of capital differs across these samples by showing that analysts' optimism, and hence, bias in the implied estimates of the expected rate of return, differs with firm size and with analysts' recommendation. As an important aside, we show that the bias in a value‐weighted estimate of the implied equity premium is 1.60% and that the unbiased value‐weighted estimate of this premium is 4.43%.     

Changes in accounting estimates: An update of priors or an earnings management strategy of “last resort”?

Evidence from prior research is mixed about whether accounting estimate changes are strategically motivated, on average, or whether they reflect new or updated information. To interpret this difference, we investigate, by category of material changes in accounting estimates, the association between estimate changes and subsequent restatements. We also explore the determinants of both income-increasing and income-decreasing estimate changes for different categories of estimate changes. We find that the motivations for and the determinants of estimate changes depend on the type of change and on whether the changes in estimates are income-increasing or income-decreasing. Overall, we conclude that when companies are motivated to bias earnings and they cannot do so by manipulating other within generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) accruals, they sometimes resort to using estimate changes. Our more detailed investigation of estimate changes at the account level suggests a more nuanced view of the determinants of changes in accounting estimates. We develop a more complete model of the determinants of changes in accounting estimates than those used in this emerging literature, which should be of interest to accounting academics, regulators, audit practitioners and audit committee members.     

Permanent and Transitory Earnings,Accounting Recording Lag,and the Earnings Coefficient

In this paper, (1) wedefine precisely the terms permanent and transitory earnings;(2) we delineate the effects of the degree of permanence andof accounting recording lag on estimates of the slope coefficientfrom a returns-earnings regression and (3) we examine the relationbetween the estimates of the earnings coefficient and observablevariables that may indicate (i) the extent to which earningsare more or less permanent, and (ii) the extent to which valuerelevant events are recorded in accounting earnings in a timelyfashion. Our main point is that attributing differences in thereturns-earnings relation to one of these effects without controllingfor the other may lead to erroneous conclusions.     

Do Australian companies manage earnings to meet simple earnings benchmarks?

Measurement error in unexpected accruals is an important problem for empirical earnings management research. Several recent studies avoid this problem by examining the pooled, cross–sectional distribution of reported earnings. Discontinuities in the distribution of reported earnings around key earnings thresholds may indicate the exercise of management discretion (i.e. earnings management). We apply this approach to the detection of earnings management by Australian firms. Our results generally indicate significantly more small earnings increases and small profits than expected and conversely, considerably fewer small earnings decreases and small losses than expected. These results are much stronger for larger Australian firms. We undertake an exploratory analysis of alternative explanations for our results and find some evidence consistent with management signalling its inside knowledge about the firm's expected future profitability to smooth earnings, as opposed to 'management intent to deceive' as an explanation for our results.     

Use of Fuller's Technique to Reduce Measurement Error in the Returns/Earnings Association

Empirical estimates of the earnings response coefficient have consistently been lower than theory predicts. This may be because empirical proxies for unexpected earnings contain measurement error. I demonstrate and evaluate the use of a recently developed technique by Fuller that yields consistent parameter estimates in the presence of measurement error. The empirical results indicate that this technique is successful at mitigating measurement error bias in the earnings response coefficient. The earnings response coefficient increases by as much as 52%. In contrast, replication of the techniques performed in previous studies increases the earnings response coefficient by only 8%.     

The Accrual Effect on Future Earnings

Earnings manipulation has become a widespread practice for US corporations. However, most studies in the literature focus on whether certain incentives would facilitate managers to manipulate earnings and there has been little evidence documenting the consequences of earnings manipulation. This paper fills this gap by examining how current accruals affect future earnings (the accrual effect) and measuring the size of this effect. We find that the aggregate future earnings will decrease by $0.046 and $0.096, respectively, in the next one and three years for a $1 increase of current accruals. Over the very long-term (25 years), 20% of current accruals will reverse. This negative accrual effect is more significant for firms with high price-earnings ratios, high market-to-book ratios and high accruals where earnings management is more likely to occur. We show that incorporating the accrual effect is useful in improving the accuracy of earnings forecasts for these firms. Accordingly, the empirical results are consistent with the notion that earnings management causes the negative relationship between current accruals and future earnings. In addition, this paper shows that one recently developed accrual model has better performance than the popularly cited model in identifying manipulated earnings.     

Religion and Female Educational Attainment

The paper reviews the literature on the education, gender, and religion nexuses and identifies plausible hypotheses that religion adversely affects female education. The link between major religions and female educational attainment is examined using the Barro-Lee data set for a sample of 97 countries. The estimates include control variables for colonial heritage, urbanization, labor force participation, and young adult mortality. The estimates show powerful negative links between female educational attainment and the proportion of ethnoreligions, Hindu, and Muslim adherents in a country, with similar results for the gender gap. The paper offers some interpretative thoughts and research agendas.     

Human capital and earnings distribution dynamics

Earnings heterogeneity plays a crucial role in modern macroeconomics. We document that mean earnings and measures of earnings dispersion and skewness all increase in US data over most of the working life-cycle for a typical cohort as the cohort ages. We show that (i) a human capital model can replicate these properties from the right distribution of initial human capital and learning ability, (ii) differences in learning ability are essential to produce an increase in earnings dispersion over the life cycle and (iii) differences in learning ability account for the bulk of the variation in the present value of earnings across agents. These findings emphasize the need to further understand the role and origins of initial conditions.     

Lost Generations: Long-Term Effects of the COVID-19 Crisis on Job Losers and Labour Market Entrants,and Options for Policy*

This paper discusses the potential long-run effects of large-scale unemployment during the COVID-19 crisis in the labour market on vulnerable job losers and labour market entrants in the United States. The paper begins by contrasting measures of the scale of job loss during the crisis. These measures are paired with estimates from past recessions indicating that the costs of job loss and unemployment can reduce workers’ earnings and raise their mortality for several decades. Focusing only on a subset of vulnerable job losers, the potential lifetime earnings losses from job loss related to the COVID-19 pandemic are predicted to be up to $2 trillion. Related losses in employment could imply a lasting reduction in the overall employment–population ratio. For these workers, losses in potential life years could be up to 24 million. Even at the low range, the resulting estimates are substantially larger than losses in potential life years from deaths directly due to COVID-19. New labour market entrants are at risk to suffer long-term losses in earnings and mortality as well. Based partly on experiences in other countries, the paper discusses potential reforms to short-time compensation programmes and unemployment insurance, which could help limit the short- and long-term harm from layoffs going forward.     

Volatility of accounting earnings

The theoretical derivation of the volatility of accounting earnings is an important topic. Not only does it concern the uncertainty in earnings measurement, but it also allows for an objective comparison between different accounting allocation procedures. An accounting allocation that yields a lower volatility of earnings can be desirable because it makes periodic earnings better estimates of underlying long-term earnings of a firm over time. Based on this information, accounting professionals can make more rational judgements of the most appropriate accounting method to be used in preparing financial reports. This paper shows how to calculate the volatility of earnings under uncertainty across a range of different scenarios.     

The association between qualitative management earnings forecasts and discretionary accounting in the Netherlands

This paper examines whether there is an association between discretionary accounting and the accuracy of long-run forecasts of annual earnings disclosed voluntarily by Dutch companies in the directors’ report. In particular, investigations were made of the consistency in the sign and direction of discretionary accounting techniques and qualitative earnings forecasts. Long-run forecasts are defined, for the purposes of this paper, as forecasts made at least seven months before the year-end. Although not mandatory, qualitative forecasts are released by well over 60% of the listed companies in the Netherlands. Empirical results indicate that there is consistency in the sign and direction of qualitative earnings forecasts and discretionary accounting. After adopting discretionary accounting, the forecast errors are reduced if the company can reach the management earnings forecast (target). In the event that reserves are insufficient to accomplish this goal, managers choose their next best option and take an earnings bath in order to maximize reserves available for future use. By partitioning the sample in various sub-sets it is shown that earnings management and forecast errors occur most in the extreme ranges of financial performance. Overall, the study shows that management engages in discretionary accounting to present results in line with the disclosed qualitative earnings forecasts in their directors’ reports. Whilst discretionary accounting may clearly improve the consistency of companies’ earnings forecasts released via the directors’ reports and the actual earnings, managers’ earnings forecasts are sometimes disclosed in anticipation of planned discretionary accounting actions.     

Earnings Management Constraints and Classification Shifting

Prior literature has investigated three forms of earnings management: real earnings management (REM), accruals earnings management (AEM) and classification shifting. Managers make trade‐off decisions among these methods based on the costs, constraints and timing of each strategy. This study investigates whether managers use classification shifting when their ability to use other forms of earnings management is constrained. We find that when REM is constrained by poor financial condition, high levels of institutional ownership and low industry market share, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. Further, we find that when AEM is constrained by low accounting system flexibility and the provision of a cash flow forecast, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. In addition, when we limit our sample to firms that are most likely to have manipulated earnings, we continue to find support for constraints of both REM and AEM leading to higher levels of classification shifting. We also find support for the hypothesis that the timing of each earnings management strategy influences managers’ trade‐off decision. Our results indicate that managers use classification shifting as substitute form of earnings management for both AEM and REM.     

How Common Are Intentional GAAP Violations? Estimates from a Dynamic Model

This paper uses data on detected misstatements—earnings restatements—and a dynamic model to estimate the extent of undetected misstatements that violate GAAP. The model features a CEO who can manipulate his firm's stock price by misstating earnings. I find the CEO's expected cost of misleading investors is low. The probability of detection over a five‐year horizon is 13.91%, and the average misstatement, if detected, results in an 8.53% loss in the CEO's retirement wealth. The low expected cost implies a high fraction of CEOs who misstate earnings at least once at 60%, with 2%–22% of CEOs starting to misstate earnings in each year 2003–2010, inflation in stock prices across CEOs who misstate earnings at 2.02%, and inflation in stock prices across all CEOs at 0.77%. Wealthier CEOs manipulate less, and the average misstatement is larger in smaller firms.     

Earnings Forecasts and the Information Contained in Spinoff Announcements

This study examines spinoff announcements in conjunction with financial analysts’ forecasts of earnings. The analysis shows that spinoff announcement abnormal returns are significantly related to the firm's information environment as proxieci by financial analysts’ earnings prediction errors. The findings also indicate that analysts significantly increase their short-term earnings forecasts in response to spinoffs, but do not significantly revise their long-term earnings forecasts. However, the earnings revisions are not significantly different across prediction error groups, which confirms that spinoff-related abnormal returns cannot be attributed solely to expected performance gains.     

Meeting or Missing Earnings Benchmarks: The Role of CEO Integrity

This paper examines the role of CEO integrity in determining whether a company's earnings benchmarks will be met, beaten or missed. Prior literature provides evidence that managers have incentives for meeting or beating earnings benchmarks and are rewarded by the market for doing so (Lopez and Rees, 2002; and Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Managers also have incentives to miss their earnings targets for the benefit of a lower strike price on subsequent option grants (McAnally et al., 2008). A CEO's involvement in backdating is taken here as a measure of his or her integrity. This paper shows that CEO integrity significantly influences whether benchmarks are met or beaten. In other words, backdating CEOs are more likely to meet or narrowly beat all three earnings benchmarks examined in the paper: positive earnings, last year's earnings and analysts’ forecasts. At the same time, they are also less likely to narrowly miss a zero‐earnings benchmark. The results presented in this paper further validate the use of benchmark meeting/beating as a measure of earnings manipulation.