Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts

Our objective is to penetrate the “black box” of sell‐side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow‐up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All‐Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high‐quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10‐K and 10‐Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts’ credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross‐sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts’ inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.     

A comparison of buy‐side and sell‐side analysts

There is very little research on the topic of buy-side analyst performance, and that which does exist yields mixed results. We use a large sample from both the buy-side and the sell-side and report several new results. First, while the contemporaneous returns to portfolios based on sell-side recommendations are positive, the returns for buy-side analysts, proxied by changes in institutional holdings, are negative. Second, the buy-side analysts' underperformance is accentuated when they trade against sell-side analysts' recommendations. Third, abnormal returns positively relate to both the portfolio size and the portfolio turnover of buy-side analysts' institutions, suggesting that large institutions employ superior analysts and that superior analysts frequently change their recommendations. Abnormal returns are also positively related to buy-side portfolios with stocks that have higher analyst coverage, greater institutional holding, and lower earnings forecast dispersion. Fourth, there is substantial persistence in buy-side performance, but even the top decile performs poorly. These findings suggest that sell-side analysts still outperform buy-side analysts despite the severe conflicts of interest documented in the literature.     

The Structure of Voluntary Disclosure Narratives: Evidence from Tone Dispersion

We examine tone dispersion, or the degree to which tone words are spread evenly within a narrative, to evaluate whether narrative structure provides insight into managers’ voluntary disclosures and users’ responses to those disclosures. We find that tone dispersion is associated with current aggregate and disaggregated performance and future performance, managers’ financial reporting decisions, and managers’ incentives and actions to manage perceptions. Furthermore, we find that tone dispersion is associated with analysts’ and investors’ responses to conference call narratives. Our results suggest that tone dispersion both reflects and affects the information that managers convey through their narratives.     

Conference Calls and Stock Price Volatility in the Post‐Reg FD Era

Past research has documented that the utilisation of conference calls is greater in the high tech sector than in other industries. Do high tech firms benefit from that? This study attempts to answer this question by examining the impact of ‘post‐Reg FD’ conference calls on the price volatility of high tech firms listed in the US market. We find evidence that more open conference calls results in lower idiosyncratic volatility.     

Analysts’ and Investors’ Reactions to Consistent Earnings Signals

We investigate (1) whether the trajectory of the current‐quarter earnings expectation path (defined by the signs of the forecast revision and the earnings surprise) provides information about future firm performance, and (2) the extent to which analysts and investors react to that information. Our results indicate that analysts underreact more to earnings information revealed by consistent‐signal earnings expectation paths than to earnings information communicated by inconsistent‐signal expectation paths. We also find that the current earnings expectation path provides incremental explanatory power for future abnormal returns, even after controlling for the sign and magnitude of the earnings surprise. Overall, our evidence is consistent with underreaction stemming from analysts’ and investors’ bias in processing the information in consistent‐signal earnings expectation paths.     

The Market Response to Beating After‐tax Earnings Targets Revisited using Analysts’ Pre‐tax Earnings Forecasts and Concurrent Tax Note Disclosures

We investigate whether the premium for achieving after‐tax earnings targets is informed by the availability of pre‐tax and after‐tax earnings forecasts. We find evidence the premium is discounted for firms achieving only after‐tax earnings forecasts compared with firms achieving both forecast targets. This is likely due to the uncertainty about future profitability and earnings quality created by failing to attain pre‐tax earnings targets. For firms achieving only pre‐tax earnings forecasts, no premium is documented. Taken together, our results indicate that while pre‐tax earnings forecasts may not move the market, they have an informational role in providing a context for assessing the achievement of after‐tax earnings targets. We also consider the usefulness of the tax note disclosures of deferred tax assets from carry‐forward losses for assessing the premium for achieving after‐tax earnings targets. Reflecting the duality of this tax deferral, we find evidence that recognition of these tax assets conveys information about lower earnings quality when recognition is likely to be opportunistic (in the case of firms achieving only after‐tax forecasts), and provides a signal of future profitability (in the case of firms achieving only pre‐tax forecasts).     

Disentangling Managers’ and Analysts’ Non‐GAAP Reporting

Researchers frequently proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP‐provided earnings are a valid proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP reporting, however, has been debated extensively. We explore this important question by creating the first large‐sample data set of managers’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures, which we directly compare to I/B/E/S data. Although we find a substantial overlap between the two data sets, we also find that they differ in systematic ways because I/B/E/S (1) excludes managers’ lower quality non‐GAAP numbers and (2) sometimes provides higher quality non‐GAAP measures that managers do not explicitly disclose. Our results indicate that using I/B/E/S to identify managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures significantly underestimates the aggressiveness of their reporting choices. We encourage researchers interested in managers’ non‐GAAP reporting to use our newly available data set of manager‐disclosed non‐GAAP metrics because it more accurately captures managers’ reporting choices.     

Non‐GAAP Earnings Disclosure in Loss Firms

This study examines the incremental information in loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures relative to GAAP earnings. Using a large sample obtained through textual analysis and hand‐collection, we posit and find that loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings exclusions offset the low informativeness of GAAP losses for forecasting and valuation. Loss firms’ non‐GAAP earnings are highly predictive of future performance and are valued by investors, while the expenses excluded from GAAP earnings are not. Additional tests suggest that loss firms disclosing non‐GAAP profits have significantly better future performance than GAAP‐only loss firms and are not overvalued by investors. Comparing non‐GAAP earnings of profitable firms to those of loss firms, we find that loss firms’ non‐GAAP metrics are significantly more predictive and less strategic. We conclude that non‐GAAP earnings disclosures are particularly informative about loss firms and help investors disaggregate losses into components that have differential implications for forecasting and valuation.     

Investment Dynamics and Earnings‐Return Properties: A Structural Approach

We propose the standard neoclassical model of investment under uncertainty with short‐run adjustment frictions as a benchmark for earnings‐return patterns absent accounting influences. We show that our proposed benchmark generates a wide range of earnings‐return patterns documented in accounting research. Notably, our model generates a concave earnings‐return relation, similar to that of Basu [1997], and predicts that the earnings‐return concavity increases with the volatility of firms’ underlying shock processes and decreases with the level of firms’ investments. We find strong empirical support for these predictions. Overall, our evidence suggests that our proposed benchmark is useful for understanding the joint dynamics of variables of interest to accounting research (e.g., earnings, returns, investment, market‐to‐book) absent accounting influences, a necessary precondition for inferring the effects of accounting from these dynamics.     

The effect of board composition on the informativeness and quality of annual earnings: Empirical evidence from Greece

This study examines how the informational quality of annual accounting earnings, varies according to the size and composition of the board of directors of publicly listed firms within the Greek capital market. Data analysis over a period of five years (2000-2004) revealed that the informativeness of annual accounting earnings is positively related to the fraction of outside directors serving on the board, but it is not related to board size. Additionally, firms with a higher proportion of outside board members proved to be more conservative when reporting bad news but on the contrary they do not display greater timeliness on the recognition of good news. Finally, firms with a higher proportion of outside directors report earnings of higher quality compared to firms with a low proportion of outside directors. Our results are robust to several sensitivity tests controlling for endogeneity, firm's fixed effects and alternative models for the estimation of discretionary accruals.     

The Evolving Disclosure Landscape: How Changes in Technology,the Media,and Capital Markets Are Affecting Disclosure

Recent changes in technology and the media are causing significant changes in how capital markets assimilate and respond to information. We identify important themes in the disclosure literature and use this as a framework to discuss the conference papers that appear in this volume. These papers examine how managers’ disclosure practices are being affected by changes in technology, the media, and capital markets. While this work makes important progress, we discuss how continuing technological change and the emergence of new forms of media offer further opportunities for research on the role of disclosure in capital markets.     

Cross‐Firm Real Earnings Management

Our analysis is rooted in the notion that stockholders can learn about the fundamental value of any firm from observing the earnings reports of its rivals. We argue that such intraindustry information transfers, which have been broadly documented in the empirical literature, may motivate managers to alter stockholders’ beliefs about the value of their firm not only by manipulating their own earnings report but also by influencing the earnings reports of rival firms. Managers obviously do not have access to the accounting system of peer firms, but they can nevertheless influence the earnings reports of rival firms by distorting real transactions that relate to the product market competition. We demonstrate such managerial behavior, which we refer to as cross‐firm real earnings management, and explore its potential consequences and interrelation with the practice of accounting‐based earnings management within an industry setting with imperfect (nonproprietary) accounting information.     

Earnings expectations and the quality of financial services

Using complaint data filed by consumers with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau against financial institutions, we show that banks receive, on average, 13.3% more customer complaints in the quarter immediately after they narrowly beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. The effect is mainly driven by banks’ attempts to reduce their non-interest expenses to beat earnings benchmarks. The relationship is stronger when bank CEOs receive a greater proportion of incentive-based compensation. Overall, our paper demonstrates how capital market incentives exacerbate shareholder–customer conflicts.     

Private Equity,Buy‐outs and Insolvency Risk

Private equity restructuring using debt has been criticized for increasing financial distress and bankruptcy especially following the financial crisis. We build a unique dataset comprising the population of over 9 million firm‐year observations and 153,000 insolvencies during the period 1995–2010. We compare the insolvency hazard of the spectrum of buy‐out types within the corporate population over time and investigate the risk profile of the companies pre‐buy‐out. Controlling for size, age, sector and macro‐economic conditions, private‐equity backed buy‐outs are no more prone to insolvency than non‐buy‐outs or other types of management buy‐ins. Moreover, leverage is not the characteristic that distinguishes failed buy‐outs from those surviving.     

An Investigation of Auditors’ Judgments When Companies Release Earnings Before Audit Completion

The majority of U.S. public companies release annual earnings prior to the completion of audit fieldwork. We investigate this phenomenon in a controlled experiment with audit partners and senior managers. We find that releasing earnings before completion of the audit pressures auditors to adopt the goals of management, thereby reducing the likelihood of post‐announcement audit‐adjustment recommendations. We also examine the effect of audit committee (AC) strength in improving auditors’ judgments after annual earnings are released. When ACs are actively involved in accounting issues and proactively communicating with auditors—characteristics currently lacking in most ACs—the negative effects on auditors’ judgments are completely mitigated. Our study provides evidence on potential unintended consequences of early release of earnings and the importance of investing in high‐quality ACs to mitigate adverse effects of client pressures on audit judgment and financial reporting quality.     

Relative Liquidity,Fund Flows and Short‐Term Demand: Evidence from Exchange‐Traded Funds

We show that highly liquid Exchange‐Traded Funds (ETFs), especially those that are more liquid than their underlying basket of securities (i.e., positive relative liquidity), are particularly attractive to investors. Using three definitions of liquidity, we find that relative liquidity predicts net fund flows, as well as inflows and outflows positively and significantly. We further document a liquidity clientele among institutional investors: (i) relative liquidity is significantly more important for short‐ than for long‐term investors; and (ii) relative liquidity is inversely related to investors’ average holding duration in the ETFs. These two findings provide evidence that relative liquidity encourages short‐term demand.     

Analyst Optimism and Incentives under Market Uncertainty

We examine how analysts’ changing incentives driven by changes in market uncertainty affect their forecast optimism. Analysts issue more optimistically biased earnings forecasts and buy recommendations under high market uncertainty (VIX). The lower reputational costs and larger benefits of optimistic output explain the increased optimistic output: Analysts are less likely to be penalized for inaccuracy and can stimulate more trading activity from optimistically biased output when market uncertainty is high. We find that the likelihood of analysts’ turnover decreases, while the trading volume associated with optimistic output increases, with VIX. No evidence suggests that analysts’ self‐selection affects our findings on optimism and market uncertainty.     

Earnings Management During Antidumping Investigations in Europe: Sample‐Wide and Cross‐Sectional Evidence

This paper examines earnings management by EU firms that initiate an antidumping investigation. We first document economically and statistically significant income‐decreasing earnings management around the initiation of an antidumping investigation. We show that earnings management increases when accounting data directly affect the magnitude of the tariffs imposed in the trade investigation. We also find that earnings management decreases as the number of petitioning firms increases or as the distance between petitioning firms increases, suggesting free‐rider and coordination problems. We find that earnings management increases when the petition is directed at a country that imports more goods from the petitioning firm's home country, suggesting that retaliation threats affect incentives. We document that raising equity or debt financing moderates income‐decreasing earnings management, consistent with the idea that sample firms trade off capital market and regulatory considerations. Our results indicate that contemporary research methods can detect accruals‐based earnings management in settings in which the incentives for earnings management can be clearly identified.     

A new perspective on post‐earnings‐announcement‐drift: Using a relative drift measure

Prior research finds that there is a delayed reaction to both analyst‐based earnings surprises and random‐walk‐based earnings surprises. Focusing on the market reaction from the post‐announcement window, prior studies show that analyst‐based drift is larger than random walk‐based drift. This finding is counter‐intuitive if we believe large, sophisticated investors tend to trade on analysts’ forecast earnings news and thus react faster and more completely than smaller and less sophisticated investors react to random walk earnings news. In this study, we construct a relative measure of post‐earnings‐announcement drift (PEAD) (i.e., drift as a proportion of total market reaction to earnings news) which we refer to as the ‘drift ratio’, and we provide evidence, consistent with our intuition, that analyst‐based drift ratio is smaller (not greater) than random‐walk‐based drift ratio. We find that this difference is more pronounced in more recent periods and for firms with more sophisticated investors. Our approach to measure the PEAD is more intuitive than that in traditional PEAD literature. Our results thus complement existing research findings by utilizing the drift ratio measure to generate new insights about the drift phenomenon.     

Anticipated Earnings Announcements and the Customer–Supplier Anomaly

I test whether the anticipation of earnings news stimulates acquisition of customer information and mitigates returns to the customer–supplier anomaly documented by Cohen and Frazzini (“Economic Links and Predictable Returns.” The Journal of Finance 63 (2008): 1977–2011). I find that attention to a firm's publicly disclosed customers increases shortly before the firm announces earnings, and that customer stock returns predict supplier stock returns shortly before, but not after, the supplier's earnings announcement. I further find some evidence that these predictable returns are increasing in the level of customer information acquisition. These results are unique to anticipated disclosure events and suggest that anticipation of supplier earnings announcements resolves investor limited attention to customer information and accelerates price discovery of customer news.