The Wealth Effect of Demutualization: Evidence From the U.S. Property-Liability and Life Insurance Industries

This study examines the wealth effect of demutualization initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating underpricing and postconversion long‐run stock performance. Our results suggest that there is more “money left on the table” for demutualized insurers than for non‐demutualized insurers. We show that higher underpricing for demutualized firms can be explained by greater market demand, market sentiment, and the size of the offering. Further, contrary to previous research reporting an average underperformance of industrial IPOs, we show that demutualization IPOs outperform non‐IPO firms with comparable size and book‐to‐market ratios and non‐demutualized insurers. We present evidence that the outperformance in stock returns is mainly attributable to improvement in post‐demutualization operating performance and demand at the time of the IPOs. The combined results of underpricing and long‐term performance suggest that the wealth of policyholders who choose stock rather than cash or policy credits is not harmed by demutualization. Stockholders who purchase demutualized company shares either during or after the IPO have earned superior returns. Our findings are consistent with the efficiency improvement hypothesis.     

The Impact of Mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards Adoption on Investment Efficiency: Standards,Enforcement, and Reporting Incentives

This paper investigates whether mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is followed by a decline in firms’ suboptimal investments. On average, we find that the probability of under‐investment in capital expenditure declines for firms from 23 countries requiring mandatory adoption of IFRS relative to firms from countries that do not have such requirements; meanwhile the probability of over‐investment remains unchanged. However, this real effect becomes smaller when we control for concurrent changes to the enforcement of financial reporting along with the introduction of IFRS in some countries, suggesting that the switch in standards is only one of the drivers for the observed benefits. Moreover, we find that the reduction in suboptimal investments is driven by firms with high reporting incentives to provide transparent financial reports from countries where the existing legal and enforcement systems are strong. We further show that the real effect increases with the predicted changes in accounting comparability. Finally, we find that after mandatory IFRS adoption, capital investment becomes more value‐relevant, less sensitive to the availability of free cash flows, and more responsive to growth opportunities. Our findings provide new insights into the real effects of mandatory IFRS adoption.     

Do long‐term institutional investors foster corporate innovation?

This article examines the effect of institutional investors’ investment horizons on firms’ innovation activities. We conjecture that the presence of long‐term institutional investors mitigates managerial myopia, prompting firms to generate greater corporate innovation outputs. Using data on patents and patent citations for US firms, we find that institutions’ investment horizons are positively related to the number of patents and patent citations. We also document that long‐term (short‐term) institutional ownership is positively (negatively) related to the innovation outputs. This article makes an additional contribution to the corporate innovation literature by addressing the positive role of long‐term institutional investors.     

Earnings Quality under Rules‐ versus Principles‐based Accounting Standards: A Test of the Skinner Hypothesis / LA QUALITÉ DES RÉSULTATS SELON QUE LES NORMES COMPTABLES SONT AXÉES SUR LES RÈGLES OU SUR LES PRINCIPES: VÉRIFICATION DE L'HYPOTHÈSE DE SKINNER*

We provide preliminary evidence, consistent with Skinner (1995), that Canada's relatively principles‐based GAAP yield higher accrual quality than the United States' relatively rules‐based GAAP. These results stem from a comparison of the Dechow‐Dichev (2002) measure of accrual quality for cross‐listed Canadian firms reporting under both Canadian and U.S. GAAP. However, we document lower accrual quality for Canadian firms reporting under U.S. GAAP than for U.S. firms, which are subject to stronger U.S. oversight, reporting under U.S. GAAP. The latter results suggest that stronger U.S. oversight compensates for inferior accrual quality associated with rules‐based GAAP. Consistent with the positive effect of Canada's principles‐based GAAP and the offsetting negative effect of Canada's weaker oversight, we find no overall difference in accrual quality between Canadian firms reporting under Canadian GAAP and U.S. firms reporting under U.S. GAAP. Our results imply that (1) policymakers who wish to compare the effectiveness of oversight across jurisdictions must control for the GAAP effect; and (2) accounting standard‐setters who wish to compare the effectiveness of principles‐ versus rules‐based GAAP must control for oversight strength.     

The Unintended Consequences of the Frequency of PCAOB Inspection

After more than 50 years of self‐regulation of the US auditing profession, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as a quasi‐governmental entity with statutory authority to inspect accounting firms that audit public clients. The frequency of this inspection is annual or triennial, based upon the number of public clients the firm audits. We examine the effects of these two levels of inspection frequency on financial reporting quality and audit fees for clients of small and midsize public accounting firms. Our findings provide evidence of significantly higher audit quality and audit fees for clients of annually inspected firms relative to clients of triennially inspected firms. These findings are robust to auditor‐client alignment analyses, propensity score matching, time‐series analyses, examination of firms that have changed from triennial to annual inspection, and particular examination of firms with inspection deficiencies. Overall, our study suggests that the two‐tier frequency system of PCAOB inspection may have also resulted in two‐tier audit quality and audit fee systems for small and midsize public accounting firms, with more frequent inspection leading to more rigorous and informed auditor decisions. We discuss the implications of our results for the Board and the profession at large.     

The Influence of Country‐ and Firm‐level Governance on Financial Reporting Quality: Revisiting the Evidence

This paper examines how firm‐level governance and country‐level governance interplay in shaping financial reporting quality. Using IFRS adoption as a source of variation in firms’ reporting discretion, and a large sample of European firms that mandatorily switch to the new set of standards, we find that in countries with low enforcement and weak oversight over financial reporting, only firms with strong board‐level corporate governance mechanisms experience an increase in financial reporting quality, consistent with firm‐ and country‐level governance mechanisms being substitutes. However, in countries with high enforcement and strict oversight over financial reporting, firms with either strong or weak board‐level governance mechanisms experience an increase in financial reporting quality, even if the increase is larger for the former group. Overall, our findings indicate that in the debate about the effects of governance on the quality of financial reporting, it is important to consider both country‐ and firm‐level corporate governance mechanisms.     

Earnings Management in Public Family Firms under Economic Adversity

This paper explores the relationship between the ownership of public firms and their motivation to implement earnings management practices, providing evidence on whether family businesses differ from non‐family businesses in terms of earnings management practices. In addition, it focuses on the possibility of asymmetrical earnings management policies between periods of stability and economic adversity. Based on a sample of Portuguese listed family‐controlled firms for the 1999–2011 period and using a panel data approach, we find no significant differences in the incentive to manage earnings between public family and non‐family firms, suggesting a compensation between the alignment hypothesis, the long‐term orientation of family firms and the desire to pass firms onto succeeding generations, and the entrenchment effect. The evidence shows that earnings management decreases with firms’ profitability, and non‐family firms’ discretionary accruals are mainly influenced by the board of directors. In crisis periods, the discretionary accruals of family firms are especially influenced by firm size. After controlling for different earnings management measures, the determinants of earnings management practices seem somewhat sensitive to the earnings quality proxies. The results provide evidence that directors and policy makers should prevent earnings management procedures in particular situations.     

The effect of restatements on analyst behavior

This paper examines how changes in the credibility of financial reporting affect analyst behavior. Using a sample of restatement firms experiencing a substantial change in credibility over 1997–2006, we document that restatements have a long‐lived effect on analyst behavior and that analysts differentiate between restatements caused by irregularities and those caused by errors. We find that while irregularity restatement firms exhibit a reduction in analyst coverage and forecast accuracy and an increase in forecast dispersion in the post‐restatement period, other restatement firms exhibit only an increase in forecast error. Finally, we find evidence to suggest that remedial actions reduce the effect of irregularity restatements on analyst behavior. Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that restatements affect analyst behavior in forming judgements regarding subsequent earnings announcements.     

Improving earnings quality: The effect of reporting incentives and accounting standards

We investigate the different effects on earnings quality of accounting standards and reporting incentives for Germany over the period 1994 to 2005. To this end, we control for reporting incentives at the firm level, instead of the country level, by using the timing of voluntary IFRS adoption as a proxy for reporting incentives. We then include reporting incentives in an analysis of earnings management and information asymmetry. Contrary to common expectation, we find that IFRS reporting potentially decreases earnings quality on average; but also that reporting incentives appear to have lower effects on earnings quality in IFRS statements than in GGAAP statements. Thus, IFRS may lead to more homogenous earnings quality across firms.     

Capital gains tax,supply‐driven trading and ownership structure: direct evidence of the lock‐in effect

This study investigates the effect of differential capital gains tax rates on investor trading and share prices in a unique market setting that facilitates the resolution of conflicting prior evidence of holding period tax incentives. In particular, we examine whether the concessionary tax treatment of long‐term capital gains increases the supply of shares that qualify for long‐term status, thereby causing downward price pressure. We find evidence of abnormal seller‐initiated trading following the 12‐month anniversary of listing for IPO firms that appreciate in price (‘winners’) and report no such evidence for firms that decline in price (‘losers’). Consistent with the tax concessions being greater for individual than institutional investors, we report that abnormal seller‐initiated trading is mitigated by higher levels of ownership by institutional investors. We also report limited evidence, for winners, of declining share prices upon qualifying for long‐term tax status.     

Beyond Tax Avoidance: Offshore Firms’ Institutional Environment and Financial Reporting Quality*

We explore how firms’ operations in Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs) through subsidiaries or affiliates affect the quality of financial reporting. Using a unique and large sample of firms that have headquarters in the 15 countries with the strictest legal regimes and have subsidiaries or affiliates in OFCs, we find that such firms exhibit lower financial reporting quality than comparable firms without OFC operations. We also find that as OFC characteristics become more prevalent, firms are more likely to engage in both accrual‐based and real earnings management. More importantly, after disentangling OFC characteristics into the opportunity for tax avoidance, regulation arbitrage and secrecy policies, we find that beyond tax avoidance, regulation arbitrage and the secrecy policies of OFCs significantly affect financial reporting quality. The causal effect of OFC operations is supported by the analysis of financial reporting quality when firms set up OFC operations. Our findings are robust to various additional tests addressing potential endogeneity issues. We conclude that the assessment of a firm's institutional environment must encompass the registration status of its subsidiaries or affiliates as well as its own.     

The Effect of Accounting Conservatism on Corporate Investment during the Global Financial Crisis

This paper examines the effect of accounting conservatism on firm‐level investment during the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. Using a differences‐in‐differences design, we find that firms with less conservative financial reporting experienced a sharper decline in investment activity following the onset of the crisis compared to firms with more conservative financial reporting. This relationship was stronger for firms that were financially constrained, faced greater external financing needs, or had higher information asymmetry. We also find that more conservative firms experienced lower declines in both debt‐raising activity and stock performance. The evidence suggests that accounting conservatism reduces underinvestment in the presence of information frictions.     

The Timeliness of Restatement Disclosures and Financial Reporting Credibility

This study investigates whether prompt discovery and disclosure of earnings restatements is associated with greater post‐restatement financial reporting credibility. We measure the timeliness of restatement detection by the length of time between the end of the misstated period and the subsequent restatement announcement. We document that shorter detection periods are significantly associated with high‐quality corporate governance characteristics and executive and/or auditor turnover, but not with characteristics of restatements. We also find that firms with shorter detection periods exhibit a more moderate decline in the information content of earnings following restatement announcements relative to firms with longer detection periods, and that detection period length has an incremental effect on the information content of earnings relative to executive and/or auditor turnover alone. In addition, we find that restatement disclosures are more timely following the implementation of the SOX‐era reforms, and that only firms with shorter detection periods experience more moderate post‐restatement declines in the information content of earnings following the implementation of the SOX‐era reforms. The results from this study suggest that the timeliness of restatement detection and disclosure is associated with greater financial reporting credibility following restatements.     

Managerial academic experience,external monitoring and financial reporting quality

This study examines the effect of managerial academic experience on firms’ financial reporting quality. Using data from China, we find that firms with top managers possessing academic experience exhibit lower levels of both accrual and real earnings management, along with a lower probability of future restatements. This effect is more pronounced for firms with inefficient external monitoring, suggesting that the higher financial reporting quality is mainly explained by the managers’ intrinsic motivation to report truthfully. The results hold when we use firm fixed‐effect regressions, instrumental variable two‐stage regressions, and a propensity score matching (PSM) approach to mitigate the omitted variable and endogeneity concerns. Our study suggests that academic experience can serve as a source of valuable expertise for corporate executives.     

Multiple Large Shareholders and Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence from China

In this paper, we examine the effect of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on financial reporting quality. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms over the period 2007–2018, we find that firms with MLS tend to have lower financial reporting quality. Our findings are robust to an array of robustness tests, including controlling for possible omitted variables, a Heckman two-step sample selection model, and a difference-in-differences analysis based on a propensity score matched sample. We further show that the effect of MLS on financial reporting quality is attenuated for firms followed by more analysts, cross-listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and held by institutional blockholders. Finally, we find that agency problems appear to be the possible underlying mechanisms through which MLS lower financial reporting quality.     

Exploring the Causes of Accounting Restatements by Family Firms

Prior research shows that family firms have better earnings quality than non‐family firms in common‐law countries and highly developed markets. In contrast, we do not find a significant difference in the financial reporting quality between family and non‐family firms in the context of a civil‐law system and less developed market. We show that the financial reporting quality of family firms is conditioned on: (1) the divergence between the controlling shareholders’ voting rights and their cash flow rights, and (2) the firm's reputation for integrity, while these two conditions do not explain the restatement likelihood for non‐family firms. Moreover, when accounting irregularities are detected in the case of family firms, they are associated with more serious accounting restatements. Together, these results imply that the severity of the conflict between ultimate and minority shareholders, and a lack of integrity, explain the propensity for making financial restatements among family firms in a regime characterized as having weak investor protection and concentrated ownership structures.     

The effect of external audits of internal control over financial reporting on financial reporting for clients of Big 4, Second-tier,and small audit firms

The external audit of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) is a very expensive and contentious aspect of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Larger public firms were first required to file a management report on and have an external audit of ICFR in 2004. Smaller public firms were first required to file a management report on ICFR in 2007 but are exempt from the audit requirement. Whereas most related prior research investigates the combined effect of management and auditor reports on financial reporting, this study examines the distinct effect of auditor reports on reporting quality. For companies audited by small auditors, we find evidence that financial reporting quality improves with an auditor report on ICFR. We find no evidence that auditor ICFR reports improve reporting quality for clients of Big 4 or Second-tier audit firms. Our study adds to the debate on the applicability of SOX Section 404 to smaller firms.     

Evidence of Avoiding Working Capital Deficits in Australia

This study examines the incidence of managerial interventions in Australian firms to avoid reporting working capital deficits. We document a significant discontinuity in the distribution of current ratios at 1.0. We also find that the propensity of Australian firms to avoid working capital deficits is largely determined by the costs and benefits of management interventions. Firms with short‐term or long‐term debt are less likely to engage in accounts manipulation, while firms paying dividends are more likely to do so. Further examination of the components of current assets and current liabilities reveals that, to avoid working capital deficits, Australian firms tend to undertake actions to overstate accounts receivable rather than overstate inventory or understate current liabilities. The results provide practical guidance and implications for shareholders, auditors and regulators in identifying accounting irregularities.     

The Informational Role of Short Sellers: The Evidence from Short Sellers’ Reports on US‐Listed Chinese Firms

Using US‐listed Chinese firms as the setting, this paper studies a novel channel through which investors can acquire information about firms’ financial reporting quality, that is, the reports published voluntarily by short sellers. I find that short sellers tend to target firms that have financial reporting red flags and that exhibit ‘good’ operating performance and stock valuations. Targeted firms experience an average three‐day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of ?6.4%, and ?13.6% for initial coverage of the firm, and the CARs are more negative when the reports allege more severe misconduct of the firms. Non‐targeted firms also experience losses in value following short seller reports, especially when they hire the same non‐Big 4 auditors as targeted firms and when their earnings quality is poor. In comparison, analysts fail to perform proper due diligence and are much less effective than short sellers in exposing misreporting risk in Chinese firms.     

Positive spillover effect and audit quality: a study of cancelling China’s dual audit system

The mandatory dual‐audit and dual‐reporting system (DADRS) for mainland Chinese firms cross‐listed in Hong Kong (AH firms) was abolished in 2010. This study quantifies a positive spillover effect from Hong Kong‐based auditors in the DADRS and examines whether and to what extent this affects the audit quality of AH firms. We find that AH firms exposed to a stronger positive spillover effect have higher audit quality, and the loss of this effect drives the declining audit quality of AH firms after they cancelled the DADRS. This study is among the first empirical works on this research topic.