Imperfect Accounting and Reporting Bias

Errors and bias are both inherent features of accounting. In theory, while errors discourage bias by lowering the value relevance of accounting, they can also facilitate bias by providing camouflage. Consistent with theory, we find a hump‐shaped relation between a firm's propensity to engage in intentional misstatement and the prevalence of unintentional misstatements in the firm's industry for the whole economy and a majority of the industries. The result is robust to using firms’ number of items in financial statements and exposure to complex accounting rules as alternative proxies for errors and to using the restatement amount in net income to quantify the magnitude of bias and errors. To directly test for the two effects of errors, we show that when errors are more prevalent, the market reacts less to firms’ earnings surprises and bias is more difficult to detect. Our results highlight the imperfectness of accounting, advance understanding of firms’ reporting incentives, and shed light on accounting standard setting.     

Standard Error Biases When Using Generated Regressors in Accounting Research

We analyze the standard error bias associated with the use of generated regressors—independent variables generated from first-step regressions—in accounting research settings. Under general conditions, generated regressors do not affect the consistency of coefficient estimates. However, commonly used generated regressors can cause standard errors to be understated. Problematic generated regressors include predicted values, coefficient estimates, and measures derived from these estimates. Widely used generated regressors in accounting include measures of earnings persistence, normal accruals, litigation risk, and conditional conservatism. Using simple regression models and simulation, we demonstrate how generated regressors can produce understated standard errors in accounting research settings. We also demonstrate how the magnitude of the standard error bias is inversely related to the precision of the generated regressor. Finally, we discuss bootstrapping as a correction for the bias and demonstrate the pairs cluster bootstrap as a tool to improve inferences in common accounting settings involving generated regressors.     

Investment Dynamics and Earnings‐Return Properties: A Structural Approach

We propose the standard neoclassical model of investment under uncertainty with short‐run adjustment frictions as a benchmark for earnings‐return patterns absent accounting influences. We show that our proposed benchmark generates a wide range of earnings‐return patterns documented in accounting research. Notably, our model generates a concave earnings‐return relation, similar to that of Basu [1997], and predicts that the earnings‐return concavity increases with the volatility of firms’ underlying shock processes and decreases with the level of firms’ investments. We find strong empirical support for these predictions. Overall, our evidence suggests that our proposed benchmark is useful for understanding the joint dynamics of variables of interest to accounting research (e.g., earnings, returns, investment, market‐to‐book) absent accounting influences, a necessary precondition for inferring the effects of accounting from these dynamics.     

Banks’ Financial Reporting and Financial System Stability

The use of accounting measures and disclosures in banks’ contracts and regulation suggests that the quality of banks’ financial reporting is central to the efficacy of market discipline and nonmarket mechanisms in limiting banks’ development of debt and risk overhangs in economic good times and in mitigating the adverse consequences of those overhangs for the stability of the financial system in downturns. This essay examines how research on banks’ financial reporting, informed by the financial economics literature on banking, can generate insights about how to enhance the stability of the financial system. We begin with a foundational discussion of how aspects of banks’ accounting and disclosures may affect stability. We then evaluate representative papers in the empirical literature on banks’ financial reporting and stability, pointing out the research design issues that empirical accounting researchers need to confront to develop well‐specified tests able to generate reliably interpretable findings. To this end, we provide examples of settings amenable to addressing these issues. We conclude with considerations for accounting standard setters and financial system policy makers.     

Ownership,two-tier board structure,and the informativeness of earnings – Evidence from China

This study extends previous research by empirically examining how ownership, two-tier board structure, and auditor affect the informativeness of earnings for companies listed in China. We measure the informativeness of earnings by the earnings–returns relation, discretionary accruals, and audit opinion. The results show that ownership concentration, the presence of foreign shareholders, the percentage of tradable shares, the type of dominant shareholder, the supervisory board, and independent directors affect the earnings response coefficients and discretionary accruals. We also find that the type of dominant shareholder, the size of the supervisory board, and the percentage of independent directors have an impact on the frequency of modified audit opinions. Our research has implications for China’s regulators who are striving to improve accounting information, transparency, and corporate governance.     

Measuring discretionary accruals: are ROA-matched models better than the original Jones-type models?

Discretionary accruals estimated from Jones-type models are elevated or depressed for firms with extreme performance. Kothari et al. (J Acc Econ 39:163–197, 2005) propose performance matching to address the issue, that is, to difference discretionary accruals estimated from Jones-type models for treatment and control firms matched on current ROA. This study shows (1) performance matching will systematically cause discretionary accruals of either sign to be underestimated, and (2) the measurement error will be negatively correlated with the true discretionary accruals. As a result, using discretionary accruals estimated with performance matching to test whether certain events induce earnings management will increase the frequency of Type II errors, and using them as the dependent or an independent variable in regression analysis will bias the regression coefficient toward zero. The results of our empirical tests are consistent with these predictions.     

Do seasoned industry specialists provide higher audit quality? A re-examination

The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the recent findings in Gaver and Utke (2019) (GU) who find that seasoned industry specialist auditors provide higher audit quality. We first illustrate how the magnitude of residuals from the accruals model can vary significantly by industry, thus highlighting the importance of including industry fixed effects when the dependent variable is discretionary accruals. We next replicate GU’s findings. We first attempt to replicate prior literature after including industry fixed effects in the audit quality (discretionary accruals) models. This is an important control, as the relevant benchmark for a firm with an industry specialist auditor is a peer firm in the same industry with a non-specialist auditor. We find that after including industry fixed effects, there is no association between seasoned industry specialist auditors and discretionary accruals. We also find that the association between industry specialization and discretionary accruals is very sensitive to the way in which the researcher calculates specialization. Our findings are informative for shareholders of public companies who vote on auditor ratification.     

Overvaluation and earnings management

Consistent with Jensen’s [Jensen, M., 2005. Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management 34, 5–19] agency-costs-of-overvalued-equity prediction, we find that overvaluation is statistically and economically related to subsequent income-increasing earnings management. This relation is robust to a series of tests that address potential endogeneity concerns, including omitted variable bias and reverse causality. The agency costs of overvalued equity are substantial. Overvaluation-induced income-increasing earnings management is negatively related to future abnormal stock returns and operating performance, and this negative relation becomes more pronounced as prior overvaluation intensifies. Among the most overvalued firms, those with high discretionary accruals underperform those with low discretionary accruals during the following year by 11.88% as measured by the three-factor alphas, and by 12.87% points as measured by industry-adjusted unmanaged EBITDA-to-assets ratio.     

The impact of audit quality on real and accrual earnings management around IPOs

We examine the relation between audit quality and the earnings management activities of IPO firms. The impact of high quality auditors on real earnings management has been researched in a number of settings e.g. SEOs. However, to date, there has been no work on the effect of high quality auditors on real activities-based manipulation around IPOs. We examine UK IPOs between 1998 and 2008 and find evidence that high quality auditors constrain the use of real activities manipulation that occurs via the management of discretionary expenses. We also find evidence, consistent with prior research, that high quality auditors constrain the manipulation of discretionary accruals. Crucially, we find IPO firms audited by high quality auditors undertake sales-based manipulation in order to manage earnings upward at the end of the IPO year. The presence of high quality auditors is not, therefore, sufficient to constrain all forms of earnings management.     

Seasoned equity offerings: Quality of accounting information and expected flotation costs

Flotation costs represent a significant loss of capital to firms and are positively related to information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. We measure a firm's information asymmetry by its accounting information quality based on two extensions of the Dechow and Dichev [2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accrual estimation errors. Accounting Review 77, 35–59] earnings accruals model, which is a more direct approach to assessing the information available to outside investors than the more commonly used proxies. Our main hypothesis is that poor accounting information quality raises uncertainty about a firm's financial condition for outside investors, though not necessarily for insiders. This accounting effect lowers demand for a firm's new equity, thereby raising underwriting costs and risk. Using a large sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), we show that poor accounting information quality is associated with higher flotation costs in terms of larger underwriting fees, larger negative SEO announcement effects, and a higher probability of SEO withdrawals. These results are robust to joint determination of offer size and flotation cost components and to adjustments for sample selection bias.     

The Use of Unsigned Earnings Quality Measures in Tests of Earnings Management

This paper examines the implications of using the absolute value of discretionary accruals when testing for earnings management. First, we analytically develop the mean and variance of the distribution of absolute discretionary accruals, and show that the expected value is an increasing function of the variance in the underlying error term from the first‐stage discretionary accrual estimation model. Second, we highlight several firm characteristics that are related to the error variance in discretionary accrual estimation models. Using simulations, we show that correlation between the earnings management partitioning variable and these firm characteristics leads to an overrejection of the null hypothesis of no earnings management. Third, we provide research design suggestions to help researchers mitigate the potential bias arising from the use of unsigned measures of earnings management. Using these suggestions, we replicate a recent study, and demonstrate that the inferences change after controlling for operating volatility.     

Did the goodwill accounting standard impose material economic consequences on Australian acquirers?

This research explores the empirical association between takeover bid premium and acquired (purchased) goodwill, and tests whether the strength of the association changes after the passage of approved accounting standard AASB 1013 in Australia in 1988. AASB 1013 mandated capitalization and amortization of acquired goodwill to the income statement over a maximum period of 20 years. We use regressions to assess how the association between bid premium and acquired goodwill varies in the pre‐AASB and post‐AASB 1013 periods after controlling for confounding factors. Our results show that reducing the variety of accounting policy options available to bidder management after an acquisition results in a systematic reduction in the strength of the association between premium and goodwill.     

Earnings Management During Antidumping Investigations in Europe: Sample‐Wide and Cross‐Sectional Evidence

This paper examines earnings management by EU firms that initiate an antidumping investigation. We first document economically and statistically significant income‐decreasing earnings management around the initiation of an antidumping investigation. We show that earnings management increases when accounting data directly affect the magnitude of the tariffs imposed in the trade investigation. We also find that earnings management decreases as the number of petitioning firms increases or as the distance between petitioning firms increases, suggesting free‐rider and coordination problems. We find that earnings management increases when the petition is directed at a country that imports more goods from the petitioning firm's home country, suggesting that retaliation threats affect incentives. We document that raising equity or debt financing moderates income‐decreasing earnings management, consistent with the idea that sample firms trade off capital market and regulatory considerations. Our results indicate that contemporary research methods can detect accruals‐based earnings management in settings in which the incentives for earnings management can be clearly identified.     

Accounting Research and Common Sense

The paper identifies some basic shortcomings of contemporary accounting research. Aside from issues related to how researchers pick topics—they are generally too remote from pre‐existing realities—the main points concern the standard paradigm: explaining a dependent variable Y in terms of X, the primary variable of interest, while controlling for Z. The paper argues that just because the t‐statistic related to X is significant does not mean that X helps to explain Y. To address this issue requires a goodness‐of‐fit analysis that evaluates the incremental contribution of X. Such tests can show that X effectively acts as noise though X's t‐statistic is significant. Incremental goodness‐of‐fit analyses would potentially have dramatic consequences on research because rejection of the null would now take place much less often. The paper also considers problems associated with ordinary least squares, with specific emphasis on the scaling of dollar amount variables in linear cross‐sectional settings.     

SEASONED EQUITY ISSUERS’ R&D INVESTMENTS: SIGNALING OR OVEROPTIMISM

It is well known that investors often react negatively to the announcements of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We posit that issuers can use positive discretionary (higher than expected) R&D investments before the SEO to signal their investment prospects to mitigate the negative announcement effect. Alternatively, positive discretionary R&D may be attributed to managerial overoptimism about future returns of R&D investments. We find strong support for the signaling hypothesis among high‐tech issuers: investors respond more favorably to the SEO announcements of high‐tech issuers with positive discretionary R&D; these issuers are more likely to use new capital in future R&D and they produce better post‐SEO operating performance. In contrast, we find some evidence of managerial overoptimism among low‐tech issuers: investors tend to penalize low‐tech firms with positive discretionary R&D at SEO announcements; they are more likely to hold new capital as cash and they fail to produce better post‐SEO operating performance.     

“Holier-than-thou” perception bias among professional accountants: A cross-cultural study

Theoretical conceptions of culture in accounting research are controversial, ranging from highly deterministic, quantified and componential perspectives (such as Hosfstede's five dimensional model) to those that suggest continual changes in cultural values brought about by forces of acculturation. This paper makes a contribution to cross-cultural accounting research by examining the influence of competing theoretical perspectives of culture and acculturation on “holier-than-thou” perception bias. “Holier-than-thou” perception bias leads to individuals perceiving themselves as acting more ethically than comparable others when confronted with ethically uncertain work-related behaviours. This study contributes to cross-cultural accounting research by surveying Australian and Indian professional accountants from big four accounting firms. We firstly seek to establish the prevalence of “holier-than-thou” perception bias in both cultural settings. Secondly, we examine the differential and competing influences of culture and acculturation on perceptions of accountants from the two countries on measures of this bias. Data was collected through a survey questionnaire administered to samples of senior accountants from the big accounting firms in Australia and India. The questionnaire comprised an auditor-client conflict and two whistle-blowing scenarios and used two questions to measure the magnitude of the bias. The results show that “holier-than-thou” perception bias exists among accountants within each of the two countries. However, the magnitude of the bias was not significant between the countries. The results support the theory of acculturation in big accounting firms. Our findings have implications for accounting research where the presence of “holier-than-thou” perception bias needs to be considered in cases where respondents are questioned on socially sensitive issues. The findings may be useful to accounting researchers, managers of multinational enterprises in general, and big-four accounting firms in particular. Our conceptual framework applied in this study is innovative and provides a template for assessing current controversies in cross-cultural accounting research.     

Learning by Failing: A Simple VaR Buffer

We study in this article the problem of model risk in VaR computations and document a procedure for correcting the bias due to specification and estimation errors. This practical method consists of “learning from model mistakes”, since it dynamically relies on an adjustment of the VaR estimates – based on a back‐testing framework – such as the frequency of past VaR exceptions always matches the expected probability. We finally show that integrating the model risk into the VaR computations implies a substantial minimum correction to the order of 10–40% of VaR levels.     

On the Relation between Conservatism in Accounting Standards and Incentives for Earnings Management

This paper studies the role of conservative accounting standards in alleviating rational yet dysfunctional unobservable earnings manipulation. We show that when accounting numbers serve both the valuation role (in which potential investors use accounting reports to assess a firm's expected future payoff) and the stewardship role (in which current shareholders rely on the same reports to monitor their risk‐averse manager), current firm owners have incentives to engage in earnings management. Such manipulation reduces accounting numbers' stewardship value and leads to inferior risk sharing. We then show that risk sharing, and hence contract efficiency, can be improved under a conservative accounting standard where, absent earnings management, accounting earnings represent true economic earnings with a downward bias, compared with under an unbiased standard where, absent earnings management, accounting earnings represent true economic earnings without bias.     

A new approach to predicting analyst forecast errors: Do investors overweight analyst forecasts?

I provide evidence that investors overweight analyst forecasts by demonstrating that prices do not fully reflect predictable components of analyst errors, which conflicts with conclusions in prior research. I highlight estimation bias in traditional approaches and develop a new approach that reduces this bias. I estimate characteristic forecasts that map current firm characteristics into forecasts of future earnings. Contrasting characteristic and analyst forecasts predicts analyst forecast errors and revisions. I find abnormal returns to strategies that sort firms by predicted forecast errors, consistent with investors overweighting analyst forecasts and predictable biases in analyst forecasts influencing the information content of prices.     

The relative and incremental value relevance of goodwill before and after SFAS No. 142

We explore the value relevance of goodwill against two benchmarks: other accounting information and long-lived tangible assets. Prior research suggests that fair value estimates for goodwill must be inferred from other available information because of the nature of goodwill, including its intangibility. Such inferences are highly discretionary and may limit the usefulness of reported goodwill estimates. Because Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 142 relies exclusively on fair value estimates to subsequently measure goodwill, reported values considering management’s increased discretion may be less reliable and less value relevant when presented in conjunction with other accounting information. However, the subsequent accounting measurement for goodwill is not dissimilar from the subsequent measurement for long-lived tangible assets, which are also subject to impairment. In general, impairment measurement is subjective; management may have greater insight, even in the presence of management incentives and other accounting information, that may help confirm or disconfirm investors’ own goodwill estimates. Using other accounting information and long-lived tangible assets as benchmarks for the value relevance of goodwill, we find that reported goodwill provides greater value relevance relative to other accounting information after SFAS 142 and that the difference between the value relevance of goodwill and other long-lived tangible assets is also significantly greater following SFAS 142.