Which Microfinance Institutions Are Becoming More Cost Effective with Time? Evidence from a Mixture Model

Microfinance institutions (MFIs) play a key role in many developing countries. Utilizing data from Eastern Europe and Central Asia, MFIs are found to generally operate with lower costs the longer they are in operation. Given the differences in operating environments, subsidies, and organizational form, this finding of increasing cost effectiveness may not aptly characterize all MFIs. Estimation of a mixture model reveals that roughly half of the MFIs are able to operate with reduced costs over time, while half do not. Among other things, we find that larger MFIs offering deposits and those receiving lower subsidies operate more cost effectively over time.     

How Are Derivatives Used? Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry

We investigate investment managers' use of derivatives by comparing return distributions for equity mutual funds that use and do not use derivatives. In contrast to public perception, derivative users have risk exposure and return performance that are similar to nonusers. We also analyze changes in fund risk in response to prior fund performance. Changes in risk are substantially less severe for funds using derivatives, consistent with the explanation that managers use derivatives to reduce the impact of performance on risk. We provide new evidence regarding the implications of cash flows and managerial gaming for the relation between performance and risk.     

Has Distance Died? Evidence from a Panel Gravity Model

The estimated coefficient of distance on the volume of tradeis generally found to increase rather than decrease throughtime using the traditional gravity model of trade. This distancepuzzle proved robust to several ad hoc versions of the modelusing data for 1962–96 for a large sample of 130 countries.The introduction of an "augmented" barrier to trade functionremoves the paradox, yielding a decline in the estimate of theelasticity of trade to distance of about 11 percent over the35-year period for the whole sample. However, the "death ofdistance" is shown to be largely confined to bilateral tradebetween rich countries, with poor countries becoming marginalized.     

Does accounting quality change following a switch from U.S. GAAP to IFRS? Evidence from Germany

This study examines whether accounting quality changed following a switch from U.S. GAAP to IFRS. Using a sample of German high tech firms that transitioned to IFRS from U.S. GAAP in 2005, we find that accounting numbers under IFRS generally exhibit more earnings management, less timely loss recognition, and less value relevance compared to those under U.S. GAAP. In addition, after analyzing the accounting quality of firms that applied IFRS throughout the entire sample period, we find that, for the metrics suggesting a decline in accounting quality for both groups of firms, the change is significantly more pronounced for firms switching to IFRS from U.S. GAAP. Overall, our findings indicate that the application of U.S. GAAP generally resulted in higher accounting quality than application of IFRS, and a transition from U.S. GAAP to IFRS reduced accounting quality. Our findings provide the first evidence on the potential consequences of a switch from U.S. GAAP to IFRS.     

How Wise Are Crowds? Insights from Retail Orders and Stock Returns

We analyze the role of retail investors in stock pricing using a database uniquely suited for this purpose. The data allow us to address selection bias concerns and to separately examine aggressive (market) and passive (limit) orders. Both aggressive and passive net buying positively predict firms’ monthly stock returns with no evidence of return reversal. Only aggressive orders correctly predict firm news, including earnings surprises, suggesting they convey novel cash flow information. Only passive net buying follows negative returns, consistent with traders providing liquidity and benefiting from the reversal of transitory price movements. These actions contribute to market efficiency.     

How Skilled Are Security Analysts?

The majority of security analysts are identified as skilled when the cross-section of analyst performance is modeled as a mixture of multiple skill distributions. Analysts exhibit heterogeneous skill—some are high-type, and some are low-type. On average, the recommendation revisions of both types exhibit positive abnormal returns. The heterogeneity stems from differential ability to produce new information; all analysts can profitably process news. Top analysts outperform because more of their recommendations are influential (i.e., associated with statistically significant returns) and both their influential and noninfluential recommendations are more informative. A majority of research firms are also identified as skilled.     

How does Monetary Policy Influence Capital Markets? Using a Threshold Regression Model

This study indicates that the effects of interest rate changes on stock prices could be twofold and that the net effect is determined by which effect is dominant. The study employs a threshold regression model to see if, before and after the central banks cut the interest rates, there is a nonlinear relation between interest rates and the stock index. Based on traditional economic theory, stock prices should be inversely related to interest rates. However, the present study finds that as interest rates start to increase or decrease, the stock index prices are significantly and positively related to the interest rates. The changes in interest rates affect stock indexes inversely only after interest rates have crossed a certain threshold. The inverse U-shaped relationship between interest rates and stock indexes differs from the traditional wisdom. It could make interest rates more valuable in forecasting stock indexes, and it holds implications for monetary policies of central banks. To avoid the spurious regression problem, this study uses a cointegration test and an error correction model to confirm the results from the threshold regression model and finds that there is a significant cointegration relationship before and after central banks cut interest rates.     

How Stable Are Corporate Capital Structures?

Leverage cross‐sections more than a few years apart differ markedly, with similarities evaporating as the time between them lengthens. Many firms have high and low leverage at different times, but few keep debt‐to‐assets ratios consistently above 0.500. Capital structure stability is the exception, not the rule, occurs primarily at low leverage, and is virtually always temporary, with many firms abandoning low leverage during the post‐war boom. Industry‐median leverage varies widely over time. Target‐leverage models that place little or no weight on maintaining a particular ratio do a good job replicating the substantial instability of the actual leverage cross‐section.     

How credible is a too-big-to-fail policy? International evidence from market discipline

This paper analyzes in an international sample of banks from 104 countries if the sensitivity of the cost of deposits to bank risk varies across banks depending on their systemic and absolute size. We analyze a period before the 2007 financial crisis and control for endogeneity of bank size, intervention policies in past banking crises, and soundness of countries’ public finances. Our results are consistent with the predominance of the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, although this effect is stronger in countries that did not impose losses on depositors in past banking crises and in countries with sounder public finances.     

Are you a collaborative leader?

Social media and technologies have put connectivity on steroids and made collaboration more integral to business than ever. But without the right leadership, collaboration can go astray. Employees who try to collaborate on everything may wind up stuck in endless meetings, struggling to reach agreement. On the other side of the coin, executives who came of age during the heyday of "command and control" management can have trouble adjusting their style to fit the new realities. In their research on top-performing CEOs, Insead professors Ibarra and Hansen have examined what it takes to be a collaborative leader. They've found that it requires connecting people and ideas outside an organization to those inside it, leveraging diverse talent, modeling collaborative behavior at the top, and showing a strong hand to keep teams from getting mired in debate. In this article, they describe tactics that executives from Akamai, GE, Reckitt Benckiser, and other firms use in those four areas and how they foster high-performance collaborative cultures in their organizations.     

How do staggered boards affect shareholder value? Evidence from a natural experiment

The well-established negative correlation between staggered boards (SBs) and firm value could be due to SBs leading to lower value or a reflection of low-value firms' greater propensity to maintain SBs. We analyze the causal question using a natural experiment involving two Delaware court rulings—separated by several weeks and going in opposite directions—that affected the antitakeover force of SBs. We contribute to the long-standing debate on staggered boards by presenting empirical evidence consistent with the market viewing SBs as leading to lower firm value for the affected firms.     

How Sensitive Are Bank Managers to Shareholder Value?

We test for the existence of market discipline by shareholders of banks with a wide range of ownership structures. Discipline by shareholders manifests itself through monitoring banks’ level of risk as well as through influencing banks’ management actions. We find that shareholders utilize the relation between stock returns and different types of risk measures to monitor risky banks. Shareholders partially influence bank management by responding to decreasing stock returns with a demand to improve loan quality. Moreover, the influence on management in small banks is more pronounced compared to large banks.     

How Robust Are Popular Models of Nominal Frictions?

We consider alternative combinations of nominal price and wage frictions in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models fit to U.S. data. Since inflation was unanchored in the 1970s, we divide the data into early, middle, and late samples (1955–68, 1969–79, and 1983–2007, respectively). We find that prices are reoptimized more frequently and exhibit greater indexation to past inflation in the middle sample than in the other two samples, while wages are reoptimized with increasing frequency and display less evidence of indexation over time. Differences in price and wage setting across samples have important implications for the economy's response to key shocks.     

Are common stocks a good hedge against inflation? Evidence from the Pacific-rim countries

We explore whether the observed real stock return–inflation relations in the U.S. and 10 Pacific-rim countries for the sample period of 1970–1997 can be explained by the interaction between real and monetary disturbances. Ten countries exhibit a negative relation between real stock returns and inflation. Malaysia is the only country that exhibits a positive relation. For nine countries, real output disturbances drive a negative stock return–inflation relation, while monetary disturbances yield a positive relation. In addition, real shock components appear to be relatively more important than monetary shock components for these countries, and as a result the observed relation between stock returns and inflation is negative. Neither the tax hypothesis nor the monetary regime hypothesis seems to be easily compatible with the diverse experiences of the Pacific-rim countries.     

Are There Rational Bubbles in REITs? New Evidence from a Complex Systems Approach

This study applies a complex systems approach to test for the presence of rational bubbles in the Equity REITs market. The applied model is based on theoretical implications of the evolution of prices under rational bubble regimes. The advantage of the approach is twofold. The model is able to detect rational bubbles while they rise and to predict the most likely time of their collapse. We apply the model to daily price data on U.S. Equity REITs from 1989 to 2011. Our findings suggest the existence of a bubble for the period of 2003 to 2007. Tests for sub-markets reveal that the bubble developed in the Residential REITs market, but not in the Office REITs market.     

Are you a good boss--or a great one?

Private moments of doubt and fear come even to managers who have spent years on the job. Any number of events can trigger them: an initiative going poorly, a lukewarm performance review, a daunting new assignment. HBS professor Hill and executive Lineback have long studied the question of how manager grow and advance. Their experience brings them to a simple but troubling observation: Most bosses reach a certain level of proficiency and stay there--short of what they could and should be. Why? Because they stop working on themselves. The authors offer what they call the three imperatives for managers who seek to avoid this stagnation. First, manage yourself--who you are as a person, the beliefs and values that drive your actions, and especially how you connect with others all matter to the people you must influence. Second, manage your network. Effective managers know that they cannot avoid conflict and competition among organizational groups; they build and nurture ongoing relationships. Third, manage your team. Team members need to know what's required of them collectively and individually and what the team's values, norms, and standards are. The authors include a useful assessment tool to help readers get started.     

Are Short Sellers Informed? Evidence from REITs

This paper uses intraday short sale data to examine whether short sellers of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are informed. We find strong evidence that short selling predicts future returns of REITs. Heavily shorted REITs significantly underperform lightly shorted REITs by approximately 1% over the following 20 trading days. This predictive relation holds for both small and large trades, but is stronger for large short trades. We also document a positive relation between shorting activity and volatility. Our results are consistent with the view that short sellers of REITs are informed and contribute to market efficiency by impounding information into prices.     

Are you a strategist or just a manager?

Perhaps the greatest strategist of all time was not a business executive but a general. Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the Prussian and German general staffs from 1858 to 1888, issued "directives" to his officers rather than specific commands. These guidelines for autonomous decision making encouraged Moltke's subordinates to show individual initiative. In this article, Hans Hinterhuber and Wolfgang Popp translate Moltke's example into business terms. According to Moltke, strategy is applied common sense and cannot be taught. The authors suggest that good entrepreneurs and managers--along with generals--are born with the qualities that make them successful. But even if managers have the potential to be good strategists, they must develop and hone their natural talents. And CEOs and top management can help by identifying and promoting such talents in their employees. Hinterhuber and Popp have created a questionnaire that helps measure strategic management competence. Managers and entrepreneurs take this test themselves, answering ten questions such as, "Do I have an entrepreneurial vision?", "Do I have a corporate philosophy?", and "Do I have competitive advantages?" Using the questionnaire, company management can evaluate managers being considered for a promotion. At the same time, those who take the test can use it to determine their own performance as strategists. Strategic managers provide subordinates with general guidelines, just as Helmuth von Moltke issued directives to his officers. And outstanding entrepreneurs create a corporate culture in which their vision, philosophy, and business strategies are implemented by employees who think independently.     

How Do Investment Ideas Spread through Social Interaction? Evidence from a Ponzi Scheme

A unique data set from a large Ponzi scheme allows me to study word‐of‐mouth diffusion of investment information. Investors could join the scheme only by invitation from an existing member, which allows me to observe how the idea spreads from one person to the next based on inviter‐invitee relationships. I find that the observed social network has a scale‐free connectivity structure, which significantly facilitates the diffusion of the investment idea and contributes to the growth and survival of the socially spreading Ponzi scheme. I further find that investors invest more if their inviter has comparatively higher age, education, and income.     

Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?

We calculate the present value of state employee pension liabilities using discount rates that reflect the risk of the payments from a taxpayer perspective. If benefits have the same default and recovery characteristics as state general obligation debt, the national total of promised liabilities based on current salary and service is $3.20 trillion. If pensions have higher priority than state debt, the value of liabilities is much larger. Using zero‐coupon Treasury yields, which are default‐free but contain other priced risks, promised liabilities are $4.43 trillion. Liabilities are even larger under broader concepts that account for salary growth and future service.