International differences in social security and saving

The U.S. Social Security Administration, in cooperation with similar agencies in other countries, recently developed estimates of social security benefits for twelve major industrial countries. The present paper uses these data to estimate the effects of social security benefits on saving and retirement in an extended life cycle model. The parameter estimates indicate that, with retirement behavior given, social security significantly reduces private saving; an increase of the benefit-to-earnings ratio by 10 percentage points reduces the saving rate by approximately 3 percentage points.     

Is Altruism Important for Understanding the Long-Run Effects of Social Security?

This paper quantifies the effects of social security on capital accumulation and wealth distribution in a life-cycle framework with altruistic individuals. The main findings of this paper are that the current U.S. social security system has a significant impact on capital accumulation and wealth distribution. I find that social security crowds out 8% of the capital stock of an economy without social security. This effect is driven by the distortions of labor supply due to the taxation of labor income rather than by the intergenerational redistribution of income imposed by the social security system. In contrast to previous analysis, I found that social security does not affect the savings rate of the economy. Another interesting finding is that even though the current U.S. social security system is progressive in its benefits, it may lead to a more dispersed distribution of wealth. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D31, D58, E2, E6, H55, J22, J26.     

The U.S. Social Security System: What Does Political Sustainability Imply?

This paper examines how political constraints can shape the social security system under different demographics. A steady-state mapping between relevant economic and demographic variables and the social security tax rate resulting from a majority voting is provided. I calibrate an OLG model to the U.S. economy. Calculations using census population and survival probabilities projections and 1961–96 labor productivity growth deliver a social security tax rate of 13.3% (currently 11.2%) and a 54% replacement ratio (51.7%). This result reflects the median voter's aging, from 44 to 46 years, which dominates the decrease in the dependency ratio, from 5.45 to 4.72. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H55, E17, D72.     

Do immigrants delay retirement and social security claiming?

ABSTRACT

We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to examine how immigrants’ retirement and Social Security claiming patterns compare to those of natives. We find that immigrants retire and claim Social Security at older ages than natives, an effect that is similar across immigrant ethnic groups and more pronounced among immigrants who arrived in the U.S. after age 40. We discuss and explore possible mechanisms for these differences. Hazard models suggests that these differences arise because immigrants have lower retirement and claiming hazard rates in their early 60s. We do not find evidence of an increase in the rate at which immigrants move abroad or exit the survey, compared to U.S. natives, in their late 50s through 60s, a finding that is consistent with immigrants retiring in the U.S. rather than abroad. These results are important given the rising share of older immigrants living in the U.S., and they have implications for the impact of immigration on government finances as well as the retirement security of an important subgroup of the population.     

Postponing retirement: the political effect of aging

Conventional economic wisdom suggests that because of the aging process, social security systems will have to be retrenched. In particular, retirement age will have to be largely increased. Yet, is this policy measure feasible in OECD countries? Since the answer belongs mainly to the realm of politics, I evaluate the political feasibility of postponing retirement under aging in France, Italy, the UK, and the US. Simulations for the year 2050 steady state demographic, economic and political scenario suggest that retirement age will be postponed in all countries, while the social security contribution rate will rise in all countries, but Italy. The political support for increasing the retirement age stems mainly from the negative income effect induced by aging, which reduces the profitability of the existing social security system, and thus the individuals' net social security wealth.     

Options in income support for the aged: A critique of the two-tier approach

Support for the two-tier approach to income maintenance for the aged is becoming widespread. Two-tier formulas combine an income-conditioned bottom tier with an earnings-related top tier to achieve antipoverty and earnings replacement objectives. This paper first refutes the claim that the two-tier approach is generally more target-efficient in reaching the poor than is the earnings-related top tier with progressive replacement rates. Next, the paper compares the effectiveness of the two systems in terms of other goals. The paper concludes by showing that a top tier with a low tax on current income can virtually dominate a wide range of two-tier formulas.     

Social security and retirement incentives in Austria

This paper provides an overview of the interaction between social security and retirement behavior in Austria in the decades up to the on-going reform process. The key question is, how much of the retirement behavior can be attributed to incentive effects of the pension system. We describe the labor market and retirement behavior of the elderly in Austria, survey the key features of the public pension system and finally present the results of a series of simulations aimed at assessing the retirement incentives generated by the pension system. We compute levels and accrual rates of social security wealth and implicit tax rates on continued work according to the method portrayed in Gruber and Wise [Gruber J, Wise D (1999) Social security and retirement around the world. University of Chicago Press, Chicago London]. To some extent, the sharp drop in labor force participation among the elderly must be attributed to major disincentives of the Austrian pension system; the system turns out to provide significant incentives to retire early. Past reforms have reduced the disincentives. Our results, however, show the need to further reform the public pension scheme and to reorient it stronger towards the principle of actuarial fairness.     

The Role of Income Effects in Early Retirement

We provide a long‐term perspective on the individual retirement behavior and on the future of retirement by emphasizing the role of (negative) income effects. We consider a political economic theoretical framework, with actuarially “fair” and “unfair” early retirement schemes, and derive a political equilibrium with positive social security contribution rates and early retirement. A reduction in the wages in youth, consistent with the recent labor market trends since the massive introduction of temporary jobs, induces workers to postpone retirement, and—in the “unfair” system—leads to lower contribution rates. A reduction in the growth rate of the economy has opposite effects on the retirement decisions, leading—in the “unfair” system—to more early retirement. Aging induces a negative income effect, but has also an opposite political effect on social security contributions and retirement decisions. For an actuarially “fair” social security system, we provide conditions for the political effect to dominate; in an “unfair” scheme, numerical simulations confirm a slight predominance of the political effect, as contribution rates increase. These results may shed some light on the future of early retirement in aging societies.     

Social insurance for the elderly

We study the effects of retirement benefits provided by social insurance programs on consumption, portfolio choice, and retirement in a continuous-time theoretical model. We show that people tend to retire earlier with an increase in retirement social insurance benefits (SIBs), consistent with empirical evidence. We show also that people tend to increase savings before retirement in anticipation of increased retirement benefits, a counter-intuitive result. The response of risky investment with an increase in the SIBs is ambiguous, depending on parameter values. The overall social welfare will increase with an increase in SIBs if the balanced budget constraint is satisfied. We also investigate the effects of changes in the two streams of the SIBs (paid in perishable goods and cash) and the proportion of workers in entire population on social welfare.     

Nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems

In this paper, we consider economies in which agents are privately informed about their skills, which evolve stochastically over time. We require agents' preferences to be weakly separable between the lifetime paths of consumption and labor. However, we allow for intertemporal nonseparabilities in preferences like habit formation. In this environment, we derive a generalized version of the Inverse Euler Equation and use it to show that intertemporal wedges characterizing optimal allocations of consumption can be strictly negative. We also show that preference nonseparabilities imply that optimal differentiable asset income taxes are necessarily retrospective in nature. We show that under weak conditions, it is possible to implement a socially optimal allocation using a social security system in which taxes on wealth are linear, and taxes/transfers are history-dependent only at retirement. The average asset income tax in this system is zero.     

A quantitative theory of social security without commitment

This paper investigates the determination of social security within a general equilibrium, overlapping-generations model where agents live for many periods, and replacement rates are determined through voting in each period by forward looking agents. The distinctive feature is the study of Markov equilibrium policy outcomes which do not rest on a commitment mechanism. Versions of the model are calibrated to the US economic, policy, and demographic conditions. Even in the absence of commitment, the policy preferences of tax-paying working-age voters sustain a positive level of retirement benefits. This follows because the current choices about social security will have, at the time when the current voters will retire, a positive impact on the political support for social security and on the returns to savings. On the other hand, the projected decline in the U.S. population growth rate causes the replacement rate and the tax rate to decline. This quantitative response without commitment differs from that in the case when policies are committed at time zero.     

Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and social security systems

Hyperbolic discounting has become a common assumption for modeling bounded rationality with respect to individual savings decisions. We examine the effects of hyperbolic discounting on the comparison of alternative social security systems. We show that this form of bounded rationality breaks the equivalence between funded and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems established in Sheshinski and Weiss [Sheshinski, E., Weiss, Y., 1981. Uncertainty and optimal social security. Quarterly Journal of Economics 95, 189-206]. Intergenerational transfers within a PAYG economy are usually secured by the social security system and independent of longevity, whereas this is not the case for the funded economy. The savings level under hyperbolic discounting is lower than under exponential discounting [Laibson et al., 1998], but the ratio between the savings level under hyperbolic discounting within a funded economy and a PAYG economy depends on the effectiveness of the commitment devices. It is shown that if individuals are hyperbolic discounters, then in a PAYG economy any change in the mandated level of intergenerational transfers is neutralized by individuals’ voluntary bequests. This does not apply to a funded system.     

美国延迟退休激励机制分析——兼论对中国延迟退休年龄改革的启示

美国社会保障法案的颁布标志着现代社会保障制度的建立。在人口老龄化的背景下,美国对法定退休年龄和养老金领取年龄进行改革,逐步废除法定退休年龄,提高正常退休年龄,同时对养老保险制度中的退休收入核查制度进行调整,建立延迟退休补助制度,由此增强延迟退休对老年劳动力延迟退休的激励。美国废除法定退休年龄和延迟正常退休年龄的改革对中国延迟退休年龄改革提供了有益借鉴。     

ANNUITIZED ASSET ADEQUACY IN JAPAN: THE DEMAND FOR INDIVIDUAL PENSIONS

In this paper, I analyze the impact of social security wealth, retirement payments, and living expenses during retirement on people's retirement savings in general, and on their individual pension holdings in particular, using micro data from a 1996 Japanese household survey. I confirm a replacement effect of social security on saving for all types of households and on individual pensions for self‐employed households only. This suggests that the social security assets of self‐employed households are less than their optimal level of annuitized assets and that they would increase their demand for individual pensions if social security benefits were to be reduced.     

Should the Social Security Trust Fund Hold Equities? An Intergenerational Welfare Analysis

In a stochastic economy with overlapping generations, fiscal policy affects the allocation of aggregate risks. The paper shows how to compute the welfare effects of marginal policy changes that shift risk across cohorts, in general and for an application to social security equity investments. I estimate the relevant correlations between macroeconomic shocks and equity returns from 1874–1996 U.S. data, calibrate the model, and find positive welfare effects for equity investments. Since stock returns are positively correlated with social security's wage-indexed benefit obligations, equity investments would also help to stabilize the payroll tax rate. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E62, H55.     

A model of social insurance with variable retirement

Models are studied, in which ability to supply labour is affected by a random variable (health) not observable by government. When ill-health strikes, the consumer must retire, but he may choose to retire in any case. Optimal social insurance policies are found for one-period, two- period, and continuous-time models. It is found that, under plausible conditions, at the optimums consumers are indifferent whether to work or not, but do work when able. Insurance contributions decrease with age, and insurance benefits increase with age of retirement. It is desirable to prevent private saving. Some comments on the U.S. Social Security system are added.     

The impact of the two-tier plan/market system in chinese industry

There has been a great expansion in the role of the market mechanism in the distribution of industrial goods in China since the late 1970s. A two-tier system, whereby part of total production of each good is allocated by various kinds of directive plans, part by markets, has emerged. It is argued that the two-tier system has resulted in the demise of the direct role of mandatory planning in the allocation of industrial goods, and that the inherent dynamic tendencies of the system are leading to a continual increase in the share of the market over time. J. Comp. Econ., September 1987, 11(3), pp. 295–308. The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 20433.     

Old‐Age Income Insecurity in Singapore: A Problem of Non‐Inclusive Development

With a growing old‐age population, ensuring income security for the elderly is becoming an increasingly important element of public policy worldwide. The World Bank report proposed a three‐tier system to avert old‐age crisis, which was extended into a five‐tier system by Holzmann et al. Our analysis of Singapore's old‐age income security system in light of these two systems shows that it lacks the basic zero and first pillars of protection against old‐age hardships. We show that a budget allocation of less than half a percent of national gross domestic product (GDP) can ensure that no elderly citizen suffers from poverty in Singapore. As Singapore occupies the status of a developed country, a government‐financed pension system that is adequate, affordable, sustainable and robust is long overdue.     

Financial Insecurity in a World of Plenty

Abstract

The U.S. economy is addicted to the simulative impacts of household borrowing. Household debt has grown dramatically since the 1990s and has served to mitigate the detrimental effects of stagnant household wages. The accumulation of this debt has also had the macroeconomic impact of stimulating the economy, pushing it closer towards full employment. However does full employment stimulated by household indebtedness actually represent economic progress? It is argued that even the poorest citizen in a modern industrialized society is better off than a king of feudal Europe, yet in the United States such material prosperity is often tied to social insecurity thanks to debt. The growth of this debt has been enabled by a financial system that has evolved dramatically over the past forty years. The U.S. financial system’s primary role is no longer to finance investment but is rather a tool that enables a separation of ownership from use. Debt has fueled corporate profits which have enriched the shareholding class while at the same time the system has reduced the financial security of the majority of workers. This article crystalizes these issues by analyzing the differentials in financial circumstances faced by workers and shareholders in several major U.S. firms.     

退休年龄、教育年限与社会保障

在本文中,我们用养老金的缴纳费率和养老金替代率代表社会保障制度,采用有限生命预期的连续时间状态代际交叠模型作为基本框架,分析了社会保障制度对消费者接受教育的年限、退休年龄、工作年限的选择、GDP增长率和利率的影响。同时,我们还分析了消费者的预期寿命对个体消费者接受教育的年限、退休年龄、工作年限的选择以及对社会保障制度的影响。