Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information

We study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers' default probabilities. Admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability, the loan quantity, the loan interest rate and the collateral required. The principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers; moreover, the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information. No credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers.     

Implementation with partial provability

We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the preferences of the agents and allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence. We show that a simple condition on evidence is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state independent and sufficient for implementation for any preferences (including state dependent) with at least three agents if the social planner can perform small monetary transfers beyond those called for by f. If transfers can be large, f can be implemented in a game with perfect information when there are at least two players under a boundedness assumption. For both results, transfers only occur out of equilibrium. The use of evidence enables implementation which is robust in the sense that the planner needs little information about agents? preferences or beliefs and agents need little information about each others? preferences. Our results are robust to evidence forgery at any strictly positive cost.     

Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers

In allocating goods with no use of monetary transfers, random allocation mechanisms can be designed in order to elicit information on preference intensities. I study the nontransfer allocation of two ex-ante identical objects under Bayesian incentive compatibility, with symmetric agents and independent private valuations. I find the ex-ante utilitarian-optimal mechanism, in which the probability of receiving a specified object is used as “numeraire” to purchase probability units of the other object. I characterize this mechanism as an appropriate combination of lotteries, auctions and insurance. The latter element ensures that efficient auctions are feasible. If the problem is constrained to guarantee exactly one object per agent, then the optimal mechanism uses no information other than the agents? ordinal preferences.     

Ordinal Efficiency and the Polyhedral Separating Hyperplane Theorem

We study problems in which each of finitely many agents must be allocated a single object, based on the agents' rankings of pure outcomes. A random allocation is ordinally efficient if it is not ordinally dominated in the sense of there being another random assignment that gives each agent a first order stochastically dominant distribution of objects. We show that any ordinally efficient random assignment maximizes the sum of expected utilities for some vector of vNM utility functions that are consistent with the given ordinal preferences. One method of proof uses a new version of the separating hyperplane theorem for polyhedra. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D61.     

Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist

Although credit rating agencies exist and are important to the capital markets, there remains a question of why they should exist. Two standard theories are that rating agencies correct a problem of information asymmetry and that they de facto regulate investments. These theories do not fully answer the question. This paper suggests an alternative explanation. While rating agencies produce little new information, they sort information available in the credit market. This sorting function is needed due to the large volume of information in the credit market. Sorting facilitates better credit analysis and investment selection, but bond investors or a cooperative of them cannot easily replicate this function. Outside of their information intermediary and regulatory roles, rating agencies serve a useful market purpose even if credit ratings inherently provide little new information. This alternative explanation has policy implications for the regulation of the industry.     

Rational expectations in the overlapping generations model

This paper reports results on the character of the rational expectations equilibria of a stochastic overlapping generations model with heterogenous markets. The model considered is a stationary overlapping generations model in which the endowments of young agents are subject to i.i.d. random shocks. The main result shown is that if there are l > 1 commodities traded in every period, then for most preferences, the rational expectations equilibrium stochastic process of prices and allocations necessarily exhibits serial correlation. This is in marked contrast to the one commodity model in which there always exists an equilibrium which is measure isomorphic to the endowment process.     

Redistribution as a selection device

This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off.     

The necessity of delaying economic adjustment

I give an explanation for why agents react with a delay to decision and expectation parameters, by showing that imperfect agents must adjust very slowly relative to optimally adjusting agents if they begin reacting as soon as the latter agents would react. The results follow from the hypothesis of imperfect choice alone irrespective of whether there are any information, search, transaction, or other costs of adjusting decisions. The results thereby provide a general reason for observing inertially lagged behavior, and also agree with recent asset market experiments whose dynamics are governed by adaptive rather than ‘rational’ expectations.     

Explaining changes in the US credit card market: Lenders are using more information

We examine two changes in the cross-sectional distribution of credit card contracts over time: the increasing variance in interest rates and the increasing variance in credit limits, using data from the 1989–2013 Survey of Consumer Finances. Within this dataset, we show that financial institutions seem to be collecting and using more consumer information when extending credit. We then develop a life-cycle model of lending using a novel contract structure reflecting modern credit cards, where interest rates and credit limits are jointly determined before actual borrowing takes place. Within the model, giving lenders more information on consumers generates realistic results along several dimensions. More information leads to better pricing, moving the market from a ‘pooling’ to a ‘separating’ equilibrium, generating the observed increase in variances, with the gains primarily going to young agents.     

A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States

We analyse a market where (i) trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining; (ii) agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good; and (iii) no new entrants are allowed once the market is open. We show that information revelation and efficiency never obtain in equilibrium, even as discounting is removed. This holds whether the asymmetry is two-sided or one-sided. In some cases there exist equilibria where a substantial amount goes untraded. This contrasts with the earlier literature, which was based on the steady-state equilibria of a model where agents enter the market every period.     

Competition and inter-firm credit: Theory and evidence from firm-level data in Indonesia

Using firm-level data we investigate the relationship between trade credit and suppliers' market structure and find a ∩-shaped relationship between competition and trade credit, with a discontinuous increase in credit provision between monopoly and duopoly. This “big jump” arises because monopolists are more likely to not offer any trade credit than firms in competitive environments. Our model exploits the fundamentally different nature between cash and trade credit sales, arguing that firms are unable to commit ex ante to a trade credit price. We show that monopolists will often sell only on cash, while credit is always provided in competitive environments.     

Infrastructural change and secular economic development

Long-term economic development is determined by changes to the infrastructure, especially material and non-material infrastructural networks that link agents in different locations. The infrastructure consists of the slowly changing, collective arena that supports production, exchange, and consumption, such as the built environment, transport networks, and institutions. In the short run the infrastructure can be regarded as fixed. Changes to the infrastructure are under normal conditions small enough to be disregarded by producers and consumers. With the creation of a critical link of a network, there will however be a revolutionary restructuring of the arena. Critical links are here defined as additions to infrastructural networks that create opportunities for new information and transport flows between previously unconnected regions. Such a revolutionary restructuring of infrastructural networks has been called a logistical revolution. Certain institutional pre-conditions are necessary for a logistical revolution, while the creation of a critical link is both a necessary and a sufficient condition. This paper discusses the three logistical revolutions that occurred in the 13th century, around 1600, and in the 19th century, which each had crucial similarities with the current “information revolution.”     

问询函监管与银行信贷决策的改善*

近年来,证券交易所推行的问询函监管逐渐成为保障和改善上市公司信息披露质量的重要机制,其实施效果自然成为监管者和学者关注的焦点。本文从银行的角度研究问询函监管对外部利益相关者的溢出效应,具体考察问询函监管对银行信贷决策的影响。研究发现,在公司被出具问询函后,银行的贷款利率显著更高,贷款期限显著更短,银行贷款要求提供担保的可能性和比例更高。进一步研究发现,当公司处于信息风险和信用风险相对较高的情境中,或银行对信息风险和信用风险较为关注的情况下,银行贷款利率上升幅度更加显著,不过,贷款期限、担保要求等非价格条款并没有显著差异。同时,问询函对银行信贷决策的影响在银企之间存在较强的信息不对称时更加显著。最后,本文发现公司收到问询函以后,分析师预测分歧度显著提高,这表明信息风险是问询函监管影响银行信贷决策的一个可能渠道。     

Optimal collective contract without peer information or peer monitoring

If entrepreneurs have private information about factors influencing the outcome of an investment, individual lending is inefficient. The literature typically offers solutions based on the assumption of full peer information to solve adverse selection problems and peer monitoring to solve moral hazard problems. In contrast, I show that it is possible to construct a simple budget-balanced mechanism that implements the efficient outcome even if each borrower knows only own type and effort, and has neither privileged knowledge about others nor monitoring ability. The mechanism satisfies participation incentives for all types, and is immune to the Rothschild–Stiglitz cream skimming problem despite using transfers from better types to worse types. The presence of some local information implies that the mechanism cannot be successfully used by formal lenders. Thus a local credit institution can emerge as an optimal response to the informational environment even without peer information or monitoring. Finally, I investigate the role of monitoring in this setting and show how costly monitoring can increase the scope of the mechanism.     

Targeted business incentives and the debt behavior of households

The empirical effects of place-based tax incentive schemes designed to aid low-income communities are unclear. While a growing number of studies find beneficial effects on employment, there is little investigation into other behaviors of households affected by such programs. We analyze the impact of the Texas Enterprise Zone Program on household debt and delinquency. Specifically, we utilize detailed information on all household liabilities, delinquencies, and credit scores from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, a quarterly longitudinal 5% random sample of all individuals in the USA with a social security number and a credit report. We identify the causal effect of the program by using a sharp regression discontinuity approach that exploits the known institutional rules of the program. We find a modest positive impact on the repayment of retail loans, but also evidence of an increase in the delinquency rates of auto loans and in Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings.     

Focusing effect and the poverty trap

I build a dynamic consumption-savings model in which agents׳ choices are distorted by the focusing effect: agents overweight the utility of goods in which their options differ more. I show that the consumption-savings choice depends both on the marginal return on savings and on the total return on savings, implying that the incentive to save may increase with the initial level of wealth. As a consequence, a salience-based poverty trap may exist when the marginal return on savings is sufficiently high and sufficiently flat. I also consider the case of a perfect credit market and show that a poverty trap may emerge when the salience of consumption is bounded above. I discuss policy implications. In particular, imposing upon an agent a punishment for decreasing savings below a threshold leads to a higher level of savings, even when the threshold triggering the punishment is not binding     

An Investigation into the Link between UK Credit Union Characteristics, Location and their Success

Abstract ** :  The unique characteristics of credit unions reduces the information asymmetry that is prevalent in credit making decisions, enabling them to provide loans where other financial institutions cannot. This makes them a potential tool in the fight against financial exclusion. Yet, the UK credit union movement is not regarded as being successful, even though there is evidence of much financial exclusion. This study is cross sectional in form, and evaluates characteristics that may contribute to the success of the UK credit union movement at national and regional level, in 2000. The findings are used to consider the impact of recent regulatory changes on the movement. The key findings are that there is a significant relationship between the success of a credit union, its size and the deprivation of the ward from which it sources its members. More specifically, larger credit unions and those located in more affluent wards, are more successful. Affiliation to the Irish League of Credit Unions and having a common bond of occupation, are also found to be contributing factors to credit union success. These results are taken as providing support for the recent changes implemented by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which is likely to result in the emergence of larger credit unions (through mergers), run by appropriately qualified persons, serving a more mixed‐income membership base. It is, however, noted that the history of the UK movement is one of missed opportunities and only time will tell whether credit unions have the wherewithal to accept current opportunities .     

Money, credit and banking

In monetary models where agents are subject to trading shocks there is typically an ex post inefficiency since some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained. This problem creates a role for financial intermediaries, such as banks, who accept nominal deposits and make nominal loans. In general, financial intermediation improves the allocation. The gains in welfare come from the payment of interest on deposits and not from relaxing borrowers’ liquidity constraints. We also demonstrate that when credit rationing occurs increasing the rate of inflation can be welfare improving.     

地理集聚会优化商业信用环境吗？——来自浙江地级市的证据

以浙江案例为样本,运用空间计量法系统探讨地理集聚对商业信用环境影响。研究证实:(1)地理集聚对商业信用环境优化具有显著促进作用,产出集聚影响超过资本和就业集聚;(2)沿海地区由熟人社会向陌生人社会转变,伴随商业信用环境逐渐优化,非沿海地区信用环境对经济形势及资本特征较为敏感;(3)副省级城市制度门槛对地理集聚造成一定扭曲,显著降低商业信用环境;(4)资本集聚和就业集聚显著提高信用示范城市商业信用环境。