Lessons from a century of FED policy: Why monetary and credit policies need rules and boundaries

Wide operational and financial independence given to monetary and credit policies subjects the Federal Reserve to incentives detrimental for macroeconomic and financial stability. The absence of a monetary policy rule created go-stop incentives that produced inefficient volatility of both inflation and unemployment during the Great Inflation. Fed credit policy has undergone massive “mission creep” since the Fed was established. Being debt-financed fiscal policy, Fed credit policy beyond ordinary temporary lending to solvent depositories creates friction with the fiscal authorities and jeopardizes the Fed׳s independence. An ambiguous boundary of expansive Fed credit policy creates expectations of Fed accommodation in financial crisis—that blunts the incentive of private entities to take protective measures beforehand (to shrink counter-party risk and reliance on short-term finance, and build up equity capital) and blunts the incentive of the fiscal authorities to prepare procedures in advance to act systematically in times of credit turmoil. These points are illustrated with reference to the 2007–09 financial crisis. Part of the problem is that the independent Fed does not have the same incentive as the 19th century Bank of England to follow Bagehot׳s Rule. The paper concludes with a set of principles to preserve a workable, sustainable division of responsibilities between the independent central bank and the fiscal authorities.     

Fed Credit Policy: What is a Lender of Last Resort?

Discussions of the Fed׳s financial crisis lending – and its role as “Lender of Last Resort” more generally – often overlook the distinction between monetary policy and credit policy. Central bank actions constitute monetary policy if they alter the quantity of the bank׳s monetary liabilities, but constitute credit policy if they alter the composition of the bank׳s portfolio without affecting the outstanding amount of monetary liabilities. In the 19th century, Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot advocated Lender of Last Resort policies as a means of expanding the money supply when the demand for money surged in a crisis. In contrast, the Fed׳s recent crisis lending for the most part left its outstanding monetary liabilities unaffected, and thus represented credit policy, not Lender of Last Resort activity. Credit allocation in a crisis is potentially costly because it affects market participants׳ beliefs about the likelihood of future central bank rescues, which in turn reduces their incentive to protect themselves against financial distress and thus exacerbates financial instability. Credible limits on credit policy thus are critical to central banks׳ core policy mission. One path to establishing such limits is to create “living wills” that detail how to resolve large, complex financial firms without government support.     

The impact of monetary policy in the midst of big shocks

This paper studies the impact of Federal Reserve policies that created the largest deviations from price stability during the Fed׳s first 100 years: the post-World War I deflation, the deflation of the Great Depression, the inflation of World War II, and the Great Inflation of the 1970s. In terms of their macroeconomic impacts, I find that deflation was uniquely depressing in the 1930s because of cartel policies that prevented nominal prices and wages from adjusting to clear markets, and not because deflation is generically depressing. I find that the biggest impact of monetary policy during World War II was in debasing debt through inflation. I find that the main drivers of the 1970s economy were long-run changes in productivity and the labor market, and that there may have been little that the Fed could have done at this time to expand employment and output. More broadly, I find that macroeconomic performance would have been better over the Fed׳s first century had the Fed followed a monetary policy to deliver stable prices.     

The evolution of U.S. monetary policy: 2000–2007

A vector autoregression with time-varying parameters is used to characterize changes in Federal Reserve policy that occurred from 2000 through 2007 and describe how they affected the performance of the U.S. economy. Declining coefficients in the model׳s estimated policy rule point to a shift in the Fed׳s emphasis away from stabilizing inflation over this period. More importantly, however, the Fed held the federal funds rate persistently below the values prescribed by this rule. Under this more discretionary policy, inflation overshot its target and the funds rate followed a path reminiscent of the “stop-go” pattern that characterized Fed behavior prior to 1979.     

In search for yield? Survey-based evidence on bank risk taking

Monetary policy can have an impact on economic and financial stability through the risk taking of banks. Falling interest rates might induce investment into risky activities. This paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and bank risk taking. We use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the US for the period 1997–2008. Besides standard macroeconomic indicators, we include factors summarizing information provided in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL). These data provide information on banks׳ new loans as well as interest rates for different loan risk categories and different banking groups. We identify a risk-taking channel of monetary policy by distinguishing responses to monetary policy shocks across different types of banks and different loan risk categories. Following an expansionary monetary policy shock, small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk. Large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure. Foreign banks take on more risk only in the mid-2000s, when interest rates were ‘too low for too long’.     

A NOTE ON THE ‘GREAT CONTRACTION’

The modern literature on the US banking crisis in 1931 overlooks the key role played by ‘liquidity black holes’ and under‐pricing in the corporate and government bond markets resulting from the banking system's fire sale of assets. This process weakened the bank lending channel in a continuous feedback loop which was eventually checked by ‘money creation’ by the Federal Reserve. This note investigates the work of Evans Clark (1933 ) who highlighted the process of fire sales and mispricing of assets due to non‐fundamental causes.     

Temporary open market operation on MBS repos: any foreshadowing of the financial crisis of 2008?

The financial crisis of 2008 was significantly influenced by housing, mortgage markets and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The Federal Reserve (Fed) conducts temporary open market operations on a daily basis and frequently uses repos on MBS. With this daily interaction with MBS, we examine whether any signal about the impending financial crisis could have been seen in the Fed’s temporary open market operations. We identify four anomalous events in MBS temporary open market operations and examine those events for signals of the financial crisis. We find nothing in the four events that would have provided signals of the financial crisis. Instead, the common feature of the four events is an unusually large supply of MBS made available to the Fed for those day’s temporary open market operations.     

Unconventional monetary policy and the stock market’s reaction to Federal Reserve policy actions

We examine the change in the effect of Federal Reserve’s policy actions on stock returns after the Fed started to use unconventional policy actions. We find that the response of stock returns to monetary policy actions are almost seven times higher after the federal funds rate hit the zero lower bound. We conduct additional analysis to examine the underlying causes of the increase in the impact of monetary policy actions of stock returns. We show that investors rebalance their portfolios towards equity after selling Treasury securities to the Federal Reserve during large scale asset purchases.     

DSGE forecasts of the lost recovery

The years following the Great Recession were challenging for forecasters. Unlike other deep downturns, this recession was not followed by a swift recovery, but instead generated a sizable and persistent output gap that was not accompanied by deflation as a traditional Phillips curve relationship would have predicted. Moreover, the zero lower bound and unconventional monetary policy generated an unprecedented policy environment. We document the actual real-time forecasting performance of the New York Fed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model during this period and explain the results using the pseudo real-time forecasting performance results from a battery of DSGE models. We find the New York Fed DSGE model’s forecasting accuracy to be comparable to that of private forecasters, and notably better for output growth than the median forecasts from the FOMC’s Summary of Economic Projections. The model’s financial frictions were key in obtaining these results, as they implied a slow recovery following the financial crisis.     

Inflation targets and inflation targeting

This paper examines the Federal Reserve System’s dual policy mandate pertaining to the promotion of price stability and high employment. It reviews the relative merits of single and dual mandates and assesses the viability of explicit inflation targets. An inflation-targeting regime is described and the experiences of several countries are reviewed. These considerations lead to proposed adoption of an explicit inflation target within the context of the Fed’s current dual mandate. This policy reform would, among other things, increase policy transparency and provide a firm anchor for inflation expectations.     

The Dollar, the Oil Price and Policy Divergence

There is currently a clear divergence of policy between the United States, Japan and Germany. With the US in recession and concern growing over the severity of the slump, interest rates have been cut in a move to revive the economy. In contrast Japan and Germany are both experiencing strong growth and monetary policy remains tight to combat inflation. This divergence was seen most clearly when the Federal Reserve Board lowered its discount rate to 6 per cent on 1 February, the day after the Bundesbank had raised its Lombard rate to 9 per cent. With G7 increasingly concerned about domestic factors, less emphasis is placed upon stable exchange rates and as a result the dollar is at an all-time low. The last two G7 communiqués have stressed ‘stability oriented monetary policies’, an ambiguous phrase which fails to define ‘stability’ either in terms of exchange rates, inflation or growth. Thus both the German and Japanese policy of high interest rates to reduce inflation and low US interest rates aimed at stimulating the economy can be termed as ‘stability oriented’. This analysis focuses on these divergent policy responses in two alternative scenarios to the world forecast we presented last month. The first scenario considers what might happen if the Federal Reserve Board were to stimulate the US economy by further cuts in interest rates, whilst Japanese and German rates were unchanged in the face of inflationary pressures. This case may be relevant if the recent US loosening of monetary policy is not sufficient to encourage growth because of a ‘credit crunch’, so that a more expansionary policy is required by the Fed. As a consequence, policy diverges further and the dollar weakens. The second scenario focuses upon a reduction in inflationary pressures in Japan and Germany brought about by an oil price fall. In this case we assume that US policy is already loose enough to avoid a prolonged recession, but that German and Japanese monetary policy is relaxed as inflationary forces recede. In this case policies converge. Each scenario thus concentrates on one of !he two features which are causing the policy divergence amongst G3 countries: recession in the US, inflation in Germany and Japan.     

Security markets and the information content of monetary policy turning points

Substantial evidence shows that a significant relationship exists between Federal Reserve monetary policy signals and subsequent security returns. Recent evidence, however, suggests that Fed rate changes do not signal shifts in monetary policy and therefore have no real policy significance. In this study, we investigate whether certain Fed signals, characterized as turning points in the monetary cycle, have real policy significance. Our evidence suggests that the Fed's signal that a turning point is occurring is unambiguous, predicts a substantial shift in Fed monetary policy, and provides costless and meaningful information about future security market returns.     

Central bank rules in historical perspective

This article explains that, while Walter Bagehot׳s Lombard Street had a rule about the central bank׳s role as a lender of last resort, it was not a precursor of the rules-based approach to monetary policy. Monetary policy rules came into fashion in the 1980s and 1990s when it became clear from the 1970s just how dangerous discretion could be. Under different historical circumstances before that and in more recent times, it was rules that seemed much inferior to discretion.     

Taking financial frictions to the data

We estimate a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with various financial frictions and analyze how well the model explains the Great Recession. Predictive analysis shows that the model can only slightly better explain the large deviation from trend during the crisis relative to a model without financial frictions. Specifically, the risk premium shock, which is a shock to the external finance premium of the entrepreneurs׳ leverage, explains the largest part of the investment downfall during the crisis. However, the ‘balance sheet’ channel of financial frictions in the model, which structurally links balance sheet conditions of financial intermediaries and nonfinancial borrowers to their borrowing rates, is estimated to be weak. We examine alternative prior specifications for how the financial frictions enter the model and continue to find a limited role for these frictions. Rolling-window estimation provides evidence for substantial time variation in parameters governing financial frictions. We conclude that the well-known financial frictions studied in this paper are not able to explain the financial crisis in a linearized and estimated model.     

QUALITATIVE EASING IN SUPPORT OF A TUMBLING FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A LOOK AT THE EUROSYSTEM'S RECENT BALANCE SHEET POLICIES

Attention has recently been drawn to compositional changes in the Federal Reserve System's asset holdings and in particular the deterioration of the balance sheet of the Fed in the face of the current crisis. However, an analysis of the balance sheet policies of the Eurosystem is still missing. In this article we fill this gap by analysing the Eurosystem's balance sheet during the recent subprime crisis. The calculation of certain balance sheet ratios supports the assessment that a significant decrease in the quality of money has occurred.     

COMMODITY MARKET REGULATION AFTER FINANCIAL CRISIS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

The United States Federal Government has imposed remarkably similar regulations on commodity markets after financial crises, particularly after the Great Depression and the recent financial crisis beginning in 2007. A comparison of these two great economic recessions will help identify the changes in commodity regulation policy over the past century.     

On the loss structure of federal reserve forecasts of output growth

Utilizing recent techniques with comparable private forecasts as benchmarks, we test the rationality of the Federal Reserve forecasts of growth under flexible loss. Our findings for 1984–2006 indicate that these forecasts are rational (efficient) and directionally accurate under symmetric loss and are thus of value when similar cost is assigned to both incorrect upward and downward predictions. Over-predictions (under-predictions) are costly when the Fed responds by implementing an unnecessary contractionary (expansionary) monetary policy and thus causes lower growth (higher inflation). Symmetric loss thus indicates that the Fed is equally concerned about both low growth and high inflation. Further results reveal that the private sector closely replicates the Federal Reserve forecasts released to the public with a five-year lag, suggesting that one can utilize the readily available private data as proxies for the not-yet-released Federal Reserve forecasts.     

Forward guidance – what does it mean and will it work?

The Bank of England has introduced ‘state‐contingent threshold guidance’, stating that it will not consider tightening monetary policy until the ILO unemployment rate has fallen below 7%. This is a similar policy to that adopted by the Fed in the US and represents an attempt to better manage the expectations of households, firms and financial markets about future changes in monetary policy.…     

Indirect Convertibility,Equity‐Based Banking and Financial Stability

Banking reform proposals put forward in the wake of the recent financial crisis maintain that equity‐based banking would be stable and would prevent bank runs. This article argues that complementing this form of banking with an indirect convertibility monetary standard and thereby dispensing with base money would enhance financial stability further. Banks would not hold a distinctive asset (base money) that would be called upon by customers at short notice, thereby removing the possibility of bank runs. No discrepancy in value between the two sides of a bank's balance sheet would arise as its assets (securitised loans) would be marked to market. Unlike other recent contributions, the intermediation model outlined here is not ‘limited purpose’ in nature as banks would not be restricted in the form of lending activity they can pursue. Common sources of banking and financial instability – liquidity risk, solvency risk, moral hazard – would be absent.     

The effect of investors’ confidence on monetary policy transmission mechanism: A Multivariate GARCH approach

This paper investigates the financial stability’s effect on the monetary policy transmission mechanisms. The correlations between investors’ confidence in the markets, money growth and economic growth are analyzed along with the correlations within their volatilities. Specifically, the heteroskedasticity of the errors is exploited in a Multivariate GARCH framework to obtain endogenously estimated measures of uncertainty. By a two-step estimator, the indirect interplay of money growth and financial markets is highlighted at different time horizons. The results contrast previous literature supportive of the “Great Moderation” as causing the recent financial crisis. Effectively, by accounting for the breaks in volatility series due to structural shifts in monetary policy, a low period of macroeconomic volatility is found not to drive directly low financial stability.