Market, Trade and Welfare in General Equilibrium

This paper develops a tractable general equilibrium model of an economy with an arbitrary number of industries under increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition. The market structure of the model economy is expressed by two basic sets of parameters: the degree of competition, and the markup ratio prevailing in each industry. The government is supposed to control the degree of competition through antitrust policy and the markup ratio through entry policy. Using this model, I re-examine the results of traditional competitive equilibrium analysis and explore the effects of competition policies on economic welfare and international trade.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, D50, F11, F12, L13, L41.     

Deconstructing the Gains from Trade: Selection of Industries vs Reallocation of Workers

In a Ricardian model with general distributions of industry efficiencies, the welfare gains from trade can be decomposed into a selection and a reallocation effect. The former is the change in average efficiency as a result of the selection of industries that survive international competition. The latter is the rise in the weight of exporting industries in production, owing to the reallocation of workers from non‐exporting industries. This decomposition, which is hard to calculate in the general case, simplifies dramatically with Fréchet‐distributed efficiencies, providing easy‐to‐quantify model‐based measures of these two effects. Selection (reallocation) turns out to matter mostly when welfare gains are small (large).     

Taxes versus quotas in lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on abatement costs

We present a model of lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on pollution abatement costs and compare taxes with quotas under such conditions. We also examine the effect of private information on lobbying activity and social welfare under these two instruments. It is found that private information might improve social welfare under taxes when the government has little concern for social welfare, whereas private information does not improve social welfare under quotas. Quotas are generally socially preferred when the slope of marginal abatement costs is steeper than that of marginal damage or when the government does not concern itself with social welfare. However, private information reduces the comparative disadvantage of taxes compared to quotas when the government has little concern for social welfare. Finally, the results of numerical examples suggest that quotas are employed rather than taxes if the difference in natural emission levels between high- and low-cost industries is large.     

Market Integration,Choice of Technology,and Welfare

This paper develops an international trade model where firms in a duopoly may diversify their technologies for strategic reasons. The firms face the same set of technologies given by a tradeoff between marginal costs and fixed costs, but depending on trade costs firms may choose different technologies. Market integration may induce a technological restructuring where firms either diversify their technologies or switch to a homogeneous technology. In general, market integration improves welfare. However, a small decrease of trade costs which induces a switch from heterogeneous technologies to a homogeneous technology may locally reduce global welfare. The model also shows that productivity differences lead to intra‐industry firm heterogeneity in size and exports similar to the “new–new” trade models with monopolistic competition.     

"新新贸易理论"的思想脉络及其发展

新新贸易理论将企业异质性成功的引入到国际贸易模型中,从微观层面解释了贸易的发生及影响,从而开拓了国际贸易研究的新领域。新新贸易理论解释了为什么好的企业做国际贸易,而较次的企业做国内贸易这一现象,该理论认为,自由贸易可以提高产业生产率水平和社会福利,所以在政策上应该促进自由贸易而不是贸易保护。     

产业内贸易中的企业行为与贸易政策——基于古诺双寡头垄断模型的分析

20世纪60年代以后,学者研究发现,传统的贸易理论无法解释大量工业化国家之间的贸易,从而使产业内贸易的研究成为国际贸易的核心问题之一。本文建立古诺双寡头垄断模型对同质产品产业内贸易中的企业行为与贸易政策进行了博弈分析,通过研究发现：寡头垄断企业之间即使在比较优势和报酬递增都不存在的条件下也会互相向对方市场销售商品;追求社会福利最大化的政府很容易陷入贸易保护的囚徒困境,从而导致双方社会福利恶化。本文认为,政府之间应该加强交往,深化合作,通过谈判解决贸易争端,避免陷入贸易保护的囚徒困境。     

Globalization,product differentiation,and wage inequality

Abstract This paper develops a two‐country, general equilibrium model of oligopoly in which the degree of horizontal product differentiation is endogenously determined by firms’ strategic investments in product innovation. Consumers seek variety and product innovation is more skill intensive than production. Stronger import competition increases innovation incentives, and thereby the relative demand for skill. An intra‐industry trade expansion following trade liberalization can therefore increase wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. As long as some industries remain shielded from international competition, the welfare implications of globalization are found to be generally ambiguous.     

International Joint Venture And Host-Country Policies

In the presence of international joint ventures, effects of policies like foreign equity cap, trade protection and domestic resource requirement restriction towards equity sharing and welfare are analysed. Foreign equity cap reduces host country's welfare. Trade protection lowers equity share for the local firm. It has a first-order source of welfare gain as the internal efficiency of the firm improves. Also, there is a first-order loss resulting from a leakage effect, since a part of the surplus goes to a foreign firm. A marginal domestic resource requirement restriction enhances the joint surplus of the venture and social welfare.     

Environmental Quality and Industry Protection with Noncooperative Versus Cooperative Domestic and Trade Policies

This paper characterizes environmental quality and industry protection in a large-country Grossman–Helpman model when production or consumption externalities exist and governments decide noncooperatively or cooperatively on domestic and trade policies. Governments choose policies efficiently from among those available, but competitive lobbies may prefer less efficient regimes. Under restricted policy availability, political-support effects can offset terms-of-trade effects on equilibrium outcomes, and inefficient trade policies can lead to higher environmental quality than efficient domestic policies. If governments cooperate, they can satisfy particular organized industries at lower costs to other lobbies and total welfare. This may result in lower environmental quality than noncooperation.     

Varying Political Economy Weights of Protection: The Case of Colombia

In this paper, we examine trade policy determinants and trade reform in a developing country setting using a political economy model. The government determines tariffs by balancing the political support from producers vs. consumers, while placing a higher political weight on producers’ welfare relative to average citizens. We then expand the model in several directions to guide our subsequent estimations at the three‐digit industry level for Colombia between 1983 and 1998. We account for import substitution motives for protection but describe how the government's move away from these policies leads to unilateral trade liberalization. We innovatively allow the political weights to vary based on key industry variables beyond a common denominator. The sectors with higher employment, labor cost, and preferential trade agreement (PTA) import shares receive a larger political weight compared to otherwise similar sectors. The novelty of our approach is estimating the effect of sectoral characteristics on protection filtered through the political weights. We obtain more realistic estimates for these weights and provide some evidence for a slowing down effect of PTAs on trade liberalization.     

Trade Liberalization in Egypt

A computable general equilibrium model of Egypt is developed to analyze proposed reforms in its trade policies, including a partnership agreement with the European Union. The model has multiple trading regions and allows for administrative trade barriers and tariffs. The paper reports computations of the revenue impacts of trade liberalization and the required changes in distortionary commodity taxes to maintain a fixed real government budget. Egypt's greatest potential gains come from removing its administrative trade barriers while adopting globally free trade. The partnership agreement with the EU could lower or raise Egypt's welfare, depending on prior trade reform.     

A sequential approach to regional integration: The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe

This paper develops a theory of optimal sequencing of regional integration and applies it to the specific question of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and the EU. We show that the timing of transition and integration has implications for the long-term trade structure of Europe. In this model the interest to integrate the CEECs comes from harmonization of policies to attract industries. Without integration, European countries will try to inefficiently protect their industries. Because of the transfers implied by the CAP and the Structural Policies, the EU delays enlargement until the CEECs have sufficiently converged. CEECs might at this point prefer to stay outside the EU and attract industries by offering them more generous protection than the EU. Such timing may be inefficient ex ante for all countries because it may prevent full European integration in the long run, inducing firms to relocate outside of the EU and governments in the EU and the CEECs to inefficiently protect industry. During the transition, all countries benefit from regional integration among the CEECs.     

An Incumbent Country View on Eastern Enlargement of the EU Part I: A General Treatment

An eastern enlargement of the EU, from an incumbent country point of view,involves a fiscal burden from extending Union agricultural and cohesion policiesto new members, coupled with potential gains as well as adjustment problemsderiving from an extended customs union and a larger single market. Enlargementis controversial, because the net effect is unclear, a priori, and will certainly vary across individual countries. Our two-part contribution tries to do shed light on this controversy. In this first part, we present a general treatment of the likely effects on different incumbent countries, while a subsequent companion paper will take a closer look at the specific case of Austria. The general view of part I, in turn, first focuses on various empirical measures highlighting crucial differences between incumbents, pertaining to the fiscal burden on the one hand, and integration gains on the other. We then argue that a proper evaluation must rely on an explicit welfare criterion, and we use a general model of economic integration in order to identify the principalchannels through which aggregate welfare of an incumbent country is affected by an enlargement of the EU. We address traditional effects of trade creation and trade diversion, as well as growth effects arising from an abolition of trade barriers. In addition, we ask how enlargement affects foreign direct investmentand labor migration, and what this implies in welfare terms for an incumbent western European country. Taken together, these effects generate a certain presumption of integration gains, which need to be set against the fiscal burden. However, a final judgement requires a case-by-case approach, based on empirical implementations of enriched and parameterized models for specific countries. The companion paper, therefore, uses a suitably specified, calibrated dynamic equilibrium model, in order to take a closer look at the Austrian case.     

Protection for sale under monopolistic competition: Beyond the CES

We extend the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by introducing a general model of monopolistic competition with variable markups and incomplete pass-through. We show that the structure of protection emerging in the political equilibrium not only depends on the weight attached by the government to consumer welfare when making its policy decision, but also on the degree of market power of firms and on the terms-of-trade variations due to the degree of pass-through. Our results highlight the importance of preferences in shaping the structure of protection and are consistent with the occurring of protectionism also in unorganized industries.     

Oligopolistic Competition and Intra-industry Trade: Evidence From the OECD

This paper develops a general reciprocal-markets model of intra-industry trade in oligopolistic industries. It shows that the effects of industry characteristics on the extent of bilateral intra-industry trade, as measured by the Grubel-Lloyd index, are invariant to whether firms compete over homogeneous or differentiated products. Based on this model, we investigate industry determinants of bilateral intra-industry trade, using internationally comparable industry data for 22 manufacturing industries in 12 OECD countries during 1970–1985. Our estimates indicate that, even after controlling for idiosyncratic industry and country-pair effects, our measures of the industry determinants explain variations in the intensity of bilateral intra-industry trade, for the most part, in accord with what the theory predicts.     

An assessment of the Europe agreements’ effects on bilateral trade, GDP, and welfare

The so-called Europe Agreements had been enacted in the 1990s to initiate the integration of goods markets between the 15 EU incumbent economies as of 1995 and 10 potential entrants located in Central and Eastern Europe. This paper evaluates the trade, GDP, and welfare effects of these agreements by means of structural analysis of a bilateral trade flow model. The results support three conclusions. First, the agreements exerted significant positive effects on goods trade between the EU15 incumbents and the CEEC and, at the same time, they induced trade redirection from other countries. Second, EU15 GDP responded by an increase of much less than 1% while that in the 10 CEEC increased by several percent in response to the agreements. Third, the effects on welfare were moderate in the EU15 but amounted to more double-digit percentage changes in the involved CEEC.     

The Effective Protection Rate Under Uncertainty: A Note*

This note presents a measure of the effective protection rate in a general equilibrium model under uncertainty where a stock market exists and international trade in securities takes place. Real equity prices replace the final commodity prices since, in the presence of uncertainty, resource allocation and therefore the output of each industry is governed by real equity prices. Using expected utility as a welfare criterion, it is shown that second-best optimum can be achieved by a tariff on the intermediate good at a rate given by setting the new measure to zero. This note provides the theoretical foundations to the measure estimated by Eldor (1984).     

Industrial subsidy policy and the optimal level of specialization

Despite compelling rationale based on the theory of comparative advantage for free trade, many countries adopt restrictive trade practices. In this paper we investigate this puzzle in a stylized two-country two-good Ricardian model of international trade. Governments can offer protection to domestic industries via industrial subsidy policy in this model. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the two-player game where industries choose the level of specialization. We determine the necessary conditions for complete specialization in (a) the free-trade regime; and (b) the protectionist regime implemented through industrial subsidy policy. Our results show that if the government intends to promote complete specialization, then a high degree of comparative advantage and a large elasticity of substitution between export and import goods are required. Empirical evidence on these two parameters indicate that complete specialization is unlikely to survive in the protectionist regime.     

Endowments,Specialization, and Policy

The paper explores the relationship between industry shares in production and their determinants including factor endowments, technology, and government policies, in a GDP–function framework. We use a new international panel dataset on production and trade compiled by the World Bank. As an intermediate step we calculate Hicks‐neutral productivity indices that vary across industries, time, and countries. We find that own‐TFP is robustly associated with industry shares across time and countries and that, after correcting for these productivity differences, output shares are related to factor endowments (Rybczynski effects) in a plausible way. Once Rybczynski effects are controlled for, we find little evidence of demand‐side policies (import tariffs) affecting the allocation of resources; we find, however, more role for supply‐side policies as the relative size of capital‐intensive industries is positively associated with infrastructure–capital endowments.