The effect of political factors on sovereign default

This aricle examines the effect of political factors on sovereign default. Using a theoretical model, we find that political instability increases the likelihood of default. To test this theoretical implication, we use a panel logit model to estimate the effect of long- and short-run political factors, along with other macroeconomic variables, on the probability of default. Data from 68 developed and developing countries between 1970 and 2010 is used to conduct the study. Our findings suggest that a country is more likely to default when (i) it has a relatively younger political regime in place; (ii) it faces a higher chance of political turnover; and (iii) it has a less democratic political system. Economic factors are also vital; a country with stronger growth and less external debt is less likely to experience sovereign default. Robustness tests using alternative measures of political risk, trade balance and EMBI sovereign bond spreads also support the baseline findings.     

Evaluating sovereign risk spillovers on domestic banks during the European debt crisis

Using a Markov-switching model with time-varying probabilities, spillovers from sovereign to domestic bank CDS spreads during the European debt crisis for a set of 14 European countries and 30 European banks are investigated. Our model is able to capture how the increased sovereign risk observed between 2010 and 2013 throughout Europe has impacted i) the probability that banks fall into a crisis regime and ii) the probability that banks stay in the crisis regime. The latter state is characterized by a high volatility and large positive returns of CDS spreads. Different regime-dependent indicators have been computed to assess heterogeneity within the region. The evidence indicates that the intensification of sovereign risk observed during the European debt crisis has positively and significantly driven the regime shifts in volatility of the bank CDS spreads due to increased risk aversion. The results show that the increase in sovereign credit risk seems to have generated second-round effects for some banks that have experienced a deterioration in their funding conditions due to a rise in the domestic sovereign default risk. Overall, our results suggest that sovereign CDS spreads can be considered good forewarning indicators for predicting the evolution of bank CDS spreads. We also find that the effects differ depending on the country and the financial institution. This result suggests that banks are heterogeneously exposed to sovereign credit risk within the same country. One argument relates to the size of these financial institutions and the domestic exposure to sovereign debt.     

Banking solvency determinants in the EU: a model based on stress tests

Using a multilevel regression model, this article aims to find determinants of banking solvency in the European Union. The endogenous variable is defined as the capital ratio determined by stress tests. Both internal (financial ratios and sovereign debt exposures) and external (macroeconomic indicators) variables are proposed as covariates. The results reveal that capitalization, earnings, assets structure and exposure to PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) sovereign debt are significant among the former, and economic growth, interest and exchange rates, and real estate prices among the latter.     

Sovereign bond market dependencies and crisis transmission around the eurozone debt crisis: a dynamic copula approach

We examine the dependency between the European government bond markets around the recent sovereign debt crisis. A dynamic copula approach is used to model the time-varying dependence structure of those government bond markets, evaluate the nature and strength of their dependencies over time, and gauge the transmission of the crisis shocks. Our results can be summarized as follows: i) the eurozone sovereign bond markets under consideration have a significant and positive dependence with the Greek and the EMU benchmark sovereign bond markets; ii) the dynamic-BB7 copula function best describes the dependence structure between these sovereign bond markets and provides evidence of asymmetric tail dependence; iii) the conditional probability of crisis transmission from Greece to other eurozone countries is higher than the other way around; and iv) Greece is the most vulnerable country when the eurozone entered into the sovereign debt crisis.     

Does local and Euro area sentiment matter for sovereign debt markets? Evidence from a bailout country

Does sentiment impact the sovereign debt markets? This article investigates whether lagged domestic and Euro area irrational sentiment (optimism or pessimism unwarranted by fundamentals) predicts future sovereign bond spreads, in Portugal, between January 2000 and December 2013. We find that domestic and Euro area sentiment negatively forecasts total return spreads and that this effect is stronger during the bailout period. Also, we find that the business sentiment is even most noticed. Therefore, Portuguese sovereign debt market is prone to the influence of investors’ sentiment.     

欧元区主权债务期限结构的实证分析

本文通过对欧元区成员国长期债务占总债务比重与各国整体宏观经济指标相关关系的实证分析表明,欧元区各国以GDP与税收比、债务与GDP之比所描述的当期融资能力与长期债务比例呈显著负相关,由于非对称冲击的作用,各国体现出不同的特征。本文同时构建了一个政府债务效用函数的二期模型,说明主权债务期限结构安排可以通过宏观调控进行跨期平滑,以防止主权债务危机的发生。     

Determinants of nonresident government debt ownership

We examine the determinants of nonresident government debt ownership, accounting for domestic and external factors and financial variables during the period 2000Q2–2014Q4, focussing on a small euro area open economy: Portugal. Our results show that better fiscal positions, higher systematic stress in Europe and higher shares of monetary and financial institutions (MFI) cross-border holdings of public debt, increase the share of nonresident held debt, and rising sovereign yields decrease that ratio.     

“欧洲学期”:欧盟改善经济治理的重要一步

主权债务危机充分暴露出欧盟内部经济治理方面的体制性缺陷,也让成员国看到深化欧盟内部融合、增进财政预算和宏观经济政策协调的必要性。"欧洲学期"就是欧盟在债务危机恶化之际推出的一项重大改革举措,是完善欧盟经济治理的重要内容。因此,对这一机制的研究显得尤为必要。本文从"欧洲学期"机制的框架内容、创新之处、存在的问题、实施现状和预期政策效应等方面着手,试图对其做出较为客观全面的剖析,并给出初步的评价。     

Sovereign debt, structural adjustment, and conditionality

The lack of a proper enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt generates a commitment failure. As a result, a sovereign may seek to improve its position in debt renegotiations and thus evade its debt obligations by reducing exports. Conditionality seeks to provide a solution to the incentive problem by addressing the commitment failure. Formalizing this argument, we show that conditionality helps the repayment of sovereign debt. In certain circumstances, it can eliminate debt overhang, especially when it is coupled with concessionary lending of sufficient magnitude. It is, however, unable to restore first best. When it is anticipated by lenders, conditionality may get international financial institutions and sovereign debtors into a trap where the debt overhang persist, debt rescheduling takes place periodically, and conditionality continues indefinitely.     

关于解决主权债重组问题的讨论:基于博弈均衡的分析框架

集中于国际主权债重组的理论诠释,并通过对主权债重组中的两个问题--集体行动困境和道德风险的博弈模型建立和分析,讨论如何建立一个解决主权债务重组问题的机制,使遇到债务困难的国家和债权人循此机制解决问题从而减少债权债务双方的损失,总结出处理主权债务问题应特别考虑的几个关系,提出一些启发性的政策建议.     

Determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in the EMU: An optimal currency area perspective

In the light of the recent financial crisis, we take a panel cointegration approach that allows for structural breaks to the analysis of the determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in nine economies of the European Monetary Union. We find evidence for a level break in the cointegrating relationship. Moreover, results show that (i) fiscal imbalances – namely expected government debt-to-GDP differentials – are the main long-run drivers of sovereign spreads; (ii) liquidity risks and cumulated inflation differentials have non-negligible weights; but (iii) all conclusions are ultimately connected to whether or not the sample of countries is composed of members of an Optimal Currency Area (OCA). In particular, we establish (i) that results are overall driven by those countries not passing the OCA test; and (ii) that investors closely monitor and severely punish the deterioration of expected debt positions of those economies exhibiting significant gaps in competitiveness.     

Model uncertainty in Panel Vector Autoregressive models

We develop methods for Bayesian model averaging (BMA) or selection (BMS) in Panel Vector Autoregressions (PVARs). Our approach allows us to select between or average over all possible combinations of restricted PVARs where the restrictions involve interdependencies between and heterogeneities across cross-sectional units. The resulting BMA framework can find a parsimonious PVAR specification, thus dealing with overparameterization concerns. We use these methods in an application involving the euro area sovereign debt crisis and show that our methods perform better than alternatives. Our findings contradict a simple view of the sovereign debt crisis which divides the euro zone into groups of core and peripheral countries and worries about financial contagion within the latter group.     

Financial stress and sovereign debt composition

Using a panel of 13 advanced economies for the period 1980–2012, we find that periods of impaired financial intermediation mainly accrue to maturity mismatches in sovereign debt. Thus, a higher (lower) share of short-term (medium and long-term) debt leads to an increase in the financial stress index. From a policy perspective, our work suggests that debt management policies translated into longer average maturities of sovereign debt not only reduce the expected debt servicing cost, but also mitigate strains in the financial sector.     

The role of debt profile vulnerabilities in sovereign distress

Sovereign debt distress has raised difficult issues in terms of debt sustainability in the past, but it has been associated not only with medium-term debt dynamics, but also with various dimensions of the debt profile that have typically built vulnerabilities over time. Vulnerabilities associated with the public debt structure and liquidity may play an important role in derailing a stable debt trajectory and thus contribute to debt distress. Financial developments may also contribute to the building in sovereign debt vulnerabilities, as deterioration in financial stability indicators can affect the balance sheet of the national treasury. Based on the experience during 37 debt distress events in countries with market access between 1993 and 2010, this article identifies early warning indicators of sovereign debt distress and defines thresholds – for the whole sample and for different regions – at which these latter have been associated with distress in the past. This approach allows us to assess indicators on an individual basis, and to develop a composite indicator of debt vulnerabilities as well.     

Transmission channels of international financial crises to African stock markets: the case of the euro sovereign debt crisis

This article investigates the effects of the European sovereign debt crisis on African stock markets within a Bayesian shrinkage VAR framework. This method allows us to consider both North African and Sub-Saharan African stock markets, and provides a flexible parsimonious specification. The results reveal varying reactions of the impulse response functions. The most exposed African stock markets are those of Egypt, South Africa and Mauritius, while the least affected stock market is, surprisingly, that of Ivory Coast. Our analysis shows that, in addition to direct transmission, several macroeconomic and market channels, such as commodities, exports, and exchange rates, are relevant. Specifically, countries with strong commercial links to European countries will be most impacted by the crisis. The severity of transmission also depends on the country’s dependence on commodities.     

European policy and markets: Did policy initiatives stem the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area?

We investigate how European policy initiatives influenced market assessments of sovereign default risk and banking sector fragility during the sovereign debt crisis in four adversely affected countries — Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy. We focus on three broad groups of policies: (a) ECB policy actions (monetary and financial support), (b) EU programs (financial and fiscal rules as well as financial support in crisis countries), and (c) domestic austerity programs. We measure immediate market impact effects: what policies changed risk perceptions, using CDS spreads on sovereign bonds and banks in this assessment. We employ dynamic panel and event study methodologies in the empirical work. We find that a number of programs initially stabilized sovereign and bank bond markets (e.g. Outright Monetary Transactions program), although announcement and implementation impacts on markets differed in some cases (e.g. second Covered Market Bond Program). Actions designed to shore up sovereign markets often lowered risk assessments in bank bond markets and policies designed to ensure safety and soundness of the European banking system in some cases significantly impacted sovereign debt markets. Finally, a number of policies designed to stabilize markets had surprisingly little immediate impact on either sovereign or bank bond market risk assessments.     

Debt crisis and 10-year sovereign yields in Ireland and in Portugal

We assess the determinants of the 10-year sovereign yield for the period 2000–2015, in Portugal and in Ireland. Results show that the long-term Portuguese sovereign yield increased with the rise of the 10-year Bund yield and during the Securities Markets Programme, but decreased due to financial integration. Additionally, during the period of the economic and financial adjustment programme, there was evidence of additional rises (decreases) due to increases (decreases) in the 3-month Euribor rate, and the level of public debt. EU/IMF funding reduced sovereign yield.     

Risks of Latin America sovereign debts before and after the financial crisis

We investigate the financial determinants of the return and volatility of sovereign CDS spread from six major Latin American countries before and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Other than CBOE VIX index, we also find that global factors including US Baa–Aaa default yield, TED spread and US Treasury rate all contribute to the changes in these sovereign CDS spread. Although global risk aversion (VIX) is a significant determinant of sovereign debt spread, in the years after the crisis, the emphasis has shifted towards short-term refinancing risk (TED). Furthermore, the risk of Greek sovereign debt crisis also transmitted Latin American CDS spreads immediately, but only in the post-Lehman sub-period. These findings provide implications for international bonds and credit derivatives trading strategies.     

The sovereign spread in Asian emerging economies: The significance of external versus internal factors

This paper investigates the dynamic relations between external factors, domestic macroeconomic factors with sovereign spreads, debt to GDP ratio, etc. in Asian emerging countries. First, we develop a theoretical model that determines the equilibrium debt level, probability of default and sovereign spread and draw empirical implications. We then employ a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model to investigate empirically how the spread of sovereign debt is influenced over time by both external and domestic factors. The empirical results show that variations in sovereign spreads are mainly driven by external shocks, with the term structure of US interest rate and the global risk aversion having the most important role. The findings also indicate that shocks from the US have a direct effect on sovereign spread and an indirect effect via domestic macroeconomic fundamentals. Finally, the evidence produced validates the presence of some response patterns of sovereign spread to the external shocks.     

Sovereign risk,interbank freezes,and aggregate fluctuations

This paper shows how spillovers from sovereign risk to banks׳ access to wholesale funding establish a bank-sovereign nexus. In a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium set-up, heterogeneous banks give rise to an interbank market where government bonds are used as collateral. Government borrowing under limited commitment is costly ex ante as bank funding conditions tighten when the quality of collateral drops. These spillovers, by impeding interbank intermediation, lower the penalty from defaulting due to an interbank freeze during a recession and propagate aggregate shocks to the macroeconomy. The model is calibrated using Greek data and is capable of reproducing stylized facts from the European sovereign debt crisis. In an application, we show that the ECB׳s non-standard financing operations mitigate the adverse feedback mechanism.