Optimal bankruptcy code: A fresh start for some

What is the optimal consumer bankruptcy law? I answer this question using an incomplete markets life-cycle model with a planner who can choose state-contingent bankruptcy costs. I develop two main theoretical characterizations. First, whenever debt discharge is allowed, it should occur without cost. Second, bankruptcy should always be allowed for highly-indebted households. Quantitatively, the optimal policy can generate a welfare gain as large as 11.6%. However, attractive informal default, asymmetric information, and moral hazard can reduce the welfare gain to as little as 0.7%.     

The Implications of Trade Credit for Bank Monitoring: Suggestive Evidence from Japan

Firms in modern developed economies borrow from both banks and trade partners. Using Japanese manufacturing data from the 1960s, we estimate the price of trade credit, and explore some of the ways firms choose between the credit and bank loans. We find that firms of all sizes borrow heavily from their trade partners, and at implicit rates that track the explicit rates banks would charge. They borrow from banks when they anticipate needing money for relatively long periods; they turn to trade partners when they face short-term unexpected exigencies. This apparent contrast in the term structures follows, we suggest, from the fundamentally different way bankers and trade partners cut default risk. Because bankers seldom know their borrowers' industries first hand, they rely on formal legal protection (like security interests). Because trade partners know the industry well, they reduce risk by monitoring their borrowers closely instead. Because the costs to creating legal mechanisms are heavily front-loaded, bankers focus on long-term debt; because the costs of monitoring debtors are ongoing, trade creditors do not. Apparently, banks monitor less than we have thought.     

Banking in computable general equilibrium economies

In this paper we develop a computable general equilibrium economy that models the banking sector explicitly. Banks intermediate between households and between the household sector and the government sector. Households borrow from banks to finance their purchases of houses and they lend to banks to save for retirement. Banks pool households' savings and they purchase interest-bearing government debt and non-interest-bearing reserves. We use this structure to answer two sets of questions: one normative in nature that evaluates the welfare costs of alternative monetary and tax policies, and one positive in nature that studies the real effects of following a procyclical interest-rate policy rule.     

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSUMER CREDIT AND DEFAULT LITERATURE

This survey discusses recent contributions to the quantitative literature on unsecured consumer debt and default, and some ongoing challenges for the literature. Key topics include the sources of the rise in personal bankruptcies, the importance of asymmetric information and the effects of developments in information technologies on consumer credit markets, delinquency and informal bankruptcy, debt collection and restructuring of distressed debt, the cyclical behavior of consumer debt and default, and the insurance role of household debt. Implications for welfare analysis and policy design are discussed. Several theoretical contributions and approaches to modeling the consumer credit markets are also highlighted.     

Robust bubbles with mild penalties for default

Limited enforcement of debt contracts and mild penalties for default can lead to low equilibrium interest rates, to ensure debt repayment. Low interest rates, in turn, create conditions for bubbles. I show that bubbles in unsecured private debt exist when the punishment for default is a permanent or a temporary interdiction to trade. Bubbles are an inefficient source of liquidity, as they lower interest rates and reduce welfare by discouraging saving.     

Reducing government debt in the presence of inequality

What are the welfare effects of government debt? In particular, what are the welfare consequences of government debt reductions? We answer these questions with the help of an incomplete markets economy with production. Households are subject to uninsurable income shocks. We make several contributions. First, by targeting the skewed wealth and earnings distribution of the US economy in our calibration, we identify inequality as the major driver of the welfare effects of public debt/GDP changes. Second, we show that in order to fully gauge the welfare consequences and the political feasibility of government debt changes, it is crucial to consider the transitional dynamics between stationary equilibria. Our results therefore have important implications for the design of debt reduction policies. Since the skewed wealth distribution generates a large fraction of borrowing-constrained households, a public debt reduction should be non-linear, such that the tax burden is postponed into the future.     

Wealth Accumulation and Factors Accounting for Success

We use detailed income, balance sheet, and cash flow statements constructed for households in a long monthly panel in an emerging market economy, and some recent contributions in economic theory, to document and better understand the factors underlying success in achieving upward mobility in the distribution of net worth. Wealth inequality is decreasing over time, and many households work their way out of poverty and lower wealth over the seven year period. The accounts establish that, mechanically, this is largely due to savings rather than incoming gifts and remittances. In turn, the growth of net worth can be decomposed household by household into the savings rate and how productively that savings is used, the return on assets (ROA). The latter plays the larger role. ROA is, in turn, positively correlated with higher education of household members, younger age of the head, and with a higher debt/asset ratio and lower initial wealth, so it seems from cross-sections that the financial system is imperfectly channeling resources to productive and poor households. Household fixed effects account for the larger part of ROA, and this success is largely persistent, undercutting the story that successful entrepreneurs are those that simply get lucky. Persistence does vary across households, and in at least one province with much change and increasing opportunities, ROA changes as households move over time to higher-return occupations. But for those households with high and persistent ROA, the savings rate is higher, consistent with some micro founded macro models with imperfect credit markets. Indeed, high ROA households save by investing in their own enterprises and adopt consistent financial strategies for smoothing fluctuations. More generally growth of wealth, savings levels and/or rates are correlated with TFP and the household fixed effects that are the larger part of ROA.     

Is the secondary loan market valuable to borrowers?

In recent years, the secondary loan market has developed into an over-the-counter market where loans are not only sold but also subsequently traded. This shift away from traditional banking is altering the business of lending. Loan sales are valuable to banks because they free up capital, generate fee-based income and facilitate risk management; but they may be costly to borrowers because they negatively affect bank monitoring incentives. In this paper, however, we argue that there is another potential benefit to borrowers from loan sales. Borrowers with trading loans, in particular those with liquid loans, may “demand” a share of bank benefits from loan sales when they take out new loans as it will be easier for banks to sell these loans afterwards. We investigate this potential benefit of the secondary loan market by comparing the interest rates borrowers pay before their loans start to trade with the interest rates they pay on loans originated post-trading. Our results show that, on average, borrowers pay higher spreads on the loans they take out after the onset of trading on their loans. Importantly, our results also show that borrowers with liquid trading loans are able to borrow at lower interest rates after the onset of trading on their loans. Thus, while the banks’ decision to sell loans may initially impose a cost on borrowers, those whose loans enter the secondary loan market and become liquid benefit from an interest rate discount on their subsequent loans.     

Credit rationing, race, and the mortgage market

This study applies microdata from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances to evaluate the effects of borrower race and default risk in mortgage lending. The empirical analysis is based on a probit model of whether borrowers obtain FHA or conventional mortgages; the former are fully insured and are characterized by easier downpayment constraints, but are typically more expensive. Hence, households borrowing through the FHA will tend to be credit constrained in the conventional market. Results of the analysis indicate that variables which proxy lender concerns about default risk and cost have an important effect on the type of loan borrowers obtain. Empirical estimates also suggest that minority households are significantly less likely to obtain conventional financing than whites, even after controlling for various proxies of default risk. These results suggest that race effects in mortgage lending may persist for reasons unrelated to borrower default risk.     

Fixed versus floating: vulnerability to rising interest rates

• ? Looking at different economies' exposure to fixed‐ and floating‐rate private‐sector debt reveals how vulnerable they could be to rising interest rates. Our analysis finds that Hong Kong, Sweden, China and Australia are potentially most exposed via floating rates to rising debt service costs. A 150bp rise in rates would also push several other countries' debt service ratios above the peaks of 2008. Less vulnerable economies include the US and Germany.
• ? High levels of floating‐rate debt imply a large and rapid pass‐through of rising interest rates to firms and households, with negative consequences. Exposure to floating‐rate debt as a share of GDP varies greatly: the highest levels are in Hong Kong, China, Sweden, Australia and Spain, with the lowest levels in the US, France and Germany.
• ? Growing shares of fixed‐rate housing debt in the US, Eurozone and UK mean the impact of higher interest rates may be less severe than a decade ago. Private deleveraging in countries such as the US, UK and Spain could also soften the impact.
• ? A rise of 100bp in short‐term interest rates would raise the debt service ratio after one year by around 2.5% of GDP in Hong Kong, with increases of 1.5–1.7% of GDP in Sweden, China and Australia. The smallest effects would be in the US and Germany.
• ? A 100–150bp rate rise would push debt service ratios in China, Hong Kong, Canada, France and the Netherlands well above their peaks of a decade ago. A similar rate rise would take debt service ratios in Sweden, South Korea and Australia close to, or above, previous peaks.
• ? The distribution of debt within economies, which our analysis does not cover, is also important. For example, there is some evidence that the US corporate sector has a high concentration of debt among borrowers with weak finances. Countries that are highly vulnerable to interest rate rises may see their central banks normalise policy rates more slowly than they otherwise would.

     

Federal Home Loan Bank advances and bank risk

The Federal Home Loan Bank system (FHLB) has evolved into a major source of liquidity for the banking system with the demonstrated ability to borrow over a trillion dollars in world financial markets based on an implied U. S. Treasury guarantee. The FHLB loans the borrowed funds to commercial banks at reduced rates that are not adjusted for the risk of an individual bank. Moral hazard could cause member banks using FHLB loans to increase financial leverage and exposure to high risk assets. Conversely, the FHLB offers banks additional liquidity and specialized debt instruments that help them manage interest rate risk. We use dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimation to test the relation between FHLB advances and bank risk. We find that if banks have relatively normal default probabilities, advances are not associated with increased bank risk but, instead, advances are related to decreased interest rate risk. However, when bank default probabilities are high, our evidence suggests advances and higher bank risk are related.     

Entry,financing, and bankruptcy decisions: The limited liability effect

A firm, which has a privileged right to undertake an irreversible investment project, simultaneously determines whether to exercise this project and also how many bonds to issue in the presence of demand uncertainty. The firm will not exercise the project until its net value from investing immediately equals its option value from delaying investment. The firm’s choice of debt levels balances the tax advantage of debt against a cost associated with the event of bankruptcy. The effects of uncertainty, asset specificity, and the costs to purchase capital later on a firm’s entry, financing, and bankruptcy decisions are examined and compared with those in the literature.     

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

The objective of the paper is to propose endogenous debt constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure the existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo et al. (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independent of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model.     

The role of debt and bankruptcy statutes in facilitating tacit collusion

Using a two‐period model this paper examines the quantity decisions of leveraged duopolists that are vulnerable to bankruptcy in the first period. When the firms have symmetric costs, a bankrupt firm reorganizes under Chapter 11. If a Chapter 11 firm experiences marginal cost relief, each firm produces a collusive output in period one in order to prevent its rival's financial demise. When the firms have asymmetric costs, the less efficient firm is liquidated under Chapter 7 upon bankruptcy. A predatory equilibrium exists, whereby the inefficient firm is driven from the market. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Modeling frailty-correlated defaults using many macroeconomic covariates

We propose a novel time series panel data framework for estimating and forecasting time-varying corporate default rates subject to observed and unobserved risk factors. In an empirical application for a U.S. dataset, we find a large and significant role for a dynamic frailty component even after controlling for more than 80% of the variation in more than 100 macro-financial covariates and other standard risk factors. We emphasize the need for a latent component to prevent a downward bias in estimated default rate volatility and in estimated probabilities of extreme default losses on portfolios of U.S. debt. The latent factor does not substitute for a single omitted macroeconomic variable. We argue that it captures different omitted effects at different times. We also provide empirical evidence that default and business cycle conditions partly depend on different processes. In an out-of-sample forecasting study for point-in-time default probabilities, we obtain mean absolute error reductions of more than forty percent when compared to models with observed risk factors only. The forecasts are relatively more accurate when default conditions diverge from aggregate macroeconomic conditions.     

Nominal rigidities equilibria in a non-Ricardian economy

I consider a cash-in-advance economy with nominal price rigidities. Nominal interest rates are the cost of liquidity and fiscal policy sets nominal transfers that affect the distribution of wealth. Under a fiscal policy associated with an unequal distribution of wealth and for policies of low or even zero interest rates, coordination failures exist, that is, involuntary unemployment persist even if prices are set at full employment levels. Coordination failures exist if and only if nominal rates are below a threshold. Moreover, I demonstrate the following result on welfare: full employment allocations at a nominal rate equal to the threshold (high liquidity costs) are better, in terms of welfare, from unemployment allocations at any non-negative interest rates below the threshold. On the other hand, under a sufficiently progressive fiscal system that reduces the inequality in the wealth distribution, coordination failures do not exist.     

Analyzing the Relationships among Race,Wealth, and Home Ownership in America

This paper presents new evidence on the determinants of the large disparities in home ownership by race in the U.S. Consistent with results first reported by P. Linneman and S. M. Wachter (1989,AREOFA J.7, No. 4, 389–402), we find noceteris paribusracial differences in ownership rates among white and minority households who possess sufficient wealth to meet down payment and closing cost requirements associated with standard mortgage underwriting criteria. However, substantial racial differences among wealth-constrained households exist, with constrained whites owning at higher rates than observationally equivalent minority households. Because minorities are disproportionately constrained by wealth-related underwriting standards, these differentials apply to roughly one-third of the white households in our samples and well over one-half of the minority sample. A multinomial model that treats central city versus suburban location as a choice variable in addition to tenure status is also estimated. The results show that even among households unconstrained by wealth-related underwriting considerations, minorities are much more likely than whites to own in central city locations. Thus, while controlling for wealth constraint status does eliminate tenure choice differences among the unconstrained, location differences remain for this group. They also are present among constrained households. Given the disparate fortunes of central city and suburban land markets in many metropolitan areas, this racial location pattern of ownership may have important long-run impacts on wealth distribution by race.     

Higher interest rates should not unduly faze consumers

• ? Though the MPC has signalled a more aggressive pace of interest hikes than previously anticipated, we still expect the impact on the consumer sector in aggregate to be modest. We estimate that household debt servicing costs will rise from the current level of 4.1% of household income to 5.0% by the end of 2019. This would still be only a little over half the pre‐crisis peak.
• ? We expect the MPC to hike interest rates twice in both 2018 and 2019, taking Bank Rate to 1.5% by the end of next year. Higher interest rates will impact on consumer spending by increasing debt servicing costs and reducing the attractiveness of credit (including mortgages), but savers will benefit from higher returns on their deposits.
• ? Mortgages account for 77% of loans to UK households and full pass through of a 100bp rise in Bank Rate to variable rate loans, implying an increase from 2.78% to 3.78%, would add £100 a month to the cost of servicing an average mortgage. But only two‐fifths of borrowers have a variable rate deal, so for many homeowners the adjustment to higher interest rates will not be immediate. And the proportion of houses which are owned via a mortgage has fallen over the past decade, suggesting that the household sector as a whole will be less sensitive to higher mortgage interest rates.
• ? Historically the relationship between Bank Rate and interest rates on unsecured lending has been weak and rates on credit cards and personal loans have not yet risen following November's rate hike. The link to deposit rates has been stronger and higher returns on savings will mitigate some of the damage to household income from higher debt servicing costs, although uneven distribution of debt and savings means that there will be winners and losers at a more disaggregated level.
• ? We have used the Oxford Economics Global Economic Model to run a counterfactual scenario where Bank Rate is kept at 0.5% throughout 2018 and 2019. The results suggest that the pace of rate hikes assumed in our baseline forecast would reduce the level of consumer spending by 0.2 percentage points by the end of 2019.

     

Credit and self-employment

The US personal bankruptcy system allows debtors to discharge uncollateralized debts if they give up assets in excess of a threshold known as an “exemption”. However, since exemptions erode repayment incentives, they may increase borrowing costs. Our paper evaluates the tradeoff between credit costs and the insurance against failure created by bankruptcy exemptions. We find that exemptions change self-employment rates and the timing, size, and financing of projects. We also find that the positive relationship between wealth and self-employment rates may not arise from credit constraints: such a relationship is present even when credit is plentiful at low interest rates.     

Extendible stock loan

In this paper, the model of extendible stock loan with forbearance is proposed. The loan is extendible, so as to prevent immediate losses or to prevent subsequent price drop; while the forbearance is granted only when the pledged share’s value is above threshold, so as to mitigate the risk-taking behavior induced by the extension. The non-synchronization of the liquidation of insolvent stock loans also alleviates the downward leverage spiral in a market downturn. Numerical analysis shows that fair extendible stock loan rates increase with the forbearance level as well as extension period, and loan rates are quite sensitive to the change of asset volatility and debt ratio. For lenders waiving the interest rates during extension period, their burden grows with extension rapidly when they grant looser forbearance and when asset volatility or loan-to-value is higher. Some suggestions are made accordingly. First, lenders offering uniform extendible loan rate can let borrowers choose between looser forbearance with shorter extension, or tighter forbearance with longer extension. Second, if the loan rate is priced fairly, lower margin requirement can only be accomplished with tighter forbearance. More looser forbearance worth higher rates.