Stable processes of exchange

In this paper we address a long standing gap in economic theory—the gap between claims for the dynamic efficiency of trading in markets, and the findings of formal economic theory, which justify those claims only under restrictive assumptions. We use agent-based methods to study the dynamics of exchange with trading agents who are characterized by several different preference relations. We see that outcomes converge with high probability to Pareto optima in the cases studied, including the well-known example due to Scarf.     

Inequity-averse preferences in general equilibrium

We study the stability with respect to the introduction of opportunity-based inequity aversion à la Dufwenberg et al. (2011) of three welfare properties satisfied by competitive equilibria in self-regarding economies: (i) Pareto efficiency may not be a stable property; (ii) undomination with respect to income redistribution is a stable property whenever the marginal indirect utility of income has no extreme variations; and (iii) generically (endowment-wise) market-constrained efficiency is a stable property.     

Odd man out: the proposal-making model

The proposal-making model is applied to the class of three-player/three-cake problems. The set of subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs) and the limit set of SPE payoffs as the risk of breakdown vanishes is characterized. The necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness is derived. The results for the alternating offer model play an important role. The model always admits one stationary SPE and this equilibrium is related to a multilateral Nash solution. The stationary SPE is the coalition-proof SPE and the limit result differs from the result known for the model without risk of breakdown.     

Central Bank or Monetary Authority? Three Views on Money and Monetary Reform

The global financial crisis triggered profound changes in the conduct of monetary policy, with ultra‐low interest rates and asset purchases becoming the main policy tools. This represents a major shift towards interventionism that even ten years after the global financial crisis has not been reversed. In this article, I assess three views on money and monetary reform. I argue that a central bank regime with a narrow focus on refinancing property at market interest rates remains an attractive alternative to the current regime and provides an essential benchmark to assess the progress of monetary normalisation.     

Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures

We investigate how coordination requirement, measured by the coordination parameter, affects the occurrence of miscoordination-based bank runs in controlled laboratory environments. We identify an indeterminacy region of the coordination parameter such that games with the parameter within the region have varying coordination outcomes and exhibit persistent path dependence. Experimental economies with the parameter above (below) the region stay close or converge to the run (non-run) equilibrium. Switches between the two equilibria occur even with fixed economic fundamentals. The experimental results are well accounted for by a version of the evolutionary algorithm that uses experimentation rates estimated from the experimental data.     

Are “bounced check loans” really loans? Theory,evidence and policy

This research addresses the controversial bank policy of paying – rather than bouncing – overdrawn checks, debits or ATM withdrawals. We argue that it should fall under lending regulations only if consumers use the program to get intentional loans. In contrast, if the program primarily applies to checking account activity then it should fall under checking account regulations. A model of precautionary balance holding and checking account customer data are used to estimate the likelihood of overdrafting. Predicted overdrafts are compared to actual overdrafts to conclude that 79% are explained by the model and thus thought to be mistakes due to the stochastic nature of household expenditures.     

住房自有率与城市蔓延：理论与实证

通过构建一个包含住房租赁市场的封闭、单中心城市一般均衡模型,模型化了住房自有率与城市蔓延之间的关系,理论模型结论显示：首先,与自有住房者相比,租房者倾向于居住在离市中心较近的地方;其次,住房自有率的提高会使城市空间面积扩大,加剧城市蔓延。进一步,利用地级市数据分别对理论命题结论进行了检验,在比较充分地控制内生性问题后,实证结果证实了高住房自有率会加剧城市蔓延。因此,长期以来我国不断升高的住房自有率也是加剧我国城市蔓延的重要原因。     

VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF CONNINGa IN MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

Abstract The mathematization of economics is almost exclusively in terms of the mathematics of real analysis which, in turn, is founded on set theory (and the axiom of choice) and orthodox mathematical logic. In this paper I try to point out that this kind of mathematization is replete with economic infelicities. The attempt to extract these infelicities is in terms of three main examples and one general discussion: dynamics, policy and rational expectations and learning are the examples; a game theory without ‘subjectivism’, based on the axiom of determinateness, is discussed in general terms. The focus is on the role and reliance of standard fixed‐point theorems in orthodox mathematical economics.     

On existence in equilibrium models with endogenous default

The equilibrium concept defined by Dubey et al. ,  and  generates equilibria such that asset buyers could raise expected returns by paying more for the assets that they purchase. A simple example shows that, in fact, all equilibria may be return-dominated in that sense. Universal existence in the DGS model thus depends critically on the assumption that lenders are unable to exploit an obvious profit opportunity.     

动态能力视角下的商业银行战略转型与经营绩效关系的理论与实证研究——以浦发银行为例

动态能力是企业可持续竞争优势的来源,战略转型能力是一种整合、建立和再配置内外部资源的动态能力。为此,本文在构建动态能力与可持续竞争优势的关系模型的基础上,从我国商业银行成功转型会获得财务资源优势的角度出发,设计了衡量商业银行战略转型是否成功的理论分析模型。为验证其模型的客观性,选择中国浦发银行为案例研究对象,在分析研究浦发银行战略转型历程的基础上,运用因子分析法对浦发银行在2001～2009年的不同发展阶段的经营绩效进行分析总结,以验证评价其如何成功地实现战略转型。本文研究发现：企业想要了解其战略转型是否获得了由动态能力决定的持续竞争优势,可借助于衡量商业银行战略转型成功的理论分析模型;正确的战略转型有利于银行提高经营绩效;为此,银行需要继续有效地实施零售业务战略、强化银行内部治理机制改革和现代信息技术网络平台的建设,这是银行获得持续竞争优势的关键。     

On bank privatization: The case of Egypt

This paper discusses the controversy regarding the privatization of the banking sector in Egypt. It provides an overview of the structure and evolution of the banking system, in the context of the series of reform measures undertaken by the Egyptian authorities over the past decades. The paper assesses the performance of the state-owned banks versus private banks over the period 1995–2005. Microprudential indicators, such as capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, and profitability, reveal that state-owned banks lag behind in terms of efficiency and performance, compared to their private counterparts. Results also suggest that retaining government ownership can adversely affect banks performance. The paper explores the factors hindering the smooth implementation of bank privatization. The authors indicate that the financial sector reform currently adopted is comprehensive; however it is confronted with various political, social, and economic risks, which raise concerns regarding its sustainability. The paper then draws on the existing literature to provide guidance to policy makers, regarding effective and successful implementation of bank privatization.     

THE THEORY OF ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURES

Most market structures are neither perfectly or monopolistically competitive: they are characterized by a few large firms that are engaged in strategic interactions in their production and investment decisions and whose number is endogenous. The theory of endogenous market structures analyzes markets in partial and general equilibrium where strategies affect entry and entry affects strategies, and exogenous primitive conditions on technology and preferences affect the equilibrium. We discuss applications to industrial organization, international trade, business cycle theory, international finance, growth and implications for welfare and for competition, trade, fiscal and monetary policy.     

Can everyone benefit from innovation?

This paper investigates whether there is an allocation rule for which innovation never hurts anyone. Existing studies provide possibility characterizations together with efficiency and a natural participation constraint, assuming the domain of one input good and one output good in which nobody prefers to consume more of the input good than what she has. We show that this possibility result does not survive and we lead to impossibility either when (i) somebody wants to consume the input good more than what she has; or when (ii) there are multiple input goods.     

On the dimensionality of bounds generated by the Shapley–Folkman theorem

The Shapley–Folkman theorem places a scalar upper bound on the distance between a sum of non-convex sets and its convex hull. We observe that some information is lost when a vector is converted to a scalar to generate this bound and propose a simple normalization of the underlying space which mitigates this loss of information. As an example, we apply this result to the Anderson (1978) core convergence theorem, and demonstrate how our normalization leads to an intuitive, unitless upper bound on the discrepancy between an arbitrary core allocation and the corresponding competitive equilibrium allocation.     

Asset prices in an exchange economy when agents have heterogeneous homothetic recursive preferences and no risk free bond is available

We study a pure exchange economy under incomplete markets where households have heterogeneous homothetic recursive preferences and lending and borrowing are precluded. We fully characterize the properties of the efficient allocations and the equilibrium asset price. The ownership distribution dynamics reveal the emergence of a dominant agent, who after some finite time, remains the only investor that increases asset holdings until asymptotically owning the entire wealth. Investors can be ranked according to a unique parameter that aggregates agents’ preference characteristics and we show how time discount rate, attitude towards risk and intertemporal substitution contribute to capital accumulation.