Diagonal Merger

Diagonal merger combines the assets of an input supplier and a downstream rival of the input demander that does not use the input. Diagonal mergers are likely to be overlooked by federal antitrust authorities as they are neither vertical nor horizontal mergers. Diagonal mergers are shown to be nearly as anticompetitive as comparable horizontal mergers and, like horizontal mergers, the welfare effects of diagonal mergers are predicted in the first instance by a modified HHI calculation.     

The impact of firm cost and market size asymmetries on national mergers in a three-country model

This paper studies the impact of firm cost and market size asymmetries on merger decisions. I consider a model where a small and a large country compete in a third (world) market. Each of the two countries has two firms (with potentially different costs) that supply the domestic market and export to the third market. Merger decisions in the two countries are modeled as a simultaneously move game. The paper finds that firms in the large country have more incentives to merge than firms in the small country. In contrast, the government of the large country has more incentives to block a merger than the government of the small country. Thus, the model predicts that conflicts of interest between governments and firms concerning national mergers are more likely in large countries than in small ones.     

Using influence strategies to advance supplier delivery flexibility: The moderating roles of trust and shared vision

This study explores trust and shared vision moderate the relationship between the manufacturer's influence strategies and supplier delivery flexibility. The major components of this study are based on reviews of marketing research that focus on influence strategies and literature regarding supply chain flexibility. The results show that the request strategy has a negative effect on supplier delivery flexibility. The model predicts that trust and shared vision have an asymmetrical effect across recommendations, information exchange, and promises influence strategies. When the relationship contains a highly shared vision, a manufacturer's use of the recommendation influence strongly promotes supplier delivery flexibility, whereas the use of a promise strategy depresses supplier delivery flexibility. In contrast, an information exchange strategy will have a negative effect, but the promise strategy will have a positive effect on supplier delivery flexibility when trust is high. This paper contributes to guidelines for management on how to align their suppliers for delivery flexibility to respond quickly to customer demands.     

A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis

I analyze horizontal mergers in procurement settings in which sellers incur costs to participate. Considering existing sellers’ contest-level entry differs from antitrust authorities’ typical emphasis on new sellers’ market-level entry to counteract a merger’s anticompetitive harm. I show that profitable mergers can increase consumer and total surplus by inducing more and stronger contest-level entry by the merged seller, which echoes common claims from merging parties that their merger is beneficial because it creates a stronger competitor. This finding suggests caution by antitrust authorities: when contest-level entry costs matter, standard models that ignore those costs prescribe blocking procompetitive mergers.

     

Upstream Capacity Constraint and the Preservation of Monopoly Power in Private Bilateral Contracting

This article presents a model of private vertical contracting with a capacity constrained monopolistic supplier. I consider ‘full capacity beliefs’ that are consistent with an upstream capacity constraint and are ‘wary’ when the constraint is tight or production is costless. I show that, facing a capacity constraint, the supplier may preserve its monopoly power in equilibrium. This result stands in sharp contrast to the standard result that the supplier cannot preserve its monopoly power, which holds under the usual implicit assumption of an infinite production capacity.     

Upward pricing pressure as a predictor of merger price effects

We use Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate whether “upward pricing pressure” (UPP) accurately predicts the price effects of mergers, motivated by the observation that UPP is a restricted form of the first order approximation derived in Jaffe and Weyl (2013). Results indicate that UPP is quite accurate with standard log-concave demand systems, but understates price effects if demand exhibits greater convexity. Prediction error does not systematically exceed that of misspecified simulation models, nor is it much greater than that of correctly-specified models simulated with imprecise demand elasticities. The results also support that UPP provides accurate screens for anticompetitive mergers.     

LARGE IS BEAUTIFUL: HORIZONTAL MERGERS FOR BETTER EXPLOITATION OF PRODUCTION SHOCKS*

The profitability of horizontal mergers is investigated in a situation in which firms face a production shock and therefore are uncertain about their future costs. I show that, due to production rationalization, small‐scale mergers can be profitable if the uncertainty is large. The efficiency gain in production also implies benign welfare consequences. Under cost uncertainty, a profitable merger always improves social welfare if no more than half of the industry's firms are allowed to merge. Finally, I show that the incentives to merge depend on the information structure. Firms are less likely to merge when they possess more information.     

Leveraging supplier capabilities: The role of locus of capability deployment

This study adds to the resource‐based view by studying how client firms may gain performance benefits from supplier IT capabilities in market‐based arrangements where the supplier's IT capabilities are readily available to multiple client firms. I argue that the locus of supplier capability deployment, i.e. whether supplier capabilities are deployed at the client (in‐sourcing) or supplier (outsourcing), has implications for client firm performance. The findings show that in‐sourcing leads to complementary effects between supplier IT capabilities and client operational capabilities. In contrast, clients with weaker operational capabilities benefit from outsourcing the respective activity to the supplier, and may even be able to reduce their capability disadvantage through outsourcing. The data on 964 U.S. credit unions contracting with 22 technology solution providers is archival. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of supplier development on buyer competitive advantage: A path analytic model

As manufacturing firms increasingly realize that supplier performance is crucial to their establishing and maintaining competitive advantage, supplier development has been a subject of considerable research in supply chain management. We develop and test a path model to explore how supplier development practices affect buyer-supplier performance from the buying firm's perspective in the context of Hong Kong's electronics industry. The results show that top management, supplier evaluation, and supplier strategic objectives are significant determinants of transaction-specific supplier development, and that buyers that have closer collaborative relationships with suppliers may strengthen their competitive advantage.     

Fifty is the New Forty: EU Merger Policy Permits Higher Market Shares After the 2004 Reform

I analyze empirically all of the European Commission’s decisions regarding “unilateral effects” aspects of horizontal mergers before and after the 2004 reform, which introduced the “significant impediment to effective competition” test in merger policy. I find that, after the reform, the Commission did not change its stance toward mergers to monopoly or quasi-monopoly (almost always challenged) and mergers in un-concentrated markets (almost never). The new test produced more frequent challenges when the combined entity is not the largest firm, but these cases remain rare. The Commission’s stance toward mergers that fall between these polar opposites appears to have been tougher pre-reform ceteris paribus.     

How much you know versus how well I know you: selecting a supplier for a technically innovative component

How do firms select a supplier for an innovative component? Three literatures speak to this question. Transaction cost economics focuses on the value of internalization, the literature on inter‐firm relationships on the value of past relationships, and the firm capabilities literature on the value of superior capabilities. Choosing a supplier means choosing a bundle of these characteristics—internal vs. external, amount of prior transactions, and capabilities—but no study has integrated all three characteristics, making it impossible to understand the trade‐offs involved either theoretically or managerially. I propose and test a model integrating all three factors, allowing us to understand the trade‐offs involved. I find that when uncertainty is low, the decision is made primarily on the basis of differences in technical capabilities. As uncertainty increases, prior relationships and a supplier being internal take on greater positive significance relative to the importance of technical capabilities. At extreme levels of uncertainty, the value of internal supply relationships becomes very high and past relationships lose their significance. While adherents of each literature have criticized the others for what they omit, this model moves beyond this mutual recrimination by incorporating the key concerns of each literature, setting the stage for future research that draws upon the strength of each. The model provides guidance for any situation where a firm must chose a partner under uncertainty. Lastly, it addresses the strategic question of how companies should organize in the long run to access the capabilities needed for competitive success. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do Substantial Horizontal Mergers Generate Significant Price Effects? Evidence From The Banking Industry

This study examines the price effects of recent US bank mergers that substantially increased local market concentration. Using the deposit interest rates that banks offer their customers as our price measure, we find that, over the 1991–94 time period, deposit rates offered by participants in substantial horizontal mergers and their local market rivals declined by a greater percentage than did deposit rates offered by banks not operating in markets in which such mergers took place. We interpret our results as evidence that these mergers led to increased market power.     

SCREENING AND MERGER ACTIVITY*

In our paper, the target of a proposed merger, by setting a reserve price, is able to screen prospective acquirers according to their (expected) ability to generate merger‐specific synergies. Both empirical evidence and many merger models suggest that the difference between high and low‐synergy mergers becomes smaller during booms. Thus, a target's opportunity cost for sorting out relatively less fitting acquirers increases and, hence, targets screen less tightly during booms, which leads to a hike in merger activity. Our screening mechanism not only predicts that merger activity is intense during booms and subdued during recessions but is also consistent with other stylized facts about takeovers and generates novel testable predictions.     

Multilateral Vertical Contracting with an Alternative Supply: The Welfare Effects of a Ban on Price Discrimination

Rey and Tirole [Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam: Elsevier (2005)] considered a model in which a monopolist sells to downstream firms using nonlinear contracts. They showed that banning price discrimination fully restores the supplier’s ability to leverage its monopoly power by enabling it to commit not to offer side discounts. I show that the situation changes when the supplier competes against a fringe of less efficient rivals rather than being a monopolist. Then banning price discrimination may cause per-unit prices to fall and welfare to increase. The dominant supplier can take advantage of a strategic bargaining effect: reducing the per-unit price makes the outside option of buying from the fringe less profitable, allowing the dominant supplier to extract more bargaining surplus through the fixed fee.     

A New Retrospective on Mergers

This paper is based on my keynote address given at the 2006 International Industrial Organization Conference in Boston, April 8, 2006. I survey long-run trends in mergers, review the debate over the economic success of mergers generally, and examine the changing treatment that business schools have accorded mergers over the past five decades. A final section is a time series analysis of links at the U.S. macroeconomic level between changes in merger activity and labor productivity growth.     

Research notes and communications management objectives in mergers and acquisitions

A taxonomy of managerial goals in mergers and acquisitions is developed through a cluster analysis of data from interviews with merger and acquisition practitioners. These clusters of objectives overlap with some objectives cited for mergers and acquisitions in the academic literature, but the correspondence is not complete. Further analysis shows that different types of mergers and acquisitions are characterized by different managerial objectives. The implications of this research for the development of a contingency model of the relationship between managerial objectives and mergers and acquisitions are discussed.     

Power,buyer trustworthiness and supplier performance: Evidence from the Armenian dairy sector

The paper presents a Multiple Indicators and MultIple Causes (MIMIC) model for explaining the relationships between buyer-seller power, buyer trustworthiness and supplier satisfaction / performance. The model draws on an organizational supply chain perspective of power and is verified using data relating to dairy farmers’ relationships with their main buyer in Armenia. The analysis indicates that buyers are more trustworthy where there is greater competition for supplies. Buyer trustworthiness is also positively correlated with both the size of a supplier, as well as a supplier being a member of a marketing cooperative. Buyer trustworthiness has a positive impact on suppliers’ satisfaction (regarding their relationship with their main buyer) and enhances the quality and quantity of suppliers’ output.     

Endogenous Mergers of Complements with Mixed Bundling

This paper studies endogenous mergers of complements with mixed bundling, by allowing both for joint and separate consumption. After merger, partner firms decrease the price of the bundled system. In addition, when markets for individual components are sufficiently important, partner firms find it strategically advantageous to raise the prices of stand-alone products, thus making substitute ‘mix-and-match’ composite products less attractive to consumers. Even though these effects favor the profitability of mergers, merging is not always an equilibrium outcome. The reason is that outsiders respond by cutting their prices to retain their market share, and mergers can be unprofitable when competition is intense. From a welfare analysis, we observe that the number of mergers that are observed in equilibrium may be either excessive (when markets for individual components are important) or suboptimal (when markets for individual components are less important).