An Asymmetric Oligopolist can Improve Welfare by Raising Price

We demonstrate that, in Bertrand/Cournot equilibrium, a firm with a relatively small market share may improve social welfare by raising its price. This could be because the price increase can mitigate an output-structure distortion: if there are two goods which have the same marginal cost, then, under some conditions, the good in higher demand (the efficient good) will have a higher markup rate than the other good (the inefficient good). This suggests that the output structure is distorted in favor of the inefficient good, since the higher markup rate of the efficient good should lead to a considerable increase in demand for the inefficient good.     

A Theory of Economic Obsolescence

A new generation of durable goods makes an old generation economically, even if not physically, obsolete. Economic obsolescence due to technological innovation requires the durable goods monopolist to implement price discrimination in two dimensions, both between consumers with different valuations and between consumers with different purchase histories. Equilibrium in the game between the durable goods monopolist and consumers depends on the extent of economic obsolescence and the relative sizes of the consumer groups. Underinvestment in innovation may take place. This contrasts with the standard literature on planned obsolescence where the durable goods monopolist overinvests in durability reducing technology.     

Commitment and monopoly pricing in durable goods models

This article investigates the issue of commitment by a durable goods monopolist. Two models of the interaction between durability, recycling, and market power are compared. The two differ according to the ability of the seller to credibly commit to a given sales strategy. This article takes the standard durable goods monopoly model, extends it to allow for depreciation, and compares the monopoly markup with Swan's predicted markup for a recycled good. The difference between the two models is shown to reduce to a single parameter in the markup equation.     

质量规制有效性和消费者信任的市场均衡效应

产品质量规制有效性和消费者信任对市场均衡具有重要影响,引入预期产品质量水平和能够检测出假冒高质量产品概率两个变量,分别表示消费者对产品质量信任状况和产品质量规制有效性,研究产品质量规制有效性和消费者对产品质量信任对产品均衡价格和数量的影响.结果表明无论是国内市场还是出口市场,消费者对产品质量信任状况对高质量产品市场均衡价格和均衡数量都有正向影响;而质量规制有效性对高质量产品市场均衡价格有正向影响,对均衡数量有负向影响.     

Price and quality discrimination in durable goods monopoly with resale trading

We examine a durable goods monopolist’s optimal dynamic price and product quality strategy when buyers are rational and can trade used durables among themselves. In contrast to the usual credibility problem of the durable goods monopolist, intertemporal quality discrimination introduces a time-inconsistency problem of not raising prices against high-valuation consumers who delay purchase for quality upgrades. Resale trading ameliorates this time-inconsistency problem and allows the monopolist to effectively price discriminate, especially when the buyers are patient. The monopolist’s optimal price and quality offers in the new good market exhibit complex dynamic patterns, and new good prices can fall as product quality improves even in the absence of entry threats or learning economies. Initial quality distortions are followed by steady-state quality allocations that are always efficient for the high-valuation buyers, but sometimes also for the marginal consumer-types. Both the resale trading frequency and the price discount for secondhand goods are driven by the pace of strategic quality obsolescence in the new good market.     

Bundling of substitutes or complements

The Adams-Yellen two good bundling framework is generalized to allow the goods to be substitutes or complements. General theorems on price change effects are given. A monopolist may find it most profitable to offer the goods only as a bundle, even if they are (imperfect) substitutes, or to not bundle the goods, even if they are complements. If one good is competitively sold, a monopoly producer of the other good can never increase profits by offering his good only as part of a bundle. However, such a monopolist might profitably offer his good in both bundled and unbundled form to price discriminate, even if the two goods are substitutes.     

One Monopoly Is Better Than Two: Antitrust Policy and Microsoft

The Department of Justice recent case against Microsoft is that it should not be allowed to aggressively maintain control over the internet browser market with the objective of preventing the internet from becoming the platform that could ultimately destroy Microsoft's operating system market. The aim of this paper is not to attack the Department of Justice case. Rather, it is to argue that for consumers one monopoly dominating both the operating system and applications is better than two separate monopolies. In our model we integrate Cournot's theory of two goods that are jointly used in the production of a third composite good with the fixed-proportion model. Utilizing our model we develop a possible explanation for Microsoft's actions – protection of its monopoly profits in the operating systems package market. Additionally we show that the price of the final product is lower if one firm monopolizes all markets. Consequently, the ordered split-up of Microsoft by Judge Thomas P. Jackson, aiming at creating two separate companies, one that will produce the windows and the other the operating systems, will harm consumers.     

Pricing and Product Positioning with Relative Consumer Preferences*

Frequent price promotions force consumers to continuously reassess their preferences over product offerings. When this leads consumers to exhibit a bias of “relative thinking”, such as may be triggered by a focus only on the most salient product attribute, we show in a model of sales (Varian, H. R., 1980, American Economic Review, 70(4), pp. 651–659) that this profoundly alters firms' pricing and product-positioning strategies. Vertical differentiation becomes more likely, with firms preferring to occupy the low-quality space in particular when they have few loyal consumers. More generally, product positioning now depends on the composition of consumers' consideration sets.     

Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Frictionless Durable Goods Monopolies

I show that small differences in quality and production costs between durables and non-durables in a product line allow a durable goods monopolist to intertemporally price discriminate even with continuous trading. In particular, a monopolist would want to both sell and rent out a durable to achieve price discrimination. This incentive to price discriminate simultaneously creates inefficient delay in the sale of the durable good, a finite trading period and long run efficiency of the market. The Coase conjecture fails because the non-durable good acts as an outside option that guarantees a minimum profit in the market for durables.     

Interfirm Bundled Discounts as a Collusive Device

This paper investigates whether and how firms competing in price with homogeneous goods (i.e., Bertrand competitors) can achieve supernormal profits using interfirm bundled discounts. By committing to offering price discounts conditional on the purchase of a specific brand of other differentiated good, the homogeneous good suppliers can separate consumers into distinct groups. Such brand‐specific discounts help the firms relax competition and attain a collusive outcome. Consumers become worse off due to higher effective prices. Our result shows that in oligopolies it is feasible to leverage other's market power without excluding rivals.     

Do Conspicuous Consumers Pay Higher Housing Premiums? Spatial and Temporal Variation in the United States

This study is the first to examine the relationship between conspicuous demand and housing price dynamics. We hypothesize that conspicuous consumers would want high‐end homes to signal their wealth and this housing consumption behavior would induce greater deviations from fundamental house prices. We test this by using a unique dataset that matches the consumers’ appetite for nonhousing luxury goods from Google Insights for Search to housing premiums that they pay for high‐end houses in U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) during 2004–2011. The estimation results demonstrate that controlling for a wide range of MSA demographic and economic characteristics, conspicuous demand has a significant, positive relationship with housing premiums. This relationship varies spatially and temporally. Conspicuous demand has a stronger relationship with a price increase in high‐end homes in MSAs with a steady, higher housing premium than in MSAs with a volatile, lower premium during the boom period. In MSAs with a steady, higher housing premium, the relationship remains significant even during the bust period, potentially contributing to maintaining higher housing premiums.     

Personalized pricing and price fairness

Mobile web technology enables discriminatory, or personalized, pricing for many more consumer good categories than has traditionally been the case. Setting prices according to individual valuations, however, generates adverse consumer reaction unless consumers are invited to participate in the price-formation process. Consumer perceptions of price fairness are key to the sustainability of any discriminatory pricing regime. Perceptions of price fairness, in turn, are hypothesized to be shaped by “self-interested inequity aversion” in which prices tend to be regarded as unfair, and purchase probabilities fall, if others are perceived to pay a lower price, while prices tend to be regarded as more fair, and consumers more likely to purchase, if inequity is in the buyers favor. Our experimental data also shows that the implications of inequity aversion for sellers can be at least partially reversed if consumers are allowed to participate in the price-formation process by negotiating the price they pay. The primary implication of our findings is that, in order to be viable, any system of discriminatory pricing for consumer goods should invite consumers to have a stake in the price they pay. Such participatory pricing may provide one way out of the current trap of Hi–Lo, or promotional, pricing that neither retailers nor manufacturers regard as sustainable.     

Underpromise and overdeliver? - Online product reviews and firm pricing

We consider a signaling model capturing the introductory and the mature phase of a product. Information concerning product quality is transmitted between consumers through reviews, which partially depend on the expectations consumers had prior to their purchase. When future sales are sufficiently important, a novel tension arises: High-quality types may want to underpromise and overdeliver by imitating low types in order to get a better review. We show the existence of a Pareto-improving separating equilibrium. Both more informative reviews and price transparency can lead to higher prices. Our analysis reveals a new rationale for loss-leadership.     

Selling Time and Selling Price: The Influence of Seller Motivation

We consider the role that seller motivation plays in determining selling time, list price and sale price. A new survey of home sellers suggests that sellers are heterogeneous in their motivation to sell. Our findings are that a seller who, at the time of listing, has a planned date to move sells more quickly than one who does not. Also, the shorter the planned time until a move at the time of listing, the shorter the actual duration of marketing time. We find that seller motivation affects sale price, but not the list-price markup. Our results suggest that theoretical models of the housing search process should be recast to allow for heterogeneous sellers.     

Local measured telephone service in the USA: A quantitative analysis

The USA has steadfastly held to a flat rate for local telephone service, whereas most other countries are characterized by a user-sensitive (measured service) system of pricing. Economic theory suggests some method of measured service pricing more accurately reflects the true costs of local service. This article seeks to determine how many US consumers could be induced to switch to measured service pricing, and using ordinary least squares, derives a model of the demand for measured service. The factors are identified that will induce the US population to move towards a measured service rate structure. The findings indicate that consumers are quite responsive to both relative price (between a local flat rate and a measured service rate) and advertising.     

Common Knowledge Reference Price and Asymmetric Price Adjustments

There is abundant empirical evidence showing that asymmetric price adjustments exist in a wide variety of markets. Prices tend to rise faster when costs rise, relative to the rate at which prices drop when costs fall. This paper argues that a common knowledge reference price—a government suggested retail price—eases the existence of asymmetric price adjustments in a scenario where costs are ever-increasing. Our analysis of the Colombian retail gasoline market suggests that when costs rise by more than the reference price, prices tend to rise more slowly relative to when costs grow by less than the reference price.     

List Prices,Sale Prices and Marketing Time: An Application to U.S. Housing Markets

Many goods are marketed after first stating a list price, with the expectation that the eventual sales price will differ. In this article, we first present a simple model of search behavior that includes the seller setting a list price. Holding constant the mean of the buyers’ distribution of potential offers for a good, we assume that the greater the list price, the slower the arrival rate of offers but the greater is the maximal offer. This trade‐off determines the optimal list price, which is set simultaneously with the seller's reservation price. Comparative statics are derived through a set of numerical sensitivity tests, where we show that the greater the variance of the distribution of buyers’ potential offers, the greater is the ratio of the list price to expected sales price. Thus, sellers of atypical goods will tend to set a relatively high list price compared with standard goods. We test this hypothesis using data from the Columbus, Ohio, housing market and find substantial support. We also find empirical support for another hypothesis of the model: atypical dwellings take longer to sell.     

Price promotions in emerging markets

How should price promotion strategies be modified in an emerging market (e.g., India, China) compared to those employed in developed markets (e.g., USA, Canada)? Specifically, how should the presence of middle-class consumers with limited ability to pay, prevalent in an emerging market, influence the depth and frequency of price promotions offered by competing firms? Lay intuition suggests that firms should promote more frequently and offer deeper discounts in emerging markets, in order to effectively sell to limited income, middle-class consumers. We construct a theoretical model that investigates the effect of the middle-class segment on firms' price promotion strategies. Contrary to lay intuition, our analysis reveals precisely the opposite results. First, price promotions offered in an emerging market (with middle-class consumers) are shallower than those offered in a developed market (without middle-class consumers). Second, relatively deep price promotions occur less frequently in an emerging market, compared to a developed market. These theoretical findings are consistent with the empirical evidence we gathered from the supermarkets in India and in Canada.     

Regulatory bias in the price structure of local telephone service

This article combines a discrete choice model of demand for residential local telephone access and an optimal price regulation model to estimate the welfare weights that state regulators implicitly place on consumers with different incomes and locations. I find no evidence of a bias towards rural consumers on average, but the relative weight on low income consumers in a geographic area can vary as a function of the proportions of rural and poor population and the political characteristics of the regulator. I also measure the welfare consequences of deviating from total consumer surplus maximization and disconnecting prices from costs.