Environmental regulations in private and mixed duopolies: Taxes on emissions versus green R&D subsidies

In this article, we compare two kinds of environmental regulations—emissions taxes and green R&D subsidies—in private and mixed-duopoly markets in the presence of R&D spillovers. We show that a green R&D subsidy is better (worse) than an emissions tax when the green R&D is efficient (inefficient), irrespective of R&D spillovers, whereas the existence of a publicly owned firm encourages the government to adopt a subsidy policy. We also show that the optimal policy choice depends on R&D efficiency and spillovers. In particular, when green R&D is inefficient and the spillover rate is low (high), the government should choose an emissions tax and (not) privatize the state-owned firm. When green R&D is efficient, however, an R&D subsidy is better, but a privatization policy is not desirable for society, irrespective of spillovers.     

TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PUBLIC ABATEMENT, AND WELFARE

This paper discusses public abatement financed by pollution tax revenue or tariff revenue and investigates the welfare consequences of a tariff. The main result of this paper is that under certain conditions a tariff reduction results in an improvement in welfare through an increase in public abatement and a decrease in pollution. This result may guide policy for countries that wish to harmonize trade liberalization and the environmental protection demonstrated by both the private and the public sectors.     

Abatement,R&D and growth with a pollution ceiling

The consequences of the 2 °C climate target and the implicitly imposed ceiling on CO₂ have been analyzed in several studies. We use an endogenous growth model with a ceiling and an abatement option to study the effect of the ceiling on the allocation of limited funds for R&D, abatement and capital accumulation. It is found that the advantagenousness of abatement rises with the cost advantage of fossil fuel versus backstop. If the cost advantage is sufficiently large at some point in time it outweighs the costs of abatement and the gains of R&D and capital accumulation. The reallocation of production towards abatement may cause an increase or decrease in long-run consumption. In the latter case, abatement allows an intertemporal consumption trade-off which may even justify the disregard of everlasting growth. In case of stock dependent fossil fuel costs, an abatement induced speed-up of technology development may cause an increase in fossil fuel stock left in situ.     

Environmental R&D and privatization in a mixed duopoly market

The study examines strategic environmental research and development (ER&D) under environmental tax in a mixed duopoly and further analyzes the impact of privatization on it. We show that the environmental tax may not necessarily promote the private (or public) firm's ER&D, and the relative ER&D performance between firms depends on the public firm's environmental attitudes and the tax rate. When the public firm cares much for environment, it can be used as an instrument to correct the private firm's underinvestment (or overinvestment) in ER&D. Moreover, privatization can (cannot) raise both firms' ER&D simultaneously if the tax rate is high (low).     

Regulation of road accident externalities when insurance companies have market power

Accident externalities that individual drivers impose on one another via their presence on the road are among the most important external costs of road transport. We study the regulation of these externalities when insurance companies have market power. Some of the results we derive have close resemblance to the earlier literature on externality regulation with market power in aviation and private roads, but there are important differences, too. Using analytical models, we compare the first-best public welfare-maximizing outcome with a private profit-maximizing monopoly, and oligopoly. We find that insurance companies will internalize some of the externalities, depending on their degree of market power. We derive optimal insurance premiums, and regular parametric taxes as well as “manipulable” ones that make the companies set socially optimal premiums. The latter take into account that the firm tries to exploit knowledge of the tax rule applied by the government. Finally, we also study the taxation of road users rather than that of firms.     

What is the potential impact of a taxation system reform on carbon abatement and industrial growth in China?

Economists have long argued that market-based environmental policy such as an environmental tax is beneficial to abate pollution emissions. This study aims at investigating the impact of carbon tax levy on carbon dioxide (CO₂) abatement and industrial growth in China. To this end, the marginal abatement cost (MAC) of industrial CO₂ emissions is estimated as the benchmark of setting the carbon tax rate by using the directional distance function (DDF). This paper employs the polynomial dynamic panel model to forecast the impact of carbon tax levy on target variables such as sectoral value-added and CO₂ intensity. The results reveal that the levy of a CO₂ tax has a negative impact on industrial output only in the short term. In the long term, the impact of CO₂ tax levy on output will become positive. The levy of a CO₂ tax is always beneficial to reduce CO₂ intensity. Corresponding policy suggestions for an environmental taxation system reform are given in the concluding section.     

TAX REVENUE-FINANCED PUBLIC ABATEMENT AND WELFARE: A CONSUMPTION TAX CASE

This paper develops a model of public abatement financed either by a pollution tax or by a consumption tax. It shows that consumption tax revenue-financed public abatement raises welfare more than pollution tax revenue-financed public abatement does when the pollution tax rate rises. This result is worthwhile for environmental protection policy makers when they are determining the revenue source of public abatement.     

Innovation dynamics and fiscal policy: Implications for growth,asset prices,and welfare

We study the equilibrium implications of different fiscal policies on macroeconomic quantities and welfare by utilizing an endogenous growth model that matches asset pricing data well. The fiscal instruments of interest are (i) subsidies to R&D expenditure, consumption and capital investment, and (ii) cuts in labor and corporate tax rates. Our equilibrium analysis provides new insights on the interplay of innovation dynamics and fiscal policy. Importantly, we find growth and welfare to be inversely related when changing R&D subsidies. However, this depends on how well the model reproduces asset pricing dynamics. Moreover, only subsidies to capital investments and cuts in the corporate tax rate have the potential to increase both growth and welfare.     

A NOTE ON TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PUBLIC ABATEMENT, AND WELFARE

This paper extends Haibara (2006) in order to focus on the welfare consequences of a pollution tax and foreign aid financed for public abatement. The main finding is that environmental protection as a result of increasing a pollution tax by the aid recipient increases the optimal value of foreign aid chosen by the donor and reduces that of a tariff chosen by the recipient. This implies that international environmental cooperation is possible between the donor and the recipient.     

Pollution,mortality and time consistent abatement taxes

We study dynamically consistent policy in a neoclassical overlapping generations growth model where pollution externalities undermine health but are mitigated via tax-financed abatement. With arbitrarily constant taxation, two steady states arise: an unstable ‘poverty trap’ and a ‘neoclassical’ steady state near which the dynamics might either be monotonically convergent or oscillating. When the planner chooses a time consistent abatement path that maximizes a weighted intergenerational sum of expected utility, the optimal tax is zero at low levels of capital and then a weakly increasing function of the capital stock. The non-homogeneity of the tax function along with its feedback effect on savings induces additional steady states, stability reversals and oscillations.     

Macroeconomic effects of R&D tax credits on small and medium enterprises

Research and development (R&D) is regarded as a core factor for the long-run performance of both large enterprises (LEs) and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This paper analyzes the economic effects of R&D tax credits by firm size. It mainly aims to compare the results of tax policies oriented towards LEs to those towards SMEs. In order to estimate the impact numerically, we use a computable general equilibrium model, which incorporates some essential characteristics of knowledge. First, we introduce a social accounting matrix that differentiates between SMEs and LEs in manufacturing industries. Then, a knowledge-based macroeconomic model estimates outcomes for policy scenarios regarding tax incentives. The results show that SMEs support more rapid growth than do LEs when the same volume of tax credits is offered to both enterprise types. We suggest that the intensity of knowledge spillovers induced by SMEs is driving this result.     

Monopoly Manacles the Capital Market

The 'political' purpose of privatisation has been said to be to raise finance to offset government borrowing and to facilitate tax reduction. Cento Veljanovski, of University College, London, argues that the essential aim is rather to change from state monopoly to private competition, butthat the maintenance of monopoly inhibits this market process.     

Effects of international sharing of pollution abatement burdens on income inequality among countries

Improvements in environmental quality will boost output production and hence economic growth. However, although environmental abatement equally benefits all economies in the world, it is shown that, if the private productive resources are not yet accumulated sufficiently in low income economies, income inequality among economies can be widened in the short term not only under equal burden sharing of pollution abatement but even under income-proportional burden sharing. When the marginal productivity is diminishing, the negative effect of the burden is large relative to the positive effect of the improved environment in economies in which resources are not accumulated sufficiently.     

Carbon taxes and the double dividend hypothesis in a recursive-dynamic CGE model for Spain

A carbon tax is potentially a policy that can reduce CO₂ emissions and mitigate climate risks, at lowest economy-wide costs. We develop a dynamic CGE model for Spain to assess the economic and environmental effects of a carbon tax, and test the double dividend (DD) hypothesis. We simulate the impact of three carbon taxes: €10, €20 and €30 per ton of CO₂. For each tax, four ‘revenue recycling’ scenarios are examined: a reduction of taxes on capital, on labor, on value-added tax, and a scenario in which revenues are not recycled. We find a DD for taxes of €10/ton and lower, within five to seven years of implementation. We estimate an annual CO₂ emissions reduction of around 10% with this tax. Under some circumstances, the DD can be achieved for a tax of €20/ton. In any case, recycling revenues to cut pre-existing taxes reduces costs of imposing carbon taxes.     

Regulating a Manager‐controlled Natural Monopoly with Unknown Costs

We study the regulation of a manager‐controlled natural monopoly with unknown costs, borrowing from Baron and Myerson (BM) (1982), where the monopoly is controlled by the owner. We consider the case where the regulator can tax the owner as well as the case where she cannot. We find that the optimal price schedule generally lies below the one in the BM model and that it can be as low as the marginal cost if the compensation parameter is sufficiently small and the regulator cannot tax the monopoly owner. We also identify the cases where the monopoly owner prefers to delegate the control to a manager. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of intellectual property rights and patented knowledge in innovation and industry value added: A multinational empirical analysis of different industries

Technological innovation drives long-term economic growth, so most countries attempt to provide an innovation-friendly environment that includes tightening protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). However, debate continues on whether strengthened IPR lead to technological development and economic growth: patents promote innovation by protecting appropriation from invention and disclosing knowledge to the public, but they also create excessive monopoly power that may impede further innovation.Using simultaneous equations with cross-country panel data from 12 countries and 3 industries (chemical, electronic, machinery), we estimated the direct effect of IPR on industry value added and the indirect effect of it through enhanced research and development (R&D). The bilateral role of IPR, as measured by patented knowledge, was used to distinguish different characteristics of industries as well as the positive and negative effects of IPR on innovation.Results suggest that IPR generally enhance industry value added, but the positive effect is mitigated with increased enforcement of IPR. Also, IPR enhanced R&D but showed a negative relationship with patented knowledge, suggesting that excessive propertization of knowledge may hinder sequential innovation. The positive role of IPR on R&D predominated in the chemical (discrete) industry and exerted negative effects in the electronic and machinery (complex) industries.     

On optimal regulation of price and R&D with asymmetric information

This paper deals with the optimal regulation for cost-reducing R&D and pricing in natural monopoly that is privately informed on its efficiency. We extend the work of Cantner and Kuhn (Rev Econ Des 4:191–204, 1999) and then we are able to analyse the entire effects of the interplay between agent’s efficiency and investment in R&D particularly considering the substitutability case.     

State-imposed solutions to negative externalities: employment impact of pollution abatement policy

Musgrave was acutely aware that many private activities, both consumption and production, generate negative externalities. Advocates for an active government rely on this concept to justify public sector regulation of private activities. Regulations and mandates, along with penalties for non-compliance, are the primary instruments used by government to bring about the “correct” level of output whenever private output gives rise to negative externalities such as environmental pollution. This study in effect offers a case study of the Clean Air Act on employment, i.e., it empirically investigates whether pollution abatement costs have had a negative impact on manufacturing employment in the U.S. Conventional microeconomic theory suggests that there is a trade-off between environmental protection outlays and manufacturing activity, i.e., higher pollution abatement compliance costs borne by industries may contribute to plant shutdowns, lower production levels and lay-offs, and/or lack of investment, thereby leading to diminished manufacturing employment. Existing studies fail to offer a clear conclusion as to the impact of existing environmental protection measures on manufacturing activity. Using state-level data for 2001, this study finds that government-imposed pollution abatement costs have had a statistically significant negative impact on manufacturing employment in the U.S. Richard J. Cebula, Shirley and Philip Solomons Eminent Scholar.     

The effect of R&D novelty and openness decision on firms' catch-up performance: Empirical evidence from China

This paper explores the strategic dimensions of R&D decisions toward novelty and openness in explaining the performance of latecomer firms in a developing economy. A structural equation model of R&D decision-making is formulated using survey data from 279 Chinese firms. The dimension of R&D novelty is defined as the degree of technological newness found in firms' R&D projects, while R&D openness describes the degree to which technologies are acquired from external sources. Our results indicate that firms' R&D decisions regarding novelty and openness are associated with demand opportunities, market competition, technological capability, and external networks. Greater R&D novelty contributes positively to innovative output but does not affect sales growth. Greater R&D openness contributes positively to sales growth but negatively to innovative output.     

Fiscal centralization versus decentralization: Growth and welfare effects of spillovers, Leviathan taxation, and capital mobility

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods, Leviathan taxation, and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare. We show that a decentralized system dominates a centralized system in terms of economic growth; however, the difference in social welfare between a decentralized and a centralized system is non-monotonic and displays a hump-shaped relationship with respect to capital mobility. Since higher capital mobility induces stronger tax competition, this finding implies that there is an optimal degree of tax competition; some tax competition is desirable, but fierce tax competition may be harmful. We also show that there is a critical level of spillovers of public goods above which centralization dominates decentralization in terms of social welfare, as in previous studies; however, if spillovers are below this critical level, capital mobility also matters in the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized systems.