Efficient forecast tests for conditional policy forecasts

Central Banks regularly make forecasts, such as the Fed’s Greenbook forecast, that are conditioned on hypothetical paths for the policy interest rate. While there are good public policy reasons to evaluate the quality of such forecasts, up until now, the most common approach has been to ignore their conditional nature and apply standard forecast efficiency tests. In this paper we derive tests for the efficiency of conditional forecasts. Intuitively, these tests involve implicit estimates of the degree to which the conditioning path is counterfactual and the magnitude of the policy feedback over the forecast horizon. We apply the tests to the Greenbook forecast and the Bank of England’s inflation report forecast, finding some evidence of forecast inefficiency. Nonetheless, we argue that the conditional nature of the forecasts made by central banks represents a substantial impediment to the analysis of their quality—stronger assumptions are needed and forecast inefficiency may go undetected for longer than would be the case if central banks were instead to report unconditional forecasts.     

Central bank’s forecasts and lack of transparency: An assessment of the effect on private expectations in a large emerging economy

We analyze whether the Central Bank of Brazil’s Inflation Reports projections influences the private’s inflation expectations. Specifically, we investigate how the central bank’s inflation forecasts affect the private sector’s inflation expectations through a qualitative and quantitative examination of the disagreement measure between them. Furthermore, we appraise if the lack of transparency resulting from the difference between the central bank’s inflation forecasts and the realized inflation affects the private’s inflation expectations. Although the findings confirm the previous studies that point out that the central bank transparency can affect the readjustment of market expectations, the results do not rule out the possibility of the central bank’s forecast and private’s inflation expectations being affected reciprocally.     

Do precious metal prices help in forecasting South African inflation?

In this paper we test whether the key metals prices of gold and platinum significantly improve inflation forecasts for the South African economy. We also test whether controlling for conditional correlations in a dynamic setup, using bivariate Bayesian-Dynamic Conditional Correlation (B-DCC) models, improves inflation forecasts. To achieve this we compare out-of-sample forecast estimates of the B-DCC model to Random Walk, Autoregressive and Bayesian VAR models. We find that for both the BVAR and BDCC models, improving point forecasts of the Autoregressive model of inflation remains an elusive exercise. This, we argue, is of less importance relative to the more informative density forecasts. For this we find improved forecasts of inflation for the B-DCC models at all forecasting horizons tested. We thus conclude that including metals price series as inputs to inflation models leads to improved density forecasts, while controlling for the dynamic relationship between the included price series and inflation similarly leads to significantly improved density forecasts.     

Forecasting inflation with online prices

Are survey-based forecasts unbeatable? They are not. This paper uses online price indices to forecast the Consumer Price Index. We find that online price indices anticipate changes in official inflation trends more than one month in advance. Our baseline one-month forecast outperforms Bloomberg surveys of forecasters, which only predict the contemporaneous inflation rate. Our baseline specification also outperforms statistical benchmark forecasts for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Similarly, our quarterly forecast for the US inflation rate substantially outperforms the Survey of Professional Forecasters.     

Does Forecast Combination Improve Norges Bank Inflation Forecasts?*

We develop a system that provides model‐based forecasts for inflation in Norway. We recursively evaluate quasi out‐of‐sample forecasts from a large suite of models from 1999 to 2009. The performance of the models are then used to derive quasi real time weights that are used to combine the forecasts. Our results indicate that a combination forecast improves upon the point forecasts from individual models. Furthermore, a combination forecast outperforms Norges Bank's own point forecast for inflation. The beneficial results are obtained using a trimmed weighted average. Some degree of trimming is required for the combination forecasts to outperform the judgmental forecasts from the policymaker.     

Inflation forecasts and core inflation measures: Where is the information on future inflation?

This paper uses the forecast from a random walk model of inflation as a benchmark to test and compare the forecast performance of several alternatives of future inflation, including the Greenbook forecast by the Fed staff, the Survey of Professional Forecasters median forecast, CPI inflation minus food and energy, CPI weighted median inflation, and CPI trimmed mean inflation. The Greenbook forecast was found in previous literature to be a better forecast than other private sector forecasts. Our results indicate that both the Greenbook and the Survey of Professional Forecasters median forecasts of inflation and core inflation measures may contain better information than forecasts from a random walk model. The Greenbook's superiority appears to have declined against other forecasts and core inflation measures.     

Kernel-based calibration diagnostics for recession and inflation probability forecasts

A probabilistic forecast is the estimated probability with which a future event will occur. One interesting feature of such forecasts is their calibration, or the match between the predicted probabilities and the actual outcome probabilities. Calibration has been evaluated in the past by grouping probability forecasts into discrete categories. We show here that we can do this without discrete groupings; the kernel estimators that we use produce efficiency gains and smooth estimated curves relating the predicted and actual probabilities. We use such estimates to evaluate the empirical evidence on the calibration error in a number of economic applications, including the prediction of recessions and inflation, using both forecasts made and stored in real time and pseudo-forecasts made using the data vintage available at the forecast date. The outcomes are evaluated using both first-release outcome measures and subsequent revised data. We find substantial evidence of incorrect calibration in professional forecasts of recessions and inflation from the SPF, as well as in real-time inflation forecasts from a variety of output gap models.     

Raiders of the lost high-frequency forecasts: New data and evidence on the efficiency of the Fed's forecasting

We introduce a new dataset of real gross domestic product (GDP) growth and core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation forecasts produced by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In contrast to the eight Greenbook forecasts a year the staff produce for Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, our dataset has roughly weekly forecasts. We use these data to study whether the staff forecasts efficiently. Prespecified regressions of forecast errors on forecast revisions show the staff's GDP forecasts exhibit time-varying inefficiency between FOMC meetings, and also show some evidence for inefficient inflation forecasts.     

How reliable are forecasts of GDP growth and inflation for countries with limited coverage?

This paper analyses the performance of GDP growth and inflation forecasts for 25 transition countries between 1994 and 2007, as provided by 13 international institutions, including multilateral, private and academic forecasters. The empirical results show that there is a positive correlation between the number of forecasters covering a given country and the forecast accuracy. Simple combined forecasts are shown to be unbiased and more accurate than most of the individual forecasters, although also inefficient. However, only a few institutions provide efficient and unbiased forecasts, with just one out of 13 forecasters providing both unbiased and efficient forecasts of both GDP growth and inflation in the observed period. The directional analysis shows a correct forecast of the change in the forecast indicator in over two thirds of cases. However, the eventual outcome is within the range of available forecasts in less than half of the cases, with more than 40% of outcomes for GDP growth above the highest forecast. Encouragingly, forecasts are shown to be improving over time and becoming more accurate with the increase in the number of forecasting institutions – forecast accuracy measured by mean absolute error improves by 0.3 percentage points for growth and by 0.2 percentage points for inflation for each additional institution providing forecasts.     

Forecast revisions of Mexican inflation and GDP growth

We analyze the forecasts of inflation and GDP growth contained in the Banco de México’s Survey of Professional Forecasters for the period 1995–2009. The forecasts are for the current and the following year, and comprise an unbalanced three-dimensional panel with multiple individual forecasters, target years, and forecast horizons. The fixed-event nature of the forecasts enables us to examine their efficiency by looking at the revision process. The panel structure allows us to control for aggregate shocks and to construct a measure of the news that impacted expectations in the period under study. We find that respondents anchor to their initial forecasts, updating their revisions smoothly as they receive more information. In addition, they do not seem to use publicly-known information in an efficient manner. These inefficiencies suggest clear areas of opportunity for improving the accuracy of the forecasts, for instance by taking into account the positive autocorrelation found in forecast revisions.     

Forecasting the UK economy with a medium-scale Bayesian VAR

We estimate a Bayesian VAR (BVAR) for the UK economy and assess its performance in forecasting GDP growth and CPI inflation in real time relative to forecasts from COMPASS, the Bank of England’s DSGE model, and other benchmarks. We find that the BVAR outperformed COMPASS when forecasting both GDP and its expenditure components. In contrast, their performances when forecasting CPI were similar. We also find that the BVAR density forecasts outperformed those of COMPASS, despite under-predicting inflation at most forecast horizons. Both models over-predicted GDP growth at all forecast horizons, but the issue was less pronounced in the BVAR. The BVAR’s point and density forecast performances are also comparable to those of a Bank of England in-house statistical suite for both GDP and CPI inflation, as well as to the official Inflation Report projections. Our results are broadly consistent with the findings of similar studies for other advanced economies.     

Do survey joiners and leavers differ from regular participants? The US SPF GDP growth and inflation forecasts

If ‘learning by doing’ is important for macro-forecasting, newcomers might be different from regular, established participants. Stayers may also differ from the soon-to-leave. We test these conjectures for macro-forecasters’ point predictions of output growth and inflation, and for their histogram forecasts. Histogram forecasts of inflation by both joiners and leavers are found to be less accurate, especially if we suppose that joiners take time to learn. For GDP growth, there is no evidence of differences between the groups in terms of histogram forecast accuracy, although GDP point forecasts by leavers are less accurate. These findings are predicated on forecasters being homogeneous within groups. Allowing for individual fixed effects suggests fewer differences, including leavers’ inflation histogram forecasts being no less accurate.     

Are Weekly Inflation Forecasts Informative?*

Are weekly inflation forecasts informative? Although several central banks review and discuss monetary policy issues on a bi‐weekly basis, there have been no attempts by analysts to construct systematic estimates of core inflation that supports such a decision‐making schedule. The timeliness of news releases are recognized to be an important information source in real‐time estimation. We incorporate real‐time information from macroeconomic releases and revisions into our weekly updates of monthly Swiss core inflation using a common factor procedure. The weekly estimates for Swiss core inflation show that it is worthwhile to update the forecast at least twice a month.     

Forecasting economic activity with mixed frequency BVARs

Mixed frequency Bayesian vector autoregressions (MF-BVARs) allow forecasters to incorporate large numbers of time series that are observed at different intervals into forecasts of economic activity. This paper benchmarks the performances of MF-BVARs for forecasting U.S. real gross domestic product growth against surveys of professional forecasters and documents the influences of certain specification choices. We find that a medium–large MF-BVAR provides an attractive alternative to surveys at the medium-term forecast horizons that are of interest to central bankers and private sector analysts. Furthermore, we demonstrate that certain specification choices influence its performance strongly, such as model size, prior selection mechanisms, and modeling in levels versus growth rates.     

Why big fiscal deficits and low inflation can coexist

• ▀ The surge in government debt caused by ballooning fiscal deficits is a necessary response to the coronavirus crisis. But we doubt this will lead to a burst of inflation in the advanced economies (AEs), let alone a debt crisis.
• ▀ Our fiscal forecasts assume AEs’ budget deficits averaged 20% of GDP or so in Q2. However, our deficit forecasts point to a sharp narrowing thereafter and for public debt as a share of GDP to peak in 2021.
• ▀ The risks around this forecast skew firmly towards deficits remaining wide, reflecting the balance of risks around our GDP forecasts and the possibility that governments allow some fiscal slippage.
• ▀ A slower narrowing of fiscal deficits than we forecast wouldn't automatically lead to a period of above-target inflation. Indeed, we wouldn't be surprised if larger-than-expected deficits were associated with weak inflation.
• ▀ High levels of corporate debt and weak labour markets raise the risk of private sector retrenchment ahead. In that case, large and sustained fiscal deficits may be needed to fill the vacuum and prevent GDP and inflation from falling. As has been the case in Japan over the past 25 years, large deficits over coming years could be associated with weak GDP growth and below-target inflation.
• ▀ If economies begin to overheat but governments keep fiscal policy loose, inflation could, of course, pick up. But central bank tightening would offset it. We believe the risk of sustained inflation overshoots is limited unless monetary policy were made subservient to governments’ own objectives. And we think the risk of central banks losing independence remains slim.

     

Designing monetary policy committees

We integrate monetary policy-making by committee into a New Keynesian model to assess the consequences of the committee׳s institutional characteristics for inflation, output, and welfare. Our analysis delivers the following results. First, we demonstrate that transparency about the committee׳s future composition is typically harmful. Second, we show that short terms for central bankers lead to effective inflation stabilization at the expense of comparably high output variability. Third, larger committees generally allow for more efficient stabilization of inflation but possibly for less efficient output stabilization. Fourth, large committees and short terms are therefore socially desirable if the weight on output stabilization in the social loss function is low. Fifth, we show that a central banker with random preferences may be preferable to a central banker who shares the preferences of society.     

Are macroeconomic density forecasts informative?

We consider whether survey density forecasts (such as the inflation and output growth histograms of the US Survey of Professional Forecasters) are superior to unconditional density forecasts. The unconditional forecasts assume that the average level of uncertainty that has been experienced in the past will continue to prevail in the future, whereas the SPF projections ought to be adapted to the current conditions and the outlook at each forecast origin. The SPF forecasts might be expected to outperform the unconditional densities at the shortest horizons, but it transpires that such is not the case for the aggregate forecasts of either variable, or for the majority of the individual respondents for forecasting inflation.     

Composite forecasts of inflation: An improvement in forecasting performance

This study investigates the performance of a composite forecast of inflation for the period 1969:I–1992:IV. This composite forecast is generated by combining the forecasts of four methods commonly used to measure expected inflation. Initially, the results of conditional efficiency tests suggest that a composite forecast can improve performance by encompassing a wider information set. The evidence, from the comparison of various forecast series, shows that the composite forecast improves on the performance of the four individual forecasts and an alternative composite forecast in terms of accuracy and rationality criteria.     

Tests for multiple forecast encompassing

In the evaluation of economic forecasts, it is frequently the case that comparisons are made between a number of competing predictors. A natural question to ask in such contexts is whether one forecast encompasses its competitors, in the sense that they contain no useful information not present in the superior forecast. We develop tests for this notion of multiple forecast encompassing which are robust to properties expected in the forecast errors, and apply the tests to forecasts of UK growth and inflation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relationship between forecast dispersion and forecast uncertainty: Evidence from a survey data—arch model

This paper examines empirically the relationship between measures of forecast dispersion and forecast uncertainty from data on inflation expectations from the Livingston survey series and the Survey Research Center (SRC) survey series. Because the survey series do not provide probabilistic forecasts of inflation, we derive measures of inflation uncertainty by modelling the conditional variance of the inflation forecast errors from the survey series as an autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) process. The analysis is complicated by the fact that the overlap of forecast horizons for the survey series does not preclude the model's disturbance terms from displaying autocorrelation, and also places a restriction on the specification for the ARCH measures of inflation uncertainty. We estimate the model using Hansen's (1982) generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure to account for the presence of serial correlation and conditional heteroscedasticity in the disturbance terms. The results generally support the hypothesis that the measures of forecast dispersion across survey respondents are positively and statistically significantly associated with the measures of inflation uncertainty. However, the appropriateness of using forecast dispersion measures as proxies for inflation uncertainty is sensitive to the choice of the survey series.