The mixed blessing of a deregulatory endpoint for the public switched telephone network

Receiving authority to dismantle the wireline public switched telephone network (PSTN) will deliver a mixture of financial benefits and costs to incumbent carriers and also jeopardize longstanding legislative and regulatory goals seeking ubiquitous, affordable and fully interconnected networks. Even if incumbent carriers continue to provide basic telephone services via wireless facilities, they will benefit from substantial relaxation of common carriage duties, no longer having to serve as the carrier of last resort and having the opportunity to decide whether and where to provide service. On the other hand, incumbent carriers may have underestimated the substantial financial and marketplace advantages they also will likely lose in the deregulatory process. Legislators and policy makers also may have underestimated the impact of no longer having the ability to impose common carrier mandates that require carriers to interconnect so that end users have complete access to network services regardless of location.This paper will identify the potential problems resulting from prospective decisions by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), such as the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to grant authority for telecommunications service providers to discontinue PSTN services. The paper also will consider whether in the absence of common carrier duties, private carriers providing telephone services, including Voice over the Internet Protocol (VoIP), voluntarily will agree to interconnect their networks. The paper will examine three recent carrier interconnection issues with an eye toward assessing whether a largely unregulated marketplace will create incentives for carriers to interconnect networks so that consumers will have ubiquitous access to PSTN replacement and other broadband services.The paper concludes that private carrier interconnection models and information service regulatory oversight may not solve all disputes, or promote universal service public policy goals. Recent Internet interconnection and television program carriage disputes involving major players such as Comcast, Level 3, Fox, Cablevision and Google point to the possibility of increasingly contentious negotiations that could result in balkanized telecommunications networks with at least temporary blockages to desired content and services by some consumers.     

EC competition law and the convergence of the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors

This article surveys how convergence is dealt with in the main areas of EC competition law. First, under Article 90 EC Treaty, the Commission has not yet reached a solution to the problems of TOs holding exclusive rights over cable TV networks or providing broadcasting services over their telecommunications networks. Secondly, while the Commission has largely upheld certain policy lines in individual decisions, it has reached markedly different outcomes in the broadcasting and telecommunications sectors. The Commission has not been able successfully to integrate non-economic factors in its competition law analysis. Third, State aid problems are likely to arise in relation with production subsidies and compulsory broadcasting fees. In the end, competition law must still evolve to deal with convergence, but in doing so it is likely to pre-empt regulatory options.     

Impact of wireless telecommunications standards and regulation on the evolution of wireless technologies and services over Internet protocol

Beginning with the historical role and importance of multi-physical standards in wireless telecommunications for the future in the US, Japan and Europe, this paper provides a cohesive vision of how wireless communication, voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) is likely to develop. Also covered in this paper are its benefits, the technical and regulatory support required to realize this vision and an assessment of its potential impact on the structure of the telecommunications industry. Although the competitive structure of the Internet is relatively open, several factors, such as frequency allocation policy and radio interface standards, could block the efficient evolution of wireless services to an IP platform. The paper proposes two major technical requirements to enable effective competition in wireless VoIP and achieve greater technical productivity.     

The Evolution of “Competition”: Lessons for 21st Century Telecommunications Policy

For over a century, assessments of competition or the lack thereof have been central to how public policy treats the telecommunications industry. This centrality continues today. Yet, numerous foundational questions about this concept persist. In this paper, we chronicle how the definition of “competition” has evolved in economics and has been applied in the communications arena. The academic literature on competition hits an important inflection point in the mid-20th century with the development of “workable competition”: a term that is equated to “effective competition.” We find that while the concept of “effective competition” is central to policy formation at the FCC, the Commission’s own applications of “effective competition” are inconsistent. Given the centrality of this concept, and its inconsistent applications to date, we draw upon the seminal contributions to the development of the notion of “effective competition” to offer a modern definition suitable for application in 21st century communications markets.     

Regulatory factors influencing Internet access in Australia and China: a comparative analysis

Internet access is determined by a combination of a widely available telecommunication infrastructure and affordability of Internet services, which are closely related to government policies (IT Group. (1999). Like other countries, both Australia and China have considered the Internet a powerful tool for national development economically and socially. As Internet growth becomes more and more significant, it becomes important to address the extent to which the underlying communication policies influence current growth rates.This paper provides a comparative review of policy approaches to regulating the Internet in both China and Australia. This study aims to identify the regulatory factors affecting Internet access in terms of availability and affordability, especially those factors which encourage the creation of a policy and regulatory environment favourable to the development of Internet infrastructure and access.This paper examines the linkages between regulatory regimes, market environments and Internet access in both China and Australia. The preliminary result suggests that government policies governing the telecommunications service market and promoting information infrastructure have a significant impact on the affordability and availability of Internet access. The most significant factor is the level of competition permitted in the telecommunication sector. It has become clear that further regulatory initiatives such as deregulatory mechanisms and interconnection regimes are needed to establish a more competitive environment for Internet access in both countries, and more particularly in China.     

The Digital Divide and Other Economic Considerations for Network Neutrality

In its 2016 Broadband Report, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recognizes that a rural/urban digital divide remains prevalent—especially with respect to broadband adoption. It also highlights several policies that the FCC has undertaken purportedly to reduce the divide, including the 2015 Open Internet Order (OIO)—in which the stated intent is to enforce “network neutrality.” However, long before the OIO, studies have raised concerns that network neutrality policies will discourage investment by internet service providers (ISPs) in broadband infrastructure, to the detriment of broadband accessibility, and may increase average consumer costs—both of which would only further exacerbate the digital divide. In this paper, we provide a holistic analysis of the effects of net neutrality on the digital divide; in doing so, we draw from recent economic research on this issue. Our goal is to present a range of economic considerations that should be taken into account when evaluating the overall impact of the OIO, with particular attention to its impact on the digital divide.     

Assessing the WTO agreements on China's telecommunications regulatory reform and industrial liberalization

By drawing on new institutional economics, this paper contends that the “rules-of-law” specified by the World Trade Organization (WTO), as an exogenous institution for the member states, will theoretically influence its members’ domestic telecommunications regulatory institutions, but that the actual effects will be different and will depend on the institutional endowments of host countries and their institutional stances. Empirically, this paper examines the impact of China's prospective membership status in the WTO on its telecommunications regulatory reform and industrial liberalization and explores the institutional barriers preventing China from fully implementing the WTO Agreements in this sector.     

Fifty is the New Forty: EU Merger Policy Permits Higher Market Shares After the 2004 Reform

I analyze empirically all of the European Commission’s decisions regarding “unilateral effects” aspects of horizontal mergers before and after the 2004 reform, which introduced the “significant impediment to effective competition” test in merger policy. I find that, after the reform, the Commission did not change its stance toward mergers to monopoly or quasi-monopoly (almost always challenged) and mergers in un-concentrated markets (almost never). The new test produced more frequent challenges when the combined entity is not the largest firm, but these cases remain rare. The Commission’s stance toward mergers that fall between these polar opposites appears to have been tougher pre-reform ceteris paribus.     

Economics at the FCC, 2017–2018: Internet Freedom,International Broadband Pricing Comparisons,and a New Office of Economics and Analytics

The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) current strategic plan lists four priority goals: closing the digital divide; promoting innovation; protecting consumers and public safety; and reforming the FCC’s processes. Economists at the FCC contribute toward the realization of each of these goals, through analysis of the nature and significance of the underlying problems that regulations are intended to solve, as well as assessments of alternative solutions. Three major FCC initiatives demonstrate the role that economic analysis played in Commission decisions in 2017–2018: the Restoring Internet Freedom Order; the new hedonic pricing model that was used in the International Broadband Data Report; and the order that reorganized Commission economists into the Office of Economics and Analytics.     

Rural internet connectivity

This research investigates Internet connectivity in rural regions, looking specifically at four states in the US. Access to the Internet has assumed new significance for commercial and political reasons, and remote and sparsely populated areas typically lack the telecommunications infrastructure for reliable and fast Internet connections. Even as government programs such as the federal E-rate provisions bring Internet connectivity for institutions such as schools and libraries under the government's universal service umbrella, more general Internet access to a broader community constituency has not been addressed within policy circles. Even the deployment of so-called “national” Internet services favors urban regions.Research associates Kyle Nicholas and Lisa Parker were instrumental in undertaking this research, as was financial support from Southwestern Bell and the Rural Policy Institute. The comments of an anonymous reviewer helped greatly.     

The FCC’s Net Neutrality Decision and Stock Prices

More than a year after a court invalidated its “net neutrality” rules on broadband Internet service providers (ISPs), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) decided to extend public-utility (Title II) regulation on broadband services. This paper uses traditional event analysis of the movements in the values of major communications and media companies’ equities at key moments in the FCC’s path to this decision to estimate the financial market’s assessment of the likely effects of regulation on ISPs, traditional media companies, and new digital media companies. The results are surprising: the markets penalized only three large cable companies to any extent, and even these effects appear to have been short-lived. The media companies, arguably the intended beneficiaries of the regulations, were unaffected.     

Broadband and universal service

Section 254(b)(3) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act established the objective that residents of rural areas should have access to advanced telecommunications and information services comparable to services in urban areas. Pursuant to the passage of the Act, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) established a new universal fund that provides explicit support to high-cost rural areas. This paper addresses the question of whether people in rural areas have similar access due to the support provided through the Commission's new high-cost fund. This paper focuses on the telephone platform because cable companies often do not serve rural areas due to the high cost of service, and because there is no mechanism for the federal or state government to subsidize the provision of advanced telecommunications services via cable. The Act's objectives are apparently not being met in rural areas served by large companies since people living in these areas are much less likely to have qualified lines that could be used to access advanced telecommunications services. On the other hand, small companies are much closer to satisfying the statutory requirement as a result of the implicit support received through cost sharing.     

The diffusion of interactive communication innovations and the critical mass: the adoption of telecommunications services by German banks

Interactive innovations are distinctive in that their adoption depends on the perceived number of others who have already adopted the innovation. Thus their rate of adoption does not take off in the familiar “S” shape until a critical mass of adopters has been reached. Data on the adoption of 12 telecommunications services by 392 German banks are used to explore our theoretical perspective on the role of the critical mass in the diffusion of interactive innovations. The most important obstacle to the adoption of new telecommunications services by banks is a low degree of diffusion (which suggests the general importance of the critical mass). These obstacles do not differ for the innovators and other adopter categories. The importance of direct network externalities in influencing the rate of diffusion of new telecommunications services should be determined for each new service, rather than assumed to always exists.     

“Data localization”: The internet in the balance

There is a steady global trend towards “Data Localization,” laws by which data is required to be maintained and processed within the geographic boundaries of its state of origin. This development has raised concerns about its possible adverse impacts on emerging data-intensive technologies such as Cloud services/E-commerce, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence and the Internet of Things (collectively, the Embedded Infosphere). The inability to reach an international agreement on rules for cross-border data flows may have significant adverse consequences for all future users of the Internet.The basis of Data Localization is grounded in two distinct but inter-related policy models: Data Sovereignty and Trans-Border Data Flows. These two concepts have different origins. “Data Sovereignty” is derived from the historic power of a state of absolute and exclusive control within its geographic borders. Policies behind TBDFs arose in Europe following World War II, primarily motivated by Nazi use of early proto-computers to help round up Jews and others. As they have evolved, TBDF policies have been directed primarily at protecting personal data and privacy.This article first examines the issues of: 1) “Information Sovereignty” and 2) TBDFs. It then describes the arguments for and against “Data Localization,” offers some examples of strong localization policies (Russia, China), and summarizes contesting policy proposals. It then contextualizes TBDF with issues of human rights (free flow of information) and privacy.While the utility of an international agreement on TBDFs is clear, the differences in approaches are tenacious. For the free-market developed world (e.g, EU, OECD), the path forward seems to lead through policy convergence to compatible rules, with differentiated levels of data protection and accountability. It is far from clear whether these rules will address, in a mandatory way, issues of the “free flow” of information in the human rights sense. At the same time, there are countries (e.g., BRICS), representing a majority of the world's population, in which political and cultural resistance will produce stringent Cyber Sovereignty and Data Localization policies with few if any human rights components.The article concludes that the more the Internet is “localized”, the more attenuated its benefits will become. The negative consequences of Data Localization will become increasingly obvious as new, data-intensive technologies become ubiquitous, creating a condition of “Data Dependence”. It is projected that in the future the nations with the least amount of Data Localization and the most open flow of information will be the most successful in benefiting from new data-intensive embedded, networked technologies. This will most likely be characterized by values adopted as policies and practices in the EU.     

Should telecoms liberalisation stop at call termination?

In recent years concerns about the degree of competition in the provision of telecommunications call termination services have emerged. While the general consensus is that call origination is becoming more and more competitive, regulatory attention to call termination has widened in scope beyond the incumbent public telephone operators, leading to direct regulation of mobile termination charges in some countries and a debate on whether regulation should also be extended to “non-dominant” networks. This paper assesses whether these concerns are justified, extending the analysis to review the economic literature on reciprocal setting of termination charges between network operators. We conclude that while ex ante regulation of call termination simplifies the work of regulators it does not appear justifiable in all circumstances.     

Municipal electric utilities’ role in telecommunications services

Municipal electric utilities (MEUs) are increasingly expanding into telecommunications services. Such entry is interesting in several respects. First, MEUs marry two potential pathways for the growth of telecommunications access infrastructure and services: public ownership of last-mile facilities and electric power company expansion into telecommunications. Second, municipalities are key early adopters of next generation access technology in the form of both fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) and broadband wireless (e.g., WiMax) systems. Third, MEUs are at the nexus of the debate over the proper role for local government in promoting broadband Internet access. Most homes in the United States are served by investor-owned local telephone and cable television providers, using company-owned wireline infrastructure. These providers have generally opposed municipal entry, arguing that it will crowd out private investment and represents an unfair and less efficient form of competition. A number of states have acted to limit—or in some cases—to promote such entry. Before engaging in this debate, it is necessary to have a clearer picture of the current state of municipal entry and the local demographic, cost, industry, and policy factors that influence its evolution. To address this need, this paper reports the results of an empirical analysis of MEUs that provide communications services to the public. This analysis shows that MEUs are more likely to offer such services if they also provide internal communication services to support their electric utility operations (scope economies); are relatively close to metropolitan areas (lower backhaul costs); are in markets with fewer competitive alternatives (cable modem and DSL service availability limited); and which are less encumbered by regulatory barriers to entry (in communities in states which do not restrict municipal entry into telecommunication services). Of these results, the competitive impacts are the least straight-forward to interpret, suggesting richer dynamics and avenues for further research.     

Spatial data constraints: Implications for measuring broadband

The accurate determination of where broadband telecommunication services are available in the United States continues to be a significant challenge. Existing data regarding broadband provision, such as that provided by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) simply designate ZIP codes with at least one high-speed Internet subscriber. As ZIP code areas vary greatly in size and shape, the lack of geographic specificity as to exactly where broadband is available, particularly within ZIP code areas, confounds communications policymaking. Further, there are a number of additional geographic nuances concerning broadband availability that also inhibit empirical examination and policy generation, including the spatial limitations of digital subscriber line services. The purpose of this paper is to briefly review the issues concerning broadband measurement in the United States and provide an empirical analysis of several spatial data constraints that must be accounted for when interpreting and constructing public telecommunications policy.     

Telecommunications policy in Turkey: Dismantling barriers to growth

Modern telecommunications technology is now widely seen as a critical driver in economic development. However, the issues involved in the rapid deployment of this technology are complex and frequently highly controversial. While some issues are technical, the most difficult ones involve changing an institutional framework originally designed for different times and different technologies. The process of changing this framework necessarily involves disruptive change for existing infrastructure and service providers as well as substantial benefits for the economy at large. This paper, based on an extensive series of interviews in Turkey in 2005 as well as published sources, seeks to discuss these issues in light of Turkey's progress to date in taking advantage of advanced available telecommunications technology and the myriad productivity-enhancing services that are associated with it.An important element in developing a more competitive and dynamic sector has been Turkey's long-standing desire to become a member of the European Union (EU). This has encouraged changes in the telecommunications regulatory regime following the guidelines set out in Chapter 19 of the EU “acquis” for candidate members. Nonetheless, substantial further efforts are needed to complete and implement the desired regulatory framework, particularly as it affects the former government monopoly carrier, Turk Telekom and the cable companies. A further limiting factor in recent years has been an overall investment climate characterized by a high level of uncertainty for most investors, regardless of size or nationality.Policy recommendations to help accelerate the deployment of telecommunications technology include a clear reaffirmation of the government's priorities for the sector, a reduction in the level of regulatory uncertainty, strengthening the Board and Staff of the Telecommunications Authority, and reviewing policies to broaden the scope and decrease the cost of telecommunication licenses.     

Dynamic Entry and Investment in New Infrastructures: Empirical Evidence from the Fixed Broadband Industry

In the telecommunications industry, the ladder-of-investment approach claims that service-based competition (when entrants lease access to incumbents’ facilities) can serve as a “stepping stone” for facility-based entry (when entrants build their own infrastructures to provide services). In this paper, we build an empirical model that encompasses a complete ladder-of-investment, composed of three rungs: bitstream access, local loop unbundling and new access facilities. Using data from the European Commission’s “Broadband access in the EU” reports covering 15 European member states for 17 semesters, we test the ladder-of-investment hypothesis. We find no empirical support for this hypothesis, that is, for the transition from local loop unbundling to new access infrastructures, and weak empirical support for the transition from bitstream access lines to local loop unbundling. These results are robust when we take into account the migration effect, the number of access rungs, the development of broadband cable, the regulatory performance, and the evolution of local loop unbundling prices.     

Access regulation and geographic deployment of a new generation infrastructure

This paper addresses the impact of regulatory policy on levels of infrastructure deployment and derived welfare in the telecommunications sector. The model considers two potentially coexisting and partially competing technologies (the “old generation network” – OGN – and the “new” generation network – NGN). This framework allows us to show that the “regulation defining access charge in order to maximize infrastructure deployment” is strictly equivalent to the case in which “no regulation applies”. We also derive from the model that these two types of regulation induce higher social welfare, but lower numbers of NGN consumers, compared to the “ex post access prices” regulation. Finally, we show that the level of infrastructure deployment (as well as social welfare and number of NGN consumers) will be highest if both investment and access charge decisions are taken by the welfare maximizing regulator. This suggests that the social optimum will be achieved through a calls-for-tender process that includes deployment and access charge requirements.