The exploratory analysis of trade-offs in strategic planning: Lessons from Regional Infrastructure Foresight

The sustainable transformation of infrastructure sectors represents a challenge of prime importance worldwide. Due to long life times of infrastructures, strategic decision making has to explicitly consider uncertainties in context conditions, value considerations and available technological alternatives. However currently, strategic infrastructure planning is often carried out in a very narrow perspective. The present paper argues that foresight informed strategic planning, allows addressing trade-offs related to context uncertainties, value conflicts and sustainability deficits in a structured way. The paper introduces a specific procedural proposal, the Regional Infrastructure Foresight method (RIF) and illustrates its potential virtues through an application to urban water management planning in a Swiss region (Kiesental).     

Joint optimization of strategic fleet planning and contract analysis in tramp shipping

Maritime transportation is one of the most capital-intensive industries. Fleet planning is vital but challenging to shipowners because the industry is extremely volatile. Relatively few papers have studied strategic fleet planning in tramp shipping, which is intertwined with contract analysis and different from that in industrial or liner shipping. This article develops a mixed-integer programming model, and it is the first of its kind that jointly optimizes strategic fleet planning and the selections of long-term and spot contracts in tramp shipping. The model can be used to determine the best mix of long-term and spot contracts for a given fleet and/or to find the optimal fleet size and mix for a set of contracts. It can be used as a basis for a fleet renewal programme, informing decisions on when to sell, whether to buy old or new ships, and when to charter in or out vessels. A numerical example is given to illustrate how to use the model to evaluate different operations strategies.     

Partial cross-ownership and strategic environmental policy

This paper analyzes the effect of passive investment in rival firms on the setting of cooperative and non-cooperative environmental taxes. We consider two firms located in different countries, with each firm owning the same percentage of the stock of its rival. We show that bilateral partial cross-ownership affects the taxes set by the countries in the cooperative and non-cooperative cases. When the stake that one firm has in its rival is great enough and environmental spillovers are low enough, cooperative taxes are lower than non-cooperative taxes. For the remaining values of parameters the opposite result is obtained.     

战略性新兴产业的推进策略

战略性新兴产业发展应建立在充分论证和科学规划的基础之上,并遵循基础优先、创新驱动和循序渐进的推进策略。战略性新兴产业的成长建立在科技研发能力和掌握核心技术的基础之上,绝不可通过低水平规模扩张来实现,在推进过程中要注意防范可能出现的风险。     

Export market correlation and strategic trade policy

In the traditional models of strategic trade policy pioneered by Brander and Spencer, exports of the domestic firm, engaged in a Cournot-Nash competition with the foreign firm in a neutral market, must be subsidized to maximize national welfare. We demonstrate that when the firms play the Cournot-Nash game in two stochastic and positively correlated markets, it may be optimal to tax exports to the more volatile market while subsidizing it in the other. The policy combination reduces the amplitude of aggregate profit and raises the utility of the risk-averse firm in a manner similar to the theory of portfolio choice. JEL Classification: F12, D18
Marchés d'exportation co-reliés et politique commerciale stratégique. Dans les modèles traditionnels de politique commerciale stratégique proposés par Brander et Spencer, les exportations de la firme nationale, qui est engagée dans une concurrence à la Cournot-Nash avec une firme étrangère dans un marché neutre, doit être subventionnée si l'on veut maximiser le niveau national de bien-être. On montre que, quand les entreprises jouent un jeu à la Cournot-Nash dans deux marchés d'exportation stochastiques et positivement co-reliés, il peut être optimal de taxer les exportations vers le marché le plus volatile et de subventionner les exportations vers l'autre marché. Cette combinaison de politiques réduit l'amplitude de variation des profits agrégés et augmente l'utilité de l'entreprise qui a une aversion au risque d'une manière qui ressemble à ce qui se passe dans la théorie des choix de portefeuilles.     

Inter-industry wage differentials and strategic trade policy

Recent studies suggest that inter-industry wage differentials exist which are neither caused by different endownments of the workers with human capital, nor by different working conditions, nor by institutional rigidities. Higher employment in high-wage sectors due to exports, therefore, raises welfare. According to empirical evidence presented here more likely than not net exports from sectors paying wage premia lead to some extra gains from trade (that cannot be explained by trade policy promoting primary sectors by high amounts of subsidies per employee) for the German economy. A case is made, however, against strategic trade policy in favour of these sectors pointing to uncertainty about the amount of the differentials, their international (dis)similarity, and their sources.

---

Zusammenfassung Empirische Untersuchungen deuten darauf hin, daß auch in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Arbeitskräfte mit gleicher Humankapitalausstattung, die unter gleichen Arbeitsbedingungen in Unternehmen gleicher Größe in einer Region arbeiten, unterschiedlich entlohnt werden, wenn sie in unterschiedlichen Sektoren arbeiten. Bestehen solche Sektorlohndifferentiale, dann hat eine Ausweitung der Beschäftigung in Hochlohnsektoren positive Wohlfahrtseffekte. Es wird daher vielfach gefordert, diese primären Sektoren vor internationaler Konkurrenz zu schützen und sie durch Subventionen zu fördern. Die vorliegende Arbeit präsentiert empirische Evidenz dafür, daß die Bundesrepublik Deutschland Extra-Gewinne aus dem Außenhandel bezieht, weil zwischen der Netto-Exportquote und der Höhe des Sektorlohndifferentials ein positiver Zusammenhang besteht, ohne daß sich die Subventionspolitik an diesen Differentialen orientiert. Gegen eine gezielte Förderung der Hochlohnsektoren im Rahmen einer strategischen Handelspolitik werden dann drei Argumente vorgebracht, die mit Unsicherheiten über Höhe, internationale Ähnlichkeit und Ursachen der Differentiale zusammenhängen.

---

---

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the international economists' group of the Verein für Socialpolitik at Hohenheim University in May 1991, at the Sixth Annual Congress of the European Economic Association in Cambridge in September 1991, and at the Universities of Hamburg and Bielefeld. I would like to thank participants at the discussions and four anonymous referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Domestic and international strategic interactions in environment policy formation

Summary. In this paper, we establish the most possilbe general formulation of the technology governing carbon-gas emission, giving rise to global external diseconomies, and ty to explore into the strategic interactions,both domestic and international, when an individual country decides on the environmental policies. Through the comparison among emission taxes, quotas, and standard in the perfectly competitive private economies, we find that the first two policies are equivalent but they are different in effects by virtue of what we may call the tax-exemption effect of emission standards. Such a difference in the policy effect further affects the other country's welfare through the global externalities, amplified through whether the government can precommit to either the emission tax or the emission standard. Received: January 16, 2001; revised version: April 16, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The authors thank the valuable comments by an anonymous referee. Ministry of Education and Science for its financial support is also greatly acknowledged. Correspondence to:K. Kiyono     

国家创新政策在全球经济中的互动模式探究

通过分析三种经典的国家创新政策互动模式及四种新型模式,探讨全球化背景下国家创新政策如何利用彼此之间的互动模式,提高政策作用效果、扩大政策影响。结果表明,不同模式的预测结论不尽相同。目前,国际上仍缺少从中斡旋的专业机构,而各国之间的战略互动又鲜有涉及创新政策,致使国家间创新政策难以协同发挥作用。因此,需要从全球战略互动角度,重新审视国家创新政策。     

Fiscal policy institutions and history

This paper shows that historical variables can explain a significant part of discretionary government spending across countries. We argue that these results provide evidence in favor of Besley and Persson’s (2009) hypothesis that institutional quality or state capacity is historically determined and further that institutional quality determines, in part, economic policy.     

Cooperative R&D and strategic trade policy

Abstract.  In this paper three different cooperative R&D arrangements in a strategic trade policy model are examined. A policy game between two governments is analysed, where each government chooses a particular cooperative R&D policy in order to maximize national welfare. Allowing cooperation in R&D is also compared with the use of R&D subsidies. It is jointly optimal for both governments to allow their firms to participate in the same type of cooperative R&D, and allowing cooperation in R&D can be superior to the use of R&D subsidies. JEL Classification: F13, L24     

Welfare implications of strategic economic policy in eastern Europe

This paper evaluates the welfare effects in a block of selected eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Romania, former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and former Yugoslavia) emerging from the possibility to participate in the European integration process and to act as strategic players in dynamic games. The results of the cooperative and noncooperative dynamic game scenarios are compared with fixed policy solutions. The McKibbin-Sachs global model (MSG2 model), which incorporates rational expectations, is used as a framework. A global supply-side shock and a fixed exchange rate regime are considered under the alternative policy layouts. It is shown that international economic cooperation may be advantageous over noncooperation. For the anchor currency of the European Monetary Union (EMU), fixing the eastern European block currencies to the EMU may lead to significant destabilization.     

Strategic planning, strategic management, strategic foresight: The seminal work of H. Igor Ansoff

H. Igor Ansoff was the prominent reference in the corporate strategy field, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. His bestseller, Corporate Strategy, was the first to give a conceptual framework and a tool box to top managers, consultants and scholars. Recognized as the real pioneer of the field, he was seen by Henry Mintzberg as also the leader of the strategic planning school. The aim of this short article is to show that he was also the father of strategic management and a leader who gave an impressive set of concepts and ideas to promote an integrative and flexible view of strategic planning, strategic foresight, organizational structures and processes.     

Plant location and strategic environmental policy with inter-sectoral linkages

In recent debates on trade liberalisation the concern has often been expressed that with more competitive international trade governments will be worried that by setting tougher environmental policies than their trading rivals they will put domestic producers at a competitive disadvantage, and in the extreme case this could lead to firms relocating production in other countries. The response by governments to such concerns will be to weaken environmental policies (‘eco-dumping’). In competitive markets such concerns are ill founded, but there is a small amount of literature which has analysed whether governments will indeed have incentives for eco-dumping in the more relevant case of markets where there are significant scale economies; even here there is no presumption that the outcome will involve eco-dumping.In this paper we extend the analysis of strategic environmental policy and plant location decisions by analysing the location decision of firms in different sectors which are linked through an input-output structure of intermediate production. The reason why we introduce inter-sectoral linkages between firms is that they introduce an additional factor, relative to those already analysed in the literature, in the plant location decision, which is the incentive for firms in different sectors to agglomerate in a single location. This has a number of important effects. First, there is now the possibility of multiple equilibria in location decisions of firms. Following from this there is the possibility of catastrophic effects where a small increase in an environmental tax can trigger the collapse of an industrial base in a country; however there is also the possibility that a country which raises its environmental tax could attract more firms to locate in that country, because of the way the tax affects incentives for agglomeration. Finally, and again related to the previous effects, there is the possibility of a hysteresis effect where raising an environmental tax in one country can cause firms to relocate to another country, but subsequently lowering that tax will not induce firms to relocate back into the original country.We consider a simple model with two countries, two industries, an upstream and a downstream sector, and two firms per industry. The analysis proceeds through a three-stage game: in the first stage the governments of the two countries set their environmental policies; in the second stage the firms in both industries choose how many plants to locate and where; in the third stage firms choose their output levels, with the demand for the upstream firms being determined endogenously by the production decisions of the downstream firms. We assume that there are no limits to production capacity, so that firms do not build more than one plant in any country. However, firms may build plants in different countries because of positive transport costs. Although the model appears very simple, it cannot be solved analytically, so all the conclusions must be drawn from numerical simulations.     

房地产品牌战略分析与探讨

我国宏观经济的发展推动了房地产业的飞速发展,但是,这几年市场空置房数量扩大和房地产企业规模小,品牌已成为提高企业竞争力的关键,只有充分认识到房地产品牌的内涵和实施的必要性,才能有效采取措施.塑造真正的品牌.     

Adaptability and flexibility in urban transportation policy and planning

The poor representation of uncertainty in the urban transportation planning process can lead to excessively large and permanent facilities. Such inflexible facilities and systems may condition and severely constrain options available to future generations for organizing the production, consumption, and distribution of goods and services. The relationship between facility size and permanence and flexibility has received too little recognition in practice and too little attention in research. This paper calls for increased to provide policy makers and practitioners with a greater understanding of the consequences of the present approach and the advantages and disadvantages of more flexible approaches.     

Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications

This study incorporates the corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives of a domestic firm and analyses strategic trade policy towards a foreign firm in a different market structure. We show that the tariff rate under a foreign (domestic) firm's leadership is lowest when the degree of CSR is large (small). We also show that the foreign firm's leadership yields the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is intermediate, while the domestic firm's leadership yields the highest welfare otherwise. In an endogenous‐timing game, we show that a simultaneous‐move outcome is the unique equilibrium when the degree of CSR is small; thus, it is never socially desirable. We also show that the domestic firm's leadership can be an equilibrium, which results in the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is large. Finally, when the degree of CSR is large, collusive behaviours between the domestic and foreign firms can increase welfare.     

Samaritan agents? On the strategic delegation of aid policy

Should a donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its aid budget to a less inequality-averse agent to alleviate the consequences of the Samaritan's Dilemma it is facing? I show that when aid impact differs across recipients the optimal type of agent depends on whether or not committing to a greater share for countries where the productivity of aid is low raises the combined domestic incomes of recipients. This is the case for donors too concerned with efficiency ex post. They therefore delegate the decision on the discretionary aid allocation rule to agents more sensitive to distributional issues than themselves.