Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models

Electoral equilibria depend upon candidates' motivations. Maximization of expected vote share may not lead to the same behavior as maximization of the probability of winning the election. Accordingly, it is desirable to understand when electoral equilibria are insensitive to the choice of candidate motivations. This paper examines sufficient conditions for local equilibrium equivalence between expected vote share maximization and maximization of probability of victory in the spatial model of elections with probabilistic voters.     

Non-stationary inflation and panel estimates of United States short and long-run Phillips curves

This paper argues that because United States inflation has been non-stationary over the past five decades the vast body of empirical research that proceeds without adequately accounting for the non-stationarity in the data is invalid. Using 50 years of United States inflation data the standard results in the Phillips curve literature are shown to be due to unaccounted shifts in the mean rates of inflation over the period. Short and long-run Phillips curves for the United States are then estimated using time series panel data techniques that account for these shifts in mean.     

Learning from private information in noisy repeated games

We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions played, and both the payoff functions and the map from actions to signal distributions depend on an unknown state. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are determined by the solutions to a family of linear programming problems. Using this characterization, we develop conditions under which play can be as if the players have learned the state. We provide a sufficient condition for the folk theorem, and a characterization of the PTXE payoffs in games with a known monitoring structure.     

Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence

We generalize the results of Hörner and Lovo (2009) [15] to N-player games with arbitrary information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under low discounting as the set of feasible payoffs that are individually rational, jointly rational, and incentive compatible. Second, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty.     

On the impact of inflation on output growth: Does the level of inflation matter?

This paper investigates the growth effects of inflation on a wide sample of countries, including both industrialized and emerging economies. Relying upon the estimation of smooth transition and dynamic GMM models for panel data, our findings offer strong evidence that inflation non-linearly impacts economic growth. More specifically, there exists a threshold beyond which inflation exerts a negative effect on growth, and below which it is growth enhancing for advanced countries.     

The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia

We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we conducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban–rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. An important reason is that there is punishment of contributors in all four subject pools. Thus, punishment can also undermine the scope for self-governance in the sense of high levels of voluntary cooperation that are sustained by sanctioning free riders only.     

Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: An experimental approach

In the real world, when people play a game, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by another subject to whom he can offer advice.Our results document the fact that allowing advice fosters the creation of a convention of behavior in Ultimatum games. In addition, by reading the advice offered we conclude that arguments of fairness are rarely used to justify the offers of Senders but are relied upon to justify rejections by Receivers.     

On the median regression for SURE models with applications to 3-generation immigrants data in Sweden

In this paper we generalize the median regression method to be applicable to system of regression equations, in particular SURE models. Giving the existence of proper system wise medians of the residuals from different equations, we apply the weighted median regression with the weights obtained from the covariance matrix of the equations obtained from ordinary SURE method. The benefit of this model in our case is that the SURE estimators utilise the information present in the cross regression (or equations) error correlation and hence more efficient than other estimation methods like the OLS method. The Seemingly Unrelated Median Regression Equations (SUMRE) models produce results that are more robust than the usual SURE or single equations OLS estimation when the distributions of the dependent variables are not normally distributed or the data are associated with outliers. Moreover, the results are also more efficient than is the cases of single equations median regressions when the residuals from the different equations are correlated. A theorem is derived and indicates that even if there is no statistically significant correlation between the equations, using SUMRE model instead of SURE models will not damage the estimation of parameters.     

Relationship between management ownership and firm value among the business group affiliated firms in Korea

In this paper, we revisit an old issue on the relation between management ownership and firm’s value. The Korean panel data on the business group firms, allows us to compute ownership right and control right separately for each business group affiliated firm. Our measures are different from the similar measures on the Korean firms as in Baek et al. (2004) or Joh (2003). Rather than confounding the two offsetting effects, this paper tests convergence of interest hypothesis and entrenchment hypothesis separately. Empirical findings show that, given control right, there is no clear-cut relation between firm value and the inside management ownership for most firms with the inside management ownership less than 42%, that there is a positive relation between firm value and the inside management ownership for those firms with the inside management ownership higher than 42%, and that, given ownership right, profitability decreases as control right increases.     

Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in which the bidders? final utility possibly depends on the winner?s identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a possible explanation for cartels? structures (not) observed in practice.     

Short- and long-term impact of remarkable economic events on the growth causes of China–Germany trade in agri-food products

This paper focuses on a systematic quantitative discussion of the short- and long-term impact of remarkable economic events on international trade in a two-stage framework. Firstly, procedures based on dummy variables are proposed to detect structural breaks, types and sizes of jumps caused by such events. Then we propose to apply a hierarchical CMS (Constant Market Share) model to all sub-periods determined by the detected change points to study the short- and long-term impact of those events on growth causes. Application to China–Germany trade in agri-food products shows that China's accession to WTO had a negative short-term impact on corresponding series. But its long-term impact on China's export competitiveness was clearly positive. The short-term impact of the EU's CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) reform on Germany's exports to China was also negative. Its long-term impact on export competitiveness was sometimes positive and sometimes negative. The financial crisis of 2008 caused a significant reduction of China's agri-food exports to Germany. But Germany's exports to China in 2009 were not affected by the financial crisis as much.     

Prize sharing in collective contests

The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed private–public good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size. (iii) In each group the members decide how much effort to put without observing the sharing rules of the other groups. It is shown that endogenous determination of group sharing rules completely eliminates the group-size paradox, i.e. a larger group always attains a higher winning probability than a smaller group, unless the prize is purely private. In addition, an interesting pattern of equilibrium group sharing rules is revealed: The group attaining the lower winning probability is the one choosing the rule giving higher incentives to the members.     

A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element property” where for each agent, there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This class includes finite and regular mechanisms. We conclude that either the quasilinearity-like assumptions of available sufficiency results cannot be completely dispensed with or some mechanisms that do not satisfy the best element property must be employed. We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation by mechanisms satisfying the best element property are more restrictive than previously thought.     

The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly

We derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale.     

Nonlinearity in the financial development–income inequality nexus

The majority of theoretical studies on the relationship between income inequality and financial development argue that financial deepening might be a feasible instrument for improving income distribution. This paper finds that the prediction crucially depends on the stages of financial development that the country is undergoing. The benefits of financial depth only occur if the country has reached a threshold level of financial development. Below this critical value, financial development counteracts income inequality. Our policy implication is that a minimum level of financial development is a necessary precondition for achieving reduction in income inequality through financial development.     

Time to default in the UK mortgage market

This paper employs duration analysis to investigate the timing of default in the UK mortgage market. Our analysis is performed on an ex ante basis, in that our explanatory variables are available to mortgage lenders when the loan is first made. We estimate both standard Weibull distributions and generalizations of the Weibull that permit non-monotonic hazard functions. The models fit the data well, suggesting that we have captured the major sources of variation in duration. We find that ‘cash flow’ variables, such as salary and interest rate paid, play the largest role. Surprisingly, loan-to-value ratios are either insignificant or influence default times in a counter-intuitive direction.     

The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium

In a simple game, coalitions belonging to a given class are “absolutely powerful” while others have no power. We attempt to make this distinction operational. Toward this end, we propose two axioms on social choice correspondences, Strong Non-Discrimination and Exclusion. Strong Non-Discrimination describes circumstances under which certain coalitions, the losing coalitions, have no influence over social choice. Exclusion requires that there are situations in which certain coalitions, the winning coalitions, can exercise their power. We show that the weak core correspondence is the minimal correspondence satisfying Maskin Monotonicity and Strong Non-Discrimination. We also show that the weak core is the unique correspondence satisfying Nash implementability, Strong Non-Discrimination, and Exclusion.     

Evaluating the carbon-macroeconomy relationship: Evidence from threshold vector error-correction and Markov-switching VAR models

This paper studies the nonlinear adjustment between industrial production and carbon prices – coined as ‘the carbon-macroeconomy relationship’ – in the EU 27. We model carbon price returns and industrial production as nonlinear and state-dependent, with dynamics depending on the sign and magnitude of past realization of returns and the growth of industrial production. Our findings show that (i) macroeconomic activity is likely to affect carbon prices with a lag, due to the specific institutional constraints of this environmental market; (ii) the joint dynamics of industrial production and carbon prices seem adequately captured by two-regime threshold vector error-correction and two-regime Markov-switching VAR models compared to linear models as main competitors. The regime-switching models proposed are profoundly checked for their economic content and statistical congruency, and are found to provide a sound statistical framework for a comprehensive analysis of the carbon-macroeconomy relationship.     

On the mark(s): Optimum currency areas in Germany

In the wake of unification, the former GDR became a member of the DM monetary zone. We evaluate whether unified Germany satisfies the criteria defining an optimal monetary area. We conclude that the primary criterion, similarity of shocks, is not satisfied even by the western states, a reflection of the importance of sector-specific relative to geographic shocks coupled with different sectoral structures. Extending this argument, we conclude that the correlation of shocks to the eastern states with western states is also likely to be small. A case for monetary unification must, in consequence, be based on political rather than narrowly economic calculations.     

Estimating intergenerational distribution preferences

Resource management decisions influence not only the output of the economy but also the distribution of utility between groups within the community. The theory of cost benefit analysis provides a means of incorporating distributional changes into the decision making calculus through the application of distributional or welfare weights. However, this practice has not been widely adopted in part due to difficulties in the estimation of distributional weights. This paper addresses this problem by using the stated preference method of choice modelling to estimate distributional weights suitable for inclusion in a cost benefit analysis framework. The findings of a choice modelling experiment designed to estimate community preferences with respect to intergenerational utility distribution illustrate the potential of this method in addressing distributional issues.