RANDOM AUTHORITY

This article rationalizes matrix management in a multiproject organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated with each other. Project managers are privately informed about local conditions and communicate strategically via cheap talk. Matrix management is modeled as a randomization over deterministic authority allocations. We show that random authority is strictly optimal when the conflict between adaptation and coordination is very severe or the coordination need is very small. Moreover, the optimal degree of delegation changes nonmonotonically in the coordination need when the incentives of the project managers are sufficiently aligned.     

OVERSEAS ASSEMBLY PRODUCTION CHOICES

This article examines the input choices for producers who assemble their goods abroad and imported them to the United States through the U.S. Overseas Assembly Provisions. Three findings emerge. First, firms reduce their use of foreign parts and assembly when foreign costs rise, but only with a lag. In contrast, recent foreign cost increases boost the foreign portion of final product value. Second, the effects of cost changes are more pronounced for U.S. outsourcing imports from developing countries. Finally, the degree of production responsiveness differs with industry capital intensity and is the greatest for low-capital intensity projects performed in non-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) locations.     

CREDIT MARKETS AND HOUSING CHOICES

This paper analyses how individual characteristics and credit market conditions interact and determine homeownership. The impact of the lifetime profile of resources on homeownership is larger when credit market imperfections are more severe. We combine data from the Bank of Italy's Survey on Household Income and Wealth with information on regional differences in interest rate spreads. We find that an increase in current resources by 10,000 euros increases the probability of homeownership by five (two) percentage points under the least (most) favourable credit market conditions.     

SCREENING FOMC MEMBERS FOR THEIR BIASES AND DEPENDABILITY

This paper develops conjectures regarding the process by which the President as a principal selects Federal Reserve Governors and Bank Presidents as his agents on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). It first establishes that FOMC members can be grouped into sets which are marked by ease and tightness biases in voting behavior. It then identifies certain career characteristics of FOMC members which are correlated with each of these biases. The paper goes on to isolate reliable partisan subsets within the ease and tightness sets and identifies a career characteristic which is highly correlated with membership in these subsets; that characteristic is a career as an economist.     

ON THE BIASES IN FOREIGN TRADE INDICES*

Starting out from the observation that both imports and exports may be viewed as the difference between domestic consumption (use) and production, static standard theory of biases in consumption and production indices is brought to bear upon trade indices: Laspeyres tends to overrate when applied to imports and to underrate when applied to exports; for Paasche, the opposite holds true. Hence, terms of trade tend to be underrated (exaggerated) when based upon Laspeyres (Paasche) price indices. The problem of extending these conclusions to the case of changes in production frontiers and preference maps is discussed. When homotheticity is absent, correlation between price and quantity relatives may upset the simple conclusions. This is of special importance in the large-country situation. Dynamics further complicate the situation. A cobweb mechanism in exports may thus reverse the static results.     

权威分配和信息传递

在成员间有利益冲突的情况下,授权是激励组织中成员释放其私人信息的一个重要方式.该文考察了在对多人授权时,权威分配的方式对于信息释放的影响.该文考虑了两种分配方案的影响.其一是所有的成员在形式上有同等的权威(委员会);其二是,某一个成员有全部的决策权威(科层制).委员会的决策规则虽然在形式上是平等的,但在实质上却可能偏向于某个成员.科层制则在形式上就完全偏向于它的领导.该文表明,权威的集中分配放大了利益冲突的影响.并且,权威分配的形式上的偏向有支配性的作用:它压倒了利益冲突以及实质偏向的影响.     

权威分配和信息传递

在成员间有利益冲突的情况下,授权是激励组织中成员释放其私人信息的一个重要方式。本文考察了在对多人授权时,权威分配的方式对于信息释放的影响。本文考虑了两种分配方案的影响。其一是所有的成员在形式上有同等的权威(委员会);其二是,某一个成员有全部的决策权威(科层制)。委员会的决策规则虽然在形式上是平等的,但在实质上却可能偏向于某个成员。科层制则在形式上就完全偏向于它的领导。本文表明,权威的集中分配放大了利益冲突的影响。并且,权威分配的形式上的偏向有支配性的作用:它压倒了利益冲突以及实质偏向的影响。     

BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP

ABSTRACT: By entrepreneurial combinations of voluntary resources, project means from public and private sources, commissions on contracts and other ways of financing, the youth house Fryshuset, with a great number of social activities for primarily young people in Stockholm, Sweden, has been able to allocate resources for establishing and expanding its activities. This development would not have been possible without struggle against established norms, values, traditions and institutions, not least the ‘close to monopoly’ that the public sector in practice was having on the fields in which Fryshuset emerged. Step by step, Fryshuset has built partnerships and alliances with public, private as well as civil actors. Expressed in a general way, Fryshuset has built a new social capital and created new norms and values. The aim of the paper is to investigate how Fryshuset has managed to build social capital through, and for entrepreneurial efforts aiming to facilitate young peoples’ development.     

中美贸易协商:不确定性与最优选择

本文试图为中美贸易协商提供一个理论框架,并从更一般化的意义上对削减关税之谜(tariff reduction paradox)给出了一个新的理论解释:从一个高关税的初始环境出发,在一定条件下政府之间会相互协商以降低关税,但不会完全取消关税。这是由于在某些情况下,关税可以减少多重瓦尔拉斯均衡带来的不确定性。进一步而言,通过外商直接投资发生的"禀赋互换(endowment swaps)"可成为优于关税和贸易管制的一种替代选择。     

NATIONAL ACCOUNTS IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES: BALANCING THE BIASES?

In the past several years, efforts have been made to introduce the 1993 System of National Accounts (1993) SNA ) in most of the formerly centrally planned economies. In doing so, a number of problems have emerged, some of which are particular to the situation of these countries. Some of these problems will probably cause overestimates of national accounts variables, others will cause underestimates, and it would be purely coincidental if these effects cancel out. This paper discusses the most disconcerting issues in this situation, and possible solutions.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN QUALITY CHOICES AND PRICE COMPETITION

We modify the price‐setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage. Our results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, whereby firms always select sequential play at the quality stage. We also investigate the mixed‐strategy equilibrium, revealing that the probability of generating outcomes out of equilibrium is higher than the probability of playing one Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In the alternative case with full market coverage, we show that the quality stage is solved in dominant strategies and therefore the choice of roles becomes irrelevant as the Nash and Stackelberg solutions coincide. With full market coverage and corner solution, the results show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, where the high‐quality firm takes the lead in the quality stage.     

CONTRADICTORY TRENDS IN GLOBAL INCOME INEQUALITY: A TALE OF TWO BIASES

Did global income inequality rise or fall over the last decades of the twentieth century? The answer depends on how cross‐country income comparisons are made. Exchange rate comparisons suggest that inequality rose whilst the purchasing power comparisons of the Penn World Table suggest it fell. We show that both measures of real incomes lead to biased international income comparisons. Exchange rate comparisons ignore the relative price of non‐tradables, whilst the fixed price method underlying the Penn World Table is subject to substitution bias. The contradictory trends are due to growing dissimilarity between national price structures increasing the degree of bias in each method. When we correct the income data to eliminate bias we find no compelling evidence of a significant change in world inequality.     

STATE INCOME TAXES AND MILITARY SERVICE MEMBERS' LEGAL RESIDENCY CHOICES

Using military residency data from 1998 to 2005 across all 50 states, I find that income taxes deter legal residencies and that the effect grows as income increases. My results indicate that states with no income tax or with exemptions for military wages experience 100% and 39% more service member residencies, respectively, than states with an income tax. The influence of state tax policy increases with higher pay and tenure. My findings are in keeping with economic theory, which suggests that high income workers will migrate out of high tax areas and be replaced by low income workers. (JEL H24, H71, J61)     

中国中部地区承接产业转移的行业选择

承接产业是加速区域经济发展的"助推器",如何科学选择承接产业是中部地区亟待解决的问题。文章在总结中部地区承接产业转移现状的基础上,运用产业区域聚集指数分析得出东部5省1市具有转移趋势的产业、运用产业梯度系数分析得出中部各省具有竞争优势的产业,最后根据各省产业资源特征和承接条件,确定出中部各省承接东部产业转移的重点行业。     

GIRLS' SCHOOLING CHOICES AND HOME PRODUCTION: EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTAN

The article develops and estimates a dynamic structural model of girls' school-going decisions and mother's labor market participation. It seeks to determine the causes of low school participation and to evaluate alternative public policies. The model incorporates mother's education, school availability, the productivity of the girl when engaged in household production, and the potential trade-off between mother's and daughter's housework decisions. Our findings suggest that school construction is the most cost-effective program. When using monetary incentives, our results highlight the effectiveness of conditionality, as opposed to unconditional transfers, and the existence of a trade-off between maternal employment and daughter's schooling.     

SOCIAL ASSETS*

We present a model incorporating both social and economic components and analyze their interaction. The notion of a social asset, an attribute that has value only because of the social institutions governing society, is introduced. In the basic model, agents match on the basis of income and unproductive attributes. An attribute has value in some equilibrium social institutions (matching patterns), but not in others. We then show that productive attributes (such as education) can have their value increased above their inherent productive value by some social institutions, leading to the notion of the social value of an asset.     

MODELLING SOCIAL ENTERPRISES

The majority of research concentrates exclusively on the objectives of governments, profit entities or non‐profit organizations, while a significant number of organizations are hybrids. One form of these hybrids is the social enterprise. This paper theoretically describes social enterprises taking into consideration their main aims. Based on the ‘earned income’ school of thought, the principal‐agent theory and considering the nature of social enterprises’ activities we propose the objective functions of their owners (principals) and managers (agents). The maximization problem of the social enterprise is defined as the weighted average of the utilities of two groups of stakeholders who have an influence on the degree of the realization of the social mission and business orientations. We point out the direction which social enterprises should follow in order to obtain the highest value of their objective functions. The desired state for social enterprises should be one in which they reinvest all surpluses in the process of their mission realization and their profit is slightly higher than the required level by the principal's contract.