Economic determinants of free trade agreements

The purpose of this study is to provide the first systematic empirical analysis of the economic determinants of the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) and of the likelihood of FTAs between pairs of countries using a qualitative choice model. We develop this econometric model based upon a general equilibrium model of world trade with two factors of production, two monopolistically-competitive product markets, and explicit intercontinental and intracontinental transportation costs among multiple countries on multiple continents. The empirical model correctly predicts, based solely upon economic characteristics, 85% of the 286 FTAs existing in 1996 among 1431 pairs of countries and 97% of the remaining 1145 pairs with no FTAs.     

Trade liberalization,free trade agreements,and the value of firms: Stock market evidence from Singapore

We examine the effects of the United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on the value of firms listed in the Singapore Exchange using event study analysis. Despite the predictability of the FTA negotiations, we find that one event – the removal of the last obstacle to the free trade deal in January 2003 – increases the value of firms in some industries by 1–11% on average. These results indicate that trade liberalization and FTAs do increase the value of firms.     

Do free trade agreements actually increase members' international trade?

For over 40 years, the gravity equation has been a workhorse for cross-country empirical analyses of international trade flows and — in particular — the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on trade flows. However, the gravity equation is subject to the same econometric critique as earlier cross-industry studies of U.S. tariff and nontariff barriers and U.S. multilateral imports: trade policy is not an exogenous variable. We address econometrically the endogeneity of FTAs. Although instrumental-variable and control-function approaches do not adjust for endogeneity well, a panel approach does. Accounting econometrically for the FTA variable's endogeneity yields striking empirical results: the effect of FTAs on trade flows is quintupled. We find that, on average, an FTA approximately doubles two members' bilateral trade after 10 years.     

Overlapping free trade agreements and international trade: A network approach

In our work, we have analysed the effect of the hub‐and‐spoke nature of free trade agreements (FTA s) on trade. Contrary to previous analyses, we have considered the effects of the country's position in the FTA network on the bilateral trade of the hub country. We have conducted an in‐depth analysis of the global network of FTA s, focusing particularly on its evolution in the last 15 years. We have utilised a panel data set covering the period 1960–2010 to investigate the effects of the hub‐and‐spoke on trade. Our results show that the countries that are more connected to FTA s export more than those that are less involved, although not all the partner countries you can connect with are the same. An increase in the number of spokes that have no link between them has, on average, a negative effect on the trade of the hub, which indicates that signing FTA s with every country is not the optimal strategy for increasing trade. However, if we consider the way new FTA s change the relative position of a country, we can see that if new FTA s make the country more central or less constrained in the network, these new agreements have a strongly positive and significant pro‐trade effect.     

The trade structure effects of endogenous regional trade agreements

This paper formulates an empirical model to estimate the impact of endogenous new regional trade agreement (RTA) membership on trade structure. The likelihood of new RTA membership is influenced by economic fundamentals such as country size, factor endowments, and trade and investment costs. In a sample of country-pairs covering mainly the OECD economies we find a particularly strong effect of endogenous RTAs on intra-industry trade in a difference-in-difference analysis based on matching techniques. The associated trade volume effects are similar to the ones found in previous research on the effects of endogenous RTAs. Overall, this indicates that RTA membership might reduce inter-industry trade not only in relative but also in absolute terms and that the trade volume effect is due to the associated growth in trade within industries.     

The effects of cross-regional free trade agreements under a vertical industry structure

This paper examines the effects of a cross-regional free trade agreement (FTA) on tariffs, welfare, and the incentives for multilateral free trade in a three-country model with a vertical industry structure. We show that the FTA induces member countries to reduce their tariffs on nonmember countries. On the other hand, a nonmember country lowers its tariff on final-good imports, but raises its tariff on intermediate-good imports. Also, the FTA makes member and nonmember countries better off. After the FTA is enacted, member and nonmember countries have an incentive to support multilateral free trade, so an FTA acts as a building block for multilateral trade liberalization.     

Tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks

This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level. We demonstrate that a country's unilateral incentive to form an FTA depends on the relative magnitudes of the (negative) market concession effect and the (positive) market expansion effect, both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two FTA partner countries. Global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form FTAs. Two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an FTA when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low. This finding is robust to several extensions of the model. Our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding.     

Economic integration agreements and the margins of international trade

One of the main policy sources of trade–cost changes is the formation of an economic integration agreement (EIA), which potentially affects an importing country's welfare. This paper: (i) provides the first evidence using gravity equations of both intensive and extensive (goods) margins being affected by EIAs employing a panel data set with a large number of country pairs, product categories, and EIAs from 1962 to 2000; (ii) provides the first evidence of the differential (partial) effects of various “types” of EIAs on these intensive and extensive margins of trade; and (iii) finds a novel differential “timing” of the two margins' (partial) effects with intensive-margin effects occurring sooner than extensive-margin effects, consistent with recent theoretical predictions. The results are robust to correcting for potential sample-selection, firm-heterogeneity, and reverse causality biases.     

Free trade agreements in a small,open country: The case of Norway

Negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) has been a high political priority for Norway. Today, it has agreements with 41 countries outside the European Union (EU)/the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), resulting in one of the world's most extensive FTA networks. FTAs cover about 10% of Norway's trade—a share likely to increase in the future. These agreements eliminate tariffs on a substantial number of traded products and have gradually become more comprehensive, covering an expanding range of non‐tariff areas. Hence, they may have trade‐promoting effects beyond tariff reductions as such. On the other hand, the non‐tariff provisions often do not go further than what has already been dealt with in other international agreements or practised domestically, so their overall effect may be limited.     

Recurrent trade agreements and the value of external enforcement

This paper presents a theory of dynamic trade agreements in which external institutions, such as the WTO, play a central role in supporting credible enforcement. In our model, countries engage in ongoing negotiations, and, as a consequence, cooperative agreements become unsustainable in the absence of external enforcement institutions. By using mechanisms such as delays in dispute resolution and direct penalties, enforcement institutions can restore incentives for cooperation, despite the lack of coercive power. The occurrence of costly trade disputes, and the feasibility of mechanisms such as escape clauses, depend on the degree to which enforcement institutions can verify, and condition on, events that may lead to trade disputes.     

The value of market access and national treatment commitments in services trade agreements

This paper looks at market access and national treatment commitments for services in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and in 95 regional trade agreements (RTAs) involving the countries that are covered in the OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI). The objective is to quantify the impact of legal bindings on trade in services that result from a reduction in the uncertainty faced by exporters. Bilateral bindings indices are created for five broad service sectors (professional services, computer services, telecoms, financial services and transport services). They indicate how close the sector is from a fully bound regime with no possibility to introduce any new trade barrier, by comparing commitments with the actual trade regime. These bilateral indices are then tested over the period 2000–2014 in a structural gravity model. Despite differences across sectors, the results confirm that the legal bindings typically found in services trade agreements tend to have a positive impact on exports even if no actual liberalisation takes place.     

Rue the ROOs: Rules of origin and the gains (or losses) from trade agreements

ABSTRACT

This article provides three-good, three-country examples of trade in both intermediate inputs and final goods. These show the adverse effects that rules of origin (ROOs) can have, even in a world where every country has a free trade agreement (FTA) with every other country. ROOs may cause ubiquitous FTAs to yield a level of welfare, for everyone, that is worse than if there were no FTAs at all, and all trade were subject to common nondiscriminatory tariffs. Thus, the move to an ever increasing number of FTAs may be reducing world welfare.     

Formation of interdependent regional trade agreements and production networks

Production networks (PNs) can be defined as a determinant of trade partnership. Deepening PNs may generate positive welfare effects and lead to a proliferation in the formation of interdependent regional trade agreements (RTAs). This paper theoretically develops the link between PNs and the formation of RTAs and empirically investigates the link by applying a qualitative choice model estimation methodology (probit) with panel data that covers bilateral country‐pairs among 147 countries between 2000 and 2010. We find that the RTA formation has been strongly driven by deepening PNs between members as well as with third countries. We also find that production network‐driven RTA interdependence is member specific.     

Mars or Mercury redux: The geopolitics of bilateral trade agreements

We analyse the role of economic and security considerations in bilateral trade agreements. We use the pre‐World War I period to test whether trade agreements are governed by standard gravity variables, or by instead—or in addition—geopolitical factors. While we like others find support for standard gravity variables, we also find that defence pacts boost the probability of trade agreements by as much as 20 percentage points. Our estimates imply that were the U.S. to alienate its geopolitical allies, the likelihood and benefits of successful bilateral agreements would fall significantly. Trade creation from an agreement between the U.S. and E.U. countries would decline by about 0.6 per cent of total U.S. exports.     

The importance of heterogeneity in determining the effects of preferential trade agreements on Foreign Direct Investment

This paper investigates the importance of PTA formation in attracting inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). In particular, we examine the heterogeneous effects of different types of PTAs (FTAs or CUs) on the extensive and intensive margins of FDI and on how the interdependence among various PTAs may affect a country's ability to attract FDI inflows. We find that the larger the preferential markets to which a country has access, the larger the FDI inflows the country receives. Furthermore, we find that the type of PTA matters in determining FDI inflows. In this case, we find that the formation of CUs tends to promote more FDI inflows than the formation of FTAs. Our findings also indicate that the formation of PTAs significantly affects FDI through the intensive margin, rather than through the extensive margin. Importantly, notice that these effects are driven by the preferential markets to which a country has access and that have not established a PTA with the FDI-originating (home) country, confirming that PTA interdependence matters in determining FDI inflows.     

The effects of trade agreements on the growth of major Latin American economies

While the connection between trade openness and economic growth is generally assumed to be positive, empirically, it is not clearly demonstrable. Examinations of the relationship between trade and growth have taken a number of approaches, differing both in the empirical methods, as well as the proxies employed for trade openness, trade liberalization, and growth, but results have been decidedly mixed. Our research differs from prior studies in that it does not examine whether trade policy, trade liberalization or the level of trade itself enhances GDP; but rather whether participating in a specific type of trade agreement/union and/or the number of trade agreements to which a given country or region belongs enhances a country's level of growth. For this purpose, we study the relationship between trade agreements and growth for 18 Latin American countries between 1960 and 2008. Empirical analysis uses an adaptation of the neoclassical Solow growth model. Even though supporters of globalization advance the notion that involvement in trade agreements will help a country's economy, our findings suggest that that may not be consistently so.     

Multilateral stability and efficiency of trade agreements: A network formation approach

We study the endogenous network formation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements by means of hypergraphs and introduce the equilibrium concept of multilateral stability. We consider multicountry settings with a firm in each country that produces a homogeneous good and competes as a Cournot oligopolist in each market. Under endogenous tariffs, we find that a multilateral trade agreement governing the rules and norms of tariff setting, that is the WTO/GATT regime itself, together with a bilateral preferential trade agreement (PTA) is multilaterally stable. We also find that the existence of the WTO is necessary for the stability of the trading system. We further analyse the impact of PTAs on multilateral tariffs within the WTO. We find that the formation of PTAs increases countries' incentives for multilateral tariff reduction.     

Endogenous political organization and the value of trade agreements

In a bargaining model of endogenous protection, I introduce fixed costs of political-organization that need to be incurred by capitalists prior to actual lobbying. Unlike Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [J. Pol. Econ. 106(3) (1998) 575] intersectoral capital mobility is disallowed. Nevertheless, I am still able to obtain their main result that a government with low bargaining power vis-à-vis the import-competing lobby precommits to a free-trade agreement. Further, with high fixed organizational costs, the government prefers to stay out of such agreements. Its maximum bargaining power consistent with signing a trade agreement has an inverse-V-shaped relationship with respect to the size of fixed costs.     

Politics of free trade areas: tariffs versus quotas

In this paper we compare and contrast the political viability of bilateral Free Trade Area (FTA) Agreements in the presence of tariffs and quotas. Assuming that the government maximizes a weighted sum of welfare and producer profits, we show that the political viability of FTAs varies according to whether trade restrictions take the form of tariffs or quotas. A key result is that whereas an FTA is unambiguously rejected by one of the countries under a tariff, it may be endorsed by both trading partners under a voluntary export quota or import quota that provides equal protection as the tariff.     

How trade and investment agreements affect bilateral foreign direct investment: Results from a structural gravity model

We employ a structural gravity approach to analyse the impact of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and other policies on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI). We use the UNCTAD global database on bilateral FDI stocks and flows. To control for the heterogeneous nature of PTAs, we employ two different indicators of PTA depth. We find that on average signing a PTA increases bilateral FDI stocks by around 30%. Nevertheless, we also find that ‘deeper’ or comprehensive PTAs (e.g., including provisions on investment, public procurement and intellectual property rights provisions) do not have a significantly different impact than signing regular PTAs. Belonging to the EU single market, on the other hand, has a strong impact and increases bilateral FDI by around 135%, and signing a BIT has an effect that is comparable to signing a PTA.