Do credit rating agencies add to the dynamics of emerging market crises?

This study investigates the role of credit rating agencies in international financial markets. With an index of speculative market pressure it is analyzed whether sovereign ratings changes have an impact on the financial stability in emerging market economies. The event study analysis indicates that sovereign rating changes have substantial influence on the size and volatility of emerging markets lending. The empirical results are significantly stronger in the case of government's downgrades and negative imminent rating actions than in the case of agencies’ positive rating adjustments. Sovereign rating changes anticipated by market participants have a smaller impact on financial markets in emerging economies.     

Market reaction to anticipated announcements

In this paper we analyze how anticipating a forthcoming public announcement affects the market reaction to the announcement by altering investors' incentives to acquire private information. Specifically, we study price change, volume, and information asymmetry at the time of the announcement. We also investigate how information acquisition, information asymmetry, price, and volume are influenced by the quality of prior knowledge, the marginal cost of gathering information, the degree of risk tolerance, and noise. Finally, we compare market reactions to anticipated announcements of known precision with the response to announcements that are either unanticipated or of uncertain quality.     

Pledgeability,Industry Liquidity,and Financing Cycles

Why do firms choose high debt when they anticipate high valuations, and underperform subsequently? We propose a theory of financing cycles where the importance of creditors’ control rights over cash flows (“pledgeability”) varies with industry liquidity. The market allows firms take on more debt when they anticipate higher future liquidity. However, both high anticipated liquidity and the resulting high debt limit their incentives to enhance pledgeability. This has prolonged adverse effects in a downturn. Because these effects are hard to contract upon, higher anticipated liquidity can also reduce a firm's current access to finance.     

How Do Anticipated Changes to Short‐Term Market Rates Influence Banks' Retail Interest Rates? Evidence from the Four Major Euro Area Economies

In this paper, we argue that banks anticipate short‐term market rates when setting interest rates on loans and deposits. In order to include anticipated rates in an empirical model, we use two methods to forecast market rates—a level, slope, curvature model, and a principal components model—before including them in a model of retail rate adjustment for four retail rates in four major euro area economies. Using both aggregate data and data from individual French banks, we find a significant role for forecasts of market rates in determining retail rates; alternative specifications with futures information yield comparable results.     

Resource Allocation Auctions within Firms

There is growing interest in the use of markets within firms. Proponents have noted that markets are a simple and efficient mechanism for allocating resources in economies in which information is dispersed. In contrast to the use of markets in the broader economy, the efficiency of an internal market is determined in large part by the endogenous contractual incentives provided to the participating, privately informed agents. In this paper, we study the optimal design of managerial incentives when resources are allocated by an internal auction market, as well as the efficiency of the resulting resource allocations. We show that the internal auction market can achieve first‐best resource allocations and decisions, but only at an excessive cost in compensation payments. We then identify conditions under which the internal auction market and associated optimal incentive contracts achieve the benchmark second‐best outcome as determined using a direct revelation mechanism. The advantage of the auction is that it is easier to implement than the direct revelation mechanism. When the internal auction mechanism is unable to achieve second‐best, we characterize the factors that determine the magnitude of the shortfall. Overall, our results speak to the robust performance of relatively simple market mechanisms and associated incentive systems in resolving resource allocation problems within firms.     

Market discipline or rent extraction: Impacts of share trading by foreign institutional investors in different corporate governance and investor protection environments

Minority investors' reliance on market discipline can vary with different country-level investor protection and firm-level corporate governance environments, which affect both discipline and rent extraction incentives of foreign institutional investors (FIIs). Using data from 47 economies between 2009 and 2017, we find that firm value increases with FIIs aggressive trading but decreases with FIIs discreet trading. The positive and negative impacts of FIIs trading are strengthened when investor protection is stronger, but weakened when corporate governance is stronger. Our analysis enhances understanding of trade-offs of FIIs trading between discipline and rent extraction in different corporate governance and investor protection environments.     

Minority shareholders' activism and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

This study investigates the effect of minority shareholders' activism on stock price crash risk in the Chinese stock market. Using a novel dataset on minority shareholders' attendance at annual general meetings (AGMs), we find that minority shareholders' attendance, especially the onsite attendance, significantly exacerbates firms' future crash risk. The results are robust to instrumental variable approach, placebo tests, and alternative measures of minority shareholders' attendance and crash risk. We also find three channels: incremental analyst following, media coverage and retail attention, all of which expand market pressure and exacerbate managers' incentives to withhold bad news. Extended analyses show that the impact of minority shareholders' attendance is less pronounced among firms with better investor protection. Overall, our findings are helpful to understand the importance of minority shareholders' activism and its unintended consequences on stock market in the emerging economies.     

Technology and Firm Size-Wage Differentials in Colombia, Mexico, and Taiwan (China)

In many economies, studies have found large wage differentialsnot accounted for by work force characteristics, collectivebargaining, or market power. Researchers attribute these differentialsto either unobserved worker quality or pay incentives designedto elicit worker effort. This article finds empirical supportfor an alternative explanation: These wage differentials resultfrom firms' technology-generating activities. Using firm-leveldata from Colombia, Mexico, and Taiwan (China), the articlecompares the effects of research and development, worker training,and exports by employers on the wages of skilled and unskilledworkers. The results suggest that technology investments leadto large wage premiums for skilled workers but not for unskilledworkers. These wage premiums are primarily the result of investmentsin research and development and in training, while exportingis relatively less important except in Colombia.     

Who said large banks don’t experience scale economies? Evidence from a risk-return-driven cost function

The Great Recession focused attention on large financial institutions and systemic risk. We investigate whether large size provides any cost advantages to the economy and, if so, whether these cost advantages are due to technological scale economies or too-big-to-fail subsidies. Estimating scale economies is made more complex by risk-taking. Better diversification resulting from larger scale generates scale economies but also incentives to take more risk. When this additional risk-taking adds to cost, it can obscure the underlying scale economies and engender misleading econometric estimates of them. Using data pre- and post-crisis, we estimate scale economies using two production models. The standard model ignores endogenous risk-taking and finds little evidence of scale economies. The model accounting for managerial risk preferences and endogenous risk-taking finds large scale economies, which are not driven by too-big-to-fail considerations. We evaluate the costs and competitive implications of breaking up the largest banks into smaller banks.     

Fiscal Transparency,Fiscal Performance and Credit Ratings

Fiscal transparency can provide policymakers with incentives to adopt better policies by enhancing the public debate on the design and sustainability of fiscal policy and establishing accountability for their implementation. Fiscal transparency can also reduce uncertainty about fiscal policy and fiscal outturns by providing more information on the underlying fiscal position and fiscal risks. Both effects suggest that countries should benefit from adopting transparency enhancing policies through better market assessments of their sovereign risk. In this paper, we investigate whether fiscal transparency has an effect on market perceptions of sovereign risk, as measured by sovereign credit ratings, and if so, through which channels. We find that fiscal transparency has a positive and significant effect on ratings – one standard deviation increase in fiscal transparency increases credit ratings by 0.7 and 1 notches (or steps in the credit rating scale) in advanced and developing economies, respectively – but its effect works through different channels in advanced and developing economies. In advanced economies, fiscal transparency is associated with better fiscal outcomes, leading indirectly to higher credit ratings. In developing economies, the direct uncertainty‐reducing effect of fiscal transparency seems to be more important. Indeed, the effect of fiscal transparency on fiscal performance is found to increase with the level of institutional development.     

Deposit insurance coverage,ownership, and banks' risk-taking in emerging markets

We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline on banks' risk-taking. Market discipline is determined by the extent of explicit deposit insurance, as well as by the credibility of non-insurance of groups of depositors and other creditors. Furthermore, market discipline depends on the ownership structure of banks and the responsiveness of bank managers to market incentives. An expected U-shaped relationship between explicit deposit insurance coverage and banks' risk-taking is influenced by country specific institutional factors, including bank ownership. We analyze specifically how government ownership, foreign ownership and shareholder rights affect the disciplinary effect of partial deposit insurance systems in a cross-section analysis of industrial and emerging market economies, as well as in emerging markets alone. The coverage that maximizes market discipline depends on country-specific characteristics of bank governance. This “risk-minimizing” deposit insurance coverage is compared to the actual coverage in a group of countries in emerging markets in Eastern Europe and Asia.     

Corporate ownership concentration and audit fees: The case of an emerging economy

The paper investigates the effects of corporate ownership concentration on audit fees in emerging economies, using Bangladesh as a case. Prior studies have indicated that audit fees in Bangladesh are significantly low. Also, the Bangladeshi private sector is dominated by high ownership concentration. Agency theory predicts that in an efficient market, managers in a highly concentrated ownership situation will have sufficient incentives to have more rigorous audits performed. However, managers in emerging economies, where the markets are not as strong, may not have similar incentives. We test whether audit fees in Bangladesh are related to corporate ownership concentration. Our results indicate that audit fees have a significant negative relationship with sponsor and institutional ownership concentrations. This indicates that in Bangladesh, companies actually pay lower audit fees when these are dominated by sponsor and institutional shareholders. For the public shareholders, we find a negative, but statistically insignificant relationship. The results seem to suggest that corporate ownership pattern may be a major factor in explaining the low audit fees in Bangladesh.     

Do Buyer Incentives Work for Houses during a Real Estate Downturn?

The impact of incentives on marketing duration is examined for residential real estate using data from the Multiple Listing Service during a real estate downturn. The focus is on incentives offered directly by sellers to potential homebuyers. The evidence suggests that incentives are not capitalized into the selling price during the softened market conditions. Alternatively, incentives are found to have a significant reduction in marketing time, however this is found to be true only for closing costs and not for other incentive classifications. The benefit of reduced expected market time from offering incentives is quickly diminished when the seller initially overprices the listing by a large amount.     

Client discretion, switching costs, and financial innovation

We analyze the incentives of investment banks to develop innovativeproducts. We show that client characteristics and market structureaffect these incentives significantly. Investment banks withlarger market shares have greater incentives to innovate andsmaller banks are likely to share their innovations with thelargest bank. Innovation incentives increase in volatile environmentsand regulatory scrutiny actually encourages loophole exploitationactivity. Our predictions are consistent with stylized factsand the analysis has broad testable implications for innovativeactivity in other markets similarly characterized by a lackof comprehensive protection for intellectual property rights,for example, the software industry.     

GLOBALIZATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS

This article has three basic aims: (1) to analyze the impact of the opening of their capital markets on the economies of host countries; (2) to investigate the causes of the Asian financial crisis; and (3) to evaluate the likely effects of the South Korean government's recent attempts to restructure its corporate sector. Although the recent Asian financial crisis has led some to question the merits of open capital markets and to call for regulatory restraints on capital flows across international borders, the scientific evidence suggests that the opening of stock markets to foreign investors has been largely beneficial for emerging economies. On average, stock market liberalization has been accompanied by increases in stock prices and reductions in stock return volatility, reductions in inflation, and reductions in the rate of currency depreciation. Much of the blame for the Asian currency crises is assigned to Asian policymakers' futile attempts to defy market forces by trying to maintain their currencies at artificially high levels. But a more fundamental cause of Asia's economic problems has been the widespread value destruction by Asian corporations, which has led to a lower value for the overall economy and weakened the banking sector. The government-directed banking systems and weak corporate governance structures (including managerial incentives to increase size and market share at the expense of shareholders) that characterize most Asian economies have resulted in systematic overinvestment, bloated payrolls, and sharp declines in corporate profitability. While applauding most of the Korean government's recent measures to reform the economy, the article expresses skepticism about the government-mandated restructuring of the chaebol known as the “big deal.” Rather than trying to direct the process of restructuring, Korean policymakers should limit their efforts to improving the market mechanism by increasing competition in the markets for capital, corporate control, and goods and services. The Korean market for corporate control transactions could be greatly improved by increasing the efficiency of bankruptcy proceedings and by allowing hostile takeovers by foreign as well as domestic investors. To increase the productivity of capital, Asian companies should seek to realign managerial with shareholder interests by tying compensation to measures of value creation like EVA.     

Inflation Targeting Around the World

This paper examines the inflation record of twenty-nine inflation- and noninflation-targeting economies. Both industrial and emerging market economies are considered. Empirical evidence is based on a comparison of actual and forecasted inflation, an econometric analysis that estimates changes in inflation persistence, and an estimate of the probability of a breach in the inflation target as a proxy for the fragility of the targeting regime. I find that inflation persistence has fallen in only a handful of emerging market economies. However, the inflationtargeting regime is not especially fragile in emerging market economies. As these economies gain experience with inflation targets and respond appropriately to forecast errors generated by the private sector, the likelihood of breaches in the target ranges tends to fall.     

Assessing time-varying stock market integration in Economic and Monetary Union for normal and crisis periods

In this paper, we examine the stock market integration process amongst 17 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries from January 2002 to June 2013 over a normal period as well as for the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and Eurozone Debt Crisis (EDC) periods. We classify the economies in three groups (A, B and C) based on their GDP to examine whether the economic size influences financial integration. Seven indicators are used for the purpose, namely, beta convergence, sigma convergence, variance ratio, asymmetric DCC, dynamic cointegration, market synchronisation measure and common components approach. The results suggest that large-sized EMU economies (termed as Group A) exhibit strong stock market integration. Moderate integration is observed for middle-sized EMU economies with old membership (termed as Group B). Small-sized economies (termed as Group C) economies seemed to be least integrated within the EMU stock market system. The findings further suggest presence of contagion effects as one moves from normal to crisis periods, which are specifically stronger for more integrated economies of Group A. We recommend institutional, regulatory and other policy reforms for Group B and especially Group C to achieve higher level of integration.     

Microfinance institutions and International Financial Reporting Standards: An exploratory analysis

Previous studies analyzing firms’ incentives to choose international accounting standards show that firms with strong contracting incentives will be more likely to comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These studies are mostly centered on developed economies and are based on European and US data. Little is known about development finance organizations’ incentives to choose to draft their financial statements according to IFRS. Because commercialized microfinance institutions (MFIs) have strong contracting incentives, we investigate whether commercialization drives the choice of IFRS and study a pooled international sample of MFIs’ audited financial statements extracted from the MIX from 2007 to 2014. Consistent with our predictions, evidence shows that commercialization and maturity (age) are likely to drive the MFIs’ choice to comply with IFRS. Results are robust after controlling for heterogeneity in national regulations with regard to IFRS.     

央行汇市干预的效果与经验

外汇市场干预是大多数国家央行管理汇率的主要手段。2008年全球金融危机以及其后的欧美债务危机,使得金融市场动荡加剧,外汇市场因避险资金的流动也日益不平静,央行的汇市干预在目标、方式、效果、影响等方面部呈现出一些新的特点,文章对此进行回顾和总结,并从将外汇干预作为宏观调控的组成部分、变被动干预为主动干预以及扩展干预模式等方面,就进一步完善央行汇市干预方式提出政策建议。     

基金激励机制的变化对股市波动的影响研究

依据中国基金激励机制经历的四个阶段,将1998年4月7日～2011年6月30日分成四个时间段。采用EGARCH-M模型并引入虚拟变量对不同时间段的激励机制进行比较研究,发现在中国基金市场中,固定比率的管理费激励机制对股市波动的影响最小。因此,从股市稳定的角度来说,中国基金市场应采取固定比率的管理费激励机制。