Auctioning Immigration Visas

Freeman (2006 ) suggested that auctioning immigration visas and redistributing the revenue to native residents in the host country would increase migration from low-income to high-income countries. The effect of the auctioning of immigration visas, in the Ricardian model from Findlay (1982 ), on the optimal level of immigration for the host country is considered. It is shown that auctioning immigration visas will lead to a positive level of immigration only if the initial wage difference between the host country and the source country is substantial. The cost of the immigration visa is more than half the earnings of the immigrant worker.     

Aging,Factor Returns,and Immigration Policy

Immigration has various economic and non‐economic effects on the destination country's inhabitants. In this paper, we focus on the impact of immigration on factor returns and analyze how aging affects immigration policy, employing a dynamic political‐economy model of representative democracy. Aging, that is, a decline in the growth rate of the native population, has an expansionary effect on immigration in this framework. This immigration effect may even overcompensate the initial contraction of the labor force. We show that the immigration rate in the representative democracy equilibrium exceeds the immigration rate that would maximize welfare of current and future generations, and we also discuss the influence of social security on immigration policy.     

How does immigration affect modes of foreign market access: trade and FDI?

This article presents a study of the effects of immigration on trade and FDI. Our analysis is distinct from previous work because it systematically examines the interactions between immigration, trade and FDI. Previous studies treated FDI–immigration relationships as being independent of the modes of foreign market access. Using bilateral data of Japan and 28 other economies for the period 1996–2011, our analysis shows that FDI inflows become more dominant compared to imports when skilled immigration flows increase and less dominant when unskilled immigration flows increase. The results suggest that the relevant policy instruments as regards the promotion of trade, FDI and immigration should vary depending on economic goals, such as current account balances and labour shortages.     

The U.S. immigration crisis

A review of the factors affecting immigration to the United States is presented. The authors develop the argument that present levels of immigration, particularly illegal immigration, are detrimental to U.S. interests, and that current global population trends will make this situation progressively worse. Stricter controls on immigration are considered.     

Dynamic effects of changes to Japanese immigration policy

This paper uses a single-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous households to analyse Japanese immigration policy. We examine the effects on output, consumption, factor prices, and utility. We do this for both steady states and transition paths. We find that: (a) aggregate output, investment, and consumption in Japan are likely to rise with any sort of loosening of immigration restrictions; (b) allowing more skilled immigration generates greater aggregate changes; (c) raising skilled immigration relative to unskilled immigration drives down skilled workers’ wages, consumption, and utility, while cutting the skilled to unskilled immigration share has the opposite effects; and (d) such immigration policy changes have small effects compared to those that occur naturally due to business cycle fluctuations     

Immigration quotas and skill upgrading

A reason why immigration policy is such a contended issue is that often immigrants end up obtaining the right to vote and, hence, may affect future policies. This paper offers a dynamic, general equilibrium model of immigration policy. In each period, a heterogeneously skilled population chooses an immigration policy by majority vote. Voters anticipate that immigration affects the skill premium and the skill composition of the electorate. The main insight is the existence of a trade-off between skill complementary immigration and the resulting shift in political power. I argue that a reasonably parameterized version of the model is consistent with the main features of US immigration.     

IMMIGRATION UNEMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP: THE EVIDENCE FROM CANADA*

This paper examines the relationship between unemployment and immigration in Canada. The bi‐directional causality test finds no evidence of a significant effect of Canadian immigration on unemployment. Cointegration tests indicate that there is no observed increase in aggregate unemployment due to immigration in the long run. The results from the causality test based on the vector error correction model confirm that, in the short run, past unemployment does cause (less) immigration but not vice versa. There is also a long‐run positive relationship among per‐capita GDP, immigration rate and real wages. The results indicate that, in the short‐run, more immigration is possibly associated with attractive Canadian immigration policies, and in the long‐run, as the labour market adjusts, Canadian‐born workers are likely to benefit from increased migration.     

EFFECTS OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE 1980–1990 U.S. WAGE EXPERIENCE

This paper questions the claim that U.S. immigration should be reduced because the economy can no longer absorb immigrants as it has in the past. Analysis of male hourly wages shows that the effect of immigration on wages did not change between 1980 and 1990. Further, immigration had no negative effects on wages in 1980 or 1990. These results suggest that the capacity of the labor market to absorb immigrants has not been reduced. Additional analysis shows that, controlling for personal characteristics, the hourly wages of the average native and immigrant worker in areas of high and medium immigration relative to areas of low immigration increased between 1980 and 1990. However, Latino immigrants are affected negatively by immigration.     

Does immigration crowd out foreign direct investment inflows? Tradeoff between contemporaneous FDI-immigration substitution and ethnic network externalities

This study examines the dynamic interactions between immigration and inward foreign direct investment (FDI) using bilateral data on these indicators between Japan and each of the 29 countries/economies of origin for both FDI and immigrants into Japan during 1996–2011. Although literature shows a positive FDI–migration relationship, I distinguish between short- and long-term effects of immigration, and show a contemporaneous negative relationship between FDI and immigration. The results show that immigration flows discourage FDI inflows (FDI–migration substitution), although larger immigration stocks induce FDI inflows (ethnic network externalities). Therefore, total effects need to be evaluated considering a tradeoff between contemporaneous substitution and the longer-term complementarity from network effects. While inward FDI promotion and immigration enhancement are often suggested as solutions to resolving shortages in domestic savings and labor, our results have implications for addressing the increasingly daunting policy issue of population aging.     

Controlling Illegal Immigration: Border Control vs. Domestic Enforcement

This paper presents a two-country general equilibrium model where international mobility of labor is prohibited. Illegal immigration nevertheless occurs. The probability of success at illegal immigration depends on resources allocated to border control and domestic enforcements. We examine the effects of switching resources form border control to domestic enforcement on illegal immigration and on welfare levels. We characterize the allocation of resources between the two methods of immigration control, that minimizes illegal immigration, and find that, starting from this allocation, moving resources from border control to domestic enforcement is unambiguously welfare improving for the destination country.

     

Selective Immigration Policies and Wages Inequality

We quantify the overall impact of immigration on native wages in France from 1990 to 2010. Our short‐run simulations indicate that immigration has decreased native wages by 0.6%. We find on average no impact of immigration on wages in the long run. However, we show that the long‐run effects of immigration on wages are detrimental to high‐skilled native workers and benefits to low‐skilled native workers. Our structural estimation allows us to evaluate the impact of “selective” migration policies. In particular, we find that selective immigration policies toward highly educated workers reduce the wage dispersion of French native workers.     

Illegal immigration: a supply side analysis

"This paper analyzes the supply-side determinants of illegal immigration using a three-sector general equilibrium model of the source country. Agricultural liberalization raises illegal immigration while liberalization of the high tech sector reduces it. In contrast, capital mobility in the source country renders trade policy ineffective for controlling illegal immigration. Paradoxically, increased enforcement (by the host country) may raise source country unskilled wages, although illegal immigration falls. Finally, under capital mobility, a rise in the source country restrictions on capital inflow raises the level of illegal immigration and reduces the effectiveness of border enforcement efforts by the host country."     

Welfare Effects of Immigration Policies in the Presence of Skilled,Unskilled Labor and Capital Mobility

This paper investigates the welfare consequences of immigration policies in a model with two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, and international capital mobility. The paper examines the effect of government policies, which change the immigration cost and cause immigration of one type of labor, on the welfare of natives, when the other types of labor and/or capital are also mobile. It is shown, for example, in the absence of capital mobility, if skilled and unskilled labor are highly complementary in production, then a decrease in the immigration cost of the net fiscal contributor skilled labor that causes its immigration, decreases the welfare of natives.     

Temporary and Permanent Immigration under Unionization

This paper investigates permanent and temporary immigration and remittance under the coexistence of unionized and non‐unionized manufacturing firms in a two‐sector economy. The impacts of immigration and remittance on respectively wages, employment, the union–non‐union wage gap and national welfare are analyzed. It is found that both permanent immigration (economy‐wide) and temporary immigration in agriculture bring positive effects on most variables (except the competitive wage), but widens the wage gap and causes income redistribution in the host country. However, if temporary immigrants work in manufacturing only, then all wages and the union–non‐union wage gap fall. That is, workers become more equally paid but poorer. In addition, remittance and globalization cause negative effects on union workers and employers. It is perhaps such consequences and the income redistribution effect of immigration that cause the media to paint a negative image of immigration.     

The Impact of Immigration on the Wage Differential in Australia

This paper investigates the impact of immigration on the wage differential between skilled and unskilled labour using simulation analysis from a dynamic intertemporal general equilibrium model. The results show that immigration cannot explain variations of the wage differential in Australia during the past 10 years. In most of the years investigated, immigration only explains a small part of the change in the wage differential. There is also no evidence that immigration exerts significant downward pressure on the unskilled wage.     

THE NON‐TRADED SECTOR,LOBBYING, AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE CUSTOMS UNION AND THE COMMON MARKET

This paper models immigration policy as the outcome of political competition between interest groups representing individuals employed in different sectors. In standard positive theory, restrictive immigration policy results from a low‐skilled median voter voting against predominantly low‐skilled immigration. In the present paper, in contrast, once trade policies are liberalized, restrictive immigration policy results from anti‐immigration lobbying by interest groups representing the non‐traded sectors. It is shown that this is in line with empirical regularities from recent episodes of restrictive immigration legislation in the European Union. It is further shown that if governments negotiate bilaterally over trade and migration policy regimes, the equilibrium regime depends (i) on the sequencing of the international negotiation process and (ii) on the set of available trade and migration policy regimes. In particular, the most comprehensive and most welfare‐beneficial type of liberalization may be rejected only because a less comprehensive type of liberalization is available.     

Immigration vs. poverty: Causal impact on demand for redistribution in a survey experiment

We investigate how demand for both the financing and the provision of redistributive policies is affected by information about immigration and poverty. Information about immigration has a positive impact on desired tax progressivity among low-income respondents and a negative one among higher income earners. Information about poverty has no impact. On the provision side, middle- and high-income respondents increase desired public education expenditure in response to poverty, while low-income respondents reduce desired education spending in response to immigration. These heterogeneities are consistent with protectionist reactions to immigration and poverty.     

U.S. IMMIGRATION REFORM: POLICY ISSUES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

In recent years, legal U. S. immigration has approached historically high levels, and illegal immigration has been thought to be high and perhaps rising. Consequently, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy proposed sweeping changes in the nation's immigration laws. During 1984, both the Senate and House passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (Simpson-Mazzoli Bill). This bill subsequently died in the conference committee that was established to reconcile differences between the bill's two versions. The proposed act has three major provisions: (1) control of illegal immigration, (2) legalization of alienstatus, and (3) reform of legal immigration. Both the House and Senate versions would maintain the present orientation of U.S. immigration policy toward family reunification, but the Senate proposed significant changes in legal immigration restrictions that would shift policy slightly more toward labor considerations. These proposed changes were eliminated in the compromise made in the conference committee. Employer sanctions and legalization of illegal aliens were left as the two most prominent alterations to existing policy. During 1985, the 99th Congress is likely to reconsider the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, perhaps in a streamlined version which emphasizes employer sanctions, legalization, and a substantial increase in border enforcement.     

Immigration and Unemployment*

The wisdom of maintaining high levels of immigration into Australia has been questioned, particularly on the grounds that migration contributes to aggregate unemployment. This paper uses both statistical causality techniques and conventional structural models to investigate the relationship between immigration and unemployment in the post-war period in Australia. The tests find no evidence of any association from migration to unemployment, though there is strong evidence of a significant effect of Australian unemployment on migration. The results indicate that immigration policy should not be dictated by unfounded fears of immigration causing unemployment, at least over the range of previous Australian experience.     

Migration, Jobs and Welfare: A General Equilibrium Analysis

Immigration has been an important element of the economic development of many countries, although in recent years there has been an intensification of doubts about the benefits of further immigration. This paper brings some simple general‐equilibrium modelling tools to bear on the question of the employment and welfare effects of immigration. Employment and taxation effects, rather than wage and distributional effects, are found to be crucial in determining the impact of immigration on the welfare of factor‐owners in the receiving country. These employment effects depend on the type of immigration and the substitutability or complementarity relationships between immigrant labour and unemployed labour. Certain types of immigration are shown to be Pareto‐improving for the receiving country, without any need for lump‐sum transfers. Simple numerical simulations illustrate the results.