A corporation’s culture as an impetus for spinoffs and a driving force of industry evolution

We offer a theory of spinoffs that explains some salient aspects of these important market entrants. In infant industries, a great share of new market opportunities is depleted by firms that spinoff from incumbents. A model emphasizing the relation between incumbents’ evolving corporate cultures and the generation of spinoffs explains this regularity in industry evolution. By doing so, we capture different patterns in firm development that finally will help explain the evolutionary paths that industries may follow. We show that organizations reach a critical size that entails the collapse of a cooperative culture and triggers the exodus of personnel founding own firms. Thereby, organizations with a cooperative culture active in a dynamic business environment provide ideal training grounds for potential founders. Moreover, we argue that cooperative firm cultures and processes of “entrepreneurial imprinting” are important sources of spinoffs’ superior capabilities concerning their later market performance. We relate our findings to empirical evidence on developmental patterns in industries, such as genealogies and performance of spinoffs.     

商业模式与新进入者领先：来自电动汽车产业的实证研究

从商业模式视角探索为何目前在电动汽车市场上处于领先地位的是新进入者而非在资源上更具优势的在位者。分别在中美两国选择新进入者比亚迪和特斯拉及在位者上汽和通用汽车进行案例研究。基于专家访谈、实地参观和文献调研发现，新进入者和在位者商业模式存在显著差异，发挥电动汽车技术特性价值主张、垂直整合价值网络和可变成本较低的收支结构是新进入者获取领先优势的重要因素。丰富了现有关于新进入者创新及电动汽车产业商业模式的研究，有助于加深对两个问题的理解：一是当在位者比新进入者更早采用新技术时，新进入者应如何利用商业模式取得领先地位；二是哪种商业模式更有利于企业在电动汽车产业市场上获取领先地位。     

R&D subsidies in a model of growth with dynamic market structure

This paper presents the effects of an R&D subsidy in a Schumpeterian general equilibrium model with rich industry dynamics. R&D subsidies raise the long-run growth rate, but they also raise the level of industry concentration. In the model firms compete for market share through process R&D endogenously determining the market structure within and across industries. Endogeneity of the market structure allows for analysis of changes in the moments of the firm size distribution in response to policy. R&D subsidies primarily benefit large incumbent firms who increase their innovation rates creating a greater technological barrier to entry. Concentration increases with fewer firms and a higher variance in the market shares. In general equilibrium, the greater distortions in the product market cause the wage rate to fall which leads to increased turnover rates. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that the model captures a large number of empirical regularities described in the industrial organization literature, but absent from most endogenous growth models. These features, such as entering firms are small relative to incumbents, the hazard rate of exit is negatively related to firm size, and large firms spend more on R&D than small firms play important roles in understanding the impact of R&D subsidies on the economy.     

Innovation,competition and firm size distribution on fragmented markets

This paper presents a simple model of firm and consumer behavior. We formulate a sub-market entry game, where boundedly rational firms decide on investing in R&D for inventing new products that will appeal to targeted groups of consumers. The success depends on the amount of resources available for the project as well as on the firm’s familiarity with market characteristics. Successful innovation feeds back into the firm size and (potentially into) market knowledge and increases the future R&D productivity. A new product decreases the market-shares of incumbents. However, this business stealing effect is asymmetric across incumbent population. We identify the section of parameter space where firms have an incentive to diversify horizontally. In this section, the model results in rich industrial dynamics. Firm size heterogeneity emerges endogenously in the model. Equilibrium firm size distributions are heavy tailed and skewed to the right. The heaviness of the tail depends on submarket specificity of firm’s market knowledge. This relationship is non-monotonic, emphasizing two different effects of innovation on industrial dynamics (positive feedback and asymmetric business stealing).     

WHY DO LARGE FIRMS TEND TO INTEGRATE VERTICALLY?

We provide a theoretical framework to discuss the relation between firm size and vertical structures. The framework is based on a Hotelling model with three downstream and three upstream firms. We show that vertical integration enhances the degree of product differentiation and show the strategic complementarity of product positioning. We also show that the downstream firm that has the largest market share is more likely to integrate vertically. Enhancing the degree of product differentiation is more beneficial for the large firm than for the rest of the downstream firms because the large firm supplies a large amount of product.     

Technology diffusion and growth

Suppose firms are subject to decreasing returns and permanent idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Suppose also firms can only stay in business by continuously paying a fixed cost. New firms can enter. Firms with a history of relatively good productivity shocks tend to survive and others are forced to exit. This paper identifies assumptions about entry that guarantee a stationary firm size distribution and lead to balanced growth. The range of technology diffusion mechanisms that can be considered is greatly expanded relative to Luttmer (2007) [21]. If entrants can make only small improvements over the technologies used by the least productive incumbents, then the firm size distribution approximates Zipf?s law and entry and exit rates are high, as in the data.     

Entry and market selection of firms: A laboratory study

We study how markets adjust to the entry of new firms under different conditions. Two incumbents face entry by three other firms. When firms’ costs are equal, entry always leads consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer surplus to equilibrium. With cost asymmetries, market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers’ standpoint but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. Simultaneous entry is in the short run more favorable to consumers than sequential entry. A longer incumbency phase favors consumers after entry.     

Pre-entry experience,technological complementarities,and the survival of de-novo entrants. Evidence from the US telecommunications industry

We investigate the effect of pre-entry experience on firms’ performance in terms of survival. In particular we focus on entrants from a related upstream industry – semiconductors – into a downstream industry – telecommunications. We examine a sample of 336 de-novo start-ups in the US telecommunication industry and we estimate a discrete time hazard model of firm exit. Our findings show that, after controlling for both firms and founders’ characteristics, firms whose founders had prior experience in a related upstream industry such as semiconductors enjoy a relatively lower hazard of exit with respect to intra-industry spinoffs and other types of start-ups. Additionally, background heterogeneity of the founding team is an important determinant of survival for the firms in our sample. Our results point to the role of interdependences and technological complementarities between two vertically related industries in affecting the performance of new entrants.     

The Role of Firms' Collaborative Agreements in the Information Technology Industry Transformation

While most articles on firm partnerships focus on the firm, the alliance or networks, we investigate the role of collaborative agreements during industrial transformation phases. Observation of a single industry, the Information Technology (IT) industry, shows that the growth of collaborative agreements formed by industry leaders in the early 1990s can be interpreted as an attempt to absorb a major industry shock characterized by vertical disintegration and the emergence of 'divided technical leadership'. Such firms have adopted collaborative agreements to maintain their leadership by controlling new entrants in the new industry segments that have resulted from the disintegration. Partnerships became a strategic component of the new 'divided technical leadership' market structure that emerged from the competitive crash of the early 1990s.     

企业生产率的代际效应和年龄效应

本文利用1998年到2004年中国制造业企业数据,从企业代际和年龄的角度研究了中国制造业企业的生产率变动,得到三个基本发现:(1)新进入企业总是能够将当时先进的技术知识和组织制度"物化"在企业的物质和组织资本中,存续企业也能通过"干中学"而提升其生产效率;而且只有在改革开始以后成立的企业才显现出显著的日益上升的代际优势;(2)中国制造业企业的代际和年龄优势并没有相应反映在外资企业上,外资企业的代际优势几乎没有,正年龄效应在第6年后也几乎消失;(3)尽管国有企业平均来看较其他所有制企业的生产率低,但在1988年之后新成立的国有企业日益增加的代际优势,表现出了明显的"追赶"效应。     

Which Firms Buy Licenses? Market Positions and License Expenditures*

This paper presents the empirical results of a comparison of technology licensing expenditures of German companies in order to test implications of the Gilbert and Newbery (1982) model. Aside from standard control variables, the motives for innovation expenditures are also taken into account. We differentiate between firms intending to secure their present position in the market (incumbents) and those intending to enter a new market (challengers). In line with the prediction of the Gilbert and Newbery model, we find that incumbents show higher expenditures for technology licenses than potential entrants.     

The political economy of entry barriers

We study a political economy model of entry barriers. Each period the policymaker determines whether to impose a high barrier to entry, and the special interest groups try to influence the policymaker's decision. Entry is accompanied by creative destruction—when many new firms enter, old firms are more likely to be driven out of the market. Therefore the current incumbents (industry leaders) tend to lobby for a higher entry barrier and potential entrants (industry followers) are likely to lobby for a freer environment for entry. We analyze both static and dynamic versions of the model to examine what kind of environment supports a policy that blocks entry. In the dynamic model, the economy can exhibit various different dynamics. In particular, multiple steady states may arise in equilibrium.     

Entry into the electric power industry

Entry of new firms into the electric power industry is becoming commonplace. The entrants typically are unregulated firms that compete with regulated electric utilities only in the generation stage of the latter's vertically integrated structure. Because of the asymmetric regulatory treatment of the incumbents and entrants, there is the possibility of biases either against efficient entry or for inefficient entry. A model of a vertical integrated utility subject to rate-of-return regulation is used to illustrate the biases, and several implications for regulatory policy are discussed.     

Estimating entrants' productivity when prices are unobserved

Entrant firms are constrained to set lower price–cost markups than incumbents due to idiosyncratic demand shocks faced in the startup phase. Productivity indices suffer from micro-level markup variation and underestimate entrants' productivity, when productivity is measured by nominal sales and expenditures but not quantities. This study makes the first attempt to estimate entrants' productivity by controlling for their markup difference, when prices or quantities are unobserved at the firm-level. The econometric methodology introduces demand side into a structural model of production to account for the price variation. The estimation routine deals with the endogeneity due to unobserved productivity using a control function approach, and retrieves average markups for entrants and incumbents together with a markup-adjusted productivity index. My findings show that entrants set on average lower markups than incumbents in Japanese manufacturing. When productivity is adjusted to markups, entrants are as productive as incumbents, while the standard measures of labor and total factor productivity indicate low productivity for entrant firms.     

Trade and product market policies in upstream sectors and productivity in downstream sectors: Firm-level evidence from China

This paper explores the heterogeneous productivity impact of trade, product market and financial market policies over the last decade in China. The paper makes a critical distinction between downstream and upstream industries, focusing on the indirect effects of regulation in upstream industries on firm performance in downstream manufacturing industries. We identify the differential effect of these policies on firm productivity growth depending on how far incumbents are relative to the technological frontier. Trade and product market reforms are found to deliver stronger gains for firms that are closer to the industry-level technological frontier, while the reverse holds for financial market reforms. The key conclusion that can be derived from the empirical analysis is that further product, trade and financial market reforms would bring substantial gains in China and could therefore speed up the convergence process. Taken at face value, the empirical estimates would imply that aligning product, trade and financial market regulation to the average level observed in OECD countries would bring aggregate manufacturing productivity gains of respectively 9%, 3% and 6.5% after 5 years.     

What makes a successful export? Evidence from firm‐product‐ level data

Abstract We analyse a very rich and unique panel database that provides information on exports at the firm‐product level. Motivated by the recent theory of multi‐product firms, we investigate what determines the survival of products in the export mix to find that, in export dynamics, characteristics of the product as well as that of the firm matter. In particular, firm productivity as well as product scale and tenure are associated with a higher export survival rate. This suggests, in line with theory, that there are firm‐ as well as firm‐product‐specific competencies that are important for shaping firms’ export mix.     

Regulation,Local Monopolies and Spatial Competition

Many regulated industries involve an oligopoly market structure. We examine optimal incentive regulation for a duopoly model of spatial competition when firms have private cost information. Market structure is endogenous as regulation determines market segments for firms and output distribution across consumers in each firm's market. By varying the assignment of consumers to firms, a relatively more efficient firm can be rewarded with a larger market, thus reducing quantity incentive distortions. We derive the optimal policy, assess the impact of asymmetric information relative to full information, and examine extensions to allow for ex ante asymmetries in firm structure.     

Firm Growth,European Industry Dynamics and Domestic Business Cycles

Based on the empirical firm growth literature and on heterogeneous (microeconomic) adjustment models, this paper empirically investigates the impact of European industry fluctuations and domestic business cycles on the growth performance of European firms. Since the implementation of the Single Market Program the 27 EU member states share a common market. Accordingly, the European industry business cycle is expected to become a more influential predictor of European firms’ behavior at the expense of domestic fluctuations. Empirically, the results of a two‐part model for a sample of European manufacturing firms reject this hypothesis. In addition, exporting firms and subsidiaries of multinational enterprises constitute the most stable firm cohort throughout the observed business cycle.     

The effect of information on the bidding and survival of entrants in procurement auctions

In government procurement auctions of construction contracts, entrants are typically less informed and bid more aggressively than incumbent firms. This bidding behavior makes them more susceptible to losses affecting their prospect of survival. In April of 2000, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation started releasing the internal cost estimates to complete highway construction projects. Using newly developed quantile regression approaches, this paper examines the impact of the policy change on aggressive entrants. First, we find that the information release eliminates the bidding differential between entrants and incumbents attributed to informational asymmetries. Second, we argue that the policy change affects the prospects of survival of entrants in the market. We find that those who used to exit the market relatively soon are now staying 37% longer, while at the median level bidding duration increased by roughly 68%. The policy has the potential to encourage entry in government procurement auctions and thus increase competition.     

Influence of market-level and inter-firm differences in costs on product positioning and pricing

The objective of this article is to study the impact of differentiation and firm positioning on firm’s pricing decisions in a horizontally differentiated competitive market. We build a parsimonious game-theoretic model and analyse simultaneous entry of firms. The effect of differentiation is modelled as an additional cost incurred by both firms based on the degree of differentiation between the firms. The cost of positioning is modelled as a market level cost affecting both firms whereby firms incur a cost if they want to position themselves away from the centre of distribution of consumers. Our analysis provides some surprising results, explains some conflicting empirical observations documented in previous research and may also be useful for further empirical research in this area by providing sharper predictions about the impact of various types of costs on market outcomes. For example, we find that if the cost of positioning is sufficiently high, then a firm with lower cost of differentiation charges a higher price in equilibrium, even when no differences in exogenous costs exist. We also find that under some circumstances the cost disadvantaged firm can enjoy higher price-cost margins compared to the cost leader thereby suggesting that higher costs could be a blessing in disguise.