高管控制权、薪酬与盈余管理

以2008-2011年度我国沪深两市的A股上市公司为对象,从管理层权力视角考察薪酬激励与盈余管理问题的内在联系。研究发现:在全流通时代公司完全有可能诱使管理层为满足激励函数而操纵会计盈余,以实现股票期权收益;在薪酬业绩挂钩的激励机制下,管理层权力大的公司其盈余管理行为更加明显,说明管理层权力的大小确实能够影响企业的盈余管理行为。同时,从公司和监管层的角度分别提出建立更为合理的与业绩挂钩的长效薪酬管理体系和进一步完善强制性高管薪酬披露制度等相关建议。     

高管薪酬的若干思考

高管薪酬问题长期备受关注,本文从公司经济特征、公司治理、盈余管理三个方面对高管薪酬进行了梳理,并对高管薪酬未来的研究指明了三个方向。     

高管薪酬激励与盈余管理的实证分析

该文综合部分国内外关于盈余管理的研究,以高管薪酬激励视角分析了我国上市公司的盈余管理行为及高管薪酬的决定因素。经实证分析,发现高管薪酬与盈余管理显著正相关,但高管持股比例与盈余管理相关性不强。     

公司绩效与高管薪酬关联性分析

公司制下的公司治理对现代经济社会有着至关重要的影响,公司价值最大化的目标即是充分满足各方利益,增加公司财富,从而使企业有长期稳定的发展。在这其中公司绩效的获得与评定又受到多个因素的影响也牵动着各方利益。因此,通过选取2009至2013年中一些上市房地产公司的年报等数据,进行了描述分析,进而对公司绩效与高管薪酬之间的关系形成了结论。结论表明,在房地产企业中,公司绩效与高管薪酬之间的关系显著,呈正相关,并且公司绩效与高管薪酬差距也成正相关关系。     

高管薪酬、高管持股与应计盈余管理

本文立足于高管薪酬激励,对上市公司应计盈余管理进行了实证研究,研究结果表明,高管薪酬与应计盈余管理之间不存在任何关系,高管持股与应计盈余管理之间呈现显著性不强的正向相关关系。     

高管控制权、薪酬激励与盈余管理

本文基于代理理论和管理者权力理论,利用2007~2013年沪深两地上市公司数据和多元回归模型,分析了高管薪酬与盈余管理的相关性,并在此基础上引入了高管控制权,考察高管控制权对高管报酬诱发盈余管理的影响。研究结果表明,高管报酬与盈余管理正相关,即高管薪酬是诱发盈余管理的动机之一;考虑高管控制权的影响后,发现高管控制权越大,其盈余管理的程度越低。     

产权、股东制衡与高管薪酬

本文利用2001--2008年中国上市公司的高管薪酬数据,对大股东与高管薪酬之间的关系进行了实证研究.结果发现我国上市公司大股东确实存在"支持"效应,大股东可以对高管薪酬实施有效的监管和制约;国有股和私人股的第一大股东会采用不同的高管薪酬策略:国有股第一大股东一般对高管采用低薪策略,并且与公司业绩相关度不大;私人股第一大股东则制定相对较高的高管薪酬,并且注意与公司经营业绩的结合.此外,第一大股东如果兼任公司高管,则会削弱大股东的"支持"效果,甚至会转变为"掏空"行为.     

上市公司风险与高管薪酬关系分析

文章以我国2015—2020年61家不同行业公司为例,进行多变量面板模型设计研究和描述性统计分析,分析了高管薪酬与风险之间的关系。从不同的角度讨论了高管薪酬对公司风险的影响,研究结果表明,高管薪酬与公司风险呈负相关;同时,高管薪酬的变化会影响公司的风险。文章提出基于风险补偿的激励对我国资本市场不同部门公司的影响的观点,特别是考虑到管理者可以从其决策中选择影响公司风险项目公司的运营。     

内部审计在管控董事会风险认知偏差中的监督与协同机制研究

在信息化和科技化时代,风险愈加复杂和未知,企业强化风险管理的重要性凸显,需要及时、准确感知面临的风险,做出科学的决策,而这一决策又容易受到风险认知的影响。因此,为了减弱董事会做出不当决策的风险,内部审计通过发挥监督和协同作用能够缓解风险认知偏差带来的影响。创新之处在于尝试从关键风险参与者角度分析董事会产生风险认知偏差的原因,并通过内部审计发挥在风险管理中的作用,推动董事会、高管层与内部审计在风险管理中的战略协调和默契协作,使董事会做出正确的战略决策。     

The Effect of Board Size and Composition on the Efficiency of UK Banks

We examine a sample of 17 banking institutions operating in the UK between 2001 and 2006 to provide empirical evidence on the association between the efficiency of UK banks and board structure, namely board size and composition. Our approach is to use data envelopment analysis to estimate several measures of the efficiency of banks, and then to use panel data regressions for investigating the impact of board structure on efficiency. After controlling for bank size and capital strength, we find some evidence of a positive association between board size and efficiency, although this is not robust across all our specifications. Board composition, by contrast, has a robustly significant and positive impact on all measures of efficiency.     

Corporate governance in the post Sarbanes-Oxley period: Compensation disclosure and analysis (CD&A)

In recent years, the entire fabric of corporate governance, certainly in the United States, has dramatically changed. With the passage of what has colloquially become known as SOX (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), US-based corporations have operated under stricter governance guidelines than at any previous time, especially as regards the structure of boards of directors and financial oversight of the corporation. A now perennial governance “hot button” issue not addressed by SOX is concern over continually rising executive compensation. Until the 2006 adoption of new compensation disclosure guidelines by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), it had been nearly 15 years since federal attention had been devoted to compensation guidelines or regulations. Beginning with 2007 filings, US corporations must now include a Compensation Disclosure and Analysis (CD&A) section. The intent behind the CD&A is to provide investors access to clear explanations of executive compensation and the philosophy that underlies compensation. As often happens, this good intent is accompanied by several unintended risks that may mitigate the effectiveness of the CD&A.     

International Debt Shifting: The Value-Maximizing Mix of Internal and External Debt

Abstract

We study the capital structure of multinationals and expand previous theory by incorporating international debt tax shield effects from both internal and external capital markets. We show that: (i) multinationals’ firm value is maximized if both internal and external debt are used to save tax; (ii) the use of internal and external debt is independent of each other; and (iii) multinationals have a tax advantage over domestic firms, which cannot shift debt across international borders. We test our model using a large panel of German multinationals and find that internal and external debt shifting are of about equal importance.     

媒体监督、声誉机制与独立董事辞职行为

以2006-2009年媒体负面报道过的公司为样本,本文研究了媒体监督对独立董事辞职行为的影响,并探讨了独立董事声誉机制在其中发挥的作用.本文发现,媒体负面报道量和独立董事的辞职概率显著正相关,而且影响力越大的媒体对独立董事辞职概率的影响越大.这说明媒体报道发挥了积极作用,特别是有影响力的媒体发挥了关键作用.在此基础上,本文还进一步证明,媒体报道之后,越重视自己声誉的独立董事辞职的概率越大,说明就独立董事这一群体而言,声誉机制可以发挥很好的治理作用.     

Board structure and role of monitoring committees

Regulators and researchers alike have focused significant attention on the structure of the corporate board. In general, the results of prior empirical studies suggest that larger boards are costly to firms because of communication and co-ordination problems. How firms use committees to mitigate these costs, however, has not received as much attention. Since boards delegate authority for specific tasks to monitoring committees with independent directors, we re-examine the impact of board structure on firm performance by specifically focusing on the number of monitoring committees. Using ROA and EVA, we find that board size is positively associated with firm performance when firms use more than three monitoring committees. We also find that the previously documented negative association between board size and Tobin's Q disappears when a firm uses more than three monitoring committees. Overall, the results suggest that firms use monitoring committees to mitigate the costs associated with larger boards.     

Scale,scope and accountability: A response to Lloyd-Jones and Lewis

This is a response to the critique by Lloyd-Jones and Lewis of our 2003 Business History article. It makes a renewed case for the extension of business history research into corporate governance and accountability, such that this new dimension is considered in conjunction with the analysis of scale and scope. Our approach and that of Lloyd Jones and Lewis demonstrate that governance and accountability, or the lack of it, in conjunction with strategy and structure, are useful dimensions of the cases they analyse, and, we would continue to argue, in the general case as well.     

Dollars and sense: The implications of CEO compensation for organizational performance

Crafting a compensation package for an organization's chief executive officer (CEO) that will help the firm maximize its performance is a vexing challenge for a board of directors. Management theory offers boards several practical hints. A board can put its CEO and the firm in the best position to be successful by (1) creating strong incentives for the CEO to act in the firm's best interest at all times; (2) benchmarking a CEO's performance and compensation relative to that of very high performing CEOs in the industry; (3) diagnosing and responding to CEOs’ feelings about equity relative to their peers; (4) paying a CEO with uniquely valuable knowledge, skills, and ability at the top of the market; (5) offering retention incentives if a proven performer with unique skills is leading a company; (6) resisting the temptation to simply mimic the compensation packages that work for leading firms; and (7) considering candidates’ social ties when recruiting a new CEO.     

国有控股银行党委领导与公司治理关系研究

在借鉴国外典型公司治理模式基础上,我国国有控股银行形成了一套独具中国特色的党委领导与公司治理结构相融合的治理模式,即党委领导具备参与公司治理的主体资格。但是,二者之间的关系错综复杂,也存在一些问题,包括：党的核心领导地位被弱化,党政干部与银行家角色存在冲突,公司治理中“三会”制衡作用存在矛盾,人力资源管理权归属存在争议。为此,本文从四方面提出改善党委领导与公司治理关系的建议：一是强化党委领导的核心作用,二是提升董事会的战略决策功能,三是授予行长充分的经营自主权,四是保证监事会依法监督。