Rents and Intangible Capital: A Q+ Framework

In recent years, U.S. investment has been lackluster, despite rising valuations. Key explanations include growing rents and growing intangibles. We propose and estimate a framework to quantify their roles. The gap between valuations—reflected in average Q—and investment—reflected in marginal q—can be decomposed into three terms: the value of installed intangibles; rents generated by physical capital; and an interaction term, measuring rents generated by intangibles. The intangible related terms contribute significantly to the gap, particularly in fast-growing sectors. Our findings suggest care in a pure-rents interpretation, given the rising role of intangibles.     

资产证券化的宏观经济效应:理论述评

2007年美国次贷危机爆发,并导致全球性金融危机和经济衰退。次贷危机本质上涉及到“资产证券化”这种金融衍生品。本文对“资产证券化宏观经济效应”的现有文献进行归纳分析,文章认为从微观层面看,资产证券化有利于提高金融效率;但从宏观层面看,资产证券化可能对金融体系结构、宏观经济稳定和货币政策有效性带来潜在冲击。政策当局应该重视资产证券化可能产生的宏观经济绩效,协调微观效率与宏观稳定之间的冲突,建立基于“金融稳定”的货币政策框架和宏观审慎监管体系。     

A Lintner Model of Payout and Managerial Rents

We develop a dynamic agency model in which payout, investment, and financing decisions are made by managers who attempt to maximize the rents they take from the firm, subject to a capital market constraint. Managers smooth payout to smooth their flow of rents. Total payout (dividends plus net repurchases) follows Lintner's (1956) target adjustment model. Payout smooths out transitory shocks to current income and adjusts gradually to changes in permanent income. Smoothing is accomplished by borrowing or lending. Payout is not cut back to finance capital investment. Risk aversion causes managers to underinvest, but habit formation mitigates the degree of underinvestment.     

企业资产证券化融资的财富效应——基于浦东建设资产证券化研究

选取浦东建设资产证券化作为典型案例,对"企业资产证券化是否会增加发起人的股东和债权人的财富"进行了实证检验,结果表明:浦东建设资产证券化给其股东带来了平均0.154%的财富增加;在资产证券化当年,浦东建设资产证券化给其债权人带来了正的财富效应;但在资产证券化后,对债权人产生了负的财富效应。     

证券化：化解不良资产的有效途径

证券化已成为化解不良资产的重要途径。在我国，不良资产证券化已具备了基本条件。在具体操作中，信用升级、品种设计、二级市场建设是存在的重要问题。     

Formulaic Transparency: The Hidden Enabler of Exceptional U.S. Securitization

Why does the securitization of residential mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, and other such consumer debt in the U.S. exceed the securitization of such debt in Europe by several trillion dollars? The author points out that lemon problems do not stop the sale of used cars but they do prevent the operation of a market in which buyers place sight‐unseen bids for used cars offered by unknown sellers. Buyers prefer to know who the seller is and test‐drive vehicles. Similarly until the 1980s, creditors were willing to forgo the information they could secure in private transactions to get tradability mainly in the case of bonds issued by governments or a few blue‐chip companies. U.S. government policy encouraged the securitization of trillions of dollars of loans made to millions of borrowers. U.S. rules—rather than new financial or information technologies—have strongly encouraged originators of mortgages and other consumer loans to rely on credit scores (commonly referred to as FICO scores) produced by credit bureaus. And reliance on scores that loan originators use but don’t produce helps overcome the information asymmetry problems that would otherwise constrain securitization. The argument turns the usual concern about securitization on its head: transferring risks to investors is normally expected to discourage careful screening of borrowers, but the author’s analysis suggests that formulaic, FICO‐based screening actually enables risk transfer by reducing information asymmetry problems. Moreover, while limiting screening reduces the upfront costs of lending, it also increases loans made to uncreditworthy borrowers. And because increasing loans made to bad borrowers raises the rates good borrowers have to pay (to compensate investors for higher defaults), U.S. rules that sacrifice information for more “complete” markets may be a bad bargain.     

The Valuation of Stock Warrants: A Reply

The warrant model is shown to be serviceable for practical purposes, and some of Skerratt's criticisms are shown to be wrong. Nevertheless, there is scope for further work on the model, both on some of the points Skerratt has raised and in other areas.
On définit le modèle concernant le warrant comme étant destinéà des fonctions pratiques et on met en évidence certaines des critiques apportées par Skerratt qui semblent ma1 fondées. II faut toutefois ajouter qu'une etude plus approfondie du modele est entreprise, celle-ci s'appuyant à la fois sur certains points soulevés par Skerratt et sur d'autres critères.     

Re-appraisal of Garner v. Murrya: A Reply

Houghton (1986) is not convinced by the arguments presented earlier in Ashton (1984) and argues that the decision in Garner v. Murray is very persuasive. He also challenges some of the conclusions reachd in my ealier paper. Those conclusions are further supported here. We agree that it is time legislative changes were made.     

Securitization,risk-transferring and financial instability: The case of Spain

The 2007–2010 financial crisis has hit a variety of countries asymmetrically. The case of Spain is particularly illustrative as it exemplifies in a vivid manner most of the core issues largely responsible for the crisis. This country experienced a pronounced housing bubble partly funded via spectacular developments in its securitization markets leading to looser credit standards and subsequent financial stability problems. We analyze the sequential deterioration of credit in Spain considering rating changes in securitized deals. Using a sample of 20,286 observations on securities and rating changes from 2000Q1 to 2010Q1 we build a model in which loan growth, on balance-sheet credit quality and rating changes are estimated simultaneously. Our results suggest that loan growth significantly affects on balance-sheet loan performance with a lag of at least two years. Additionally, loan performance is found to explain rating changes with a lag of four quarters. Importantly, bank characteristics (in particular, observed solvency, cash-flow generation and cost efficiency) also affect ratings considerably. Additionally, these other bank characteristics seem to a higher weight in the rating changes of securities issued by savings banks as compared with commercial banks.     

Securitization without adverse selection: The case of CLOs

In this paper, we investigate whether securitization was associated with risky lending in the corporate loan market by examining the performance of individual loans held by collateralized loan obligations. We employ two different data sets that identify loan holdings for a large set of CLOs and find that adverse selection problems in corporate loan securitizations are less severe than commonly believed. Using a battery of performance tests, we find that loans securitized before 2005 performed no worse than comparable unsecuritized loans originated by the same bank. Even loans originated by the bank that acts as the CLO underwriter do not show under-performance relative to the rest of the CLO portfolio. While some evidence exists of under-performance for securitized loans originated between 2005 and 2007, it is not consistent across samples, performance measures, and horizons. Overall, we argue that the securitization of corporate loans is fundamentally different from securitization of other assets classes because securitized loans are fractions of syndicated loans. Therefore, mechanisms used to align incentives in a lending syndicate are likely to reduce adverse selection in the choice of CLO collateral.     

The solution to the forward-bias puzzle: Reply

My proposed econometric solution to the forward-bias puzzle provoked several comments. Those comments raise three primary objections to my solution. (1) It suffers from multicollinearity, miss-specification and other serious econometric problems. (2) My key test equation is a tautology or identity. (3) My econometric solution has nothing to do with either the forward-bias puzzle or uncovered interest parity. This is my reply to those objections.     

The Commercialization of Government's Departmental Accounting (AAS 29): Quasi Rents and Public Welfare

In the Australian public sector. departmental administrative reform is intent on producing lean. efficient. commercially orientated government entities. An accounting regulatory response is AAS 29. Financial Reporting for Governtizetzt Departments. which requires all government departments as reporting entities to adopt in principle much of the whole corpus of private sector accounting standards and statements including. importantly, current cost accounting. This paper explores the proposition that the commercialization of departmental accounting through AAS 29 or similar pronouncements is directly associated with a significant reduction in social and public welfare accountability. Accounting processes are powerful. value-laden agents of social change. Benston (1980) states that 'benefits (net of costs) of accounting standards to society' cannot be measured but can be specified for individuals. Here. accounting outcomes are identified to be the residuals of economic policies to eliminate quasi rents in government. Standardization in AAS 29 rests on the assumption that rights and obligations being equities of generations of participants can be periodically measured as A -L = E at current factor prices. This economic notion lacks cultural heritage in financial disclosure of continuing equities in government and may, for any generation of consumers. induce an excess of social costs over social benefits for the accounting standardization process under prevailing managerialist philosophies.     

基础设施项目贷款证券化的可行性分析

一、目前我国商业银行基础设施项目贷款的特点和问题 1.目前我国仍处于基础设施建设的高峰期,大量的城市建设、教育产业、航空、电力、电信等基础设施项目急需实施,这些项目具有投资规模大、建设周期长、资金回收慢、但收益较为稳定的特点,对我国经济迅速实现与国际接轨有重要意义.     

知识产权证券化:高新技术产业发展的有效推动力

知识产权资产证券化是近年来兴起于发达国家的一种新型的资产证券化类别,其发展之快,引起各方的广泛关注.本文首先对知识产权证券化及其特点进行了介绍,然后重点分析了知识产权证券化对我国高新技术产业发展的影响以及运用知识产权证券化推动我国高新技术产业发展的对策及建议.