杭州市土地招标出让博弈实证分析

在土地使用权出让3种方式中,招标是富有良性竞争的一种方式.以杭州市为实例结合博弈论建立的土地使用权招标出让不完全信息静态博弈模型,通过对博弈均衡的分析指出土地招标出让时投标人越多,越有利于充分实现土地价值;同时城市与城市之间以及大城市内部不同片区之间竞相出让土地的博弈结果,导致土地供给总量过大、土地价格下跌、土地资源浪费、土地效益降低,故土地出让宜采用束放策略.     

The problem of fair division of surplus development rights in redevelopment of urban areas: Can the Shapley value help?

Many more people are expected to live in urban areas in the coming decades, and much of the physical transformation will take place in the built-up areas of cities. Landownership is a key factor in urban regeneration, and the fair division of benefits is a major obstacle to redeveloping urban land in a cooperative context. This paper aims to show that the Shapley value, a fair division scheme developed within the cooperative game theory framework, can be used to achieve a fair division of the surplus development rights among landowners remolding smaller and irregular parcels into bigger and regular ones, resulting in higher aggregate development rights. The methodology is illustrated by a case study of three parcels selected from the Karabaglar district in Izmir, Turkey, where surplus development rights are available for landowners cooperating for land amalgamation. The findings show that the Shapley values for the landowners satisfy the core conditions of the game and landowners can benefit from the highest possible development rights and share the surplus fairly. However, the current institutional setting has to be restructured to apply such division schemes.     

Capitalization by formalization? – Challenging the current paradigm of land reforms

Most of the land reforms in developing countries in recent decades follow a blueprint that is based on the property rights theory. This blueprint was supported by Western government-backed development aid institutions and the World Bank and intends to achieve a capitalization of property rights on land by formalization and individualization. Its supporters expect higher efficiency of the land markets and higher tenure security. The focus of the article is not so much on the formalization efforts themselves, but on the capitalization of the use rights. In contrast to the opinions of the property rights theorists, it is argued that this approach leads to a decoupling of benefits and costs of land use, which causes external costs, encourages rent-seeking behaviour and weakens the state. The central statement of supporters of privatization, namely that this strategy supports the efficiency of land markets, is rejected. Instead, the approach gives way to economically efficient and powerful interests at the expense of other groups and a diversity of living forms. Some evidence is provided using the examples of Germany (as a Western “blueprint”) and Cambodia (as a land in reform process). The plea is to couple the benefits and costs of land use and thus to eliminate external effects. This coupling can be achieved by a “decapitalization” of the use right on land.     

Capitalization by formalization? – Challenging the current paradigm of land reforms

Most of the land reforms in developing countries in recent decades follow a blueprint that is based on the property rights theory. This blueprint was supported by Western government-backed development aid institutions and the World Bank and intends to achieve a capitalization of property rights on land by formalization and individualization. Its supporters expect higher efficiency of the land markets and higher tenure security. The focus of the article is not so much on the formalization efforts themselves, but on the capitalization of the use rights. In contrast to the opinions of the property rights theorists, it is argued that this approach leads to a decoupling of benefits and costs of land use, which causes external costs, encourages rent-seeking behaviour and weakens the state. The central statement of supporters of privatization, namely that this strategy supports the efficiency of land markets, is rejected. Instead, the approach gives way to economically efficient and powerful interests at the expense of other groups and a diversity of living forms. Some evidence is provided using the examples of Germany (as a Western “blueprint”) and Cambodia (as a land in reform process). The plea is to couple the benefits and costs of land use and thus to eliminate external effects. This coupling can be achieved by a “decapitalization” of the use right on land.     

Will the TRIPS Agreement Foster Appropriate Biotechnologies for Developing Countries?

While almost all of the investment in agricultural biotechnology to date has been in temperate crops suitable for developed countries, developing countries are the greatest potential beneficiaries of this major technological advance. To realise this potential requires investment in crops appropriate to climatic and agronomic conditions in developing countries. Protection of intellectual property rights is a necessary condition for the private sector to invest in appropriate biotechnologies. This paper develops a game theoretic model of a bioscience firm that adapts a new technology to a range of agronomic conditions in response to the enforcement of intellectual property rights in a developed and a developing country. Over a range of potential penalties, low levels of enforcement by the developing country remain endemic despite the desire to have the bioscience firm adapt the biotechnology to its local conditions. In particular, the trade penalties contained in the Agreement on Trade‐Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights are likely to be ineffective. The developing country might increase enforcement if the developed country was more aggressive in liberalising agriculture trade because there would be greater symmetry in the benefits of the technology.     

征地冲突中利益相关者的博弈分析——以地方政府与失地农民为例

研究目的：构建地方政府与失地农民的博弈模型,找出促使均衡结果合理化的因素变化关系。研究方法：博弈论。研究结果：减小失地农民的维权成本,增加失地农民的征地收益,加大对地方政府违法征地的惩罚力度,可以促使地方政府与失地农民之间博弈均衡更合理化,可以有效抑制地方政府违法征地的冲动,减少失地农民上访维权的现象,避免征地冲突的发生,促进社会经济和谐发展。     

On the use of tradable development rights for reducing flood risk

We explore the use of a system of tradable development rights (TDRs) as a method for reducing flood risks brought about by development in flood prone areas. Typical land management practice focuses on zoning policies which are able to increase economic efficiency, but result in an inequitable distribution of benefits. A TDR program has the potential to increase equity while maintaining the efficiency of the socially optimal land allocation. We begin with a graphical analysis and then present a theoretical model incorporating unidirectional spatial externalities, and demonstrate how a TDR program could be implemented to internalize these negative external costs.     

城市土地使用权挂牌出让中竞价人的理性分析

为了更加深入研究土地使用权出让行为,利用博弈及风险理论,提出了土地使用权挂牌出让中竟价人的出价策略,通过分析证明挂牌出让能使各竞价人的出价更为理性,为合理配置城市土地资源提供了新的研究思路;同时也指出挂牌出让中更易滋生腐败.利用杭州市和北京市土地出让结果说明了挂牌出让是目前土地使用权出让的主要方式,分析了产生这一现象的原因.     

农地发展权界定、细分与量化研究——以北京市海淀区北部地区为例

研究目的:通过农地发展权的界定、细分和量化的研究,尝试解决中国农地非农化过程中土地增值收益分配和外部性补偿问题。研究方法:理论研究与实例研究相结合。研究结果:农地发展权可以细分为基本发展权、实体发展权和虚拟发展权;在三项权利关系中,基本发展权是基础,实体发展权是主体,虚拟发展权是延伸;基本发展权价值归国家以解决外部性问题,实体发展权价值由国家和农地产权人共享,虚拟发展权价值归被限制开发农地所有者和使用者。研究结论:农地发展权应该界定为国家与农地产权人共享的土地产权,并以海淀区北部地区农地非农化为例,进行了农地发展权量化和分配测算,政府的土地外部性补偿问题得到较好地解决,同时农民得到了较高的土地增值收益。     

排污权交易市场下的厂商最优决策

针对水污染物排放权交易市场中排污权的转让问题,分别构建了高污染处理成本厂商和低污染处理成本厂商在行业间排污权转让的最优决策模型,以及同行业内的双寡头厂商之间的排污权转让的博弈模型,从而求得排污权的最优定价,以及两种转让方式下厂商的最优生产量以及最佳排污权交易量,为排污权交易市场下厂商的最优决策提供参考依据。     

水量调配博弈分析及应用研究

提出水量调配博弈模型假设,建立完全竞争水量调配博弈模型,对水量调配博弈模型进行分析,得出结论:完全竞争市场的水量调配模式未必是有效率的,政府的作用至关重要。对水量调配博弈模型应用提出建议:建立一套符合中国国情的水权体系,完善水资源分配制度,建立合理的水价形成机制,健全水权交易市场。     

植物品种权交易中的“囚徒困境”博弈分析

借助"囚徒困境"博弈模型分析植物品种权交易中普遍存在的道德风险问题。结果表明:在没有任何监督、惩罚措施的情况下,最终的博弈均衡只能是交易双方都选择不遵守策略,以实现各自利益的最大化;但通过对博弈模型进行适当的改进,就会发现只要监督和惩罚措施得当,提高其违约成本,交易双方就会为实现各自利益最大化而选择遵守策略,并据此得到实现植物品种权交易良性循环运作的有效条件,提高交易成功率。     

委托-代理理论及国有土地产权分级授权管理

研究目的:在中央和地方政府土地利益博弈影响土地资源合理配置条件下,探讨中国国有土地产权管理新思路.研究方法:文献资料法和实证分析法.研究结果:揭示了中国国有土地产权管理与委托-代理理论的内在关联,提出运用委托-代理理论指导中国国有土地产权管理.研究结论:中国国有土地产权分级授权管理能从根本上理顺土地产权关系,具有较强的现实意义和指导意义.     

基于完全信息动态博弈的中国征地问题分析

研究目的:提供分析现实中征地活动的一个视角,并为实现征地社会最优化提供建议。研究方法:完全信息动态博弈分析方法。研究结果:在征地博弈中,地方政府的强势、农民的弱势及农民维权成本的高昂是使得征地博弈均衡结果偏离社会最优的关键因素。研究结论:为优化现实中的征地活动,需要通过调整征地博弈的收益矩阵、降低农民维权成本等措施来从地方政府和农民两个角度增加对征地活动的约束。     

水电工程索赔的三方博弈分析

基于水电工程特点,运用博弈论的方法,建立承包方、监理和业主3方的索赔博弈模型,分析了水电工程中索赔3方在不同条件下的选择和行为,并在此基础上对水电工程的一般索赔过程进行了分析,得出了博弈3方在不同条件下的得益情况及其纳什均衡解,旨在为博弈3方进行科学决策提供一定的借鉴。     

森林生态效益补偿机制与公民环境权保护

我国森林生态效益补偿机制的建立,是国家重视和保护公民环境权的有力措施。《森林法》规定的生态效益补偿基金,奠定了森林生态效益补偿机制的法律基础。为进一步保护公民环境权,国家应加强环境法治,保障森林生态效益补偿机制的有效运行。     

农村宅基地流转模式成因分析

运用博弈理论和演绎归纳等分析方法,建立农村宅基地流转模式博弈决策模型,以期认识宅基地流转模式的成因及其发展方向。研究表明,农村宅基地流转模式的博弈均衡受地理区位、农民宅基地物权属性认知、中央政府宅基地流转政策取向等诸多参数的影响与制约。鉴于当前地区经济发展水平、农民权益诉求等差异,农村宅基地流转制度设计应因地制宜。但不论采取何种配置方式,宅基地流转模式选择与演进都应遵循利益平衡,尤其要保护腾地农户利益。而长期来看,切实实现土地收益均衡分配和农民权益保障,需要将农村宅基地市场化流转、构建城乡统一建设用地市场作为农村土地制度的改革方向。当然,建立城乡统一建设用地市场也需要多种制度协同完善以保证政府与农民联合决策下预期博弈结果的实现。     

基于政府补贴的废旧电子产品闭环供应链博弈研究

废旧电子产品回收再利用具有显著的经济和生态效益潜力,但当前盈利性还较弱,考虑到政府补贴的可行性和显见的积极作用,本文从三方博弈角度出发,构建了政府、企业、消费者三者的序贯博弈模型,研究了三者之间的博弈策略以及达到博弈均衡时的条件与结果,并据此从三个主体角度提出了具体的政策建议。     

Economies of scale and market structure in international grain trade

A large body of literature has examined international grain trade in imperfectly competitive models. The article develops a two-stage duopoly model that considers a private trader and a State Trading Enterprise (STE) competing on a foreign market. The key difference between the private trader and the STE is their international organization; while the STE makes use of external agents to export, the private firm may choose to internalize international transactions. The game is solved for different modes of competition and under both assumptions of homogeneous and differentiated products, in order to assess how these assumptions affect the outcome of the game. The results of the game are examined by using numerical examples. The analysis shows that external shocks on export markets may result in a change of market structure and, consequently, of market shares. These effects depend on the initial market structure. Furthermore, the degree of product differentiation and the assumed mode of competition significantly affect the relative values of transaction and fixed costs at which the market structure changes.     

资源枯竭型城市工矿用地退出利益冲突及解决策略研究

深度挖掘工矿用地的潜在价值将满足资源枯竭型城市转型发展过程中的用地需求,减小政府的土地开发成本,保障有限的土地资源得到最有效使用。本文以工矿企业持续退出,城市转型发展对建设用地需求增大为背景,以地方政府、工矿企业、投资商为主要利益相关者,构建完全信息动态博弈模型,分析工矿用地退出中存在的利益冲突。研究表明:地方政府、工矿企业、投资商在工矿用地退出过程中将会以各自所能获利多少进行博弈。只有各利益主体积极表达利益诉求,厘清产权归属,使各利益主体均衡享有工矿用地退出收益才能更好实现退出进程。