企业产权拍卖中竞标方的投标策略及产权定价机制

拍卖中买主竞标的过程就是给标的物寻价、定价的过程。以企业产权作为拍卖对象，在参与各方非合作博弈条件下，分析竞标方可能采用的几种不同投标战略，及其对产权定价的影响。     

考虑固定收益率的采购拍卖投标策略研究

本文分析了单物品多因素采购拍卖中的供应商投标问题,在考虑供应商存在固定收益率的前提下,建立了相应的多因素拍卖中存在固定收益率的投标策略模型。本模型在Che建立的多因素拍卖打分函数模型的基础上,引入Lorentziadis考虑的固定收益率。分析表明,模型中存在3种类型的供应商,且各类供应商具有相应的投标策略。同时,分析了不同类型的供应商的投标策略与其市场竞争力之间的相互关系。     

企业产权拍卖中竞标方的投标策略及产权定价机制

在拍卖活动中，买卖双方之间存在合作博弈和非合作博弈两种状态。本文研究企业产权作为拍卖对象时，在参与各方非合作博弈条件下，分析竟标方可能采用的几种不同投标战略，及其对产权定价的影响。     

投标与拍卖的决策理论方法

本文介绍国内很少涉及的国际投标和拍卖中的一些重要概念和基本问题，重点综述国际投标与拍卖的决策理论模型与方法的发展历史与现状。     

建筑工程投标策略分析

通过对投标策略的分析,有助于投标企业捷高中标率,进而多承接工程,改善企业的生产经营状态.投标策略包括两方面的内容,一是报价策略,一是非报价策略.     

建筑工程投标策略分析

通过对投标策略的分析,有助于投标企业提高中标率,进而多承接工程,改善企业的生产经营状态。投标策略包括两方面的内容,一是报价策略,一是非报价策略。     

工程投标报价策略与博弈研究

国内外通用的、科学合理的工程承发包方式,我们称作为工程项目建设中的招投标。除了靠自身的素质和实力外,承包企业在市场竞争中投标策略和投标技巧对于能否中标、能否取得更多利润有着举足轻重的作用,是企业在竞争中立于不败之地的重要手段之一。本文首先介绍了工程招标及投标的概念,分析了工程投标报价策略,同时阐述了招投标过程的博弈特性,以及工程投标报价的博弈研究,最后分析了基于博弈研究的工程报价措施。     

IPO定价机制选择：固定价格、拍卖与累计投标

本文进一步拓展了Biais和Faugerson-Crouzet（2002）的模型。研究发现，固定价格定价机制由于不能收集投资者关于股票的真实信息，其抑价水平往往高于拍卖（统一价格拍卖）以及累计投标定价这三种定价机制，只有在投资者拥有的私人信号全部是坏信号的情况下，三者之间的抑价水平才会一致。拍卖与累计投标的抑价水平差异取决于投资者的理性约束行为。     

工程项目投标分析与策略

招标投标制度的推行,改变了我国工程承包方式,成为施工企业取得施工业务的主要途径。对于大型工程项目,投标工作本身就是一项复杂而充满风险的工作。文章就工程项目的投标分析及相关策略进行了阐述。     

浅谈投标报价策略

投标竞争获胜的关键因素是报价。一个准确的报价 ,不仅要求对招标单位有足够的吸引力 ,而且使建筑施工企业获得一定的甚至是较多的利润。为此 ,施工企业投标时 ,就需要针对一定的工程对象确定具体的报价指导思想 ,并据此确定投标策略。一、制定投标报价策略的要点制定投标策略应根据不同的招标工程的具体情况和竞争形势 ,采取不同的投标策略。不仅不同企业的投标策略不同 ,而且同一企业对不同招标工程所采取的投标策略也不一样。可见 ,投标策略是非常灵活但并非不可捉摸的东西。可以从大量的投标实践中 ,归纳总结出制定投标策略的四个要点 ,…     

Auction design with opportunity cost

This paper studies revenue-maximizing auctions in an independent private value setting where potential bidders have known positive opportunity cost of bidding. The main findings are as follows. Firstly, there is no loss of generality in deriving the revenue-maximizing auctions within the class of threshold-entry mechanisms. Secondly, for any given set of entry thresholds, a second-price sealed-bid auction with properly set reserve prices and entry subsidy is revenue-maximizing. Thirdly, a variety of auctions are revenue-maximizing within the symmetric threshold-entry class. Two of them involve no entry subsidy (fee). Fourthly, we identify sufficient conditions under which it is in the seller’s interest to limit the number of potential bidders even if the revenue-maximizing symmetric threshold-entry auction is adopted. Lastly, the revenue-maximizing auction implements asymmetric entry across symmetric bidders in many cases. I am grateful to Jean-Jacques Laffont for his advice. I thank Isabelle Brocas, Juan Carrillo, Indranil Chakraborty, Jeff Ely, Jinwoo Kim, Vijay Krishna, Preston McAfee, Isabelle Perrigne, Eric Rasmusen, Guofu Tan, Quang Vuong, Joseph Wang for helpful comments and suggestions. Insightful comments and suggestions from the associate editor and two anonymous referees have greatly improved the paper. Earlier versions have been presented at the 2004 International Industrial Organization Conference, the 2005 Pan Pacific Game Theory Conference and the 2007 International Game Theory Conference. All errors are mine. Financial support from National University of Singapore (R-122-000-088-112) is gratefully acknowledged.     

The Dynamic Vickrey Auction

We study the efficient allocation of a single object over a finite time horizon. Buyers arrive randomly over time, are long-lived, and have independent private values. The valuation of a buyer may depend on the time of the allocation in an arbitrary way. We construct an incentive compatible mechanism in which (A) there is a single financial transaction (with the buyer), (B) ex-post participation constraints are fulfilled, (C) there is no positive transfer to any agent and (D) payments are determined online. We exploit that under the efficient allocation rule, there is a unique potential winning period for each buyer. This reduces the multidimensional type to one dimension and the payment of the winner can be defined as the lowest valuation for the potential winning period, with which the buyer would have won the object. In a static model, this payment rule coincides with the payment rule of the Vickrey Auction.     

拍卖经济理论综述

近 2 0年来 ,拍卖理论已经迅速发展成为经济学中最成功也最活跃的重要分支之一。在国内 ,政府与私人部门正与日俱增地通过拍卖机制采购或销售商品与权利。但拍卖从业界和经济学界对拍卖理论仍然相当陌生。为此 ,本文以基准拍卖模型和收入等价定理为起点 ,紧密围绕拍卖机制的绩效比较与最优拍卖机制设计问题 ,系统地介绍了近半个世纪以来国际拍卖理论的主要进展 ,同时展望其未来的发展轮廓并对这一前沿理论予以简要评述。①     

Auction fever: Rising revenue in second-price auction formats

The prevalent term “auction fever” visualizes that ascending auctions – inconsistent with theory – are likely to provoke higher bids than one-shot auctions. To explore and isolate causes of auction fever experimentally, we design four different strategy-proof auction formats and order these according to expected rising bids based on pseudo-endowment effect arguments (psychological ownership and disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept). Observed revenues in the experiment in the four formats rank as expected if bidders have private uncertain values (the private information of a bidder is the distribution of her value). A control treatment supports our view that the traditional private certain values approach prevents auction fever in the laboratory. Another control treatment with a procurement auction relates the auction fever bids to bids in a one-shot auction with real endowments. We conclude that, when bidders are uncertain about their valuations, auctions that foster pseudo-endowment may raise bids and revenues.     

Auction theory adaptations for real life applications

We develop extensions to auction theory results that are useful in real life scenarios.1. Since valuations are generally positive we first develop approximations using the log-normal distribution. This would be useful for many finance related auction settings since asset prices are usually non-negative.2. We formulate a positive symmetric discrete distribution, which is likely to be followed by the total number of auction participants, and incorporate this into auction theory results.3. We develop extensions when the valuations of the bidders are interdependent and incorporate all the results developed into a final combined realistic setting.4. Our methods can be a practical tool for bidders and auction sellers to maximize their profits. The models developed here could be potentially useful for inventory estimation and for wholesale procurement of financial instruments and also non-financial commodities.All the propositions are new results and they refer to existing results which are stated as Lemmas.     

Combinatorial Games under Auction Play

ARichman gameis a combinatorial game in which, rather than alternating moves, the two players bid for the privilege of making the next move. The theory of such games is a hybrid between the classical theory of games (von Neumann, Morgenstern, …) and the combinatorial theory of games (Berlekamp, Conway, Guy, …). We expand upon our previous work by considering games with infinitely many positions as well as several variants including thePoorman variantin which the high bidder pays a third party (rather than the other player).Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C7.     

Market Power in Emissions Trading Markets Ruled by a Multiple Unit Double Auction: Further Experimental Evidence

We discuss selected methodological problems of previous Double Auction (DA) experiments and test the hypothesis that a Multiple Unit Double Auction (MUDA) is able to prevent market power in an emissions trading market. Additionally, we analyze how the information subjects receive about the market structure and different levels of subjects’ experience influence the behavior. Based on a larger number of independent observations than analyzed in previous studies, the experiment generates two main results. First, emissions trading markets ruled by a MUDA realize a high degree of efficiency even under market power conditions. However, a MUDA is, in general, not able to restrict market power. We observe persistent price discrimination in two market power environments, i.e., the distribution of profits is strongly shifted in favor of the strong market side without greatly harming efficiency. This result is independent of the information to subjects about the market structure. Second, when subjects are experienced, the efficiency is higher and the ability of the strong market side to exercise market power declines strongly. However, the variability of behavior is large and the strong market side is still able to realize supracompetitive profits in some groups.      

累积创新框架下的知识产权保护研究

本文通过构建累积创新框架下的拍卖模型来探讨知识产权制度的社会福利效应,比较各种具体制度的效率及在各种特殊的产业中的应用保护。基于存在领先厂商情况下累积创新过程中的创新竞赛问题的分析,可以得到三种不同策略情形下的社会福利函数,并确定知识产权保护程度的适用范围。研究结论的应用扩展表明:以生物技术、电子和医药等为主的行业,适用比较严格的保护制度进行保护,如专利制度;以计算机软件、音乐、书籍和期刊等为主的行业,适用比较宽松的保护制度进行保护,如版权制度。     

制造业企业合作创新知识共享策略研究

合作创新是制造业企业整合资源、分担创新风险以及提升创新效率的一种有效形式,但其另一方面也加剧了核心知识泄露、核心竞争力丧失等风险。为探究制造业企业合作创新过程中的知识共享策略,基于制造业企业合作创新中的开放策略、半开放策略、不开放策略,构建制造业企业合作创新知识共享策略选择博弈模型,运用MATLAB软件,通过数值模拟演示不同决策参数变化对策略选择的影响。结果表明：在有限理性下,制造业企业会选择半开放策略,决策受企业自身知识泄露风险系数、知识成本、知识隐藏系数、合作伙伴知识吸收能力、违约金的影响。据此,提出相关建议。     

基于粗糙集的在线拍卖网站灰色评价方法研究

随着在线拍卖的不断发展,在线拍卖网站投资者和参与拍卖商品的竞拍者都十分关注在线拍卖网站的运营状况,因此,客观合理的在线拍卖网站的综合评价方法对在线拍卖网站的建设与发展具有重要的意义,在一定程度上促进了人们在线拍卖活动的意愿。本文通过对在线拍卖网站进行分析,建立了在线拍卖网站评价指标体系,提出了一种基于粗糙集的在线拍卖网站灰色评价方法。该方法先基于粗糙集并结合专家的意见,建立信息系统,进而确定各层指标的权重,然后根据灰色统计的方法建立评价权矩阵,最后基于指标权重信息和评价权矩阵,利用模糊方法进行综合评价。以14家在线拍卖网站进行了实证计算分析,结果表明,该方法具有较好的客观性和实用性,解决了传统在线拍卖网站评价中存在的问题,提高了评价结论的正确性和有效性。