Functional separability within a quadratic inverse demand system

In this paper, a quadratic inverse (almost ideal) demand system (IQUAIDS) is derived, that generalizes the inverse (almost ideal) demand system (IAIDS). Starting from a flexible parameterization of the distance function, this model allows a more flexible specification by overcoming the potential restrictiveness of linear scale curves. However, at a point of normalization, the IQUAIDS boils down to the IAIDS, thus the additional flexibility pertains only to the specification of scale elasticities away from the point of approximation. Previous work on functional separability is extended to the case of inverse demands, and necessary and sufficient conditions for weak separability of the direct and indirect utility function derived, in terms of the Antonelli elasticities of complementarity and of the scale elasticities. Their proper parametric representation within the inverse specification is also derived. An empirical application to fish demand in Italy is provided, mainly for illustrative purposes.     

Extreme inequality aversion without separability

Hammond (J Econ Theory 11, 465–467, 1975), Meyer (J Econ Theory 11, 119–132, 1975), and Lambert (The distribution and redistribution of income Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2001) provide the formal result connecting leximin and the idea of extreme inequality aversion for social preferences of the expected utility type. Using an analogous approach, we show that for social preferences not necessarily satisfying the separability axiom that underlies expected utility theory, the case of extreme inequality aversion is covered by the class of weakly maximin social preferences—i.e., the class of social preferences that give priority to the worst off in all cases in which the worst off is not indifferent. I wish to thank Bart Capéau, Frank Cowell, Peter Lambert, Luc Lauwers, Erik Schokkaert, Frans Spinnewyn, and Bertil Tungodden for valuable comments. Remaining shortcomings are mine. Financial support from the Fund for Scientific Research - Flanders (grant G.0005.04) and the Interuniversity Attraction Poles network funded by the Federal Public Planning Service, Belgian Science Policy (grant P5/21-A) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Intertemporal separability in overlapping-generations models

In a pure exchange overlapping-generations model with many goods, but a single consumer with preferences separable between two periods of life, there are (generically) finitely many equilibria in which money has no value. If money has value, then (generically) there is at most one dimension of indeterminacy. This property does not generalize to a model with many consumers and general preferences. It is shown why a separable representative consumer implies such strong conclusions. It is also shown that the absence of income effects leads to similar results.     

The separability principle in bargaining

Summary. We investigate the implications of the separability principle in the context of bargaining. For two bargaining problems with the same population, suppose that there is a subgroup of agents who receive the same payoffs in both bargaining problems. Moreover, if we imagine the departure of this subgroup with their payoffs, then the remaining agents face the same opportunities in both bargaining problems. The separability principle requires that under these hypotheses, the remaining agents should receive the same payoffs in both bargaining problems. We begin with investigating the logical relations between separability and two other axioms, contraction independence and consistency. Then, we establish characterizations of the Nash and egalitarian solutions on the basis of separability. Received: 12 August 2002, Revised: 22 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78.Youngsub Chun: This work was supported by the Brain Korea 21 Project in 2003. I am grateful to William Thomson, a referee, and an associate editor for their valuable comments.     

The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods

A quasi-linear social choice problem is defined as selecting one (among finitely many) indivisible public decision and a vector of monetary transfers among agents to cover the cost of this decision. This decision is based upon individual preferences, which are assumed to be additively separable and linear in money. The Separability axiom is a consistency property for choice methods on societies with variable size: the decision is not affected if we remove an arbitrary agent under the condition that he be guaranteed his original utility level and the cost to the remaining agents is modified accordingly. Thus the utility level assigned by the social choice function to agent i is the price at which the other agents are unanimously willing to buy agent is share of the decision power. A general characterization of choice methods satisfying this axiom is provided. Three subclasses of particular interest are characterized by additional milder axioms. Those are: (i) equal sharing of the surplus left over some reference utility (e.g., the utility at a status quo decision), (ii) utilitarian methods that merely select the efficient public decision and perform no monetary transfers, and (iii) equal allocation of nonseparable costs, which divides equally the surplus left over from the utility derived from the pivotal mechanism (also known as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism).     

Rank, separability, and conditional demands

Rank R demand systems that are either conditioned on some good (such as durables) or are separable from that good, are shown to be identical to unconditional demand systems having rank R or R + 1. More generally, the rank of a conditional demand system or a separable subsystem is a lower bound on the rank of the corresponding demand system over all goods. This relationship is applied to reinterpret some existing empirical results regarding rank, conditioning goods, and separability.
Rang, séparabilité et demandes conditionnelles. On montre que des systèmes de demande de rang R qui sont conditionnés par rapport à un bien (des biens durables par exemple) ou sont séparables de ce bien sont identiques aux systèmes de demande inconditionnels de rang R ou R + 1. Plus généralement, le rang d'un système de demande conditionnel ou d'un sous-système séparable est une limite inférieure au rang du système de demande correspondant pour tous les biens. Cette relation est utilisée pour ré-interpréter quelques résultats empiriques pour ce qui est du rang, des biens conditionnants et la séparabilité.     

Disaggregation of excess demand under additive separability

A differentiable function satisfying Walras' law and homogeneity of degree zero can be disaggregated, at a point, into excess demand functions, each derived by the maximization of a regular and additively separable utility function subject to the budget constraint.     

Testing separability of public consumption in household decisions

In this paper we propose a sequential strategy, based on the microeconomic approach of the demand theory, in order to test for separability between private and public consumption. The aim of the present work is to verify, using a conditional almost ideal demand system, whether the different components of public consumption exert conditioning effects on the allocative structure of private spending. The empirical estimation of the model and the separability tests are developed for both a demand system in five functional categories of private spending, and for a demand system in six categories, where the private expenditures on those goods and services which can also be offered by the public sector are enclosed in a single functional category. The results of the separability tests, obtained using UK data for the 1974–2000 period, show that public individual consumption plays an important role in modifying consumer choices, while public collective consumption does not affect private consumption behaviours. The relationships between the different components of private spending and public individual consumption are both of substitutability and complementarity; in particular, we find that public individual consumption and the corresponding private expenditures on ‘Health, education, recreation and social protection’ are complements.     

Inequality aversion and separability in social risk evaluation

This paper examines how to satisfy “independence of the utilities of the dead” (Blackorby et al. in Econometrica 63:1303–1320, 1995; Bommier and Zuber in Soc Choice Welf 31:415–434, 2008) in the class of “expected equally distributed equivalent” social orderings (Fleurbaey in J Polit Econ 118:649–680, 2010) and inquires into the possibility to keep some aversion to inequality in this context. It is shown that the social welfare function must either be utilitarian or take a special multiplicative form. The multiplicative form is compatible with any degree of inequality aversion, but only under some constraints on the range of individual utilities.     

Wage bargaining and employment revisited: separability and efficiency in collective bargaining*

We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow. We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of “independence of irrelevant alternatives” is shown to be crucial for this type of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining problem into one-dimensional problems – and thus helps to facilitate real-world negotiations.     

Input-output separability in production models and its structural consequences

Separability of inputs and outputs in a multioutput technology is analyzed in this paper.     

Testing exclusion restrictions and additive separability in sample selection models

Standard sample selection models with non-randomly censored outcomes assume (i) an exclusion restriction (i.e., a variable affecting selection, but not the outcome) and (ii) additive separability of the errors in the selection process. This paper proposes tests for the joint satisfaction of these assumptions by applying the approach of Huber and Mellace (Testing instrument validity for LATE identification based on inequality moment constraints, 2011) (for testing instrument validity under treatment endogeneity) to the sample selection framework. We show that the exclusion restriction and additive separability imply two testable inequality constraints that come from both point identifying and bounding the outcome distribution of the subpopulation that is always selected/observed. We apply the tests to two variables for which the exclusion restriction is frequently invoked in female wage regressions: non-wife/husband’s income and the number of (young) children. Considering eight empirical applications, our results suggest that the identifying assumptions are likely violated for the former variable, but cannot be refuted for the latter on statistical grounds.     

论高等院校会计核算中心职能的创新

创立会计核算中心体制是实现高校财务管理,适应经济体制改革的有效机制。明确设立会计核算中心的地位和职能,规范高校财务行为,加强财务管理,提高资金使用效益,创造一个良好的经济环境,促进高校事业发展具有现实意义。     

Testing for separability between commodity demand and labour supply in West Germany

In this paper we use a methodology for testing for separability of commodity demands from male and female labour supply on a single cross section. In the empirical section of our paper we apply the methodology to a representative micro data base for West Germany. We estimate the corresponding demand systems for nine goods, analyse their economic properties and test the hypothesis that male and female leisure are separable from commodity demand. We reject the hypothesis that goods are separable from male and female time. Moreover, we show the implications of our results for optimal taxation of goods and labour supply.     

浅谈福建省主体功能区规划

福建省主体功能区规划正在紧锣密鼓地编制,这是一项贯彻落实科学发展观、构建社会主义和谐社会的重大举措福建省陆地面积12.14万平方公里,地势两北高、东南低,其中山地、丘陵和平原分别占75%,15%和10%.山地基本是林地,坡度陡,人类难以居住生活,更发展不了工业,但绿化的山地使福建拥有63%的森林覆盖率,创造了良好的生态环境.福建的丘陵有的是林地,有的是梯田,现在各地都在寻找低矮的缓丘陵,用推土机推出一些平地和台地来,建设工业园区,拓展城镇,拓展居住用地.     

On the social structure of markets

Economic theorists have seldom discussed the social structuresbehind markets, even though market trading relies heavily onseller/buyer roles and personal relations among traders. Thispaper considers the structural basis of markets and proposesa layered approach which accommodates a wide range of competitiveand relational trade within a definition of markets that distinguishesthem from non-market exchange. Giving due regard to social structureslays bare the institutional character of markets and providesa rationale for case studies of how particular markets function.     

On the structure of Ramsey equilibrium: Cycles,indeterminacy, and sunspots

Summary We consider a one-sector neoclassical capital accumulation model under borrowing constraints with infinitely-lived heterogeneous households. Under the standard assumptions of strictly concave and time-additive utility functionals and a strictly concave production function we show that perfect foresight equilibria can be non-unique, even locally non-unique (indeterminate), and periodic of arbitrary long periodp. Moreover, we prove that there can exist non-trivial rational expectations (sunspot) equilibria when the agent's expectations about future factor prices depend on extrinsic uncertainty.Remarks made by an anonymous referee were extremely helpful in preparing the final draft of this paper.