Slow track, fast track, and the “Galactic Club”

Discoveries in the physical and biological sciences suggest that intelligence is widely distributed throughout the universe. Before long, either we will decide that these discoveries have pointed us towards a false conclusion, or we will obtain undeniable evidence of extraterrestrial life. After finding one extraterrestrial society, we are likely to discover others and, in this manner, become a part of the “Galactic Club”. Following the “slow track”, an initial encounter will lead to accelerated search efforts that will put us in touch, one by one, with additional societies. Following the “fast track”, our initial contact will be with an affiliate of the Galactic Club, and this society will give us instant access to other members. The physical constraints imposed by interstellar distances, coupled with our understanding of large social systems, suggest that the Galactic Club will be large, stable, slow-paced, and exert only loose control over its members. The two tracks have different implications for managing initial contact, protecting our security, knowledge transfer, handling culture change, and preserving our identity.     

Are Selling,General, and Administrative Costs “Sticky”?

A fundamental assumption in cost accounting is that the relation between costs and volume is symmetric for volume increases and decreases. In this study, we investigate whether costs are "sticky"—that is, whether costs increase more when activity rises than they decrease when activity falls by an equivalent amount. We find, for 7,629 firms over 20 years, that selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs increase on average 0.55% per 1% increase in sales but decrease only 0.35% per 1% decrease in sales. Our analysis compares the traditional model of cost behavior in which costs move proportionately with changes in activity with an alternative model in which sticky costs occur because managers deliberately adjust the resources committed to activities. We test hypotheses about the properties of sticky costs and how the degree of stickiness of SG&A costs varies with firm circumstances.     

Discussion of “Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence”

Li [2008. Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics, this issue, doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.02.003] finds that firms with losses, or with transient income, write annual reports with long sentences and big words. I begin by discussing some explanations for Li's primary results, using his more detailed results, along with the results of related papers, to assess the plausibility of those explanations. I then briefly discuss the 10-K's of a single company over the course of 3 years, to provide more detailed insight into what might drive the length and readability of annual reports. Finally, I present some possible directions for future research.     

The Effects of Monetary Policy “News” and “Surprises”

There is substantial agreement in the monetary policy literature over the effects of exogenous monetary policy shocks. The shocks that are investigated, however, almost exclusively represent unanticipated changes in policy, which surprise the private sector and which are typically found to have a delayed and sluggish effect on output. In this paper, we estimate a New Keynesian model that incorporates news about future policies to try to disentangle the anticipated and unanticipated components of policy shocks. The paper shows that the conventional estimates confound two distinct effects on output: an effect due to unanticipated or “surprise” shocks, which is smaller and more short‐lived than the response usually obtained in the literature, and a large, delayed, and persistent effect due to anticipated policy shocks or “news.” News shocks play a larger role in influencing the business cycle than unanticipated policy shocks, although the overall fraction of economic fluctuations that can be attributed to monetary policy remains limited.     

Accounting, “economic citizenship” and the spatial reordering of manufacture

This paper addresses the roles of accounting within one of the most extensive programs of advanced manufacture undertaken by an American corporation. Three distinct levels of analysis are pursued: firstly, the profound alterations that were to be effected in the identity and mode of operation of a key assembly plant, and in the ordering of its manufacturing spaces, as diverse calculative and managerial expertises were brought into complex and tentative alignments within a factory modernization process; secondly, the hopes and ideals for advanced manufacture and for American competitiveness that were to be constituted and made operable within this process; and thirdly, the links formed between this ambitious program of plant renewal and the various appeals to a “new economic citizenship” that have become prevalent in debates on advanced manufacture. By focusing on the relays and interconnections between these three levels of analysis, and the shifting ensembles thus formed, we are able to explore the dynamics of a specific attempt to govern the economic and personal dimensions of an enterprise. The concern is with all of those programs and technologies, including accounting, which seek to act upon and to transform the conduct of manufacture and the conduct of persons in a certain way. For it is, we argue, through such interventions that a new mode of seeking to govern economic life is set in place. And it is through such means that a novel type of economic citizen is called upon to play a new set of roles within the enterprise and within the nation.     

Disclosure “Bunching”

This paper studies managers' preferences among information acquisition and disclosure policies when their firms are required to engage in “real‐time” or “continuous” financial reporting. The paper predicts that for many, but not all, processes describing the distribution of their firms' cash flows, when subject to such reporting requirements, managers will engage in disclosure “bunching,” that is, they will bunch the discretionary component of the information they acquire and disclose into a single point in time rather than spread the acquisition and disclosure of that information over time. We show that managers' preferred bunching period depends on managers' strategy for trading in their firms' shares, managers' risk aversion, the risk premium the capital market attaches to firms' shares, and the size of managers' initial ownership stakes in their firms. We also study and characterize how the equilibrium prices of firms' shares vary over time and also how managers' optimal trading strategies vary with their most preferred “bunching” strategies. Several extensions confirm the robustness of the optimality of disclosure “bunching.”     

Discussion of “Information and Liquidity”

I discuss the model of asset liquidity by Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2011, this issue, Forthcoming) . I consider a model with bilateral matching and bargaining in which a perfectly divisible asset serves as means of payment. A recognizability problem is introduced by assuming that the asset can be counterfeited at a positive cost. In contrast to Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright , in equilibrium sellers always accept objects that they do not recognize. The private information problem manifests itself by smaller quantities traded in uninformed matches.     

Skinner's “Interpretation Panel”— A Means to Balance “Power”

The rules versus principles debate and the vital importance of context ‐ the circumstances‐specific nature of judgment ‐ are at the heart of Ross Skinner's suggestion for an “interpretation panel". International considerations and developments involving governance and regulation have created imbalances in power, expertise, and impartiality, increasing the importance of and need for such a panel. This analysis considers the nature of the problem, how professional judgment has been characterized, and why a panel would be appropriate to address, among other concerns, the audit committee's dilemma when accounting disputes arise. Evidence is provided that management turnover is higher in cases involving multiple restatements, governance problems, or regulators' sanctions. Although, intuitively, management turnover is likely to be associated with widely publicized restatements, some patterns suggest that it is a function of entity size, scope of management changes considered, and the manner in which the restatement was identified. Specifically, an identifiable source of discovery, as well as external involvement, is associated with a greater propensity for management change. In contrast, restatements linked to changes in available guidance from regulators are less likely to result in such turnover. One implication is that effective control design and monitoring to facilitate internal discovery of errors can decrease the likelihood of multiple restatements and reduce fault finding that leads to management change. The judgmental nature of restatements suggests that an infrastructure supporting “right‐mindedness” does have merit. An interpretation panel would increase the feasibility of principles‐based standards, facilitating timely resolution of accounting‐associated disputes and thereby enhancing the information environment underlying the allocation of capital.     

Bank fragility, “money under the mattress”, and long-run growth: US evidence from the “perfect” Panic of 1893

This paper examines how the US financial crisis of 1893 affected state output growth between 1900 and 1930. The results indicate that a 1% increase in bank instability reduced output growth by 2–5%. A comparison of Nebraska, which had one of the highest bank failure rates, with West Virginia, which did not experience a single bank failure, reveals that disintermediation affected growth through a portfolio change among savers: people simply stopped trusting banks. Time series evidence from newspapers indicates that articles containing the words “money hidden” significantly increase after banking crises, then slowly die out.