Recycling and Waste Diversion Effectiveness: Evidence from Canada

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between recycling policy options and recycling behavior to study the most effective methods of diverting post-consumer waste from landfills. We employ data from a unique, micro-data set collected from households in communities across Ontario, Canada. We estimate the relationships between several commonly recycled materials (newsprint, glass, plastics, aluminum cans, tin cans, cardboard, and toxic chemicals) and individual household characteristics, recycling program attributes, and garbage collection financing methods. We find that user fees on garbage collection have significant impacts on recycling levels for all materials except toxic chemicals, and mandatory recycling programs on particular items have significant effects on recycling for almost all materials. Limits on the amount of garbage that can be placed at the curb, and providing free units under user fee systems, however, generally have a negligible or detrimental impact on recycling.JEL classification: D10, H23, Q28     

The effect of experience and quantity-based pricing on the valuation of a curbside recycling program

Quantity-based pricing for garbage collection services and recycling programs are becoming increasingly popular methods of meeting municipal solid waste diversion objectives. This article investigates household willingness to pay (WTP) for a pilot curbside recycling program (CRP) in the presence of a quantity-based pricing scheme for garbage collection services, which allows a household to alter their garbage container size at a reduced price. Unlike previous studies that have modeled the simultaneity of these household decisions as a two-step process, we jointly estimate the household's intentions using a full-information maximum-likelihood (FIML) approach. Our results show a strong positive correlation between a household's WTP for a CRP and its stated intention to reduce its garbage container size when a CRP is offered. The positive correlation suggests that WTP will be higher for households which are more likely to reduce their garbage container size. Thus, in the presence of quantity-based pricing, a household's WTP for recycling more fully reflects the marginal social costs of garbage disposal.     

Environmental activism and dynamics of unit-based pricing systems

It is well-known that unit-based pricing systems have a significant effect on the quantity of collected waste. Part of this effect may, however, result from a selection bias or environmental activism effect. Based on a pooled cross-section for the Netherlands for 1998–2005 we show that despite the correction for environmental activism the effect of the weight and bag unit-based pricing system on the quantity of waste is sizeable. Moreover, this environmental activism effect is decreasing over time, so that the most environmental friendly municipalities implement unit-based pricing systems at first. In addition, we show that the volume effects of the different unit-based pricing systems are rather stable over time. Although we find some evidence for a learning effect, nearly no evidence is found for an awareness erosion effect. This means at least that the effect of unit-based pricing does not decrease over time, which is reassuring from an environmental point of view. Pricing waste helps.     

Cost savings in unit-based pricing of household waste: The case of The Netherlands

We estimate the effects of four unit-based pricing systems on waste collected in Dutch municipalities. Unit-based pricing is shown to be effective in reducing unsorted and compostable waste and in stimulating recyclable waste. If the estimations are corrected for differences in environmental activism between municipalities the effects are still large but significantly lower. The bag- and weight-based systems perform equally and far better compared with the frequency- and volume-based systems. This is interesting, as administrative costs are significantly lower for the bag-based system. Finally, unit-based pricing has no effect on the amounts of waste collected in surrounding municipalities.     

An EU Recycling Target: What Does the Dutch Evidence Tell Us?

The European Union (EU) advocates a household waste recycling rate of more than 65 %. Although the Netherlands has already invested heavily in recycling policies, this is still a big challenge as nowadays this rate is approximately 50 % on average and very few no municipalities have a rate above 65 %. Given this practice, it is possible to learn from the Dutch experience which policies are effective in increasing recycling rates. Based on a large panel data set for the Netherlands, we show that unit-based pricing, avoiding a duo-bin for unsorted and compostable waste, and reducing the frequency of collecting unsorted and compostable waste at the curbside are effective in raising the recycling rate. However, only a bag-based pricing system has a substantial effect, but this policy can have some adverse effects. Other unit-based pricing systems have effects of less than 10 % points. In nearly all cases, changing the frequency of collection of recyclables has no or very small effects. Moreover, the complementarity between unit-based pricing and curbside service is low. Overall, it seems very difficult to reach the EU goal of 65 % with the policies applied.     

Evaluating Unit-Based Pricing of Residential Solid Waste: A Panel Data Analysis

Municipalities introduced unit-based pricing (UBP) with the aim of achieving a decrease in household waste generation and for the replacement of unsorted waste with recycling. Although many studies have shown that UBP has a short-run effect on recycling, few works have tackled the long-run effect on waste generation and recycling. By using panel data for 665 Japanese cities over 8 years, we examine the long-run effect of UBP on waste generation and recycling. The estimation results in waste generation suggest that there is a rebound effect, though a small one. We confirm that the effect of UBP on recycling sustains for the long run. We also find that the short- and long-run responses to an economic incentive for recycling activities differ with income groups. Recycling among the high-income group has not been promoted by implementation of UBP, but people in that group are willing to participate in recycling without an economic incentive. In contrast, recycling activity within the low-income group is strongly motivated by UBP for many years.     

PRICE AND SUBSTITUTION IN RESIDENTIAL SOLID WASTE

Many per-unit curbside recycling and garbage collection pricing systems were implemented in the 1990s. A detailed data set is used to estimate the effect of an increase in the per-unit price change for a long-running pricing system across time in one city. A fixed-effects regression controls for collection district and explanatory variables including weather, time, and employment changes. The elasticity estimate is within the range of previous work but with a higher cross-price elasticity to recycling. This shift to recycling results in significant financial benefits to the city and a small decrease in social welfare. ( JEL Q5, Q53)     

Does garbage pricing increase the immoral disposal of household waste?

Some empirical studies have attempted to clarify the mechanism of illegal dumping by examining the degree to which per-bag pricing plays a role. However, previous research on the behaviour of avoiding paying a charge for waste collection has tended to neglect so-called ‘immoral disposal,’ which is less risky than illegal dumping because there is no legal penalty. In this study, we define immoral disposal as the dumping of waste in a manner that is immoral but not illegal. To detect the existence of immoral disposal, we apply a spatial econometric approach, namely an extended panel spatial Durbin model, to identify the actual spillover effect of garbage pricing in neighbouring municipalities on immoral disposal from the total waste. A major finding of this study is that immoral disposal exists in unit-based pricing, two-tiered pricing, and fixed pricing.     

Economic Incentives and Residential Waste Management in Taiwan: An Empirical Investigation

This paper presents an empirical study of how three waste management policies have affected residential waste generation and recycling behavior in Taiwan over the past decade. The three policies are unit-pricing of garbage in Taipei, a mandatory recycling program in Kaohsiung, and a nationwide policy of charging for plastic bags. We estimate policy effects on total waste, total recycling, and recycling of four specific materials, all measured by weight per capita. Unlike prior work, we find that unit-pricing and mandatory recycling policies lead to significant increases in recycling of most materials, as well as increased levels of total recycling and garbage reduction. The “plastic bag” policy is generally found to lower material-specific and total recycling rates, as well as total garbage volumes.     

Weight-based pricing in the collection of household waste: the Oostzaan case

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the effects of weight-based pricing in the collection of household waste. Using a comprehensive panel data set on all households in a Dutch municipality we estimate short-run as well as long-run price effects for the amounts of both compostable and non-recyclable household waste. We find significant and sizeable price effects, with the elasticity for compostable waste being four times as large as the elasticity for non-recyclable waste. Long-run elasticities are about 30% larger than short-run elasticities.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

STATE DEPENDENT PRICING AND BUSINESS CYCLE ASYMMETRIES*

We present a tractable, dynamic general equilibrium model of state‐dependent pricing and study the response of output and prices to monetary policy shocks. We find important nonlinearities in these responses. For empirically relevant shocks, this generates substantially different predictions from time‐dependent pricing. We also find a distinct asymmetry with state‐dependent pricing: Prices respond more to positive shocks than they do to negative shocks. This is due to a strategic linkage between firms in the incentive for price adjustment. Our state‐dependent model can account for business cycle asymmetries in output of the magnitude found in empirical studies.     

Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Induce Collusion? An Experimental Study

We use experiments to examine whether the auctioning of entry rights affects the behaviour of market entrants. Standard economic arguments suggest that the licence fee paid at the auction will not affect pricing since it constitutes a sunk cost. This argument is not uncontested though, and this paper puts it to an experimental test. Our results indicate that an auction of entry licences has a significant positive effect on average prices in oligopoly but not in monopoly. These results are consistent with the conjecture that entry fees induce players to take more risk in pursuit of higher expected profits. In oligopoly, entry fees increase the probability that the market entrants coordinate on a collusive price path. In monopoly, taking more risk does not make sense since average prices are already close to the profit-maximizing price.     

发展中国家普遍服务义务的经济分析

本文构建一个简单的非对称信息模型,分析发展中国家特定的普遍服务问题。在模型中,政府与垄断企业的非对称信息产生于在农村提供服务的边际成本,最优普遍服务政策可以用两种规制手段即资费和网络投资来实现。本文对区别定价和统一定价两种情形进行了对比分析,得出的结论是：在实施区别定价时,与完全信息相比,不完全信息将提高农村地区的资费水平,并且减小相应的网络覆盖面积;而在实施统一定价时,农村地区的定价可能降低,但这是以网络覆盖面积的减小为代价。模型结果还表明,合谋的成胁会弱化企业的激励。有意思的是,在这两种定价机制下,企业和纳税人这两种不同的利益集团均有同规制者合谋的动机。实际上,纳税人利益集团的存在,强化了规制者和企业之间的防止合谋约束,并且为了减少规制者同纳税人利益集团的合谋收益,即使规制者具有高成本信息,也会使配置结果扭曲。     

Do small pecuniary incentives motivate residential peak energy reductions? Experimental evidence

This article evaluates demand-side interventions aimed at reducing residential consumption during the peak energy periods. The interventions were applied to a sample of high-income households and included a set of text message reminders advising participants to reduce electricity use during peak hours. One group of participants received accompanying intra-day increases in peak-hour kWh rates, while another group of participants did not receive any price incentives. We find that intra-day price increases, though small in absolute magnitude, produced significant reductions in peak energy use. Reductions in use, as compared to a control group, were significantly higher among the pricing group compared to the group only receiving text messages, suggesting that pricing played a central role in influencing behaviour. Our results contribute to ongoing policy discussion about the effect of dynamic pricing on consumer energy demand.     

ILLEGAL DISPOSAL AND WASTE COLLECTION FREQUENCY

A model of household refuse production is presented in which the implications of the presence of dumping incentives for the public choice of garbage collection frequency under a user fee system are analysed. Insofar as governments wishing to balance their waste collection service budgets can set the marginal benefit of collecting garbage equal to its marginal cost, no externality arises through pick‐up frequency. However, when the expected punishment for dumping is zero or independent of its extent, the public provision of refuse collection frequency turns out to be negatively affected by the amount of garbage that individuals dump and, therefore, intervention in the management of household waste is required. The optimal policy is found to consist of taxes on consumption goods and subsidies for curbside (or legal) disposal and recycling that are directly linked to collection costs.     

环境规制对现存企业迁移行为的影响研究

在城市化发展过程企业渐渐由中心区迁往外围区域,鲜有研究从这一视角观察企业迁移行为。本文从环境规制的角度对现存企业的迁移行为进行了探讨。实证分析发现在省级层面,废水污染费征收率提升显著减少企业在城市之间迁移的数量,废气污染费征收率提高增加企业城市之间迁移的数量。在企业层面环境规制增强显著提升企业在县区之间迁移的概率。利用国家贫困县名录,进一步发现废气污染费率增加显著提升企业往县和贫困县迁移的概率。进一步分析发现加入WTO、2003年污染费征收改革后污染费上升时企业显著提高向贫困县迁移的概率。最后本文发现环境规制提高了企业的创新水平以规避环境规制成本从而降低了迁移的概率。     

Pricing schemes and market efficiency in private retirement systems

We study the effects of different pricing schemes on the overall surplus in a privately managed retirement system with multiple service providers and switching costs. We develop a theoretical model based on the Chilean retirement system and consider a repeated auction for monopoly rights over new enrollees. We consider a dynamic model solved by pension fund administrators and by consumers. We compare three different pricing schemes: (a) fees on contributions, (b) fees on returns, and (c) a two‐part tariff including an auction over a guaranteed rate of return and allowing the firm to keep a portion of returns generated above this guaranteed rate. We also consider heterogeneity across individuals where agents earn high or low wages and high‐wage customers have proportionally lower switching costs due to more cost‐effective access to financial planning services. We find that auction participants subsidize consumers. We also treat savings as a durable good. In this case, pricing over returns worsens the switching related inefficiencies just described relative to pricing over contributions, despite the better incentives it provides. These inefficiencies can be resolved by allowing firms to price discriminate.     

Peak-load pricing in duopoly

In this paper, we consider peak-load pricing by duopolists that maximize profit (not social welfare). We compare price levels and profits across peak-load versus uniform pricing regimes. Our main result is that the introduction of peak-load pricing can plausibly reduce prices by making price competition more severe and thereby reducing profits. This result suggests that competing firms may engage in collusion by not committing to peak-load pricing. Therefore, from the regulator's perspective, it will be desirable to encourage firms to engage in peak-load pricing to intensify competition.     

Leave it in the ground? Oil sands development under carbon pricing

We evaluate the impact of internalizing the carbon emissions externality on new oil sands projects. Using data from recent oil sands projects and estimates of both the social costs of carbon and carbon prices consistent with meeting global climate change targets, we estimate the potential impact of action on climate change on the economic viability of oil sands investments. Our results indicate that oil sands are a marginal resource before they incur any carbon costs. Incorporating carbon costs, we find that the viability of oil sands depends on the coverage of carbon pricing across the life cycle emissions from oil sands and on the equilibrium incidence of carbon prices on producers. We show an important interaction between resource royalties and carbon charges that implies that the impact carbon pricing depends on not only the stringency and coverage of the carbon price but also its point of application of a carbon price. Finally, we explore the potential for technological change to mitigate the impacts of carbon pricing on oil sands investment viability.