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1.
Although the aggregate capital share of U.S. firms has increased, capital share at the firm‐level has decreased. This divergence is due to mega‐firms that produce a larger output share without a proportionate increase in labor compensation. We develop a model in which firms insure workers against firm‐specific shocks, with more productive firms allocating more rents to shareholders, while less productive firms endogenously exit. Increasing firm‐level risk delays exit and increases the measure of mega‐firms, raising (lowering) the aggregate (average) capital share. An increase in the level of rents magnifies this effect. We present evidence that supports this mechanism. 相似文献
2.
Michael Powell 《The Rand journal of economics》2019,50(1):121-146
I analyze a model of production in a competitive environment with heterogeneous firms. Efficient production requires individuals within the organization to take noncontractible actions for which rewards must be informally promised rather than contractually assured. The credibility of such promises originates from a firm's future competitive rents. In equilibrium, heterogeneous firms are heterogeneously constrained, and competitive rents are inefficiently concentrated at the top. I explore several policy and empirical implications of this result. 相似文献
3.
We investigate how firms strategically vary their disclosure policies in response to labor unemployment concern. Using changes in state unemployment insurance laws as exogenous variations of labor unemployment concern, we show that firms provide more bad news forecasts when unemployment concern is low. This relation is stronger when firms are financially constrained, when CEOs and CFOs have higher equity incentives, and when workers are likely to be affected more by unemployment. Our findings are not driven by earnings management reversal or underlying performance changes, and are robust to a battery of identification tests. Finally, we find a similar effect of unemployment concern on disclosure using the tone of 10‐K and 10‐Q filings as an alternative proxy for corporate disclosure. Overall, our findings suggest that labor unemployment concern is an important consideration for corporate discretionary disclosure. 相似文献
4.
David Coleman 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》1988,1(3):233-255
Rent Control in Britain began in the First World War and has lasted, on and off, most of this century. There has been almost no new building for private rent since 1939. The private rented sector is small (8%), marginalized, delapidated, and unattractive.The British Government is enacting new legislation to reform all areas of rented housing. Rents of new lettings will be freely agreed (i.e., at market levels) between landlord and tenant. But the tenant has security of tenure, subject to renegotiating a new rent. The absence of any important tax incentives or other subsidy was an obstacle to revival even with market rents. But the Business Expansion Scheme proposal in the March 1988 budget has created considerable interest among investors.Paper for conference on Rent Control: The International Experience, John Deutsch Institute Roundtable, Kingston, Ontario, 2 September 1987 相似文献
5.
CEOs with substantial general managerial ability (generalist CEOs) possess a substantial share of organization (human) capital and have different risk-taking incentives than do their counterpart specialist CEOs. Using an index increasing in CEO general managerial skills as a proxy for general managerial ability, we find that investors require higher returns from firms featuring CEOs who have profuse general managerial ability. Furthermore, expected returns are significantly increasing with CEO general managerial ability in firms with high organization capital, that belong to M&A-intensive industries and that have complex operations, high agency problems and high anti-takeover provisions. These findings are consistent with arguments that organization (human) capital has significant expected return implications and that CEOs with higher general managerial skills may lead to higher agency problems, feature different risk-taking incentives and be more costly to retain in times of need. 相似文献
6.
Bo Hansson† 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2004,31(3-4):333-358
This study, using a direct measure of the wage growth rate within firms, examines the value premium in relation to human capital. The results suggest that the dispersion in wage growth in value and growth stocks explains a large portion of the differences in stock returns. It appears that value stocks are less exposed to shocks in rents to human capital. Differences in labor force characteristics among value and growth stocks also proved to be an important factor in determining both the impact of future changes in labor income growth rate and firm value. The present findings are understood to mean that the ability of investors to forecast the dispersion in wage growth in firms is limited. 相似文献
7.
We provide an explanation for hedging as a means of allocating rather than reducing risk. We argue that when increases in total risk are costly, firms optimally allocate risk by reducing (increasing) exposure to risks that provide zero (positive) economic rents. Our evidence shows that mutual thrifts that convert to stock institutions increase total risk following conversion, consistent with their increased abilities and incentives for risk taking. They achieve this increase by hedging interest-rate risk and increasing credit risk. We provide some evidence that risk-management activities are related to growth capacity and management compensation structure attained at conversion. 相似文献
8.
Paul Healy George Serafeim Suraj Srinivasan Gwen Yu 《Review of Accounting Studies》2014,19(4):1281-1308
We examine how cross-country differences in product, capital, and labor market competition, as well as earnings management affect mean reversion in accounting return on assets. Using a sample of 48,465 unique firms from 49 countries, we find that accounting returns mean revert faster in countries where there is more product and capital market competition, as predicted by economic theory. Country differences in labor market competition and earnings management are also related to mean reversion in accounting returns—but the relation varies with firm performance. Country labor competition increases mean reversion when unexpected returns are positive but slows it when unexpected returns are negative. Accounting returns in countries with higher earnings management mean revert more slowly for profitable firms and more rapidly for loss firms. Thus earnings management incentives to slow or speed up mean reversion in accounting returns are accentuated in countries where there is a high propensity for earnings management. Overall, these findings suggest that country factors explain mean reversion in accounting returns and are therefore relevant for firm valuation. 相似文献
9.
Monitoring by long-term investors should reduce agency conflicts in firms' labor investment choices. Consistent with this argument, we find that abnormal net hiring, measured as the absolute deviation from optimal net hiring predicted by economic fundamentals, decreases in the presence of institutional investors with longer investment horizons. Firms dominated by long-term shareholders reduce both over-investment (over-hiring and under-firing) and under-investment (under-hiring) in employees. The monitoring role of long-term investors is stronger for firms facing higher labor adjustment costs both in absolute terms and relative to capital adjustment costs, and those for which human capital is regarded as more important. The effect is also more pronounced for firms that have stronger incentives and/or more opportunities to deviate from expected net hiring. We address endogeneity concerns by exploiting exogenous changes to long-term institutional ownership resulting from annual reconstitutions of the Russell indexes. 相似文献
10.
REBECCA LESTER 《Journal of Accounting Research》2019,57(4):1059-1114
How do U.S. companies respond to incentives intended to encourage domestic manufacturing? I study the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD), which was enacted in the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004 and was the third largest U.S. corporate tax expenditure as of 2017. Using confidential data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, I find greater average domestic investment spending of $95.5–$143.6 million, but only within the sample of domestic‐only firms and not until 2010, when the greatest statutory DPAD benefits were available. Additional evidence suggests that U.S. multinational claimants invest abroad rather than in the United States and that the increased investment by DPAD firms is accompanied by a reduction in the domestic workforce, consistent with a substitution of capital for labor. I also show that the delayed investment response is due to firms engaging in other responses first, such as changing corporate reporting to shift income across time and borders. Quantifying the extent of these effects contributes to the literature that studies this tax deduction and informs policy makers as to the effectiveness of both manufacturing incentives and U.S. corporate income tax rate reductions in stimulating real domestic activity. 相似文献
11.
Knut K. Aase 《The GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review》1990,15(2):141-157
In this paper we present a partial economic equilibrium model of the labor market in which we maximize the workers' expected discounted utility level, while implying a zero expected profit for the firms. The model we use for the labor market takes into consideration transitions between the various states of employment and the time periods spent in each state. The probability distribution of these time periods may be arbitrary, not restricted to being exponential, as is the case for ordinary time-continuous Markov processes. The basic principles and difficulties arising from monitoring problems and moral hazard are discussed. In order to analyze unemployment insurance schemes that include incentives for workers to avoid unemployment, we depart from the simplest form of the principle of equivalence in insurance. Several different alternatives are discussed, all giving rise to partial insurance and thus incentives. We also analyze the effects that early retirement have on unemployment. Here, we include social security benefits in the economic model. Finally, we show that the optimal solutions entail quantity rationing. 相似文献
12.
资本劳动比的提高对企业发展、经济增长和结构转型都具有重要意义。本文利用2002—2011年中国工业企业数据和283个地级市统计数据,探讨了最低工资标准提高对企业资本劳动比的影响。研究发现,最低工资标准提升对制造业企业资本劳动比具有显著的正向影响。平均而言,最低工资标准每提升10%,企业资本劳动比将提高2%,该结果在工具变量回归、双重差分法等多项稳健性检验下均成立。机制分析表明,最低工资标准提高会使企业增加资本投入和减少劳动力雇佣,这一结论为企业用资本替代劳动力的事实提供了直接证据。异质性分析表明,最低工资标准提升对企业资本劳动比的影响主要集中于非国有企业、较低工资水平企业和劳动密集型企业。进一步研究发现,随着最低工资标准提升,企业生产率和盈利能力显著提高,从而佐证了企业用资本替代劳动力的积极效应。本文的研究为进一步完善最低工资制度,促进经济转型升级提供了经验依据与政策启示。 相似文献
13.
Using novel firm-level data on employment quality in an international sample of M&A deals, this paper investigates the cost-benefit trade-off faced by acquirers when providing generous employment policies. We find that shareholders react more positively to deal announcements by acquirers providing generous employee incentives when the deal is domestic, but negatively when the deal is cross-border. These effects are primarily driven by the provision of monetary incentives and are strongest for firms in skilled industries. We argue that generous employment policies increase synergy gains and reduce labor adjustment costs in a domestic takeover. In cross-border deals, however, costs associated with managing employee policies across borders and lack of opportunities for eliminating work duplication negatively affect acquirer returns. Nevertheless, we find that country-specific acquisition experience can mitigate these negative effects. Our results cannot be explained by country-level labor regulations or by target-level employment policies. 相似文献
14.
We examine whether having an internal labor market can help a firm affiliated with a privately owned business group (POBG) reduce labor cost stickiness. Our findings suggest that, when a POBG-affiliated firm experiences a decrease in sales, it has lower labor cost stickiness than an otherwise equivalent firm that is not affiliated with a POBG. Specifically, we find that, on average, a POBG-affiliated firm entirely mitigates labor cost stickiness when it has a decrease in sales. In addition, we document that, to adjust its labor cost downward, a POBG-affiliated firm hires fewer employees, rather than paying lower wages. We show that the lower labor cost stickiness is due to movement of employees from the focal firm to other firms within the same POBG. When sales fall, the POBG reallocates excess employees at the focal firm to other firms within the business group via an internal labor market, and the focal firm thereby increases its per capita profit. Moreover, we find that agency cost mediates the impact of a POBG on labor cost stickiness. When the external market is less effective or the POBG headquarters have strong incentives, the effect of POBG affiliation on the reduction in an affiliated firm's labor cost stickiness is more salient. 相似文献
15.
We investigate the extent to which the overvaluation hypothesis provides incentives for managers to beat earnings benchmarks, and whether this benchmark beating can be reliably interpreted as evidence of earnings management. We carefully identify firms immediately above earnings benchmarks that have a priori, overvaluation‐based incentives to achieve the benchmark. We therefore focus on benchmark‐beating observations where manipulation is most likely, providing a more powerful test of the existence of opportunistic financial reporting. Consistent with overvaluation‐related incentives encouraging earnings management, we find that overvalued firms that just exceed levels‐related earnings benchmarks have higher unexpected accruals than firms with less extreme valuations. 相似文献
16.
Jean-François Tremblay 《International Tax and Public Finance》2010,17(1):52-66
This paper examines the effects of wage taxation and corporate income taxation on training investment in frictional labor
markets. Because of labor market frictions, the wage structure is compressed and workers do not capture the entire return
from their skills. As a result, both firms and workers have incentives to support part of the costs of training investments.
The analysis shows that when decisions to invest in training are made by firms and workers acting cooperatively, a wage tax
increases the level of investment in skills whereas a corporate income tax decreases it. In this case, the introduction of
a small wage tax unambiguously increases efficiency. The effects of both types of taxes on training are reversed when investment
decisions are taken by firms alone. In any case, a corporate income tax is not neutral with respect to decisions to invest
in skills even if the full cost of investment is deducted from taxable income in the period when it is incurred and the tax
system provides full loss offset. 相似文献
17.
We examine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, CEO retention policies, and mergers and acquisition (M&A) decisions in firms in which founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay-for-performance sensitivity for nonfounder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high-powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average US board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms. 相似文献
18.
Yixin LiuDavid C. Mauer 《Journal of Financial Economics》2011,102(1):183-198
We examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how compensation incentives designed to enhance the alignment of manager and shareholder interests could influence stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We find a positive relation between CEO risk-taking (vega) incentives and cash holdings, and we find a negative relation between vega and the value of cash to shareholders. The negative effect of vega on the value of cash is robust after controlling for corporate governance, is stronger in firms with high leverage, is reversed for unlevered firms, and is not present in financially constrained firms. We also find that the likelihood of liquidity covenants in new bank loans is increasing in CEO vega incentives. Our evidence primarily supports the costly contracting hypothesis, which asserts that bondholders anticipate greater risk-taking in high vega firms and, therefore, require greater liquidity. 相似文献
19.
This study examines the causal impacts of political influence on hedge fund activism in an exogenous setting of U.S. gubernatorial election. Local incumbent politicians have incentives to protect local inefficient firms from being targeted by activists because activism could lead to divestment and local worker layoffs. And such incentives can become weaker in election years because political competition increases the incumbent politician’s accountability to broader groups of stakeholders. Consistent with this prediction, the likelihood of local firms being targeted by activists is shown to be significantly higher during election years. Moreover, the firm’s political connections mitigate the effects of election, suggesting that politicians still maintain protection to connected firms. Further cross-sectional tests show that the effects of election are stronger (1) for firms with lower labor intensity, severer problem of free cash flow and lower efficiency, and (2) when the political competition is fiercer. Additional tests reveal that hedge fund activism enhances the target firm’s operating performance and creates larger value for investors when it faces weaker political influence. To sum up, our findings suggest that political influence affects hedge fund activism and the activists strategically adjust the timing of initiating campaigns according to the changes of such influence. 相似文献
20.
Nearly one in ten professionals now works part-time. But all too often, part-time work creates as many problems as it solves. At best, many part-timers work more hours than they intended. At worst, they see their importance to their organizations dwindle. Two generations have wrestled with such arrangements, and today some part-time professionals have found ways to overcome the challenges, with shining results. Drawing on two years of research investigating part-time engineers, financial analysts, IT specialists, and consultants, the authors present five strategies used by successful part-timers to make their unique position work for themselves and their companies. To begin with, successful part-time professionals take pains to make their work-life priorities, their schedules, and their plans for the future transparent to the organization. Second, they broadcast the business case for their arrangement, being careful to demonstrate that the arrangement has not disrupted the business and may even have a positive impact. Third, they establish routines to protect their time at work and rituals to protect their time at home. Fourth, they cultivate champions in senior management who protect them from skeptics and advocate for their arrangements up and down the ranks. And last, they gently but firmly remind their colleagues that, despite their part-time status, they're still major players in the organization who cannot be ignored. Taken together, these strategies not only help the part-timer deal with the organization but also make the organization itself more receptive to the possibilities of part-time work. 相似文献