Converting social conflict: Focal points and the evolution of cooperation

We examine the ability of focal points to transform situations of potential conflict into situations of cooperation. In performing this function, focal points convert “worst-case scenarios” into “better-case scenarios,” which are easier for political economic systems to handle. Focal points thus contribute to the ability of political economies to perform well in the face of less than ideal conditions, enhancing systemic robustness. JEL Code P0     

Embedded economics: The irrelevance of Christian fictive domestic economy

When reading the New Testament, the modern historically-minded interpreter would do well to keep in view that early Christian traditions emerged in the advanced agrarian societies of the first-century, eastern Mediterranean. In these societies, kinship and political institutions, roles, and norms determined economic and religious institutional behavior. That is, religious and economic structures were always embedded in either the kin group or the political group. Hence, to understand the “economic” assumptions and behaviors described in the New Testament, the interpreter must develop scenarios that fit the document’s historical and social context; the alternative is a necessarily anachronistic and ethnocentric reading. This essay articulates some basic perspectives entailed in historically and culturally sensitive interpretations of Old Testament and New Testament passages dealing with “economics”. The methodology employed here is a broadly based “social scientific criticism,” focusing on reading theory and cultural anthropology.     

Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics

The paper examines the issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) from the perspective of constitutional economics, focusing on the distinction between a political community’s constitutional choice of the rules of the “market game,” and the market players’ sub-constitutional choice of strategies within these rules. Three versions of CSR-demands are identified and discussed, a “soft,” a “hard”, and a “radical” version. The soft version is concerned with the issue of how “socially responsible” corporations ought to play the market game within existing rules. The hard version is about how the rules of the market ought to be changed in order to induce “socially responsible” corporate behavior. And the radical version questions the compatibility of CSR and the logic of the market game, calling in effect for adopting some alternative economic regime.

Poverty traps and the robust political economy of development assistance

Robust political economy emphasizes the lack of benevolence and omniscience of would be reformers. In addition, we consider the effects of biased decision-making for the robustness of the policy implications. This paper examines the robustness of the policy implications of models based on coordination failures and poverty traps. In particular, we address the revival in ‘big push’ type models and its policy implications. We argue that attempts to promote economic development through ‘big push’ models lack robustness. JEL Code O1, O20, P26, P41     

What is the Best Distribution for Pollution Abatement Efforts? Information for Optimizing the WFD Programs of Measures

The Water Framework Directive (WFD) has mobilized economic theory in order to encourage E.U. Member States to reach desirable environmental water pollution levels by conciliating economic and ecological interests. For this purpose, a stringent standard (“good status”) has been set. Nevertheless, it will be possible to relax this standard if it appears that total abatement costs required for reaching this “good status” exceed expected environmental benefits. This ambitious policy updates the issue of the abatement costs and environmental benefits assessment. Concerning the costs, a full discrimination of the abatement effort minimizes the total cost when the impact of polluters changes spatially, while a uniform effort can reach a pollution target in flexible ways. In this case, the increase of the degree of discrimination of the abatement effort is required only if it generates significant positive economies. Our theoretical and empirical results have shown that the discrimination advantage becomes insignificant for either very demanding or very little demanding ecological standards and varies according to the polluters’ profile. In the case of “intermediate” standards, efficiency gains become negligible with a restricted number of effort “levels”.     

An economics for development and peace: With a particular focus on the thought of Ernst F. Schumacher

Ernst F. Schumacher'sSmall is Beautiful seems thoroughly persuasive even at the turn of the century, as reckless material development is increasingly recognized as a threat to peace. This article describes how his thought was influenced by Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi's and Schumacher's ways of thinking are considered as alternative development theorees, different from any of those stemming from laissez-faire economics or Marxism. The formulation and proliferation of Schumacher's ideas about intermediate technologies are traced in both Indian and global contexts, to evaluate their sufficiency as bases for development. Moreover, their implications for contemporary economics are discussed, with the assistance of Amartya K. Sen's concepts of “capability,” “sympathy” and “commitment,” which are in clear contrast to the conventional concept of “economic man.” Finally, it is concluded that Schumacher's alternative development theories and practices, as well as Sen's economics, may play important roles in development and peace studies in the 21^st century. I am grateful to William Volgor, Michael McPherson, David Schrom and Mark Kurowski for their helpful suggestions on drafts of this article.     

Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others

Economic models typically allow for “free disposal” or “reversibility” of information, which implies non-negative value. Building on previous research on the “curse of knowledge” we explore situations where this might not be so. In three experiments, we document situations in which participants place positive value on information in attempting to predict the performance of uninformed others, even when acquiring that information diminishes their earnings. In the first experiment, a majority of participants choose to hire informed—rather than uninformed—agents, leading to lower earnings. In the second experiment, a significant number of participants pay for information—the solution to a puzzle—that hurts their ability to predict how many others will solve the puzzle. In the third experiment, we find that the effect is reduced with experience and feedback on the actual performance to be predicted. We discuss implications of our results for the role of information and informed decision making in economic situations. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9128-y. JEL Classification C91, D83     

Social Change versus Transition: The Political Economy of Institutions and Transitional Economies

The “transition” process in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) was one of the most dramatic non-marginal adjustments in economic systems ever experienced. During the transition process, elements of centrally administered socialism and embryonic market relations co-existed. This made traditional economic theory irrelevant. The purpose of this paper is to discover policy concerns and outcomes that orthodox “transition” literature ignores. Stanfield’s contribution to the economic literature, a cultural-holistic approach of radical institutionalism, makes it possible to understand the “transition” process from a new and more enlightened perspective. Stanfield provides a better understanding of the complexities involved, since the nature of change in the EEFSU is social and ever-lasting, not an end-state in the form of “transition”. Students of transition and of international development would benefit from this novel approach, which dismisses “transition” and substitutes “social change”, as the proper designation and manifestation of what actually took place in EEFSU.     

Credence Goods,Efficient Labelling Policies,and Regulatory Enforcement

We analyse the optimality of information revelation of hidden attributes of “credence goods” via alternative labelling procedures. When consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the hidden attribute, producers can either self-label their products, or have them certified by a third party. The government can impose self or third party labelling requirements on either the “green” or the “brown” producers. Our benchmark model develops a condition that links the optimal imposition of third party labelling to the relative market share of each type of the good under complete information. We extend our analysis to incorporate asymmetric information and cheating by the producers. When corrupt producers can affix spurious labels, the government needs to supplement the labelling policy with costly monitoring activities. We find that mandatory self-labelling schemes generally dominate mandatory third party labelling, unless the “market share effect” greatly exceeds the “incentive-to-cheat effect”.      

Constitutional Foundations of Economic Freedom: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis

Using time-series cross-section analysis, we provide additional empirical validation for the principal-agent model developed by Adserà et al. (2003). In our innovation, efficient economic policy is proxied by “economic freedom” from the Fraser Institute database and constitutional “political institutions” are proxied by variables from the Database of Political Institutions. Our results suggest that the more credible the threat of removal from office, the more government officials will pursue efficient economic policies. The authors are grateful to Alan Hamlin and an anonymous referee for their highly valuable input to the development of this paper. Tel.: +1-604-291-4167     

Economic policy making in evolutionary perspective

Economic policy making is discussed from three different angles: the political economy of actual policy making (“what policy does do”), the analysis of policy instruments for given ends (“what policy could do”), and the debate on policy goals and their legitimization (“what policy ought to do”). Center stage in the evolutionary perspective is new, positive and normative knowledge which is unfolding during the policy making process and in its aftermath. It is argued that this implies regularities and constraints which extend and modify the comparative-static interpretations of public choice theory, economic policy making theory, and social philosophy. RID="*" ID="*" The author should like to thank three anonymous referees of this journal and the editor for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.     

Should economists count?—The Dickensian view

This paper considers Charles Dickens’ charge that by relying too exclusively on statistics, political economists simply cannot understand the human dimension of the questions they examine and the policies they propose to reform economic conditions. Particular attention, is paid to three of Dickens’ writings: his 1836 “Full Report of the First Meeting of the Mudfog Association for the Advancement, of Everything;” his 1853 Christmas story, “The Chimes;” and finally, his 1854 novelHard Times, where these questions were a central theme.     

The Law of Primogeniture and the Transition from Landed Aristocracy to Industrial Democracy

We study the connection between inheritance systems and the historical evolution of the relationship between a society’s economic structure and its political system, with a focus on Europe from feudal times. The model predicts that, in an early agrarian phase, aristocratic political systems prevail, while democracies tend to emerge with industrialization. At the same time, as indivisible landed estates are replaced by capital as the primary source of wealth, the inheritance system evolves endogenously from primogeniture to partition. The dynamics of output, distribution, class structure and political participation are in turn reinforced by the system of intergenerational wealth transmission, with primogeniture tending to concentration and partition to equalization. “But the law of inheritance was the last step to equality.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835).     

Endogenous structural change and crisis in a multiple time-scales growth model

The slow and endogenous twist of economic macro-structure makes up an important evolutionary feature of capitalist economies, and may be at the root of structural crisis. In this line, a Goodwinian growth model with increasing returns and profit-sharing that tries to picture a simple scenario of the seventies crisis is considered. It is shown that the exhaustion of the Kaldor-Verdoorn “productivity law” can entail, in a nonlinear framework, a “catastrophic” bifurcation from a “high” to a “low” growth path. Slow/fast dynamical systems then allow one to formalize a multiple time-scales dynamics where the growth path is shaped by the structural framework in which it takes place, but has also a long -un feedback. Structural change and crisis appear as long term and endogenous outcomes.     

From contract to mental model: Constitutional culture as a fact of the social sciences

This paper develops the concept of constitutional culture—the attitude, thoughts, and feelings about constitutional constraints and the nature, scope, and function of constitutionalism. Constitutional culture is approached as a complex emergent phenomenon bridging Hayekian cognitive and institutional insights. It can be studied as a mental model, a series of expectations and understandings about the constitutional order, how it is, and how it ought to be. The “map” and “model” approach from Hayek’s Sensory Order (1952) is employed to understand how individuals and (cautiously) groups of individuals at the national level approach constitutionalism. This paper goes beyond the more traditional one-size-fits-all approach where all individuals respond uniformly to incentives, as provided by the constitution qua contract. Instead, constitutionalism is tied up in the individual’s vision of the world, that is, what Hayek (1948) labels “the facts of the social sciences.” The paper concludes with four areas where constitutional culture can further the insights of constitutional political economy: comparative political economy, constitutional stickiness, constitutional maintenance, and the new development economics.     

Social capital and social economics

The “discovery” of social capital in the early 1990s led to an upsurge of research into the economic impact of social cohesion and governmental effectiveness. This paper outlines key developments in the social capital literature over the past 13 years. It then examines theory and evidence of the links between social cohesion, quality of governance, economic performance and human welfare. The literature indicates that social capital makes a measurable contribution to economic development and overall wellbeing, particularly in developing countries. Partly in response to this emerging body of evidence, there has been increased interest in the application of community development principles to economic development initiatives. This paper argues that the advent of social capital theory represents a partial convergence between social economics and mainstream economics, and signifies an increased acceptance that economic activity cannot be meaningfully “disembedded” from social and political context.     

Back to the BOG, Austrian-style

Robust political economy begins with assumptions of self-interested planners who lack perfect information. In such a world, the social planner does not necessarily outperform the decentralized outcome. Crampton and Farrant (2005) argue that the inability to engage in economic calculation reduces the ability of social planner to extract consumer surplus. Thus, the lack of calculation improves the welfare of the median citizen which contrasts with conventional wisdom. We argue that they overstate their results. First, the calculation argument fails because of its underdevelopment, not because of the empirical record. Second, the welfare implications cannot be adequately addressed by assuming diminishing marginal utility of income or using the median welfare standard. Third, robust political economy has not developed a model that yields meaningful welfare comparisons. Thus, robust political economy remains in its early stages. JEL Code P0, P16, P50 With apologies to Gordon Tullock     

Information and political failures: to what extent does rational ignorance explain irrational beliefs formation?

This paper discusses Bryan Caplan’s “rational irrationality” theory. In particular, it shows that this theory neglects the impact of social construction of information in the beliefs formation process. Conversely, Kuran and Sunstein’s competing theory which explains the beliefs formation process through information and reputation cascades mechanisms takes into account this influence (Kuran and Sunstein in Stanford Law Rev 51: 683–768, 1999). Besides, this theory keeps the rational ignorance assumption into the analysis and emphasizes the role of activist interest groups who strategically use voters’ ignorance. In this way it provides an economic theory of irrational beliefs formation based on sound political epistemology.     

The political economy of constitutional restraints

Constitutions are multidimensional objects with non-trivial implications on the structure of the political environment and, therefore, on the policy outcomes. This paper models constitutions as sets of “restraints” on the authority’s choice freedom (absolute and democracy restraints). We argue that even if both kinds of restraints seem to be serving the same purpose (increase social welfare), “democracy restraints” prolong the “life” of a constitution while “absolute restraints” not. We moreover use the proposed way of modelling constitutions in order to explain the dominance of intermediate (in terms of tightness of “democracy restraints”) constitutions in the real world.