外包与不确定环境的最优资本投资

本文以需求不确定性为切入点，为外包生产行为提出一个解释。当需求存在不确定性时，我们分别考虑存在与不存在外包可能性的两种情况下的最优资本投资模型。我们发现，当存在不确定性时，外包行为具有帕累托改进的性质，而且，在存在外包可能性的情况下，生产品牌产品的垄断厂商可以借此降低固定资产投资。此外，我们还发现外包的成本对于垄断厂商的资本投资具有显著的影响。     

模糊需求环境下企业合并的效果分析

通过构建一个模糊需求环境下的寡头垄断模型,具体分析存在政策性补贴、外国进口关税时本国受补贴企业、不受补贴企业和外国企业之间的合并选择行为.我们发现,当政策性补贴较高时,合并会发生在本国企业之间;当关税较高、政策性补贴较低时或者关税非常低、政策性补贴较高时,合并均会发生在本国企业与国外企业之间;本国不受补贴企业和外国企业之间不会产生合并.需求模糊函数中斜率的不确定性不影响对企业对合并的选择,但对企业的产量及利润大小具有负作用.     

模糊需求环境下企业合并的效果分析

通过构建一个模糊需求环境下的寡头垄断模型，具体分析存在政策性补贴、外国进口关税时本国受补贴企业、不受补贴企业和外国企业之间的合并选择行为。我们发现，当政策性补贴较高时，合并会发生在本国企业之间；当关税较高、政策性补贴较低时或者关税非常低、政策性补贴较高时，合并均会发生在本国企业与国外企业之间；本国不受补贴企业和外国企业之间不会产生合并。需求模糊函数中斜率的不确定性不影响对企业对合并的选择，但对企业的产量及利润大小具有负作用。     

基于成本视角的企业外包研究

用生产成本、交易成本和沉淀成本可以解释外包存在的经济理性。与新建企业自行生产与购买决策不同,在企业内部生产的情况下,外包被视为一种外部购买行为;交易成本和沉淀成本的存在会减少对外包的需求。这种分析框架比较好地解释了企业外包行为。当前,我们应大力完善市场制度、企业内部决策机制及网络治理结构等,以减少企业的沉淀成本,推进企业外包。     

意识到需求不确定下的超短期定价行为

意识到需求不确定下的超短期定价行为金和辉左大培（中国留美学者）（中国社会科学院经济所１００８３６）一、需求的不确定性给经济学带来的问题稍有经济生活常识的人都知道,几乎没有任何厂商能够完全正确地预料市场上对自己产品的需求。即使一个厂商具有某种垄断地位...     

创新技术价值信息不对称下厂商的许可策略

本文构建了创新技术商业价值信息不对称情况下在位创新厂商和生产厂商间的技术许可博弈模型,并运用逆向归纳法分别寻求混同均衡和分离均衡。分析结果表明,若运用两部制许可方式,从创新厂商的角度出发,当创新技术高经济价值的可能性较大时,高提成费用混同许可最优;当创新技术低经济价值的可能性较大时,低提成费用混同许可最优。此外,本文还得出固定费用许可条件下的最优许可策略。无论厂商选择何种许可方式,均不存在分离均衡。     

论国际垄断和国际垄断价格

随着战后对外直接投资大规模发生，资本在世界范围内迅速集中，在许多产业形成了寡头垄断。国内垄断和国际垄断相互推动，使国内和国际市场的垄断程度不断加深。另外，市场垄断日益依赖于对技术的控制，技术垄断越来越成为市场垄断的主要因素。在国际垄断条件下，国际市场价格以最劣生产条件的垄断厂商仍然能够得到平均利润为基础，并受不同国家市场的需求和供给的变化影响，差别定价成为国际垄断寡头定价的一般方式。     

从知识型员工的需求特点探讨人才的吸纳与维持

一、知识型员工的需求特点 人力资本在投资时与物质资本一样面临着风险。随着技术进步，这种存在于人身上的资本存量面临着劳动力市场需求的不确定性，且由于与其所有着无法分离，其所有者知识性员工面临更大的贬值危机，而人力资本相对物资资本其退出成本更高使得知识型员工投资风险更大。会在消费中消耗而是在合二为一的生产和消费中不断增殖。对具有高含量的知识型员工进行投资将得到较大递增的投资收益。     

不确定性条件下资本市场投资预期收益模型探析

在现实经济活动中特别是在资本市场投资中,人们对将来的情况很难准确地预测到,他们所知道的最多只不过是在未来各种各样的收益状况下所可能产生的结果.也就是说,未来经济活动特别是资本市场投资活动具有不确定性.由于不确定性的预期的作用和影响,在不确定性条件下的资本市场投资预期收益模型与在确定性条件下的收益模型存在着一定的偏差.只有减少人们对经济不确定性的预期,才能使资本市场投资需求旺盛.     

垂直生产结构、利率管制和资本错配

政府补贴、自然垄断定价权和行政进入壁垒的存在导致中国产生了以上游国企垄断、下游非国企竞争为特征的垂直生产结构,并引发了企业之间的资本错配。本文构建了含有垂直生产结构和利率管制的动态一般均衡模型,研究了资本错配的产生机理。结果表明:在垂直生产结构之下,国企尤其是亏损国企不仅凭借垄断地位挤占了非国企在上游行业的投资空间,而且通过抬高中间品价格削弱了非国企在下游行业的投资动机,导致资本明显错配,而利率管制则强化了垂直生产结构的影响。借助利率市场化改革和国企改革(核心是消除行政进入壁垒),当经济体达到新的均衡时,国企和非国企资本错配的问题将会显著改善,总产出将增加24.2%,居民消费将增加66.9%。本文研究还表明,两类改革不应该先后进行,而应该同时推进。     

International Outsourcing and R&D: Long‐Run Implications for Consumers*

We show that international outsourcing and R&D by the outsourced firm may be either substitutes or complements. Outsourcing increases the R&D investment in small markets and in highly competitive product markets, whereas it decreases the R&D investment in large markets. If the outsourced firm can be technologically very efficient under exporting, outsourcing can make the consumers worse off by reducing the R&D investment. If there is skill differential in the production process and outsourcing occurs only in the unskilled activities, R&D‐reducing outsourcing occurs in a relatively low‐skilled industry. If outsourcing of the unskilled jobs reduces the effective cost of the skilled workers by increasing the productivities of the skilled workers, outsourcing provides further disincentive for R&D compared to the situation where outsourcing of the unskilled jobs does not affect the effective cost of the skilled workers.     

Pollution Abatement Investment When Environmental Regulation Is Uncertain

In a dynamic model of a risk-neutral competitive firm that can lower its pollution emissions per unit of output by building up abatement capital stock, we examine the effect of a higher pollution tax rate on abatement investment both under full certainty and when the timing or the size of the tax increase is uncertain. We show that a higher pollution tax encourages abatement investment if it does not exceed a certain threshold rate. However, akin to the Diamond-Mirrlees tax anomaly, it is possible that a higher pollution tax rate results in more pollution. The magnitude uncertainty discourages abatement investment, but at the time of the actual tax increase the abatement investment path may shift either upward or downward. On the other hand, when the timing is uncertain, the abatement investment path always jumps upward, thus suggesting that the effect of magnitude uncertainty on the optimal investment path may be more pronounced than that of timing uncertainty. Further, we show that the ad hoc practice of raising the discount rate to account for the uncertainty leads to underinvestment in abatement capital. We show how the size of this underinvestment bias varies with the future tax increase. Finally, we show that a credible threat to accelerate the tax increase can induce more abatement investment.     

Progressive Taxation, Tax Exemption, and Irreversible Investment under Uncertainty

We analyze the impact of progressive taxation on irreversible investment under uncertainty. We show that if tax exemption is lower than sunk cost, higher tax rate will decelerate optimal investment by increasing the optimal investment threshold, while if tax exemption exceeds sunk cost, three different regimes arise. For “small” volatilities the optimal investment threshold is a positive function of volatility, but independent of tax rate. For “medium” volatilities it is independent of both tax rate and volatility. Finally, for “high” volatilities the optimal investment threshold depends positively on volatility, but negatively on tax rate so that we have “tax paradox”.     

To outsource or not to outsource in an integrated world

This paper investigates outsourcing decision under certainty and uncertainty. When the production activity can be fragmented into two or more processes, an integrated firm must be competitive in each of the fragmented processes. There are gains from outsourcing when factor prices differ between countries. When factor prices are not equalized internationally, a firm may outsource the process which uses its scarce source intensively. If the cost of outsourcing is lower in the foreign country, full outsourcing occurs under certainty. However, even if the outside supplier has a cost advantage, uncertainty in outsourcing cost ensures that partial outsourcing is optimal for risk-averse firms.     

THE BENEFIT OF REDUCED COMPETITION AND THE COST OF INFORMATION RENT UNDER OUTSOURCING

We analyse the cost and benefit of outsourcing with adverse selection in a duopoly by comparing outsourcing with in‐house production in terms of the manufacturer’s expected profit. When two manufacturers faced with ex ante cost uncertainty compete in a differentiated duopoly, outsourcing brings about a benefit in terms of reduced competition, while it entails the cost of information rent. We show that the manufacturers always choose in‐house production in Cournot and Bertrand competition, when outsourcing and in‐house production follow the same ex ante cost distribution. When the manufacturers compete in Cournot fashion, the cost of information rent always exceeds the benefit of reduced competition under outsourcing. On the other hand, when they compete in Bertrand fashion, it is possible that even if the benefit of outsourcing exceeds the cost, both manufacturers cannot choose outsourcing.     

The evolving patterns of global production of multi‐product firms

We extend the framework of Antràs and Helpman (2004) to investigate how multi‐product firms choose different production structures for producing various products and derive four equilibrium patterns of global production. We show that the evolving patterns of inward foreign direct investment and outward processing trade observed in China can be explained by the rapid increase in labour productivity relative to wages. The model predicts that, as labour productivity increases, outsourcing activities will eventually exhibit an inverse U‐shape. We also find that technology spillover increases outsourcing but reduces FDI; the increase in labour productivity, however, could raise both FDI and outsourcing activities.     

The role of public infrastructure and subsidies for firm location and international outsourcing

This paper presents a model in which final goods producers outsource intermediate input production. Intermediate inputs are differentiated and their production can be located at home or abroad. The model is used to examine competitive location policy in a (two-country) free trade area (FTA). It is shown that national public infrastructure investment has a positive effect on both the number of intermediate input producers and the return to the immobile factor in the home country. International outsourcing from home declines. Opposite effects are triggered in the partner country. In a welfare analysis we characterize national infrastructure policies that aim to maximize national income (net of tax costs) and compare the non-cooperative FTA-equilibrium with optimal policies from an integrated point of view. We show whether or not there is a need for policy coordination. Firm subsidies are discussed as an alternative to public infrastructure investment.     

Idiosyncratic Uncertainty and Firm Investment

We test the impact of idiosyncratic demand uncertainty on investment using a panel of 82 Dutch listed manufacturing firms in the period 1984–1995. The measure of uncertainty is constructed by estimating a state space model at the firm level to isolate idiosyncratic uncertainty from other unobserved components. Generalised Method of Moments estimators show that demand uncertainty, which is specific to the firm, depresses firm investment. More interestingly, we find that idiosyncratic uncertainty is more important in explaining firm investment than total uncertainty that mixes idiosyncratic uncertainty with other sources of uncertainty.     

Profit sharing under the threat of nationalization

A multinational corporation engages in foreign direct investment for the extraction of a natural resource in a developing country. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a return a share of the profits. The host country provides access and guarantees conditions of operation. Since the investment is totally sunk, the corporation must account in its plan not only for uncertainty in market conditions but also for the threat of nationalization. In a real options framework, where the government holds an American call option on nationalization, we show under which conditions a Nash bargaining leads to a profit distribution maximizing the joint venture surplus. We find that the threat of nationalization does not affect the investment threshold but only the Nash bargaining solution set. Finally, we show that the optimal sharing rule results from the way the two parties may differently trade off rents with option values.     

Allocation effects of uncertainty on resources in Japan

This paper provides evidence of a negative association between macroeconomic uncertainty and the cross sectional dispersion of investment rate for a panel of Japanese manufacturing firms. We show that an increase in uncertainty leads to the narrowing of the cross section dispersion of investment rate and vice versa. This finding suggests that firms’ fixed capital investment behavior becomes more homogeneous in times of increased uncertainty.